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The thesis examines the effects of interventions by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 
peace, justice and conflict processes in northern Uganda and Libya. The 'peace versus justice' 
debate, wherein it is argued that the ICC has either positive or negative effects on 'peace’, has 
spawned in response to the Court's interventions into active and ongoing conflicts. The thesis is a 
response to and engagement with this debate. Despite often seeming persuasive, claims within the 
'peace versus justice' debate have failed to set out a coherent research agenda on how to study the 
effects of the ICC's interventions on 'peace'. Drawing on theoretical and analytical insights from 
the fields of conflict and peace studies, conflict resolution and negotiation theory, the thesis 
develops a novel and nuanced analytical framework to study the Court's effects on peace, justice 
and conflict processes. This framework is applied to two specific cases: the ICC's interventions in 
Libya and in northern Uganda. The core of the thesis examines the empirical effects of the ICC 
on each case. Approximately 80 interviews were conducted with key figures in Libya, Uganda 
and at the ICC. In its comparative analysis, the thesis examines why the ICC has the effects that it 
does, delineating the relationship between the interests of states that refer situations to the ICC 
and the ICC's self-interests and arguing the negotiation of these interests determines who / which 
side of a conflict the ICC targets and thus its effects on peace, justice and conflict processes. 
While the effects of the ICC's interventions are ultimately mixed, the thesis aims to contribute to 
a more refined way to study the effects of the ICC and to further our understanding of why the 
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Chapter 1: Justice in Conflict  
 
The great call for the truth about the past, for filling in the blanks  and unmasking 
falsehoods is, to a great extent, based on the conviction that the truth will disclose the 
guilt of those who we hate or condemn and will put laurels on the heads of those that 




Twenty-five years after the war in northern Uganda broke out, a diminutive former commander of the 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was escorted by local police officers into a courtroom in Gulu. On 11 
July 2011, as a marching band played triumphant music outside of the courthouse, a throng of 
journalists, curious observers and relatives gathered to watch as a shackled Thomas Kwoyelo became 
the first LRA commander brought before judges to face war crimes charges. In the stifling heat of the 
overcrowded courtroom Kwoyelo's trial began.  
 Simultaneously, some 2,500 miles northwest of Gulu, the forty-year rule of Muammar Gaddafi 
was crumbling. Just a few months earlier, Libyan citizens had taken to the streets to protest the Gaddafi 
regime. Their demonstrations quickly escalated into calls for regime change. By summer 2011, the 
country was mired in a see-sawing civil war. There was no clear indication that the conflict would end 
anytime soon, even with a NATO intervention supporting the Libyan opposition. A military stalemate 
loomed, prodding the parties to the war to consider whether a political solution to the conflict might be 
reached.  
 With the exception of their shared temporal relationship, these events might at first appear 
unconnected and disparate. They aren't. The conflict in northern Uganda between the LRA and the 
Government of Uganda as well as the uprising and civil war in Libya between the Gaddafi regime and 
the Libyan opposition were targets for intervention by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In both 
northern Uganda and Libya, proponents of international criminal justice hailed the involvement of the 
ICC. In both conflicts, others decried it. Both cases emerged as focal points for the so-called “peace 
versus justice” debate.  
 Are interventions by the International Criminal Court conducive to peace? Broadly, there are 
two viewpoints in this continuing debate: on the one hand, proponents maintain that the ICC is 
necessary for peace and can yield net positive effects on conflict resolution. There are no costs, they 
insist, to pursuing both peace and justice simultaneously. On the other, skeptics and critics maintain 
that interventions by the ICC are ultimately deleterious and risk undermining attempts to resolve 
conflict peacefully. If anything peace must come first. The dichotomous nature of the debate is 
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unsatisfactory. It isn't sufficient to simply conclude that some believe there is no peace without justice 
while others will argue that there is no justice without peace. Yet this dominant framing continues to 
define debates regarding actual and potential ICC interventions. Where there is a potential for the ICC 
to intervene in an ongoing and active conflict, invocations of the arguments that characterize the “peace 
versus justice” debate are soon to follow. But as the ICC matures as an institution, a more sophisticated 
and nuanced understanding of the ICC impact on the complex dynamics of peace, conflict and justice 
processes is needed. Contributing to this aim is the ultimate goal of this thesis. 
This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, the chapter offers a brief 
outline of the emergence and development of the “peace versus justice” debate, arguing that the debate 
has become the dominant framing of ICC interventions into ongoing conflicts. The chapter 
demonstrates how the ICC was made – and is predisposed – to intervene in active and ongoing 
conflicts and has been directed to by individual states and the UN Security Council. The third section 
addresses the thesis' research questions and research design. In the fourth section, the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis are outlined. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the overall findings of 
the thesis.  
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I. The ICC and the Emergence of the Peace-Justice Debate 
 
The project of international criminal justice was revived with great enthusiasm and productivity in the 
mid-1990s. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created as a 
response to the Balkan conflict in the 1990s and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
(ICTR) was set up in the wake of the 1994 Genocide. Both were established via the UN Security 
Council's Chapter VII powers and sought to prosecute individuals deemed criminally responsible for 
atrocities. Later, so-called 'hybrid tribunals'  in Sierra Leone (SCSL), Cambodia (ECCC) and Lebanon 
(STL) were added to a growing cohort of international institutions mandated to investigate and bring 
individuals responsible for international crimes to justice. In 1998, negotiators met in Rome to 
negotiate the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), creating the first-ever permanent 
institution of international criminal justice. With the sixtieth ratification of the Statute in July 2002, the 
Court became a functioning entity. The establishment of this diverse array of institutions, all of which 
share the goal of bringing to account individual perpetrators of mass atrocities, had been resuscitated 
from its alleged Cold War coma; the legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, where senior Nazi officials 
were tried following WWII, had seemingly and finally been fulfilled. 
 But this new era of international criminal justice is distinct from the Nuremberg model. The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals were set up to prosecute and punish individuals 
following the Allied powers' victory in WWII. Since the 1990s, however, the practices of war, conflict 
resolution and international criminal justice have collided and the ICC is the pinnacle of this collision. 
As elaborated below, the ICC is an institution predisposed to intervening while conflicts are ongoing.  
 At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, civil wars have increasingly been resolved 
through negotiations rather than military victory (see Licklider 1993; Zartman 2005, 2; Wallensteen 
2007; Sisk 2008, 195; Toft 2010, 1). The introduction of international criminal justice into the 
dynamics of political conflict and conflict resolution has created new dilemmas and challenges for 
actors seeking to resolve war through negotiated settlement. To be absolutely clear: the ICC has 
complicated conflict resolution. What is not clear is how it has done so and whether this is ultimately a 
help or hindrance to the establishment of peace.  
 The dilemma of pursuing criminal accountability in the context of ongoing and active conflict 
has been captured in the so-called “peace versus justice” debate. It should be noted that the debate did 
not first emerge with the creation of the ICC. Its essence was apparent during the Cold War. As early as 
1961, the German scholar Otto Kirchheimer contemplated whether justice may “backfire... if it induced 
the leaders of a future war to fight to the bitter end rather than surrender and face the possible future of 
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war criminals.” (See Elster 2006, 49). Scholars of international relations also wrestled with the 
theoretical relationship between peace and justice (see, e.g. Bull 2002) whilst the political transitions in 
South America were characterized by a balancing act between the prerogatives of justice and the desire 
for stability and order (see e.g., Jelin 1994; Nino 1996; Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Crenzel 2008). Despite 
the fact that the scales of peace and justice generally balanced heavily in favour of peace as order and 
stability (Banks 1987, 261-265) the pursuit of international justice and accountability in conflict and 
transitional states prior to the end of the Cold War was instrumental in the development of the global 
human rights movement and in the subsequent creation of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia – and the ICC (see Peskin and Boduszynski 2003, 1121; see also Kerr and Mobekk 
2007; Akhavan 2009).  
 The creation of the ICTR and ICTY fundamentally altered the functional relationship between 
peace and justice. Both ad hoc tribunals were established by the United Nations under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter (1945) which pertains to “Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. In particular, the ICTY was created to provide justice as well as 
contribute to the restoration of peace and security in the former Yugoslavia.1 This indicated a 
significant change in how justice would be pursued. From the Nuremberg trials to the trials of 
Argentina's military junta, justice had been pursued after the conclusion of violence. The ICTY, 
however, was to contribute to bringing justice and resolving an ongoing conflict. As Simon Chesterman 
(2001, 149) notes, “[t]he decision to commence prosecutions while the conflict continued was a 
substantial departure from the Nuremberg mold.” The tribunal, and by extension international criminal 
law, surfaced as a central feature of conflict resolution efforts. 
 Predictably, the question and controversy of peace versus justice embroiled the tribunal from its 
inception (Akhavan 2009). The quandary was clear: how could the international community seek a 
negotiated settlement to the Bosnian war when those with whom they sought to negotiate were 
precisely the actors who were under investigation by the Tribunal? (See Bass 2000, 211; William and 
Scharf 2002, 23). For some, a tribunal that was initially perceived as “little more than a public relations 
device” (Holbrooke 1999, 189-190) became a tool that could play a key role in complementing efforts 
to establish peace. For others, it emerged as an institution which potentially conflicted with and 
obstructed efforts to end the war. The stakes – and the expectations – were high. In 1995, then ICTY 
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone (1996, 486) wrote that what brings peace and justice together are 
decisions to confront the past which “may be crucial to the prospects for future peace and prosperity. 
                                                 
1
 See Statute (1993) 
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The stability of an emerging democracy, and perhaps even the outcome of a war that is still being 
waged, may depend on the wisdom behind such a policy decision.” 
 While other tribunals, notably the Special Court for Sierra Leone, have also inspired debates on 
the relationship between peace and justice (see Hayner 2007, Moghalu 2008, 104-125), it was the 
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which made permanent a debate which was until 
then sporadic, context-specific and ad hoc.  
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II. The Politics of ICC Interventions in Ongoing and Active Conflicts 
The ICC has emerged as a potential actor in ongoing conflicts in which war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide have been perpetrated and where the Court has – or has been granted – 
jurisdiction. This “potential to shift the delivery of post-conflict justice towards in-conflict justice” is a 
defining feature of the Court and a result of its permanence (Kastner 2011, 14). As Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman (2005, 385) write, “[t]he ICC is the archetypal ex ante tribunal”, 
courts which are “established before an international security problem has been resolved or even 
manifested itself, or are established in the midst of the conflict in which the alleged crimes occurred.” 
(See also Sriram 2007, 579).  
 Given the combination of its limitless, forward-looking temporal jurisdiction in those states 
where it has jurisdiction to investigate crimes and the fact that it can only investigate situations after 1 
July 2002, the Court is predisposed to intervening in active conflicts (see also Waddell and Clark 
2008a, 8). Where the Court has jurisdiction, there is nothing to preclude the Prosecutor from 
intervening before a conflict has ended. Debates on potential interventions in Syria (Jose 2013; Cronin-
Furman 2014), Palestine (Falk 2014: Human Rights Watch 2014), and Ukraine (Agence France-Press 
2014; Phillips 2014; Whiting 2014) illustrate that the ICC is expected to be amongst the first-
responders when atrocities occur in the context of violent conflict and unrest. As Rebecca Hamilton 
(2014) recently observed: “Popular sentiment points to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the 
obvious venue for any crisis that makes world headlines.” Moreover, the widespread claims, as 
explored in Chapter 2, that international criminal law can deter potential perpetrators and that there is 
“no peace without justice” suggest that, for proponents, it is necessary that the Court intervene in 
ongoing conflicts – and that it does so regularly in order to affirm the utility of justice as a means to 
resolve conflict and bolster peace.  
 
Table 1.1: ICC Interventions to Date 
State (Date of ICC 
Intervention) 
Trigger Type Primary Focus of ICC 
Investigation at time 
of Intervention 
Status of 
Conflict as of 
June 2014 
Uganda  (2003) Self-Referral Ongoing Conflict Active  
Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2004) 
Self-Referral Ongoing Conflict(s)  Active  
Central African Republic 
(2004) 
Self-Referral Ongoing Conflict Active 
Darfur / Sudan (2005)  UNSC Referral Ongoing Conflict  Active  
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Ivory Coast (2011) Proprio Motu 2010/11 Post-Election 




Libya (2011) UNSC Referral Revolution and 
Ongoing Conflict  
Concluded 
(October 2011) 
Mali (2012) Self-Referral Ongoing Conflict Active  
 
 The proclivity of the ICC to intervene in active wars (see Table 1) is central to the “peace versus 
justice debate”. Indeed, the “conceptual challenge” at the core of the peace-justice debate is a product 
of the ICC being “the first permanent international war crimes tribunal... which will regularly be active 
during ongoing conflict.” (Papenfuß 2008, 1). But how has the ICC intervened in ongoing and active 
conflicts? Interventions into ongoing conflict do not derive from some Archimedean nowhere devoid of 
politics and political interest. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how and by whom the ICC has 
been requested to intervene in ongoing wars.  
  There are three ways in which the ICC's jurisdiction can be triggered, as mandated by Article 
13 of the Rome Statute (1998): where a situation is referred by a state party; where a situation is 
referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter; or upon the Prosecutor's own volition, via the Prosecutor's prorio motu powers. To date, the 
ICC has opened eight official investigations – four by self-referral (northern Uganda, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and Mali), two in response to UN Security Council 
referrals (Darfur and Libya), and two via the Prosecutor's 'proprio motu' powers (Kenya and Ivory 
Coast). The former two referral types – self-referrals and UN Security Council referrals – have guided 
the ICC into intervening in ongoing and active conflicts (see Table 1 above). These two referral types 
are thus the focus of this thesis. 
 
(i) Self-Referring Governments and the ICC 
The early years of the ICC's existence were marked by a certain level of institutional insecurity. The 
creation of the Court in 1998 was an unprecedented achievement. It promised to transcend the 
traditional realpolitik of international relations and offer independent justice and accountability in the 
name of humanity and liberal cosmopolitanism (see Ainley 2008; Franceschet 2008; Kersten 2014a). 
But serious questions faced the institution, the answers to which would determine whether it became a 
permanent feature of international relations: Would the international community support the ICC 
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sufficiently for it to survive? Could an independent Prosecutor stand up to major powers? How would it 
get its first cases and where would it get them from? How would states react to an international tribunal 
intervening in their sovereign, domestic affairs? Judge Sang-Hyun Song (2010), the Court's current 
President, has conceded that “even the judges first appointed in 2003 were unsure that the Court could 
survive the scepticism and hostilities. Privately some judges suggested that it could collapse within a 
couple of years.” In order to avoid such a fate, the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor in particular, 
needed a politically sensitive – and cautious – strategy.  
 The issue that dominated the Court's first years was its tumultuous relationship with the United 
States. The administration of George W. Bush pursued policies to actively undermine and isolate the 
Court.2 If the ICC was to survive, it would need to demonstrate that it did not pose a threat to the US. 
As David Bosco (2014) has shown, in its first years, the ICC's policy towards the US, and major 
powers more broadly, was one of accommodation. This is demonstrated if not by an admission by the 
Prosecutor than through his decision-making and the Court's record. As Bosco (ibid., 19) writes: “By 
focusing on those areas of the world where major powers support the court's involvement – or at least 
do not oppose it – the prosecutor may be able to convince even skeptical countries that the court poses 
little danger to their interests”. This could be achieved by opening investigations in states where US 
interests were few and by demonstrating that the Court would not play roughshod with the principle of 
sovereignty. The Court focused primarily on accepting invitations from ICC member-states to 
investigate conflicts taking place on their territories. This came as somewhat of a surprise to Court 
observers. The idea behind state referrals as a trigger mechanism was that states would refer each other 
and not themselves to the Court (Schabas 2007, 145). But these 'self-referrals' were useful for the new 
Court and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) recognized their potential political utility. As Benjamin 
N. Schiff (2008, 225) writes, “the OTP shifted emphasis from a legalistic approach to a somewhat more 
political-diplomatic one” in an attempt to actively negotiate self-referrals from states. As of 2014, the 
Court has opened four investigations into situations following the receipt of a self-referral: northern 
Uganda (2003), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), the Central African Republic (2004) and 
Mali (2012). Each situation constituted an ongoing and active conflict at the time of referral. They are 
also notable for the fact that none have major power’s vested interests at stake and all are situations in 
which the UN had been heavily involved prior to the ICC's intervention (Bosco 2014, 89; see also 
                                                 
2  
For analyses of the relationship between the US and the ICC see Schabas (2004);  Ralph (2007); 




Sachs 2008, 6; Schabas 2010, 548).  
  
(ii) The Security Council Referrals and the ICC 
The relationship between the UN Security Council and the ICC played a dominant – and contentious – 
role at the Rome Statute negotiations (Glasius 2006, 47-60; Schabas 2012, 90-91). Proponents of the 
ICC were concerned that giving the UN Security Council too much influence over the functioning of 
the Court would deeply politicize the ICC's work and place international criminal justice at the whim of 
the UN Security Council's five permanent members.
 
This was precisely the politico-judicial 
relationship they had sought to avoid and believed could be transcended.
3
 Proponents consequently 
sought a Court that would be independent of the Council and centered on an independent Chief 
Prosecutor. Security Council members – especially the United States, Russia and China – opposed an 
independent Prosecutor who, they felt, could handcuff the Council in its role of maintaining and 
restoring international peace and security (Glasius 2006, 56). Ultimately, a compromise position was 
reached in an attempt to assuage the concerns of all sides (Glasius 2006, 51). The so-called 
“Singaporean compromise” was reflected in Article 16 of the Rome Statute (1998), which allows the 
Security Council to defer any ICC investigation or prosecution deemed to be a threat to international 
peace and security for up to 12 months (renewable yearly). Crucially, under Article 13b of the Rome 
Statute (1998), the Council is also able to refer non-member states to the Court under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. To date, it has done so on two occasions – in the case of Darfur in 2005 and in the case 
of Libya in 2011. Both were ongoing and active conflicts at the time of referral.  
 In 2005, the ICC received a referral of the situation in Darfur from the UN Security Council. 
This required an abstention from the US (as well as non-ICC member states Russia and China) during 
the vote on Resolution 1593 (United Nations Security Council 2005). The Office of the Prosecutor 
readily accepted the referral when it was made.4 Since then, five warrants have been issued including, 
                                                 
3  For more on the ICC-Security Council relationship, see Kaye (2013). 
4 
 It is arguable that the Prosecutor does not have much of a choice in accepting UNSC referrals. If the 
OTP were to reject such a referral (claiming, for example, that accepting a referral was not in the 
"interests of justice"), the Office would be required to justify its decision to the ICC's Pre-Trial 
Chamber. It is not a given that the Pre-Trial Chamber would accept the OTP's decision. If the Pre-Trial 
Chamber was not convinced, it could request that the OTP "reconsider" it decision. This may have the 




most dramatically the indictments for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on the grounds that he is 
responsible for the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur.5  
 In February 2011, the UN Security Council once again invited the ICC to investigate an 
ongoing and active conflict, this time with a unanimous referral of Libya to the Court. At the time, 
India's Ambassador to the UN, sitting on the Security Council, exclaimed his belief that “the referral of 
the situation to the International Criminal Court would help to bring about the end of violence.” (See 
Security Council 2011). Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch (2011a) praised the Security Council, 
stating that: “The United Nations is showing concerted international resolve to pressure Gaddafi and 
his henchmen to end their murderous attacks on the Libyan population.” What both statements made 
clear was the conviction that when the Security Council refers situations to the ICC, the role of the 
Court is to contribute to a cessation of violence in the context of an active political conflict.  
 As a permanent institution with a mandate to 'end impunity', the ICC is tailored to intervene in 
ongoing wars. It has done so at the request of member-states and the UN Security Council. It is the 
effects of the Court’s interventions that the “peace versus justice” debate – and this thesis – seeks to 
establish.  
 
                                                 
5 
A warrant of arrest was initially issued in 2008 after Bashir was charged with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. At the time, the Judges deemed the evidence insufficient to also include a charge of 
genocide. However, in 2010, the ICC issued an additional arrest warrant, this time charging Bashir with 




III. Research Questions and Aims 
This thesis is a study of the effects of the ICC's intervention on peace, justice and conflict processes – 
and not just on 'peace'. The narratives, practices and processes of peace, conflict and justice cannot be 
disentangled. They are inter-dependent and feed into one another (see Chart 1.1).  
 
Chart 1.1: Peace, Justice and Conflict Processes 
The thesis is guided by three separate but related research questions:  
 
(i) How should we study the effects of the ICC on the conflicts in which it intervenes? 
(ii) What are the effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict processes in northern Uganda and 
Libya?  
(iii) Why does the ICC have these effects on peace, justice and conflict processes? 
 
(i) How should we study the effects of the ICC interventions? 
As shown in detail in Chapter 2, the arguments which claim that the pursuit of international criminal 
justice produces positive effects on 'peace' (ending impunity; deterring future crimes; marginalizing 
perpetrators; and building legacies conducive to peace) and claims which insist that justice makes 
attaining peace more difficult (instigating violence; undermining peace negotiations; being too 
divorced from local realities; and being no substitute for more concerted, coercive action) are all 
problematic. They have entrenched a binary, dichotomous vision of the relationship between peace and 
international criminal justice. It is hoped that this thesis can contribute a clearer research design for 
identifying and assessing the Court's impacts on the situations in which it intervenes.  
 In order to answer the question: How should we study the ICC's impacts?, the thesis employs 
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insights from the fields of conflict resolution, negotiation theory and conflict and peace studies in order 
to develop a novel analytical framework which can provide a rigorous and nuanced framework to 
identify and assess the effects of the ICC on peace, conflict and justice processes. The analytical 
framework uses neither wholly deductive nor inductive reasoning, but rather abductive (see Dubois and 
Gadde 2002; Kolko 2010; Thomas 2010). In developing the framework,  a broad review was conducted 
of conflict and peace studies, conflict resolution and negotiation literature as well as literature on the 
effects of the international criminal justice on peace processes in order to identify key theories relevant 
to peace, justice and conflict processes. The analytical framework was, in the first instance, derived 
from this review. Second, the framework was used as a means to measure the effects of the ICC on 
interventions in two cases, Libya and northern Uganda. Data from secondary and primary sources was 
collected and 'fed into' the analytical framework (see below). As additional data was received, the 
framework was revised and, in turn, more relevant data was sought. In other words, these phases of 
research were interrelated rather than separate. In their analysis of abductive logic, Dubois and Gadde 
(2002, 555) refer to this process as “systemic combining” and observe that:   
The preliminary analytical framework consists of articulated ‘preconceptions’. Over 
time, it is developed according to what is discovered through the empirical fieldwork, 
as well as through analysis and interpretation. This stems from the fact that theory 
cannot be understood without empirical observation and vice versa.  
 
 The thesis, as elaborated in greater detail below, rests on case study research. Such research 
requires the development of “theoretical frameworks during the course of the research which inform 
and make sense of the data and which can be systematically examined during the case study for 
plausibility” (Hartley 2005, 324). Again, the processes of generating the analytical framework and 
generating empirical data were never entirely divorced. They worked in symbiosis, each refining the 
other as research progressed. Importantly, this approach is dynamic and does not portend to provide 
rigid conclusions or generalizations regarding the ICC's effects on peace, conflict or justice processes 
(Schvaneveldt  and Cohen 2010).  
 Ultimately, the development of this analytical framework is intended to challenge the binary 
conclusions regarding the effects of ICC interventions on conflicts and to expose the fact that the Court 
has complex, diverse effects through time, within and between cases, as well as on different elements 
of any given peace process. The framework allows for a novel and nuanced way in which to employ 
structured and rigorous research to study the ICC and its impacts on ongoing and active conflicts. 
 As suggested above, the framework was used as a roadmap to examine and assess the effects of 
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ICC interventions in northern Uganda and Libya. As a result, a case-study approach is employed (Yin 
2003, 4-11). The benefit of case-study analysis is that it fosters both theoretical and empirical 
contributions. As Jean Hartley (2005, 323) writes, the aim of case-study research “is to provide an 
analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the theoretical issues being studied.” Hartley 
(Ibid.) reminds us that “[a] case study is not a method but a research strategy.” In line with such a 
strategy, the research draws on multiple sources of evidence (Eisenhardt 1989, 534; Yin 2003, 11): 
semi-structured interviews, relevant reports and documents, and secondary source literature. In 
addition, the thesis benefited from “opportunistic” data collection (see Hartley 2005, 324) in the form 
of diaries from a former LRA commander. Wherever possible, data collected through fieldwork was 
cross-validated and triangulated with secondary sources and documents (Wolcott 1988, 192; Stake 
1995, 107-8). Approximately sixty-five interviews were conducted with individuals who had intimate 
knowledge of the conflicts in northern Uganda and Libya.
6
 They included political figures involved in 
negotiations, senior combatants, civil society leaders, journalists, and staff from international 
organizations. Given the diversity of actors interviewed, a semi-structured approach to conducting 
interviews was employed. 
 Three months were spent based at the Refugee Law Project in Kampala and Gulu, northern 
Uganda. During this period, approximately forty interviews were conducted. Gathering primary data 
proved much more difficult with regards to Libya. Over a year was spent at the London-based Lawyers 
for Justice in Libya (LFJL) with the aspiration of traveling with LFJL to Libya to conduct interviews. 
However, as time passed and the security situation deteriorated this became unfeasible. As a result, 
between May 2013 and January 2014, interviews were conducted with approximately 20 individuals 
with first-hand knowledge of Libya and the civil war via Skype and telephone. 
 
(ii) What are the Effects of ICC Interventions in northern Uganda and Libya? 
Chapter 2 of this thesis outlines the key arguments made for (ending impunity, marginalization, and 
deterrence / prevention) and against (instigating violence, undermining peace negotiations and acting as 
a moral hazard) the pursuit of international criminal justice in the context of ongoing and active 
conflicts. What becomes clear in this review is that the views expressed within the “peace versus 
justice” debate remain polarized (Crocker 2004, 2; Sriram 2004, 6; Freeman 2009, 25; Clark 2011). 
The core of this thesis, Chapters 4-7, shows that claims within the “peace versus justice” debate were 
applied to the ICC's intervention in both northern Uganda and Libya, but that they do not represent an 
                                                 
6 A list of interviewees can be found in the appendix of this thesis. 
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accurate picture of the actual effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict processes in either case.  
 These two cases have never been studied in relation to each other, but were chosen for their 
points of comparison. The ICC intervened in northern Uganda after the situation was referred to the 
Court by the Government of Uganda in 2004. The self-referral produced the Court's first-ever 
investigation. In 2005, the Court issued five arrest warrants for senior commanders of the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA). While the conflict in the region has seen very little international military 
engagement, official peace negotiations were held between the Government and the LRA in Juba from 
2006-2008. In contrast, the situation in Libya was referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council in 
2011. The Court subsequently issued arrest warrants for government leaders, including Muammar 
Gaddafi, at the behest of the UN Security Council and in combination with a military engagement led 
by NATO. No official peace negotiations took place and the Gaddafi regime is no longer in power. The 
divergence in referral-type, the targets of ICC indictments and the existence of official negotiations 
provide valuable differences and possible comparative insights into the effects of the ICC across these 
two cases.  
 
(iii) Why does the ICC have the effects that it does? 
Rather than solely identifying and assessing the effects of the ICC on the conflicts in which it 
intervenes, this thesis takes an extra step in asking why the Court has the effects on peace, justice and 
conflict processes that it does. This can only be answered, it is argued, by looking behind the veil of 
ICC decision-making. There is a risk of viewing the Court as an institution that produces effects via its 
prosecutorial decisions and judicial rulings.  It is argued that what goes on within the Court and how 
the specific decisions made in the ICC and, in particular, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), shapes the 
effects of the Court on the situations in which it intervenes.  
 In order to answer why the ICC has the effects that it does, it was necessary to conduct 
interviews with staff members at the Court. In 2013 and in the subsequent months, interviews were 
conducted with current and former senior ICC staff. These semi-structured interviews were conducted 
in The Hague as well as over Skype and were aimed at ascertaining the link between the OTP's 
decision-making and the effects the Court ultimately has on peace, conflict and justice processes.  
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IV. Thesis Outline 
The pursuits and practices of conflict resolution and international criminal justice have become 
increasingly intertwined. The Court is predisposed to intervening in ongoing wars: out of the eight 
situations in which the ICC has issued arrest warrants, six constitute active violent political conflicts at 
the time of the Court's intervention (see Table 1 above). The Court has the potential to shape efforts to 
resolve conflict through peaceful means and a debate about the relationship between 'peace' and 'justice' 
will continue to capture the imagination of scholars and observers. But what insights has this debate 
generated thus far – and are they sufficient in identifying and assessing the effects of the ICC on peace, 
justice and conflict processes?  
 The short answer is: ‘no’. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive and critical examination of key 
arguments put forward in the “peace versus justice” debate. The core of the chapter outlines and 
assesses the arguments that have been proffered for and against the role of international criminal justice 
in the context of ongoing and active conflicts. The arguments in favour of pursuing international 
criminal justice trials as means to positively affect peace examined in this chapter are: ending impunity; 
the potential deterrence effect of criminal prosecutions; and the marginalization of perpetrators. The 
arguments examined against the pursuit of accountability in the context of ongoing conflict are: that 
trials instigate and prolong violence; that international criminal justice undermines peace negotiations; 
and that accountability is no substitute for more concerted action to end war. It is demonstrated that 
neither proponents nor critics are able to conclusively show that there is “no peace without justice” or 
“no justice without peace.” But should the ICC be judged on its capacity to influence 'peace'? Using 
claims made by senior figures at the Court, the chapter argues that it can and it should. However, given 
that the claims made to date – on either side of the debate – are unsatisfactory, there is a need to rethink 
how to study the effects of the ICC in a way that allows for a more nuanced assessment of the effects of 
the Court on peace, justice and conflict processes.  
 A more nuanced examination and treatment of the effects of the ICC can be achieved by 
embracing key insights from scholarship on peace negotiations, conflict resolution, and conflict and 
peace studies. This is the aim of Chapter 3. Drawing on theoretical insights from the aforementioned 
fields, the chapter develops an analytical framework that parses out key phases, dynamics and issues 
that are widely recognized as relevant to the success and failure of peace processes (see Chart 3.1). 
 It is argued that the primary effect of ICC interventions on ongoing conflicts is on the conflict 
narrative – the dominant understanding and discourse of the causes and dynamics of the war, and on 
the attitudes and incentives of warring parties towards committing to a peace process. The effect of the 
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ICC on these two issues subsequently affects the three distinct stages of a peace process: the pre-
negotiation, negotiation and post-negotiation phases. Key constitutive elements of these phases of a 
peace process are delineated and the possible effects of the ICC on each are discussed. In the pre-
negotiation phase, these are: the timing of negotiations; the location of peace negotiations; and the 
mediation strategies employed to get the parties to the negotiation table. In the peace negotiation phase, 
the potential effects of the ICC on the composition of delegations at peace talks and the agenda of the 
negotiations are outlined. In the post-negotiation phase, the framework questions whether a given peace 
process was actually about peace or was susceptible to spoilers, as well as the potential effects of the 
Court on the creation and implementation of post-conflict justice and accountability mechanisms. This 
framework provides the roadmap that is subsequently employed to assess the two case studies at the 
heart of the thesis, namely the ICC's interventions into northern Uganda and Libya. 
 In 2003, the Government of Uganda (GoU) requested that the ICC intervene and investigate the 
situation in northern Uganda where the GoU had been engaged in a long-standing and brutal conflict 
with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). In 2005, the Court issued five arrest warrants for members of 
the LRA's senior command, including leader Joseph Kony. The Court's intervention and its issuance of 
indictments against LRA commanders instigated a polarizing debate on the role and impact of 
international criminal justice in northern Uganda. Many openly feared that the ICC's intervention 
would undermine any potential peace process. But three years after Uganda's self-referral – and just 
one year after the warrants were issued – the GoU and the LRA entered into what was widely 
recognized as the best opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive solution to the war. So how did the 
parties get to the negotiation table and what, if any, role did the ICC play? 
 Chapter 4 begins by contextualizing the conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
and the Government of Uganda (GoU), focusing on the causes and dynamics of the war. The chapter 
then examines the effects of the ICC on the conflict narrative, the attitudes and incentives of parties to 
committing to the Juba peace process as well as the pre-negotiation phase of the Juba peace process. It 
is argued that: the ICC's intervention has contributed to an obfuscation of the political causes of the war 
and the political nature of the violence waged against northern Ugandans – by both the LRA and the 
GoU; it has bolstered the narrative of a 'good', just and legitimate government fighting an 'evil', mad, 
criminal rebel group; and the ICC has reaffirmed and entrenched a conflict narrative that has focused 
primarily on the role and responsibility of the LRA and Kony, in particular, in propagating violence. 
However, rather than providing a disincentive for Kony and the LRA to negotiate, it is argued that the 
ICC's intervention and the conflict narrative it helped entrench actually contributed positively to the 
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LRA's decision to commit to engaging in peace talks. There is little evidence that it directly contributed 
to the GoU’s commitment to do likewise. 
 The chapter subsequently explores how these effects shaped the pre-negotiation stage of the 
Juba Peace Process and, in particular, the timing of negotiations, the location of the peace talks and the 
mediation strategies employed to get the warring parties to the negotiation table. With regards to the 
timing of the Juba negotiations, it is concluded that the ICC may have played a role but that it did so in 
combination with a variety of other factors, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached 
between Sudan and South Sudan in 2005. The peace talks took place in Juba, the capital of South 
Sudan, a country which was eager to eliminate the LRA from its territory. Importantly, South Sudan is 
not a member of the ICC. It is argued that this reality played a role in the decision-making on where to 
hold peace talks between the LRA and GoU. Lastly, dealing with the ICC warrants head-on formed a 
key element of the mediation strategies employed by South Sudan's Vice President, Riek Machar, to get 
the LRA to the negotiation table. Given the LRA's interest in dealing with the arrest warrants and 
challenging the dominant conflict narrative of the war, this was to be expected. Overall, despite oft-
stated fears that the ICC would preclude negotiations from moving forward, the Court's intervention in 
northern Uganda appears to have contributed positively or, in some instances, negligibly to the onset of 
negotiations between the LRA and GoU.  
 Chapter 5 examines the effects of the ICC on the 2006-2008 peace negotiations between the 
LRA and GoU, as well as the effects of the ICC on post-Juba peace and justice in northern Uganda. The 
chapter first considers the Court's effects on the composition of the delegations at Juba and the agenda 
of the peace talks. It is argued that the ICC had a significant impact on the composition of the LRA's 
delegation at Juba. The indictments prevented senior LRA commanders, notably Joseph Kony and 
second-in-command, Vincent Otti, from attending the peace talks. This undermined the negotiations, as 
the LRA delegation that was sent to Juba was unrepresentative of the LRA high command and, as a 
consequence, LRA delegates pursued narrow, personal interests. With regards to the talks' agenda, the 
ICC had the effect of ensuring that justice and accountability would be central to the negotiations, 
something that had not occurred in previous peace talks between the LRA and GoU. No suitable 
approach to dealing with the arrest warrants was ultimately identified and, in the end, the talks 
collapsed. 
 The fact that the LRA and GoU decided to enter peace negotiations should not be equated with 
a commitment on the part of either to see them through. The chapter assesses whether the Juba peace 
talks were genuinely about achieving peace, demonstrating that there is compelling evidence that 
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neither the LRA nor the GoU were fully committed to a comprehensive peace and that both saw their 
engagement in peace talks as strategically beneficial. It is thus concluded that the ICC cannot bear 
responsibility for failure of the Juba peace negotiations.  
 In the last section, the chapter examines the effects of the ICC on post-conflict peace and justice 
in northern Uganda. Post-Juba, the ICC has had no known negative effects on the level of stability and 
security in northern Uganda, suggesting that northern Ugandans are no longer concerned with an issue 
which has not affected the current stability that they enjoy. The chapter then examines the creation of 
the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the High Court of Uganda, a judicial body that was 
negotiated at the Juba peace talks as an institution that could prosecute individuals responsible for 
committing crimes during the war and which could be employed to challenge admissibility of the ICC 
in northern Uganda. The focus of this section of the chapter is on Uganda's first-ever war crimes trial, 
that of former LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo. It is argued that the ICD is ultimately an institution 
created to selectively prosecute LRA combatants and, as such, risks entrenching rather than challenging 
the conflict narrative in northern Uganda. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 turn to the case of the ICC's intervention in Libya. In February 2011, the 
United Nations Security Council unanimously referred the deteriorating situation in Libya to the ICC. 
The Court subsequently – and with unprecedented speed – opened an official investigation into the 
civil unrest in the country. Just four months later, three arrest warrants were issued, for Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and his security and intelligence chief, Abdullah al-
Senussi. In response, many commentators wondered whether the ICC's intervention would help or 
hinder attempts to resolve the Libyan civil war.  Most commentators simply recycled the language of 
the “peace versus justice” debate but their judgements are not based on detailed knowledge of the 
realities on the ground.   
 Chapter 6 begins with an overview of the causes and dynamics of the Libyan Revolution and 
civil war between the Gaddafi regime and the Libyan opposition, arguing that the uprising in Libya was 
initially about bringing forward and addressing socio-economic and political grievances – and not 
necessarily about regime change. The core of the chapter examines the empirical effects of the ICC on 
the conflict and attempts to initiate direct peace negotiations between the regime and the Libyan 
opposition's political wing, the National Transitional Council (NTC). The effects of the Court's 
intervention on four issues in particular are examined: the conflict narrative and dominant 
understanding of the Libyan conflict; the attitudes and incentives of the actors involved in the war 
towards negotiations; the mediation strategies employed to encourage the rebels and the Gaddafi 
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regime to negotiate and, particularly, determine the fate of Gaddafi; and the potential emergence of a 
ripe moment for a negotiated settlement to the civil war.  
 The clearest effect of the ICC's intervention in Libya was its impact on shaping a narrative and 
understanding of the Libyan war that painted the regime as beyond the pale and the opposition as 'good' 
and just. In doing so, it helped justify the goal of regime change and obfuscated both the causes of the 
conflict as well as the Western-led political rehabilitation of the Gaddafi regime in the years preceding 
the war. These effects on the conflict's narrative, in turn, had implications on other important dynamics. 
The conflict narrative emboldened the rebels to commit to a military victory and bolstered the resolve 
of their claim that Gaddafi's departure from power was a necessary precondition to any potential 
negotiated settlement. As a result, the ICC may have contributed to preventing the emergence of a 
mutually hurtful stalemate and created a ripe moment conducive to peace talks. However, this 
conclusion should be qualified. It is not clear that official peace talks between the NTC and the Gaddafi 
regime were ever a feasible way to end the war – for reasons other than the ICC intervention.  
 The Chapter ends with an analysis of whether any of the actors that intimated an interest in 
negotiating a settlement between the regime and the opposition forces could have successfully done so. 
Five actors are considered here: the African Union; the intervening NATO forces; Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi; the NTC Libya's opposition; and Muammar Gaddafi himself. It is concluded that the 
necessary commitment and compromises required to get to the negotiation table never existed amongst 
the various actors participating in the conflict. Ultimate responsibility for any failed peace process 
cannot be laid at the feet of the ICC.  
 Chapter 7 turns to an empirical examination of the effects of the ICC on post-Gaddafi Libya and 
the country's approach to post-conflict justice. It is argued that the ICC's ability to positively affect 
peace and justice in post-conflict Libya has been limited. The first section of the Chapter examines the 
debate regarding who should try the two surviving ICC indictees – Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah 
al-Senussi. It delves into where they should be tried, focusing on the OTP’s support of Tripoli's 
intentions to prosecute Saif and Senussi in Libya by Libyans and the failure of the Prosecutor to 
explore options beyond that or a trial by the ICC in The Hague. The second section assesses non-
investigated international crimes committed by Libya's opposition forces, focusing on the cleansing of 
Tawergha and the killing of Gaddafi, both alleged international crimes. The final section examines two 
'transitional justice' mechanisms implemented by Libya: a blanket amnesty for revolutionaries and the 
Political Isolation Law. Each of these sections exposes the limitations of the ICC to positively affect 
post-conflict justice and peace in Libya. 
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 Chapter 8 seeks to answer the question: why does the ICC have the effects that it does on peace, 
justice and conflict processes? This penultimate chapter outlines the relationship between the ways in 
which the ICC is requested to intervene in ongoing conflicts, the subsequent decision-making of the 
OTP in deciding which parties to target for prosecution, and the consequent effects of the ICC on 
peace, conflict and justice processes. The central argument here is that the ICC is guided by a 
negotiation between its own institutional interests and the interests of the political actors upon which 
the Court depends. This negotiation of interests has led the OTP to investigate and prosecute parties to 
a conflict selectively, generally only focusing on one side of the war whilst neglecting the other. 
Ultimately, the selective prosecution of non-state actors or state actors determines how the Court has 
affected peace processes in Libya, northern Uganda, and beyond.  
 The chapter proceeds in three sections. In section one, it is demonstrated that self-referrals lead 
the Court to prosecute non-state actors whilst Security Council referrals lead the OTP to primarily 
target seek government officials. In the second section, the ICC's decision-making is analyzed in order 
to show that the OTP selects who to target as a result of a negotiation between the Court's institutional 
interests and the interests of the political actors upon which its effectiveness and continued existence 
depend. Three institutional interests are outlined: cooperation to build cases; cooperation leading to the 
enforcement of arrest warrants; and recognition of the ICC as a relevant and effective institution in 
international politics. In the final section, the two cases at the heart of this thesis, northern Uganda and 
Libya are revisited. It is shown that the processes of decision-making, negotiation of interests and 
selectivity were instrumental in determining the ICC's effects on peace, justice and conflict processes in 
both cases.  
The final chapter revisits the overall aims of the thesis. It offers concluding reflections, both 
specific to the cases of northern Uganda and Libya as well as generally on the effects of the ICC on 
ongoing and active conflicts. Whilst reflecting on what can be learned from the two cases, it is 
observed that ICC interventions amplify the importance of some issues and dynamics in a peace 
process. It is also reiterated that decision-making within the ICC and, in particular, the OTP with 
regards to which side of a conflict is targeted for prosecution has a significant determinant impact on 
the ICC's effects on peace, justice and conflict processes. The heart of the conclusion reflects on the 
ICC's effects on each of the issues and dynamics that constitute the thesis' analytical framework, 
identifying where further research is needed as well as providing some suggestions for practitioners 
engaged in the projects of international criminal justice and conflict resolution. 
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V. Conclusion – Overall Contributions 
The thesis makes three overall contributions. First, through the development of a novel analytical 
framework, the thesis establishes a more nuanced and rigorous way of studying, researching and 
critically assessing the effects of the ICC on peace, conflict and justice processes. Importantly, the 
framework is not intended to be rigid or unchangeable. Rather, as described in the conclusion of the 
thesis, it is hoped that it can be continuously developed, improved, adapted and applied to new cases.  
 Second, the thesis contributes novel empirical insights into the effects of the ICC's interventions 
in both northern Uganda and Libya. Given the paucity of literature on the subject, this is easier to 
achieve in the latter case than the former. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the “peace versus justice” 
debate in northern Uganda has received significant scholarly attention. With regards to northern 
Uganda, the thesis attempts to bring together a vast amount of literature and primary research in order 
to provide a detailed account of the effects of the ICC's intervention on the Juba peace process and its 
aftermath. In a number of instances, the thesis confirms arguments made by scholars, but does so 
through the novelty and nuance of the analytical framework, demonstrating the utility of the framework 
not only in dispelling arguments but also verifying them. In contrast, there are only a handful of 
analyses which deal with the ICC's intervention into Libya and, as will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7, 
many treatments of the Libyan Revolution and civil war ignore the Court's intervention altogether. 
Again, the analytical framework is deployed to structure the analysis of primary and secondary 
resources in order to generate novel insights and conclusions.  
 Third, as illustrated in Chapter 8, analyses of the specific decision-making and discretion of 
actors at the Court is often neglected.  Through primary interview-based research, the thesis sheds light 
on how decision-making at the ICC, specifically in the Office of the Prosecutor, shapes the Court's 
effects on peace, justice and conflict processes.
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Chapter 2: Peace and / or / with / versus Justice 
 
Introduction  
While there is a recognition, illustrated by the volume of works published on the subject, that 
understanding the relationship between peace and justice is an important goal, agreement on what that 
relationship is or the appropriate parameters of the debate remains elusive. But the lack of consensus 
within the peace-justice debate should not be confused with a lack of genuine engagement and rich 
empirical and theoretical insights that those engaged with the debate have been able to generate.  
 The core aim of this chapter is to outline the engagement of scholars with the peace-justice 
debate to date and, in so doing, to demonstrate that the study of the ICC's effects on ongoing and active 
conflicts needs to be re-imagined. The first two sections of the chapter outline the primary arguments in 
support of and against the pursuit of international criminal justice as a means to contribute to 
establishing peace. For each of these positions, the chapter also presents counter-arguments in order to 
expose the limitations and weaknesses of each argument.. It is made clear that no single argument or 
combination of arguments within the peace-justice debate is immune from persuasive contestation; 
none conclusively show that justice is a help or hindrance to peace. Given this, is it even worth 
appraising the effects of the ICC on peace? Section three of this chapter argues that it can and should be 
evaluated in order to highlight the variable geometry of its impact. The chapter concludes by arguing 
that there is a need not only to rethink what the impacts of ICC interventions are on ongoing conflicts, 
but to reimagine how to study its effects.  
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I. No Peace Without Justice 
Do ICC interventions promote peace? This section explores the key arguments made with reference to 
peace in support of prosecuting those responsible for atrocities: ending impunity; marginalizing 
perpetrators; and deterring and preventing future crimes.
7
 While they are treated in turn, advocates tend 
                                                 
7
 There are at least three additional arguments advanced in favour of international criminal justice, 
which should be acknowledged. First, some suggest there exists a right to truth, especially amongst 
victims of atrocities (see Joinet 1997; Doak 2008). It is claimed that denying truth poses a barrier to 
reconciliation and makes a return – or continuation – of conflict more likely (Goldstone 1996, 486). 
Trials can be a cathartic experience for victims (Williams and Scharf 2002, 125) and, by producing an 
accurate historical record, they create a “shrinking space of denial” (Orentlicher 2008; see also Ignatieff 
1999, 184; Coughlan 2011). However, the concept of 'truth' is not unproblematic – conceptually or in 
practice (see Crocker 2004, 9; Mendeloff 2004; Lanegran 2005). 'Truth' “defies strict definition” 
(Quinn 2001, 387) and there is no consensus on what kind of truth trials create, let alone how it would 
contribute to peace (see Quinn 2001, 387-8; Kerr and Mobekk 2007, 133-4). 
 A second argument suggests that there exists a legal and moral obligation to prosecute. It has 
been contended that we have witnessed a “a revolution” in accountability (Sirram 2005; Thakur 2006, 
113) and a transformative change in international relations from whether to face past human rights 
violations to how to face them (Seils and Weirda 2005, 13; Cryer 2006, 221; Freeman 2009, 18). Most 
advocates of an obligation to prosecute international crimes rely on interpretations of human rights 
treaties and customary law (see Orentlicher 1991; Scharf 1996; Roht-Arriaza and Gibson 1998; Gavron 
2002; Cryer 2005, 101-117; Lutz 2007; Laplante 2009; Freeman 2009, 36-55). However, despite 
evidence that a “general obligation to ensure individual criminal accountability” exists (Freeman 2009, 
36), an obligation on states to prohibit the use of amnesty laws is far from crystalized (see Cryer 2005, 
107; Schabas 2007, 41; Vinjamuri and Boesenecker 2007; Freeman 2009; Mallinder 2010; Olsen et. al. 
2010; The Belfast Guidelines 2013). Moreover, the ICC's Rome Statute of the ICC is notably silent on 
the issue of amnesties (see Scharf 1999; Gavron 2002, 109; Stahn 2005, 698-9).
  
 Third, a claim which generally pertains to the maintenance of peace rather than its creation, is 
that the ICC can contribute to rebuilding the rule of law by galvanizing the capacity of domestic 
tribunals to address crimes (Wigglesworth 2008, 827; Stahn 2009, 10). The belief that the Court should 
instigate domestic prosecutions is so fervent that Moreno-Ocampo (2003, 2) famously declared that is 
is “the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national 
institutions would be a major success.” Moreover, positive complementarity has been placed at the core 
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to view these goals as complementary and mutually reinforcing (Leebaw 2008). So strong is their 
conviction that many declare, as Ellis (2006, 113) has, that “[t]here can be no lasting peace without 
justice, and justice cannot exist without accountability.” For proponents of international criminal 
justice, tribunals are “the major policy innovation of the late twentieth century designed to diminish 
human rights violations” (Hunjoon and Sikkink 2010, 1). And, they claim, justice is not simply a 
sufficient condition for peace; it is necessary.  
 
(i) Ending impunity: Ending impunity is the primary aim of international criminal justice and is 
regularly invoked as necessary for the establishment of peace. Moreover, there is value, advocates 
argue, in the acknowledgement that crimes took place: “When the past is pushed aside before it has 
been clarified, discussed and dealt with, sooner or later it will invade a nation's political life, forcing 
governments to face it, though not always under the most favourable conditions” (Aguilar 2007, 22). In 
other words, impunity is a threat to stability and peace. If impunity is not ended, argues Ellen Lutz 
(2006, 327), unmet expectations “will cast a long shadow across the political landscape that will not go 
away until they are realized” (see also Goldstone 1996, 492; Kritz 1997, 127). Ignatieff (1999, 184) 
adds that, while it is necessary to remain modest about what war crimes trials can achieve, “leaving war 
crimes unpunished is worse: the cycle of impunity remains unbroken, societies remain free to indulge 
their fantasies.” 
 Ending impunity goes to the heart of the ICC's mandate. As Fatou Bensouda (2013b), the 
Court's Chief Prosecutor, recently declared to the UN Security Council with regards to individuals 
indicted for their role in the violence in Darfur: “as long as they enjoy impunity for the crimes they 
commit, they will continue to represent a threat to international peace and security.” Bensouda's 
predecessor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo (2007b, 220), has similarly conflated ending impunity with 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of the ICC's 2009-2012 Prosecutorial Strategy (OTP 2010, 5). But the notion that the ICC and other 
international criminal tribunals can and should alter domestic political and judicial landscapes is an 
enormous expectation. The Court is not a panacea for the institutional sources of state collapse or inter-
state conflict. The expectation that ICC interventions will lead to (re)building the rule of law, ending 
impunity and thus peace, is a tall order – if not simply overzealous. As Viviane Dittrich (2013, 198) 
writes: “High and conflicting expectations exist regarding what the legacies are and should be in the 
areas of law, justice, peace and reconciliation, given different legacy concepts.” The expectations on the 




promoting peace, arguing that: “The [Rome] Statute ensures that the law will guarantee lasting peace, 
and that impunity for the worst perpetrators is no longer an option.” In 2008, he was even more 
unequivocal in stressing the centrality of ending impunity to the Court's ability to spread peace. 
Quoting a European Union representative at the Rome Negotiations, Moreno-Ocampo insisted that the 
creation of the ICC would make the world:  
More just, because perpetrators of atrocities will not go unpunished; safer, because it 
will deter those who might otherwise act with impunity; and more peaceful, because the 
knowledge that justice is being done may help the victims to put the past behind them 
and encourage all the parties to participate in a process of reconciliation (Moreno-
Ocampo 2008, 1). 
 
For proponents, the goal of ending impunity, in and of itself, is key to producing 'peace'. Advocates of 
international criminal accountability are motivated by the belief that if societies do not seek to confront 
and account for past atrocities, they “leave in place the seeds of future conflict...[which] perpetuates a 
culture of impunity that can only encourage future abuses” (Kritz 1997, 127). Judicial mechanisms 
signal a warning to potential perpetrators that crimes will not be tolerated, will result in criminal 
prosecution and potentially a prison sentence.
  
Impunity encourages continued abuses domestically 
while simultaneously emboldening perpetrators elsewhere (ibid., 129). It is also argued that, by 
acknowledging criminal violations through trials, the systemic, institutionalized nature of human rights 
violations can be identified and dismantled, thus deterring future crimes (Goldstone 1996, 490; see 
Akhavan 1998). In other words, international criminal justice helps to identify the systems and 
structures which perpetuate atrocities and thus can contribute to their eradication and replacement. 
 Few would attempt to argue against the need to end impunity. The debate, rather, is how, when 
and at what cost to end impunity. Critics, as seen below, suggest that seeking to end impunity under the 
wrong conditions may hinder efforts to establish and maintain peace.  
 
(ii) Marginalization / Stigmatization: According to proponents of war crimes trials, targets of ICC 
prosecution will be marginalized – both domestically and internationally (see HRW 2009, 18-34; 
Thakur 2006, 119; Mendes 2010, 11-12).
.
 This argument, which “is claimed to be a primary mechanism 
through which justice can help deliver peace” (Vinjamuri 2013), relies on the assumption that political 
figures will not associate with individuals accused of committing atrocities. Perpetrators are thus likely 
to be stigmatized by their former allies, their political constituents, as well as sections of the 
'international community', leaving them with few resources (financial or other) with which to wage war 
or commit crimes. This process of marginalization fits within the notion, developed by Stephen 
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Stedman (1997, 5) that peace is better assured if “spoilers” – those “leaders and parties who believe 
that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence 
to undermine attempts to achieve it” – are isolated. While expectations of international criminal justice 
should be kept in check, according to Wippman (2006, 120), “at a minimum, international criminal 
prosecutions may help marginalize or incapacitate extremists, paving the way for moderate political 
leaders to take power.” Thus investigations and prosecutions can isolate actors who might otherwise be 
inclined to undermine or derail a peace process. In some cases, the argument is made that certain actors 
must be cut out for any meaningful peace negotiation to take place (see e.g. de Waal and Stanton 2009, 




 Domestically, marginalization may be the result of political cost-benefit calculations on the part 
of domestic political actors. It may simply be too costly for such actors to continue being affiliated with 
perpetrators. The issuance of an indictment or arrest warrant may also be seen as an indication of 
weakness on the part of the indicted individual and therefore an opportunity for domestic competitors 
to challenge their power. Internationally, states and state-based actors face the existence of a global 
civil society and their own domestic human rights constituencies which often refuse to tolerate public 
cooperation between government officials and alleged perpetrators. This explains, for example, the 
recalcitrance on the part of the US to allow indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to speak at the 
United Nations General Assembly (see Gladstone and Kushkush 2013; Prendergast and Ismail 2013). 
In both domestic and international contexts, it may simply be too costly to be seen with alleged 
perpetrators of mass atrocities. Isolating prosecuted pariahs, it is argued, is good for peace.  
 But the marginalization hypothesis suffers from a host of problems. First, retributive criminal 
justice may induce an increased desire on the part of a potential target to partake in a peace process. In 
other words, international prosecution may raise the need for the targeted individual(s) to partake in a 
peace process rather than isolate them. Moreno-Ocampo (2007a) has, for example, suggested that the 
ICC does not damage peace processes because “arrest warrants have brought parties to the negotiating 
table”. This is also a common refrain in the context of northern Uganda (see Chapter 4 and 5). But 
                                                 
8  
That the ICTY managed to isolate key spoilers, particularly Radovan Karadžić and Ratko 
Mladić, is claimed by many authors. See e.g., Akhavan (2001), Wippman (2006, 123). Not all agree. 
Vinjamuri (2013, 3-4) suggests that the ICTY was not responsible for marginalizing of Karadžić and 




proponents claim both that it is good for peace if targets are marginalized and that it is good for peace 
that they respond to arrest warrants by taking a peace process more seriously. Second, when the targets 
of marginalization are state leaders or heads of state, marginalization may become indistinguishable 
from an agenda of regime change (see also Mendeloff 2014, 14-17). This may or may not be 
problematic but proponents should be more forthright about the relationship between international 
criminal justice and regime change. Third, as most dramatically demonstrated by Bashir's travel to ICC 
member-states, the record regarding marginalization is limited (see Barnes 2011; McCormick 2012). 
Fourth, the removal of targeted individuals from a peace process is treated as a good in and of itself. 
The assumption is that those who replace the indicted individual will be 'moderate' and necessarily 
contribute positively to peace (Vinjamuri 2010, 195). But what precludes the 'next generation' of state 
or non-state leaders from being just as, or perhaps even more, violent, brutal and repressive? No 
evidence has been produced that regime change in Khartoum or the demise of Joseph Kony would lead 
to a Sudanese government or a Lord's Resistance Army that seek peace. Lastly, and perhaps the most 
potent criticism of marginalization, is that warrants can shame actors who respond by lashing out 
against civilians and/or seeking to consolidate their power through violent means (see below). 
 
(iii) Deterrence and Prevention: The deterrence capacity of international criminal justice is, for many, 
their most important justification and goal (Wippman 1999/2000, 474). Deterrence requires “the 
deliberate attempt to manipulate the behavior of others through the enunciation of conditional threats” 
(Dawood 2011, 2; see also Freedman 2005). It may be specific – aimed at a specific individual who has 
committed atrocities, or general – consisting of a signal to the wider community that crimes will not be 
tolerated (see Akhavan 1998). It is thus intended to have a broader prevention effect on current and 
future conflicts but also affect a cessation of the commission of atrocities and thus contribute to conflict 
termination.  
 Perhaps the most innovative element of international criminal law is its focus on individual, 
rather than collective, guilt (see Goldstone 1996; Simpson 2007, 54-78). According to Kritz, holding 
individuals, rather than groups, responsible “rejects the dangerous culture of collective guilt and 
retribution that often produces further cycles of resentment and violence” (Kritz 1997, 128; see Minow 
1999/2000, 430). The individualization of guilt is thus seen to directly contribute to the prevention 
capacity of justice by diminishing collective rage and disincentivizing collective revenge. Tribunals 
may also deter violence by presenting an alternative to the vengeance that fuels the characteristic 
“downward spiral of violence” of violent political conflicts (Minow 1998, 11; see also Lie et al 2006, 
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7). The thirst for vengeance is apparently quenched through legal recourse rather than through violence; 
the potential for retributive violence is displaced by the pursuit of retributive justice.  
 For advocates, the capacity of trials to prevent crimes is among the most important 
consequences of international criminal law. Yet the deterrence argument remains problematic and 
continues to suffer from a lack of rigorous empirical analysis. As Kate Cronin-Furman (2013, 1) 
observes, scholars of international criminal justice's deterrence capacity have produced claims which 
“rely on undertheorized assumptions about both the operation of deterrence and the commission of 
mass atrocity.” Cronin-Furman (Ibid. 21) concludes that the empirical record of deterrence is ultimately 
mixed and that “the cost-benefit calculations of commanders who affirmatively order mass atrocity are 
likely already to involve overriding benefits for and strong disincentives against the commission of 
atrocity crimes. Thus, the risk of prosecution and punishment is not likely to change their decision-
making calculus.” Illustrative of the difficulties in assessing the deterrence and preventive capacity of 
ICC decision-making, Michael Broache (2014) has shown that the stages of the Court's intervention in 
the DRC had divergent effects through time: the arrest warrant against Bosco Ntaganda produced no 
changes in levels of violence; the conviction of Thomas Lubanga instigated an increase in violence 
against civilians; and Ntaganda's surrender contributed to a decrease in violence. Rather than 
concluding that the ICC thus deters or does not deter atrocities, Broache (2014, 34) rightly concludes 
that “scholars and practitioners should be more attuned to the possibility of heterogeneity in the effects 
of ICC action.” 
 The deterrence argument neglects the differences and possible interactions between collective 
and individual sources of deterrence. Whether the target of deterrence is a leader of a well-organized 
political bureaucracy or a government or group makes a difference. Likewise, we should expect 
different outcomes if the source of deterrence is a permanent, uncompromising arrest warrant issued by 
the ICC versus a potentially temporary, coercive measure that can be reversed in order to 'reward' 
changed behaviour (see Mendeloff 2014). Fluctuating commitment to international criminal justice is 
also relevant. Within the field of conflict studies, a consensus has begun to emerge that, in the context 
of negotiated settlements to civil wars, it is the credibility of international guarantees to punish or 
reward negotiating parties that determine the success of negotiated agreements (see Walter 1997; 
Walter 2001; Kerr 2005; Toft 2010). In parallel to this conclusion, perhaps the greatest challenge for 
proponents of international criminal justice is state cooperation and enforcement (see Pankhurst 1999, 
249; Peskin 2008; see also Chapter 9). The relationship between credible commitment to enforce 
warrants and deterrence /prevention remains unclear. However, as Layla Dawood (2011, 2) argues, 
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there is a recognition that “it is imperative that the one who carries out the threat has the means of force 
to inflict the damage that he/she promises to cause on his/her opponent.” Threats to prosecute must be 
backed up by the legitimate possibility of an alleged perpetrator finding him or herself in front of 
judges defending his or her actions. In other words, the effectiveness of tribunals and courts has been 
tethered to state-cooperation. As Madeleine Albright and Richard Williamson (2013, 19) write, 
“champions of the ICC can fairly argue that the likelihood of future atrocities is diminished every time 
a perpetrator is successfully prosecuted.” But what if targets – like Uganda's Joseph Kony or Sudan's 
Omar al-Bashir – and those outside of the ICC's remit – like Syria's Bashar al-Assad or North Korea's 
Kim Jong-un – remain free? Does this create an 'anti-deterrent' effect? The point here is that the 
potential deterrence capacity of international criminal prosecutions may be more the result of the 
commitment and resolve of international actors rather than the inherent nature of criminal prosecution 
itself. This is particularly relevant for the ICC as the interest of powerful states in supporting the 
Court's mandate has fluctuated over time rather than remained constant (Bosco 2014). However, there 
may also be other issues affecting the ICC's deterrence and preventive capacity. 
 Novel research on deterrence suggests that the capacity of the ICC to act as a coercive 
mechanism to end or prevent violence is “highly tenuous” (Mendeloff 2014, 5). This is not, David 
Mendeloff (2014) argues, because the Court's warrants aren't enforced but because of the degree to 
which the Court is politically independent. Crucially, “for coercive threats to be effective they must be 
accompanied by credible assurances that the threat will be removed in the face of compliance.” 
However, ICC warrants are non-negotiable. Aside from delaying prosecutions for 12 months under 
Article 16, “[t]his is not something over which states have control, and which the Court itself is 
structurally and ideologically unable to do” (Ibid., 5). Mendeloff (ibid.) also finds that the coercive 
capacity of ICC warrants is further limited in the context of ongoing conflict and that warrants are 
likely to be less effective against high-level perpetrators – precisely the kind of actors the ICC targets.  
 As a number of scholars have pointed out, the deterrence thesis also assumes that actors in a 
conflict are rational and make decisions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis (Wippman 1999/2000, 
476; Lie et al 2006, 2; Stahn 2009, 5). It remains unclear which costs are prioritized by alleged 
perpetrators targeted by tribunals and whether it is appropriate to assume similar calculations between 
different actors and across different cases. The assumption that actors in conflict are rational “is often a 
fiction, in light of the underlying political context of the conflict” (Stahn 2009, 5). The rational-choice 
foundation of deterrence literature may also occlude the emotional responses of those that international 
criminal law seeks to deter. Emotions such as humiliation, embarrassment and fear may result from 
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investigations and arrest warrants and may affect any potential for international criminal justice to 
prevent crimes (see Lupovici 2011). 
 Some scholars have argued that the individualization of guilt in this context is not a strength, 
but a weakness of international criminal justice. During the Nuremberg Trials of senior Nazi officials, 
Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson noted that “[o]ne of the dangers ever present in this Trial may be 
protracted by details of particular wrongs and that we [may] become lost in a 'wilderness of single 
instances'” (see Leebaw 2008, 104). Fletcher (2002) argues that the focus on individual guilt reflects a 
liberal bias. More scathing critiques argue that the focus of individualizing guilt ignores the very social 
nature of crimes (Fletcher 2002; see also Mamdani 1997; Chapter 3). Minow (1999-2000, 431) 
acknowledges that rather than capturing the social complexity of crimes, the individualization of 
responsibility presents individuals as “larger-than-life characters, who stand in for all the numerous 
others who could not be found, or who could not feasibly be tried.” The ICC's interest and ability to 
prosecute only those individuals “most responsible” for crimes may be seen as half-way impunity 
because so many are left unaccountable and the collective nature of crimes neglected (Ainley 2008). 
The question that remains, then, is whether lower-level perpetrators can be deterred by international 
criminal justice and whether there is an expected 'trickle-down' effect wherein the potential deterrence 
of high-level perpetrators filters down to lower-level combatants. Again, the deterrence literature is 
silent on this subject.  
 Lastly, perhaps the most significant problem with the claim that trials and tribunals have a 
deterrence capacity may be the conceptual difficulty in measuring deterrence itself (see Cobban 
2006b). How can we know whether a trial prevents an individual from committing crimes when, by 
extension of not having committed the abuses, there is no evidence that the individual would have 
committed them in the first place? Indeed, unless there is a precipitous decline in all violations of 
international criminal law, the question of deterrence may be fundamentally slanted against proponents 
of trials because, as William Schabas (2007, 57) explains, “while we can readily point to those who are 
not deterred, it is nearly impossible to identify those who are.” 
 
Proponents argue that, by ending impunity, marginalizing real and potential international criminals, as 
well as preventing and deterring mass atrocities, the pursuit of international criminal justice in the 
context of ongoing and active conflict can have a net positive effect on the establishment and 
maintenance of peace. But the claims of proponents have severe weaknesses and limitations. It cannot 
be concluded that pursuing justice is necessarily good for peace – at least not for the reasons 
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proponents suggest. Of course, this does not mean that the opposite is true, that the pursuit of justice 
will ultimately have negative effects on peace.  
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II. Peace First, Justice Later 
It may be, as historian Norman Goda suggests, that the nature of war crimes trials means that 
“international trials cannot help but spawn scepticism” (Goda 2007, 8). It should thus come as no 
surprise that critics have developed their own set of arguments against pursuing international criminal 
justice interventions in the context of ongoing conflict: that international criminal justice can instigate 
and prolong violence; that trials may undermine peace negotiations; and that justice is no substitute for 
more concerted, coercive action.
9
  
 Critics disagree with the sweeping claim that there can be “no peace without justice” and argue, 
instead, that there can be “no justice without peace” (Chesterman 2001). Some doubt that the use of 
law can fundamentally transform a society while establishing and sustaining order and stability. On the 
contrary, as Martti Koskieniemmi (2001, 224) retorts: “the role of judicialism in poking the flames of 
conflicts should not be underestimated.”  
 
(i) Instigating Violence: Rather than marginalizing potential and real perpetrators, critics of war crimes 
trials argue international criminal justice can cause targets to (re)commit to violence. Perpetrators may 
be shamed, stigmatized and embarrassed as a result of being targets of judicial interventions. Shame 
can lead to continued violence and the entrenchment of power. This claim rests on the influence of 
shame on the causes of violence, explored by sociologists such as James Gilligan (2003) and applied to 
                                                 
9
 Another argument that has been put forward against the pursuit of international criminal justice but 
one which does not relate directly to 'peace' is that they are too expensive. Between the ICC, the ICTY, 
the ICTR, the SCSL and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the estimated 
costs of their work between 1993 and 2015 is $US 6.3 billion (see Ford 2010). This cost does not seem 
exorbitant in relation to other expenses such as the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on the Iraq war, 
the $US 6 billion cost of the 2012 US Presidential Election or the $15 US billion paid to host the 2012 
London Olympics (see McLaughlin 2013, 77). However, for critics of trials, the 'amount' of justice 
bought at this price is simply too little. 
    Other critics insist that war crimes trials are too divorced from local realities and thus are not 
context-sensitive (for discussion see Simpson 2007, 30-53). International criminal justice is also seen 
as an inappropriate foreign imposition against weak states (see e.g. Branch 2010b). Parallel to, and as 
an extension of these arguments runs the belief that the ICC runs roughshod with local approaches to 
justice and accountability. This was evident in the context of northern Uganda (see, for example, Allen 
2006, 128-138; see also Sriram 2007, 588-590). 
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violent political conflict by scholars like David Keen (2008). 
 Leebaw (2008, 101) argues that the prosecution of political violence is likely to be destabilizing 
because it constitutes “a process that condemns as shameful actions that may previously have been 
championed as a matter of duty to a particular political community.” In order for peace to be 
established and maintained, respect is essential. Respect is necessary for any legitimate and successful 
attempt at altering the behaviour of a regime or individual. Without respect, the patterns that precipitate 
violence and antipathy towards peace processes may become increasingly entrenched. Shaming leaders 
provides them with the justification for uncompromising and continued violence, since such individuals 
are disqualified as legitimate negotiating partners. Fabrice Weissman (2010) of Médecins Sans 
Frontières goes so far as to declare that “'no peace without justice' is not a peacemaking slogan, but a 
call to war.” 
 Critics worry that pursuing accountability for key actors in a conflict, particularly those who 
wield a significant level of power (which, it should be noted, is likely to be those deemed “most 
responsible” by tribunals like the ICC), will lash out against civilians. Nowhere has this been more 
evident than in the reaction of critics to the arrest warrants issued by the ICC against Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur.
10
 Following 
the arrest warrant, al-Bashir retaliated by expelling thirteen humanitarian aid agencies from Sudan. 
Alex de Waal (2010), a vociferous opponent of the Court's work in Sudan, claimed that “a campaign of 
shaming that is relentless, escalating and personalized,” and “the liberal use of the word 'evil' to 
describe the Sudan Government...runs the risk of fuelling a vicious cycle of escalating acrimony.” 
 Importantly, the utility of shaming and marginalization is not easily discerned. Like deterrence, 
it may depend on who precisely is being shamed/marginalized as much as the act of 
shaming/marginalization itself. There is an ever-present danger in assuming similar responses to 
investigations and indictments across cases. Actors who respond to arrest warrants with violence in 
differing contexts may appear to be making similar calculations but, in fact, are driven by a divergent 
set of contextual factors and incentives. These calculations will, however, undoubtedly affect the 
willingness and interests of parties towards peace negotiations.  
 
(ii) Undermining Peace Negotiations: It has been demonstrated that violent political conflicts 
                                                 
10 
Charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes were levelled against Bashir in 2008 while the 




increasingly end via negotiated settlement (see Wallensteen 2007; Sisk 2008, 195).
.
 Conflicts which are 
not exhausted by the complete victory of one side and the complete demise of the other, it is argued, 
require negotiated agreements (Zartman 2005, 2; Toft 2010, 1). Critics, however, argue that seeking to 
prosecute key actors involved in a negotiated settlement is disruptive to the peace process and makes an 
agreement less likely. International criminal justice interventions can thus prolong conflict and increase 
deadly violence (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 51). 
 Conflicts which end in negotiated agreements rather than military victory by one party, tend to 
include provisions for power-sharing between the conflicting parties, an increasingly common tool for 
negotiators seeking to mediate the end of wars (Sisk 2008, 195). Power-sharing solutions seek to create 
“social contracts between two or more peoples, or between two or more territorial governments” 
(O'Leary 2005, xxii). They also act to reassure previously conflicting parties about key issues 
concerning the control of, and access to, economic resources, political power and security (Vandeginste 
and Sriram 2011, 9). It is argued that power-sharing is particularly necessary where the social fabric of 
a society has particularly sharp ethnic, religious, regional, or other, tensions (ibid., 10).  
 Vandeginste and Sriram (ibid.) argue that the paradigms of post-conflict power-sharing and 
accountability clash. Where conflicts have included mass atrocities, the typical response has been to 
grant amnesties or offer exile to perpetrators as an incentive to continue the process of negotiating 
peace (Lie et al 2006, 2). A problem consequently arises when attempting to provide a place for justice 
in power-sharing agreements. The problem is exacerbated because, as Michael Scharf (1999, 509) 
notes, it is unrealistic to believe that a party would cease hostilities if “they would find themselves or 
their close associates facing life imprisonment.”11 This has been echoed by individuals indicted by the 
ICC. Vincent Otti, a senior official of the Lord's Resistance Army who was indicted by the ICC in 
2005, vowed that he would “only sign an agreement that brings peace, not one that leads me to the 
International Criminal Court” (Ojwee 2007). This reflects the rather uncomfortable reality that 
perpetrators of atrocities may be “indispensable allies” in the pursuit of peace (Snyder and Vinjamuri 
2004,12). 
 Importantly, critics do not argue that justice can never be achieved, but believe that pursuing 
justice before or during attempts to establish peace are detrimental. Justice delayed for critics is not 
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justice denied, but rather justice made possible. The sequence should be “first to consolidate peace, and 
only later to pursue justice” (Thoms et al 2008, 3), or as Snyder and Vinjamuri (2004, 6) declare. 
“Justice does not lead; it follows.” This does not mean, as Moses Chrispus Okello (2007, 2) writes, that 
justice is accorded lesser priority to peace but that the order in which each is pursued is important. It 
may simply be, as some argue, that “some form of negotiated settlement is simply the price that must 
be paid to ensure stability in the short term” (Koskenniemi 2001, 217). Pursuing international criminal 
justice in the context of ongoing and active conflicts, on the contrary, illustrates that accountability is 
prioritized over peace (Dugard 2002).  
 For critics of war crime trials, amnesties for those responsible for mass atrocities remain an 
essential tool for bringing warring parties to the negotiating table as well as providing them with the 
incentive to both agree to, and implement, a peace agreement (see Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/2004; 
Cobban 2006a). This is particularly pertinent when neither side in a conflict is able to achieve total 
victory. For those who face a choice between survival and justice, amnesty may be viewed as the 
“least-worst option” (Freeman 2009, 23). Mark Freeman (ibid, 7) maintains that people may be 
repulsed by impunity but their “repulsion for war and tyranny is greater.” As negotiating tools, 
Christine Bell adds: “If the choice is between an imperfect peace and a perfect war, imperfect peace 
may be worth a gamble” (Bell 2006, 1-2). 
 The effect of pursuing justice on negotiating peace is perhaps the most prominent issue within 
the peace-justice debate. While the argument that no one will sign an agreement that results in a prison 
sentence is logical and intuitive, the increased demand for justice, particularly by victims, may suggest 
that peace agreements that exclude accountability entirely are no longer seen as credible or legitimate. 
This lack of credibility and legitimacy may continue to fuel resentment and the cycle of vengeance that 
proponents of trials argue is satisfied through retributive justice. There is no easy or obvious way 
forward: an agreement that does not satisfy calls for justice may fail, but an agreement that does may 
never be agreed to in the first place. Addressing this dilemma, Jon Elster (2010, 13) pondered “whether 
there exists a degree of punishment that is severe enough to satisfy the population and mild enough to 
satisfy the wrongdoers.” 
 With regards to the employment of amnesty laws for perpetrators of atrocities, their effects 
remain unclear. Recent studies by Louise Mallinder (2007, 2008, 2009) and Freeman (2009) have 
helped problematize and unpack monolithic conceptions of amnesties. An empirical study by Olsen et 
al (2009) has illustrated that amnesties for past human rights violations, when combined with trials, are 
positively correlated to human rights and democracy. It has also been argued that not all amnesties are 
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the same and not all may be morally and legally objectionable (Bell 2006, 83-84; Hayner 2008, 330). 
Mallinder (2008), for example, distinguishes amnesties on the basis of who is covered by them, which 
crimes are covered and whether they are conditional. While the effects of divergent types of amnesty 
laws on peace processes require greater scrutiny, it remains “[p]remature to assert that an amnesty is no 
longer worth the paper it is written on” (Freeman 2009, 29). If their utility has not expired, then they 
may remain useful in the pursuit of peace.  
 Another weakness of the argument that justice necessarily frustrates negotiations, and indeed 
the corollary that it helps peace negotiations, is its mixed record. The following chapters deal with 
evidence on whether or not the ICC's interventions helped or hindered peace processes in northern 
Uganda and Libya where the record is mixed and it is unclear that a negotiated settlement to either 
conflict was feasible. In other instances, there is evidence that judicial interventions bolstered peace 
negotiations. Priscilla Hayner (2008, 335) argues that the pursuit of accountability against Charles 
Taylor may have positively contributed to peace negotiations in Liberia, while, in Sierra Leone, it was 
only with the arrest of Foday Sankoh “that the peace implementation process began to take hold.” In 
short, the question of how the pursuit of justice has been treated at the negotiation table and how it has 
affected peace negotiations remains unclear and the empirical record remains murky. 
 At the center of the debate about whether international justice can guarantee peace is a common 
feature in international criminal justice: unrealistic expectations. Mark Osiel (2000, 119) has written 
about the inherent limitations of international law in prosecuting “offenders in a manner consistent with 
existing law and its moral premise” (see also Malamud-Goti 1996, 167-198; Goda 2007, 8). In the 
wake of WWII and amidst the trials of senior Nazi officials at the Nuremberg tribunal, Hannah Arendt 
(1946, 54) wondered whether some crimes “explode the limits of law...[and w]e are simply not 
equipped to deal on a human, political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that is 
beyond goodness or virtue.” Indeed, law is finite (Goda 2007, 8). As Kerr and Mobekk rightly argue, 
trials “need to be carefully assessed in light of what the tribunals can do, rather than what some have 
argued they should do” (Kerr and Mobekk 2007, 31). With regards to the ICC, Kirsten Ainley (2011, 
309), concurs, noting that “the expectation that it can bring peace as well as justice is unrealistic.” 
When setting and measuring the expectations of what international criminal tribunals  can achieve, 
especially in the midst of conflict, it is important to remain modest (see Ignatieff 1999, 184). Indeed, 
with regards to the peace-justice debate, there is a need to recognize the inconvenient reality that no 
perfect solution exists. As Martha Minow (1998, 8) explained: 
no response can ever be adequate when your son has been killed by police ordered to 
shoot at a crowd of children; when you have been dragged out of your home, 
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interrogated, and raped in a wave of 'ethnic cleansing'; or when your brother who 
struggled against a repressive government has disappeared and left only a secret police 
file, bearing no clue to his final resting place. Closure is not possible...Legal responses 
are inevitably frail and insufficient...[there is an] incompleteness and inescapable 
inadequacy of each possible response to collective atrocities. 
 
 Lastly, the argument that international criminal justice should be sequenced is theoretically and 
practically problematic. Sequencing suggests that, while accountability and peace aren't necessarily in 
tension, in order to maximize the benefits of their relationship, the pursuit of justice should follow the 
establishment of peace. In other words, “peace first, justice later” (Refugee Law Project 2005). The 
sequencing argument is attractive because it represents an attempt to move beyond the “false 
polarisation of peace and justice” (Okello 2007). On the ground, the sequencing argument requires 
achieving a cessation of violence, followed by the warring parties entering inclusive peace negotiations 
to achieve peace. Warring parties discontinue active conflict in exchange for an official or de facto 
amnesty from prosecution. Once stability is assured and the time for accountability is ripe, those 
amnesties can be revoked and the leaders of the conflict can be brought to account. This is, broadly 
speaking, the lesson that has been drawn from the experience of Latin American transitions from 
dictatorship to democracy. As Sikkink (2011, 161) writes, Latin American states “have not had to 
choose between truth or justice, peace or justice, or between prosecutions and democracy. Instead, they 
have faced more complex issues, such as... what sequencing or combination of transitional justice 
mechanisms can help build democracy and resolve conflicts.” Moreover, Lyandro Komakech (2011) of 
the Refugee Law Project invoked the example of Argentina as an ideal example of sequencing peace 
and justice in order means to circumvent the tensions between peace and justice. He explained: 
I don’t see it as a debate. It is common sense that in situations of what we have been 
experiencing, strategically we should be sequencing these issues, prioritizing and 
looking at what is best in the short-term and what is best in the long-term...It is very 
legitimate in any process that we must create an enabling environment that can 
guarantee justice can be done…If you start asking for justice even before you create 
that enabling environment, it is not even a debate, it is foolery…We must sequence 
them. (Komakech 2011). 
 
The problem with the sequencing theory, however, is that it cannot be premeditated. It is difficult, if not 
impossible to imagine a dictator, tyrant or rebel leader accepting an amnesty that he or she knew would 
subsequently be revoked. Indeed, premeditated sequencing has never been done. At the same time, the 
sequencing argument disregards that power-sharing agreements can reward leaders (and potential 
perpetrators) not only with protection from prosecution, but with powerful economic and political 
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positions. These positions may allow them to gain rather than lose the ability to forcefully retaliate 
when their impunity is subsequently challenged and justice can finally be pursued. Sequencing may 
pose hidden dangers. 
 Justice is not an easy issue to negotiate. The effects of ICC interventions on negotiations – and 
peace, conflict and justice processes more generally – are the very focus of this thesis. As one scholar 
put it, “the relationship between criminal trials and peace remains empirically under-explored and thus 
constitutes a critical area for future research” (Clark 2011, 544). This research is necessitated by the 
continued lack of understanding of these effects, despite a rich array of theories.  
 
(iii) No  Substitute for Military Commitment: Are tribunals set up as a means to detract from 'real' 
action to resolve conflict? Some observers believe that justice can be instrumentalized by international 
actors in order to demonstrate that they are 'doing something' or, as Chesterman (2001, 8) puts it, 
achieving “through law what the international community was not prepared to achieve through force.” 
(See also Wippman 1999, 473; Thakur 2006, 119; Peskin 2008, 36).  Some fear that international 
criminal justice is only pursued when the will or capacity to intervene militarily is absent, lending but a 
hollow impression of concerted action. Even ardent proponents admit that tribunals have been set up as 
“alibis for no action [rather than] indicators of toughening new standards of international judicial 
accountability” (Ibid.). Yet some worry that international criminal justice actually castrates the 
international community's capacity to militarily intervene to end human rights abuses. Thomas W. 
Smith (2002, 177) has argued that the ICC creates a “moral hazard”12: 
if international actors feel confident that human rights criminals will eventually be 
brought to justice, either in their own countries or before the ICC, they may be less 
inclined to intervene to stop human rights crimes while they are happening, something 
international actors have been reluctant to do in any case. 
 
Smith (ibid., 177-178) further argued that numerous factors, including shifting public opinion away 
from coercion and intervention and towards international law and tribunals, unease over humanitarian 
intervention, as well as the ICC's inability to prosecute aggression, may inadvertently contribute to the 
ICC becoming “a virtuous excuse for states to turn a blind eye to atrocities, a moral free ride on the 
coattails of humanitarian law.” 
 If such a moral hazard exists, it would have profound implications on the possibility of the ICC 
                                                 
12 The concept of moral hazard in international relations has been primarily applied to the subject and 
practice of humanitarian intervention. See the work of Alan J. Kuperman (e.g. 2008; 2009). 
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contributing to peace. Indeed, international criminal justice would prolong and potentially exacerbate 
conflict by providing a veneer for inaction. Importantly, such an approach would also constitute a threat 
to tribunals and courts by leaving these institutions to stand alone with the burden of expectations about 
their capacity to prevent violence and establish peace.  
 Eric Neumayer (2009, 3) asks whether “the ICC is a form of organized hypocrisy behind which 
states hide who cannot or do not want to take real action?” But there is a need to be cautious about 
what the ICC can achieve. Justice is not a panacea for peace. The question is whether it should be part 
of the peacemaking equation. In this context, Neumayer provides evidence that suggests cautious 
optimism: “on the whole the fact that the ICC is primarily supported by states, which have been active 
in the past, suggests that it will function as a complement to, not a substitute for action” (2009, 20). 
Moreover, the support of states for international criminal justice is likely to be determined by the 
specific case and not a broader intention to use international institutions as a veneer to demonstrate that 
'some' action is being taken. And here the record is mixed. For example, in Libya, the UN Security 
Council approved both a referral of the situation to the ICC and a military intervention by NATO. But, 
after endorsing the ICC's intervention, the Security Council subsequently lost interest in supporting the 
Court's mandate (see Chapter 6). Still, it is difficult to say that the Security Council used the ICC as a 
means to show it was doing 'something' rather than taking concerted, military action.  
 
Critics claim that judicial interventions by international courts can instigate or prolong violence, 
undermine peace negotiations, and represent an excuse for avoiding actions which are more likely to 
resolve conflict. However, each of these assertions suffers from weaknesses and limitations. They do 
not demonstrate that international criminal justice is inherently deleterious to peace. Where does this 
leave us? Is it possible that tribunals like the ICC shouldn't be assessed by their impact on peace at all?  
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III. “Peace versus Justice” - An Unfair Judgement of the ICC? 
As an institution mandated and concerned with international criminal law and not with conflict 
resolution, one could argue that the ICC should not be judged for its effects on anything but its ability 
to achieve international criminal justice. The ICC isn't responsible for peace and it could be argued that 
measuring its impact on peace is unfair. In line with this thinking, the ICC's Office of Prosecutor (2007) 
released a policy paper distinguishing the “interests of justice” and the “interests of peace”. While the 
OTP acknowledged that the Court “was created on the premise that justice is an essential component of 
a stable peace” (Office of the Prosecutor, 2007, 8), it delineated a division of labour wherein matters of 
peace and conflict resolution were beyond the ICC's remit:  
there is a difference between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of 
peace and that the latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the Office of 
the Prosecutor... the broader matter of international peace and security is not the 
responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other institutions (Ibid. 1, 
9).  
Similarly, current ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda (2013) reiterated this view: “As the I.C.C. is 
an independent and judicial institution, it cannot take into consideration the interests of peace, which is 
the mandate of other institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council.” These remarks should 
not simply be taken as an inclination on the part of the OTP to separate peace and justice, but to 
separate law from politics.  
 Politics is seen as anathema to the purpose and mandate of the ICC. The term politics here is 
generally assumed to mean the realpolitik of international relations (see Chapter 8). The Court, in the 
eyes of its champions, is intended to transcend such politics. As Cherif  Bassiouni (2003, 191; see also 
Rodman 2009, 125) wrote: 
The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of 
realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the pursuit of 
political settlements unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this 
approach often runs directly counter to the interests of justice... 
 
There is an apparent need amongst certain figures within the Court to espouse a separation between 
politics and the ICC's mandate. Moreno-Ocampo (2007b, 224) insisted that politics has no bearing on 
the Prosecutor's work: “The Prosecutor’s duty is to apply the law without bowing to political 
considerations, and I will not adjust my practices to political considerations. It is time for political 
actors to adjust to the law.” 
 But few endeavours are as political as conflict resolution. Indeed, the political nature of mass 
atrocities is central to those who argue that international criminal justice is inimical to efforts to 
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establish peace. For example, former South African President Thabo Mbeki and Mahmood Mamdani 
(2014) have argued that because “mass violence is more a political than a criminal matter”, societies 
attempting to overcome periods of conflict characterized by mass violence and atrocities need “a 
political process driven by a firm conviction that there can be no winners and no losers, only 
survivors.”  
 At the same time, senior figures within the ICC have consistently asserted that the Court is 
conducive to peace and a necessary ingredient in conflict resolution. The same 2007 policy paper stated 
that: 
a new legal framework has emerged and this framework necessarily impacts on conflict 
management efforts. The issue is no longer about whether we agree or disagree with the 
pursuit of justice in moral or practical terms: it is the law. Any political or security 
initiative must be compatible with the new legal framework insofar as it involves 
parties bound by the Rome Statute (Office of the Prosecutor 2007, 4). 
What follows from this position is that the ICC must be held to account for its effects on conflict 
resolution because it is indelibly part of any initiative to resolve conflicts in which international crimes 
have taken place. Indeed, in a speech on the relationship between peace and justice, former ICC 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo (2007a) maintained that the entire practice of peace negotiations had not 
only been re-calibrated but had been replaced by international criminal justice: 
For centuries, conflicts were resolved through negotiations without legal constraints. In 
Rome in 1998, a new and entirely different approach was adopted. Lasting peace 
requires justice-- this was the decision taken in Rome by 120 States... It is essential on 
the contrary to ensure that any conflict resolution initiative be compatible with the 
Rome Statute, so that peace and justice work effectively together.  
The ICC cannot escape the fact that its work affects conflict resolution. But the Court maintains a 
contradictory position on the subject. While it insists, as noted above, that the pursuits of peace and 
international criminal justice are separate endeavours, it also holds that its effects on peace are positive. 
In the same article referenced above, Bensouda (2013) argues that “justice can have a positive impact 
on peace and security… if anything, the 'shadow of the Court' has helped to isolate individuals wanted 
by the I.C.C., or to kick-start negotiations.” Thus, whilst maintaining that the ICC does not take the 
politics of peace into account, the Prosecutor is simultaneously eager to take credit for the Court's 
effects on peace processes – so long as they are positive. Such proclamations open the Court's actual 
effects on peace, justice and conflict processes up to scrutiny.  
 Additionally, the Court's increasingly close relationship to the UN Security Council, the 
primary international body responsible for assuring international peace and security, signals the ICC's 
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interest in being used as a tool of conflict resolution. Indeed, Bensouda (2012) has declared that the 
ICC should be seen as a “tool” in the “toolbox” of the Responsibility to Protect – a doctrine which can 
only be legally invoked by the Security Council. More brazenly, former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo (2013) recently insisted that the ICC is “a new power for the Security Council”.  
 While the ICC may maintain the veneer that the pursuit of justice and conflict resolution are 
separate endeavours, it also insists that that peace and justice are inseparable. Moreover, if the Court is 
to maintain a reputation as a useful institution in international relations, it needs to demonstrate that it 
won't ruin peace processes (see Chapter 8). It is thus not only fair but necessary to judge the ICC on the 




IV. Conclusion: Re-Imagining the Peace-Justice Debate 
As Chandra Lekha Sriram (2009, 5) notes, “[a]n obvious lesson that has emerged, and one that cannot 
be stressed enough, is that the peace versus justice dilemma is grossly oversimplified...there is a 
persistent belief in the sharp dichotomy between peace and justice that needs to be continually 
challenged.” (see also Chesterman 2001). There is a widespread assumption that there are only two 
choices for societies in transition: forgetting the past and sacrificing justice through amnesty or 
achieving justice through criminal prosecution (Crocker 2004, 2; Sriram 2004, 6; Freeman 2009, 25).
 
This is far too reductionist to be satisfactory and is symptomatic of a field that remains in “urgent need 
for more sustained, systematic, comparative analyses, and for greater attention to fact-based rather than 
faith-based claims.” (Thoms et al 2010, 26). 
 This chapter has sough to show that neither the arguments in favour or against of ICC 
interventions in the context of ongoing and active conflicts are compelling or conclusive. This leaves us 
with two possibilities: either international criminal justice should not be judged by its effects on peace 
or the study of the impact of the ICC needs to be re-imagined. The chapter has shown that the ICC can 
and should be judged by its effects on peace. Therefore, a rethinking of how to study ICC interventions 
is needed to understand these effects. It is to this task that the thesis now turns. 
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Chapter 3: An Agenda for 'Peace' in the 'Peace versus Justice' Debate 
We all repeat the mantra that there can be no lasting peace without justice; and that’s 
true enough. But I don’t think that we have yet resolved the inevitable tensions between 
the two in a workable fashion – Louise Arbour (2013). 
 
Introduction 
 Despite a raft of sophisticated arguments regarding the potential positive and negative impacts 
of the International Criminal Court on the conflicts in which it intervenes, the peace-justice debate has 
proven insufficient in elucidating a clear and rigorous framework for how to study the Court's effects. 
Again, there is no doubt that the ICC has complicated conflict resolution. This is not in dispute. But the 
arguments within the peace-justice debate, as currently constructed, have not provided a sufficient 
means to identify and analyze how conflicts are shaped by interventions by the Court and what impact 
this has on potential peace, justice and conflict processes. As a result, despite a desire to move beyond 
the rigid and dichotomous nature of the debate, a way to do so remains elusive. 
 Given the amount of time and energy spent on the 'peace versus justice' debate, why has a more 
rigorous research agenda on the effects of international criminal justice on peace processes not 
emerged? Part of the reason is that the key issues, phases and dynamics that affect and constitute a 
potential peace process have been neglected. This chapter seeks to fill this lacuna by offering an 
analytical framework with which to assess and analyze the effects of ICC interventions on ongoing and 
active conflicts.  
 
Peace in the “Peace versus Justice” Debate  
In assessments of the effects of international criminal justice on peace, peace has generally been held as 
a constant, defined in its negative variant – the cessation of large-scale, direct forms of physical 
violence (see, e.g., Lie et al 2006). This is unsurprising. As a concise variable, the reliance on negative 
peace is “understandable given methodological concerns.” (Höglund and Kovacs 2010, 369). In this 
context, in order for the ICC to have a positive effect on peace, the work of the Court must be 
associated with a decrease in, or cessation of, direct, physical violence. Conversely, the effects of the 
ICC on peace are negative if the Court's intervention precipitates continued conflict or intensified 
violence. A recent example of this approach is a study conducted by Courtney Hillebrecht (2011), who 
has measured changes in the incidence of conflict interactions (violence) in Libya against key moments 
in the ICC's investigation into the Gaddafi regime.  
 Peace can also be considered in its positive variant, implying something 'greater' than negative 
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peace – social justice and the lack of structural violence (see Galtung 1969, 167-191). Here, the effects 
of the ICC would be positive if they contributed to the achievement of 'reconciliation'13, and social 
cohesion in the states in which the Court intervened. The ICC would have negative effects if it 
prevented such goals from being achieved by, for example, contributing to the entrenchment of social 
divisions.  
 Both approaches are problematic. While any finding that the ICC leads actors to respond 
violently would be important, focusing on negative peace requires the attribution of causality to the 
ICC for changes in levels of violence. However, by assuming that there is a clear correlation between 
patterns in violence and the decision-making of the Court, analyses like Hillebrecht's risk 
decontextualizing political violence, attributing responsibility for increases and decreases in violence to 
the ICC without adequately considering simultaneous factors which also contribute to levels of 
violence. They also do not tell us why particular actors may respond to the ICC's activities with 
increased or decreased levels of violence. Moreover, an approach focused myopically on violence 
neglects empirical findings that increases in violence may, however counterintuitively, have positive 
effects on the potential resolution of a given conflict (see Greig and Diehl 2012, 108-112). In short, 
such studies cannot adequately demonstrate the complexity of issues and dynamics which affect levels 
of violent behaviour.  
 Focusing on positive peace is even more problematic. The achievement of positive peace is 
undoubtedly a noble and worthy aspiration. However, it is a distant, long-term and sometimes 
conceptually 'fuzzy' goal whose ultimate achievability is unclear. It may be the distant end to which 
societies aspire but never reach. Moreover, it isn't clear how the ICC, as a judicial institution, could or 
should contribute to a society's pursuit of social justice or the eradication structural violence.  
 More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, both approaches neglect that peace is often a 
product of a peace process – “a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means” 
and founded upon a “mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, 
and dialogue in both official and unofficial arenas.” (Saunders 2011, 483; See also Burgess 2004). The 
distinct factors and facets critical to a peace process are subsumed under the banner of 'peace'. Little, if 
any, attention is paid to what a peace process entails and the possibility of a complicated mix of effects 
on the distinct issues, phases and dynamics that constitute it. Even less attention is paid to the 
possibility that increases and decreases in violence or even failed negotiations are the consequence not 
of the ICC but of an altogether separate mix of factors, behaviours and interventions. Seeking to 
                                                 
13 
For difficulties in finding consensus on what constitutes 'reconciliation', see Graybill (2004). 
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ascertain whether international criminal justice is “good or bad” or “helps or hinders” obfuscates how 
international criminal justice may impact these particular phases, dynamics and issues of peace 
processes – and how. As a result, approaches to analyzing the peace-justice debate have proved 
insufficient in understanding the effects of the ICC on ongoing conflicts and, in particular, its effects on 
moving peace processes forward. Gradually, this is changing. 
 Despite “limited attention, among conflict researchers, directed toward how states attempt to 
deal with their past history of violence and how this can eventually affect the prospects for long-term 
peace and stability” (Lie et al 2006, 1), there is a slow but welcome acknowledgement that international 
criminal justice should be studied through the lens of peacebuilding (see Sriram 2007; Newman 3t al 
2009; Campbell et al 2011; Ramsbotham et al 2011; Sriram et al 2013). This chapter, the analytical 
core of the thesis, seeks to add to this growing body of research by proposing a novel framework for 
studying the effects of international criminal justice on conflict resolution and peace processes. This is 
achieved by bringing key elements pertaining to peace processes into the peace-justice debate. 
 Our first task is to identify how an ICC intervention may impact the understanding or narrative 
of a conflict as well as the incentives and attitudes of the parties towards the prospect of entering 
negotiations. The chapter posits that the conflict narrative – the overarching framing or understanding 
of a conflict's causes and dynamics – along with the attitudes and incentives of the warring parties 
towards entering a potential peace process will affect all other issues, phases and dynamics of any 
potential peace process. How the ICC shapes these two issue areas will ultimately determine whether 
and how a given peace process moves forward.  
 Our second task is to identify the dynamics and phases that are required to move parties towards 
a peaceful settlement and how the ICC may affect them. There is a general recognition within conflict 
and peace studies that a peace process consists of three key stages: pre-negotiation, negotiation and 
post-negotiation (see, e.g., Höglund 2008, 15; Greig and Diehl 2012, 16). Others consider additional 
phases (See, e.g., Guelke 2008, 63-77; Kriegsberg 1998, 280-284), but the inclusion of these three 
phases is uncontroversial. Moreover, each phase in a peace process is itself made up of different issues 
and dynamics. How the ICC affects these dynamics will affect the potential for a peace process to 
move towards the ultimate aim of conflict resolution. Taking the above, a framework to study and 






Chart 3.1: The Effects of ICC Intervention on Peace Processes  
 
Of course, not all conflicts will follow the same trajectory. Peace and conflict processes are rarely, if 
ever, linear. Importantly, and as illustrated in the framework, some conflicts will never reach a 
negotiation phase but instead end through the military victory of one side (such as in the case of Sri 
Lanka) or return to a state of conflict (such as the Central African Republic). Indeed, the former 
situation is especially relevant to the analysis offered in this thesis as Libya is an example of a one-
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sided military victory of the opposition over the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. But even in such 
instances, we should expect that the new government and transitional state will make decisions 
regarding matters of international criminal justice and accountability – even if that decision is to ignore 
the matter altogether. Moreover, and as elaborated below, we should expect that the manner in which a 
conflict ends will shape and determine the new government's approach to confronting past atrocities. 
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I. Conflict Narratives: From Causes and Dynamics to Good and Evil 
How conflicts are understood will invariably affect many, if not all, the stages of a peace process. This 
section is concerned with the over-arching narrative of a conflict and how it may be affected by ICC 
interventions into ongoing and active conflicts. A conflict narrative can be understood as the dominant 
lens or, as Sverker Finnström (2009, 100) describes it, the “official discourse” enacted to make sense of 
the conflict. The particular focus here is on how a conflict is perceived in terms of its causes and 
dynamics. Debates about the causes and dynamics of conflict represent efforts not only to understand 
the persistence of political violence but to understand the very nature of a conflict. 
 Understandings of what causes and fuels violence ultimately shape the dominant narrative of a 
conflict. It is generally accepted that the causes of violence need to be distinguished from the dynamics 
of war and that addressing both is critical to any successful peace process (Azar 1986, 31; Burton 
1986a, 29).14 A number of theories have been put forward to explain why political violence is chosen 
as the expression of conflict and why it persists in civil wars. The 'greed versus grievance' debate 
attempts to tackle precisely this question (see Berdal and Malone 2000). On the one hand, authors such 
as a Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that, as rational agents, parties to a conflict will pursue violence 
primarily as a result of economic dispositions and cost-benefit analyses (see Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 
Reno 2000, 43-68; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563-595). On the other hand, numerous authors have 
suggested that it is the political grievances of the parties, and not economic greed, that is at the root 
cause and driving motivation of violence. Disagreements over issues such as identity, ethnicity, 
religious affiliation, or social class are the ultimate causes and drivers of violence (see also Azar 1986, 
29; Burton 1986b, 99).  Others suggest that greed versus grievance is a false debate. The reality is that 
no conflict can easily be grouped as purely greed-based or grievance-based and “we really need to 
understand how 'greed' and grievance interact.” (Emphasis in original) (Keen 2008, 30; see also Dolan 
2009, 255). Nevertheless, the debate demonstrates the extent to which understandings of the causes of 
violence play a role in how conflict resolution is approached. Even those who are altogether skeptical 
of the utility of identifying “root causes” accept that the identification of the causes and dynamics of a 
conflict has largely determined approaches to resolving violence (see Woodward 2007).  
 A second feature that plays out in narratives of conflicts is the demonization and vilification of 
belligerents. It is common in violent political conflicts for each side to demonize the other in an attempt 
                                                 
14
 Not all agree, however. Susan Woodward (2007, 164) posits that a focus on root causes can be 
deleterious, observing that “there are some very good reasons and some not so good why the ‘root 
causes’ do not matter in successfully ending a civil war.” 
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to undermine the legitimacy of their adversary's positions and aims while elevating the legitimacy of 
their own. This rhetoric frames the cause of the conflict as the particular attributes and 'evil' of an 
adversary and establishes a 'good' versus 'evil' account where one side of the war is dehumanized and 
viewed as illogical and barbaric (Mazurana 2005, 30). As explored below, the process of vilification 
can impinge on the possibility of a negotiated settlement.  
 How might the ICC affect the dominant narrative of a conflict and, more specifically, 
understandings of the causes and dynamics of violence? First, the ICC is likely to bolster a 'good' 
versus 'evil' account of the conflict into which it intervenes. As Gerry Simpson (2007, 157) writes: 
“War crimes trials describe a world of bad men doing evil deeds.” Through its investigations and 
issuance of arrest warrants, the ICC has a labelling function which can have profound effects on 
understandings of a conflict. This is not to say that the ICC itself creates 'good' versus 'evil' narratives. 
As a familiar feature of violent conflict, such a framing of a conflict will likely pre-date any ICC 
intervention. However, the ICC may contribute to entrenching this understanding of the war. After all, 
few things are more effective at demonizing a party to a conflict than accusations that they have 
committed the most egregious violations against 'humanity' – war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Importantly, once an arrest warrant has been issued, the warrant and its effects on 
stigmatizing the indicted party are likely to be permanent. Some groups that have previously been 
politically rehabilitated, such as Sinn Féin or the Palestine Liberation Organization, did not have the 
stigma of criminal arrest warrants hanging over them. In the case of an ICC-indictee, a warrant is 'live' 
until the individual is either tried or deceased. Indictees may thus carry their stigma indefinitely. For 
example, while Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir agreed to allow South Sudan to peacefully separate 
from Sudan, he remains permanently stigmatized as a perpetrator of genocide in Darfur, in large part 
because of the ICC's arrest warrant against him.15  
 Second, and relatedly, the intervention of the ICC may produce a narrative that is, above all, 
about particular individuals. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ICC functions to individualize guilt and 
responsibility for the crimes under its jurisdiction. A by-product of pursuing individual responsibility 
for atrocities is the ascription of responsibility of a conflict to specific individuals. There is a risk that 
the ICC places the “entire blame for violence on a few particularly 'savage' Africans – whether Omar 
al-Bashir or Kony – by misrepresenting situations and reducing the wide set of actors and structures 
                                                 
15
 Bashir was charged in March 2009 with crimes against humanity in genocide. In July 2010 charges 
of genocide were added. As noted in Chapter 2, his stigmatization has not prevented him from traveling 
on diplomatic missions, including to ICC member-states.  
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involved in violence to just a few individuals.” (Branch 2011, 213). Moreover, as Keen (2008, 3) points 
out, “[w]here atrocities are seen as a kind of moral collapse, they are usually portrayed as the work of 
particularly bad (or evil) individuals.” Individuals indicted by the ICC are likely to receive this label 
and be consequently delegitimized as belligerents in the conflict and, possibly, as negotiation partners.  
 For the ICC, social and socio-economic causes and dynamics are irrelevant. After all, only 
individuals can end up in the dock at The Hague. Thus, where the ICC intervenes, we should expect to 
see those individuals it investigates and indicts take a prominent, even dominant, role in the narrative of 
the conflict. The individual perpetrator wanted by the ICC, in this context, may be seen as the very 
cause of the conflict itself. Bringing such individuals to justice, then, is likely to be seen as being a 
form of conflict resolution in and of itself. The trope that there can be “no peace without justice” here 
suggests that conflict resolution is not possible unless those guilty of atrocities are brought to account. 
This certainly has been the case with Joseph Kony, Omar al-Bashir and Muammar Gaddafi, figures 
who have assumed 'larger-than-life' roles during the wars in northern Uganda, Darfur, and Libya, 
respectively. Their stigmatization has inspired and entrenched views that resolving the wars 
necessitates their 'removal'. 
 Third, the ICC is a fundamentally dynamics-focused institution; it is largely irrelevant why 
crimes were committed and the political context in which atrocities occur is not intended to have any 
bearing on the Court's investigations or prosecutions. “Greed or grievance?” is not a question one is 
likely to hear in an ICC courtroom.16 What matters is that atrocities occur and that when they do, a 
legal and moral framework exists to punish those 'most responsible'. As Louise Arbour (2012) 
observes: “Humanitarian or judicial objectives address only the manner in which the conflict unfolds” 
(emphasis added). This has been a point of contention for some observers. Mahmood Mamdani (2009, 
272), for example, has decried the decision by the ICC to charge Bashir with genocide in Darfur, 
insisting that it has decontextualized the conflict in favour of a view whereby “all deaths, 'direct' or 
'indirect,' are the result of a single cause – violence – coming from a single source: the government of 
Sudan.” Mamdani (Ibid., 273) adds that the ICC's “mono-causal and one-dimensional version of 
history” amounted to “demonization masquerading as justice.” In contexts where the ICC intervenes, 
the Court will thus likely contribute to a narrative of the war that is based on the dynamics of violence 
and atrocity (by 'evil' forces or individuals), neglecting the causes underlying violence.  
 Importantly, the neglect of a conflict's causes, as well as some of its dynamics, is likely to be 
                                                 
16 
Interestingly, however, there have been calls to address economic greed within the ICC. See, for 
example, Clarke (2013). 
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exacerbated in cases where the Court intervenes in conflicts whose roots lie beyond the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. The Court has a limited temporal jurisdiction and can only investigate atrocities which occur 
after 1 July 2002. Moreover, the Court's temporal jurisdiction can be restricted by the UN Security 
Council when it refers a situation to the Court, as it did in the case of Libya (see Chapters 6 and 8). The 
effects of a tribunal's temporal jurisdiction on a conflict are important. The decision to intervene in 
conflicts whose causes precede the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC may affect who is investigated and 
prosecuted. Moreover, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC may also obfuscate the role and 
responsibility of other actors in contributing to or even creating the conditions under which atrocities 
occur. For example, the temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
was restricted by the UN Security Council to the period of 1 January to 31 December 1994, despite 
Rwanda's demands that the tribunal be granted a broader mandate. As a result, the Tribunal has been 
unable to investigate the role of Belgian and French forces in fostering the conditions for the genocide 
(Lanegran 20045, 114), not to mention allegations that the Rwandan Patriotic Front subsequently 
conducted a counter-genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo (see Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010).  
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II. The Attitudes and Incentives of Warring Parties  
The attitudes and incentives of parties towards committing to a peace process are determined by 
whether the parties believe that their interests are better served by engaging in peace talks or by 
continuing to fight. The decision-making of the warring parties in this context will ultimately shape and 
determine the potential for a peace process to begin – and potentially succeed.  
 Giessman and Wils (2011, 190) suggest three motivations for parties to engage in mediated 
peace negotiations: negotiations may become the preferred strategic option for the parties as a result of 
a military stalemate, because of support within the party's constituency for negotiations, or as an 
attempt to use the negotiations as a cover to regain military strength; entering negotiations may be a 
communication strategy aimed at giving “a public signal of readiness to compromise” while increasing 
pressure on the other party to “react constructively;” or the parties entering into negotiations may seek 
to improve the “general conflict environment” by communicating to interested parties that the conflict 
can be transformed (Ibid., 190-191). At the core of all of these motivations is a desire of the parties to 
retain or rescue their sense of legitimacy.  
 It should come as no surprise that the framing of a conflict as good-versus-evil can shape the 
attitudes and incentives of parties towards peace talks. Greig and Diehl (2012, 124) argue that accounts 
which pit 'good' against 'evil' tend to make “negotiating with the other side difficult and settlement of 
the conflict virtually impossible.” In a similar vein, Bertram I. Spector (1998, 44-49) argues that 
demonization raises the costs of negotiation by giving the decision to negotiate the appearance of 
appeasement and any negotiator the potential label of hypocrites and collaborators in evil. Moreover, 
One of the major consequences of villainization is the closing off of the negotiation 
option and the peaceful settlement of disputes...[and] often the immediate response of 
the villain is further rigidity in its position and an escalation of the conflict. (Ibid., 47). 
  
Demonization may thus have the effect of reducing the space for peaceful approaches to conflict 
resolution by raising the costs of negotiations. International actors understand the utility (and danger) 
of labelling actors as criminal and 'evil' on the potential to initiate peace negotiations. For example, 
when it was suggested that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad be labelled a criminal for his role in the 
Syrian civil war, US Secretary of State responded by stating that “[b]ased on definitions of war 
criminal and crimes against humanity, there would be an argument to be made that he would fit into 
that category... But I also think that from long experience that can complicate a resolution of a difficult, 




 None of this is to say that negotiations with 'villains' cannot occur. Spector (1998, 45) cites 
numerous cases in which a previously identified 'villain' is negotiated with, including negotiations 
between the UK Government and the Sinn Féin as well as Israel's decision to negotiate with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However, this requires and a commitment to “overcome the 
very designation of the other party as a villain...Without this prenegotiation decision, real negotiation 
will never occur.” (Ibid.). 
 The decision of whether to negotiate with “extremists”, “terrorists”, or “international criminals” 
is as difficult as it is controversial (see Spector 1998, 43-59; Fisher et al 1999, 168-171; Zartman 
2008a; Mnookin 2010; Zartman and Faure 2011). Negotiating with 'villains' is likely to “be morally, 
politically and legally sanctioned.” (Slim 2007, 10). The colouring of a conflict as 'good' and 'evil' has 
consequently created opportunities for parties to reject negotiating with an opponent on the basis of its 
perceived 'evil', a label often constructed and reproduced by the very same party that is unwilling to 
negotiate. In other words, a 'good' versus 'evil' narrative of the conflict can be 'tapped into' in order to 
justify the positions and decisions of the warring parties towards negotiations. For example, following 
overtures on the part of the Taliban to negotiate a 'truce' in Afghanistan with the United States, former 
US Vice President Dick Cheney responded: “We don't negotiate with terrorists.” Cheney then 
reaffirmed the country's commitment to a full military solution: “I think you have to destroy them...It's 
the only way to deal with them.” (See Fattah 2006). Cheney's statement demonstrated how the 
demonization of an entire group as “terrorists” could justify both a refusal to negotiate as well as a 
commitment to a military solution to the conflict.
17
  
 There are undoubtedly risks in negotiating with stigmatized individuals and groups, including 
that doing so bestows legitimacy to such actors and their causes. The decision of parties to negotiate 
with 'evil' thus presents a baseline moral dilemma for the field of conflict resolution and one whose 
stakes may be exacerbated by ICC interventions.  
 It is important to also consider the attitudes and incentives of actors who may not be direct 
participants in the conflict but play a role in fuelling the war. Ensuring the right parties play a 
productive role in the peace process is a critical task (See Zartman 1989, 248). This requires having an 
understanding of the drivers of conflict, some of which may be beyond the boundaries of the state or 
conflict theatre. In particular, it is not unusual for regional or neighbouring powers to have active 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that the US, under Barack Obama, subsequently engaged in negotiations with the 
Taliban (see, e.g. Brennan 2013; Roberts and Graham-Harrison 2013) 
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interests in the conflict that need to be addressed (Giessman and Wils 2011, 191).18 Leaving key 
external parties outside of a peace process may doom attempts to find a sustainable solution to the 
conflict.  
 ICC investigations and arrest warrants may have numerous and diverse effects on the attitudes 
and incentives of conflict parties as well as their patrons. Firstly, individuals targeted by the ICC may 
respond to the Court's intervention violently. As outlined in Chapter 2, critics of international criminal 
justice's role in ongoing conflicts suggest that the ICC's targets will lose any incentives to peacefully 
resolve the conflict and thus will lash out. A re-commitment or outburst of violence may be a 
demonstration of strength in the face of the ICC on the part of the indicted individual. This is, for 
example, one way to interpret Bashir's expulsion of humanitarian groups from Darfur in the wake of his 
indictment by the ICC in 2009. However, violent responses may also be the result of an indicted 
individual being humiliated by the issuance of an arrest warrant. Emotions such as humiliation and 
embarrassment may result from investigations and indictments and subsequently impact the party's 
behaviour and attitudes towards peace. David Keen (2008, 50) has argued that humiliation can 
contribute to the ongoing production of violence (see also Gilligan 2000; 2003). In such cases, we may 
see actors entrench their commitment to violence. Crucially, however, attributing continued or 
escalated violence directly to the ICC requires evidence that the violence is linked to the Court's 
intervention and decision-making and not to other factors in the conflict. Continued violence may be a 
result of actors being 'locked-in' to a logic of violence or other factors, such as a military intervention 
by external parties.  
 It may not be the target(s) of the ICC who respond to the Court's intervention by renewing their 
commitment to violence. In cases where an ICC intervention is aimed at only one (or primarily at one) 
side of the conflict, such as in Uganda or Libya, the Court will shape and reaffirm a narrative of the 
conflict that ultimately benefits one side of the war, painting them as the legitimate and 'good' side by 
virtue of not being indicted. In contrast, the indicted party becomes 'criminal' and 'evil'. Non-targeted 
parties may believe that the Court's intervention signals a shift in the international community's 
perception of the conflict in their favour, bolstering their position in the war. In this way, the ICC's 
intervention may be seen not as a means to investigate a situation, but a way to investigate a particular 
party or group of adversaries. This is a widely held misconception. In his thorough and compelling 
                                                 
18
 The work of Gérard Prunier (2004; 2009) on the regional dynamics of conflict in Eastern and Central 




analysis of the Libyan uprising, Ethan Chorin (2012, 201) makes this error in writing that the UN 
Security Council made a “referral of key individuals to the International Criminal Court” (emphasis 
added) and not the situation in Libya itself. Such an interpretation may inspire a (re)commitment to 
violence and embolden those belligerents that the ICC doesn't target to continue fighting in the belief 
that a military victory against their 'evil', 'criminal' adversaries is ultimately achievable. The non-
targeted party may also tap into the 'good' versus 'evil framing of the conflict in order to justify their 
recalcitrance or refusal to explore a negotiated settlement. The non-indicted party may thus argue that it 
cannot negotiate with 'evil' or with 'criminals' and 'terrorists'. Notably, a refusal to negotiate with 
individuals wanted by the ICC fits with the Court's view that certain actors, namely those wanted on 
allegations of international crimes, are not, and can never be, legitimate negotiation partners. 
 But it is important not to discount the possibility that neither party responds violently to an ICC 
intervention. Some indicted actors may attempt to rescue the sense of legitimacy they perceive as being 
threatened by the Court. If they feel that the narratives produced by the involvement of the ICC, as 
discussed above, misrepresent them but can be altered or reversed, they may seek to communicate their 
interest in a peace process and commit to negotiations, viewing it as a platform or pulpit from which to 
make their case. This is most likely to be true for non-state actors such as rebel groups who do not 
otherwise have significant means to communicate with the outside world (see Giessman and Wils 2011, 
191). Engaging in the peace process may thus lend a degree of legitimacy to the indicted party. This is 
also likely to be heightened when only one side in the conflict is targeted by the ICC. Here, the indicted 
party may seek to use the peace process as a vehicle to communicate what they see as a more fair and 
accurate understanding of the conflict wherein both sides are seen as responsible for violence and 
human rights abuses.  
 An intervention by the ICC may also affect the perceived (in)security of a targeted party and 
cause them to retract. The ICC, in this context, may be seen as a direct threat to the viability of the 
targeted group and their security, particularly if they lose the support of external groups. Still, this does 
not necessarily mean that the targeted group will respond violently. Rather, they may take a defensive 
approach and even enter peace negotiations in order to bide their time. If insecurity and fear for safety 
is caused by the ICC's intervention, it is likely that the targeted group will seek guarantees against 
prosecution as a precondition to entering peace negotiations (see the case of the LRA in Chapter 4).  
 The attitudes and incentives of indicted parties may also be affected by the response of external 
parties and patrons with interests in the conflict to an ICC intervention. The Court's interventions may 
create an important disincentive for conflict patrons to continue supporting – financially or otherwise – 
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the investigated or indicted party, particularly where international scrutiny and the possibility of 
sanctions is high. This, in turn, may affect the indicted party's interest in entering negotiations. An 
indicted party may seek to fill the vacuum left by a departed patron by exploring the benefits of 
entering negotiations or by engaging in peace talks in order to 'buy time' to find new sources of support.  
 Similarly, it is possible that the ICC may encourage the defection of an ICC-indicted party's 
supporters and allies. Insofar as this weakens the indicted party, this too may have implications on the 
party's willingness to enter the peace process. Again, this does not tell us whether or not the party will 
seek negotiations because it views a peaceful settlement favourably or whether it does so in order to 
'buy time', regroup and rearm. Additionally, there is a danger in ascribing defections in the midst of 
conflict directly to the ICC whilst other factors, including the level of violence, sanctions and offers 
from third parties, may be as, if not more, influential. Nevertheless, if indicted individuals are isolated 
internally or externally as a direct or indirect result of the ICC, this gives some credence to the claims 
that the ICC can marginalize and isolate indicted individuals. 
 Lastly, it is important to consider the possibility that the ICC does not affect the attitudes and 
incentives of actors targeted by the ICC in any measurable way. In such cases, there may be more 
pressing issues at hand, such as an intense period of warfare or an ongoing international military 
intervention which threatens the very survival of the indicted party. In such cases, we might expect that 
little attention is paid to the dropping of ICC warrants in relation to the dropping of bombs. 
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III. The ICC and Peace Processes  
The overarching narrative of a conflict and the attitudes and incentives of warring parties to enter peace 
talks are key factors which determine whether and how a potential peace process is initiated. Both 
factors filter through and affect the subsequent phases, issues and dynamics of any given peace process. 
This section 'explodes' peace processes into their constituent phases, issues and dynamics and suggests 
how the ICC can affect each.  
 Peace processes generally consist of at least three phases: a pre-negotiation phase, a negotiation 
phase, and a post-negotiation phase. Each of these stages is made up of additional issues and dynamics. 
This is not to suggest that all peace processes will pass through all three phases or that they will do so 
similarly. Some efforts to resolve and transform conflict may fail before they reach the negotiation 
phase. Others may fail during negotiations, resulting in a return to violence or a new round of mediated 
talks, while others may fail in the post-negotiation phase as parties de-rail the implementation of peace 
agreements. It should also be noted that the phases in a peace process – and the issues and dynamics 
within them – cannot be neatly packaged (Zartman 1989, 237). It may not always be clear where one 
phase ends and another begins – or vice versa. Issues and dynamics that affect one phase will often leak 
into and shape subsequent stages. In short, the packaging of a peace process into neatly delineated 
phases belies the complexity and dynamism of conflict resolution, where phases often blur and blend 
rather than begin and end. While it is essential to recognize this reality, the thesis nevertheless treats the 
phases under consideration as analytically distinct. Parsing them out provides a useful way to examine 
how international criminal justice affects the unique issues and dynamics within each stage of a peace 
process. 
 
III.I. Getting to the Table: The Pre-Negotiation Phase 
Studies of the pre-negotiation phase of peace talks are ultimately concerned with the distinct dynamics 
and decisions which affect the willingness of parties to 'get to the table'. Pre-negotiation is, as Janice 
Gross Stein (1989, 232) remarks, a process that is “analytically distinct and prior to the process of 
negotiation.” Zartman (1988, 240) concisely spells out the parameters of the pre-negotiation stage of a 
peace process:  
Prenegotiation begins when one or more party considers negotiation as a policy option 
and communicates this intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree to 
formal negotiations...or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an 
option...In essential terms, prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which the 
parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual problem to a joint search 
for cooperative multilateral or joint solutions...[T]he nature of the activity lies not in 
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conducting the combined search for a/the solution but in arriving at and in convincing 
the other party to arrive at the conclusion that some joint solution is possible. 
 
Critically, the pre-negotiation stage offers potential learning which may enable “the parties to 
reconceive their relationship” (Stein 1989, 232) and permit them “to move from conflicting perceptions 
and behaviours” to cooperative ones, thus creating a shift towards a “conciliatory mentality, believing 
the solution is to be found with, not against, the adversary.” (Zartman 1988, 243). Where pre-
negotiations fail to move the peace process towards official negotiations, the parties will likely return to 
using violence as the dominant expression of conflict until the military victory of one party over the 
other or a renewed round of pre-negotiations.  
 At least three issues are of critical importance in the negotiation phase: the timing of the 
negotiations, the decision of where to hold peace talks, and the mediation strategies employed to get 
parties to the negotiation table. 
 
(i) Ripe Moments: The Timing of Peace Talks   
Few issues have garnered as much attention amongst scholars and practitioners of international conflict 
resolution as when negotiations should be initiated. “Parties resolve their conflict only when they are 
ready to do so” (Zartman 2003) and the success of a peace process depends on the “proper timing of 
and necessary conditions for the launching of an appropriate mediation process.” (Mitchell 1993, 156). 
 While many authors have written about the importance of identifying “ripe” moments in the 
peace process (See, e.g., Kriegsberg and Thorson 1991; Haass 1990), no one has so systematically 
explored the timing of negotiations as William Zartman (See Zartman 1989; Zartman 2000; Zartman 
2008b, pg.232-244; Zartman 2008c). Ripe moments, according to Zartman (1989, 43), occur when 
parties experience a mutually hurting stalemate wherein the conflict presents itself to the warring 
parties as an endless, “flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future”. Faced with a decision to either 
continue fighting a war they cannot win and which is incurring high costs on the belligerents and few 
benefits, the parties will decide that an alternative approach to resolving the conflict is desirable. The 
parties may be spurred on by a “recent or impending catastrophe” which pushes them out of the violent 
deadlock towards negotiations (Zartman 2008c, 232). Ripeness thus pertains to both the ideal timing as 
well the right conditions for peace talks (Fisher 2011, 20). It reflects the reality, as Rubin (1991, 238) 
puts it, that conflicts have a life cycle which “consists of blips and bulges rather than a straight 
line...[and these] changes in intensity create opportunities for movement.” In short, this mutually 
hurting stalemate is a necessary (if insufficient) condition for a shift in strategic thinking away from 
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attempting to achieve military victory towards a consideration of resolving the conflict via peace 
negotiations. If the desire to negotiate is reciprocal, a “mutually enticing opportunity” to find a peaceful 
resolution may emerge between the parties. 
 Some have criticized or attempted to reformulate Zartman's ripeness theory. Kleiboer (1994 
115-116) questioned whether ripeness is a “fruitful notion” and suggested that the concept of 
“willingness” to negotiate is more appropriate because willingness allows for the “possibility of 
conflict management at a much earlier stage” than ripeness. Lederach (2008, 38) also takes aim at the 
concept of ripeness, arguing that it assumes a linearity to conflict that is unlikely to exist and thus is 
“more like a rear-view mirror than a windshield” to understanding why parties enter a peace process 
when they do. Pruitt (2005, iv) treats Zartman's work more favourably but suggests an alternative 
theory in postulating “readiness theory” which posits that “an actor’s readiness for conflict resolution is 
a function of both motivation to end the conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation.” There 
is thus a general agreement that the timing of negotiations and the factors that bring parties to the table 
at a particular moment is critical – even if the details of when is right and how to identify the best time 
to negotiate remains contested. In short, timing matters. Not all moments in a conflict are best or ideal 
for mediation and negotiation.  
 The questions with regards to the ICC's effects are rather simple: does the Court's involvement 
affect the conditions which lead to peace negotiations at a particular time and, if so, how? Can an 
intervention by the ICC contribute to 'ripeness' and the emergence of a mutually hurting stalemate 
between the parties? 
 First, the ICC may inhibit a mutually hurting stalemate from emerging. It may, as many suggest 
(see, e.g. de Waal 2010; Weissman 2010; Mbeki and Mamdani 2014), embolden targeted parties to 
respond with renewed or heightened violence. Moreover, as suggested above, the labelling of actors as 
“evil” criminals may embolden the non-targeted party to continue fighting rather than enter 
negotiations, if it believes that the intervention of the ICC is part of a larger international agenda which 
can help it defeat its enemy. The non-targeted party may thus read the investigation or indictment of its 
adversary as a legitimization of its own position and its use of violence and consequently refuse to 
enter into any process which reconceives their adversary as a legitimate negotiation partner. In such 
instances we might expect the emergence of a ripe moment for negotiations to be frustrated by the 
ICC's intervention in favour of the non-targeted party committing to continued violence. This is true 
even if the ICC-targeted adversary is prepared to negotiate. As Greig and Diehl (2012, 109) write: “[a] 
one-sided hurting stalemate would leave a situation in which the unconstrained side may continue 
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fighting and reject any settlement attempts.” 
 Alternatively, the ICC may have the opposite effect, altering the strategic and tactical 
calculations of the parties involved and thus contributing positively to the emergence of a mutually 
hurting stalemate. This may occur directly or indirectly. Directly, a party may feel threatened by ICC 
investigations and arrest warrants and thus explore whether it is possible to enter negotiations, perhaps 
with the aim of negotiating the removal of indictments. Indirectly, patrons of a party under the 
microscope of the ICC may, as mentioned above, remove their support for fear of being associated with 
an investigated and indicted party or because of other international pressures. If the now marginalized 
party was highly dependent on the patron's support, this could move them closer towards a recognition 
that 'winning' the conflict is impossible; a negotiated settlement thus emerges as an attractive 
alternative. In other words, an investigation or indictment may create, or may be perceived by the party 
as, a “recent catastrophe”. However, as noted above, there remains the ever-present risk that 
negotiations may also be used as a means to buy time to re-organize and seek new patrons.  
 
(ii) Location of Negotiations 
The selection of a location for negotiations is never random. While the decision-making involved in 
choosing a location for peace talks has not receive its scholarly significant attention, it is of critical 
importance (see Holbrooke 1998, 203-204; Giessmann and Wils, 2011, 183-206; Brown and Baer 
2011, 190–200). As Salacuse and Rubin (1990, 5) explain: 
Site selection, in fact, is always an important decision in negotiation... The reason for 
this concern is that disputants almost always assumed and with good reason--that the 
particular location in which they negotiate will have consequences for the ensuing 
process and, ultimately, its results. 
 
Salacuse and Rubin (1990, 5-10) outline four possible locations to hold negotiations: in the territory of 
either of the warring parties, in a third-party's territory, or, as a result of technological advancements, in 
a virtual space. There exists considerable disagreement about which types of location are best suited to 
negotiate the termination of violent political conflict. Some view distant locations as most appropriate. 
According to Wallenstein (2007, 45), for example, a “needs-based approach” to conflict resolution 
views negotiations as best “held far from the scene.” Geissman and Wils (2011, 198), conversely, 
maintain that the preferences of the protagonists in a conflict will generally be inclined to hold 
negotiations within the conflict state or at least nearby. They further list key characteristics of an ideal 
location: safety and security for the parties, neutrality, and confidentiality (ibid., 199), but concede that, 
in protracted conflicts, finding neutral ground may require holding negotiations outside of the conflict 
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country. This may prove difficult for rebel groups which find it difficult to travel to other states for fear 
of being detained or attacked (ibid.). Importantly, Salacuse and Rubin (1990, 9) note that the presence 
of a third-party mediator is likely to be a determining factor: “one of the most important contributions 
that a third party can make as mediator or conciliator is to offer the disputants an acceptable place to 
negotiate.” This was the case, for example, with the Camp David and Dayton Accords (see Holbrooke 
1998, 203-204), where the US offered both its mediation and its territory to the disputants. It might be 
added that some states take particular interest in gaining reputational benefits by offering their territory 
for negotiations. The tiny Middle Eastern country of Qatar, for example, has positioned itself as host to 
a multitude of international negotiations and dispute resolutions, including the Darfur peace talks and 
recent negotiations between the US and the Taliban (Hounshell 2012). 
 Does the ICC affect the location of peace negotiations and, if so, how? First, it would be 
expected that negotiations involving indicted individuals do not happen on the territory of a third-party 
state which is a member of the ICC. If negotiations were held in a member state of the ICC, there 
would likely be a significant outcry as well as pressure from the international community and 
international human rights groups for the host state to detain and surrender the ICC-indicted individual 
to the Court, creating an unwelcome distraction for the parties and mediators. In other words, states 
concerned about the domestic and reputational costs of hosting stigmatized actors are unlikely to offer 
their territory as a location for talks. Notably, Qatar is not a member-state of the ICC and thus caters as 
a suitable location for talks on the Darfuri conflict in which both members of the government of Sudan 
and rebel groups have been indicted by the ICC. 
 Second, it is expected that the indicted parties will seek to influence the decision on where to 
hold negotiations. As suggested above, security and safety concerns are likely to loom large in the 
selection of a setting for peace talks. Indicted individuals are thus unlikely to feel secure travelling to 
states where their apprehension is distinctly possible or probable. At the very least, we would expect 
them to seek guarantees that they will not be arrested. At times, this may require an offer or promise of 
amnesty (see below). However, this may not suffice in convincing the indicted party to be present at 
peace talks.  
 The choice of location will also be affected by who is indicted. Government parties are unlikely 
to fear using their territory as a location for negotiations, even if they are a member of the ICC. Rebels, 
on the other hand, are unlikely to feel secure negotiating on the government's territory or the territory 
of an ICC member-state where there is a risk of being arrested and extradited to The Hague.  
 While a debate remains as to what an ideal location for peace talks is, there is a general 
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agreement that location matters. Parties to a peace process have an interest in where talks are held and, 
at least in some cases, an ICC intervention will shape the decision-making and rationale of where peace 
negotiations are held.  
 
(iii) Mediation Strategies to Get Parties to the Negotiation Table  
There is no universally accepted definition of “mediation”. However, as Fisher (2011, 159) points out, 
all definitions share a few key characteristics. Mediation “is the intervention of a skilled and impartial 
intermediary working to facilitate a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement on the issues that are the 
substance of the dispute between the parties.” According to Greig and Diehl (2012, 2), it is also 
important to recognize that “mediation is voluntary on the part of disputants as well as the mediator.” 
Bercovitch and Gartner (2009, 20-21) add that “mediation is a rational, political process, representing a 
strategic engagement between parties and a mediator” that is most likely to be pursued in complex 
conflicts where other attempts to manage the conflict have failed, making the possibility of mediation 
more appealing to the protagonists. Fisher (2011, 173-174) concurs, adding that, “[s]adly, mediation 
efforts are typically initiated only after the parties' attempts have failed and coercion or violence has 
already taken place.” (See also Kleiboer 1994, 115). 
 Mediators may be individuals (e.g. former US President Jimmy Carter or former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki) although, by a rather significant margin, mediation is largely carried out by 
states or international organizations (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992, 10-14; Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, 
22-26).19 Mediators can also be 'official' – appointed to the position of professionally mediating a 
negotiation, or unofficial – individuals or groups are not officially appointed mediators but take on 
mediator-type roles. Further, mediators can take a multitude of forms and roles in the conflict 
resolution process (see Mitchell 1993, 141-148; Keashley and Fisher 1996, 241-242; Moore 2003).  
 Choosing a mediator remains an issue of much contention. The choice is highly context-
dependent, reflecting the particular needs, interests and expectations of the parties involved (see 
Giessmann and Wils 2011, 196). There is little agreement on whether mediators should and can be 
impartial, disinterested and neutral. Fisher (1996, 161) argues that mediators, while not disinterested in 
the outcome of a dispute, should not have any “direct interest” in the conflict itself. Bercovitch and 
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Even in cases where organizations and states conduct mediation, according to Greig and Diehl (2012, 
92) “[m]ediation is actually carried out not by states or organizations per se, but by their chosen 




Houston (1996, 13) disagree, arguing that “[m]ediators may intervene to protect the parties or to 
promote their own interests.” It may simply be impossible for mediators not to not have a political 
predisposition regarding the conflict. As Zartman and Touval (1985, 32) write: “mediators are players 
in the plot of relations around the conflict with some interest in its outcome; otherwise they would not 
mediate.” Bercovitch and Rubin (1992, 6) suggest that “[m]ediators are not, and cannot be neutral”; 
they can be “impartial, or better still perceived as impartial, but they certainly can not be neutral.” (see 
also Groeneveld-Savisaar and Vuković 2011, 110). Bercovitch (1996, 5), moreover, adds that mediators 
“need to be seen as having access to resources and the ability to get the conflict parties out of a no-win 
situation. It is resources and the ability to effect a change, not the appearance of impartiality, that are 
the sine qua non of effective mediation.”  
 In general, there is broad agreement that the choice of mediator should “engender trust on the 
part of the parties”, have the “requisite knowledge and skill to properly fulfill their role,” (Fisher 2011, 
8) and “be acceptable to both parties.” (Bercovitch 1996, 5).20 Mediators cannot be overtly favourable 
to one side of the conflict. As Burton (1986b, 105) argues, “[t]hey are required to be, and to be seen to 
be, supportive of all parties.” (emphasis in original). Above all, they must be supportive of achieving 
peace. In short, it seems clear that the choice of mediator should be accepted by both sides of the 
conflict, be able to engender trust, and have adequate resources at their disposal. These characteristics 
are strategically employed to move the conflict towards peaceful resolution. Key amongst these 
strategies is the use of incentives.  
 Numerous authors have noted the importance of incentives in keeping protagonists committed 
to the peace process (see, e.g. Ramsbotham et al 2011). These might be divided into negative and 
positive incentives or “carrots and sticks”. Importantly, those third-party actors with the most leverage 
are not necessarily the best mediators. Hard power may actually undermine a mediator's reputation and 
credibility (Giessmann and Wils 2011, 197). However, along with putting pressure on the parties, the 
use of coercive and non-coercive incentives by mediators “can prove decisive” (Lake and Rothchild 
1996, 21; see also Zartman 1995, 21).  
 There are a number questions regarding how the ICC may affect mediation: is the selection of 
the mediator affected by the ICC? How does the ICC affect the mediators' strategies in convincing the 
                                                 
20 There is, however, disagreement as to how much knowledge of the conflict the mediator should 
have. Burton (1986b, 105), for example, argues that it is better that the mediator “not have a 
specialized knowledge of the area and of parties involved...An 'expert is likely to know the answers 
before the parties have met!” 
77 
 
warring parties to come to the negotiating table? Does the mediator address the question of justice 
head-on or neglect it? 
 Because the mediator must engender trust in the parties that they will be fair aFnd serve (at least 
some of) their interests, we might expect that mediators are rarely chosen from states or organizations 
closely associated with the ICC. Intuitively, this would be the case where the cost of negotiating with 
'evil', in terms of public opinion, is especially high. For example, it would be unimaginable to see a 
high-ranking European diplomat serving in the role of mediator with Kony or al-Bashir. The problem 
of granting legitimacy to indicted parties may also prohibit certain international organizations from 
offering their mediation. For example, the United Nations has voiced a certain, albeit somewhat 
confusing, weariness towards mediators interacting with ICC indictees. In its 2012 Mediation 
Guidelines, the UN declared that mediators should “[l]imit contacts with actors that have been indicted 
by the International Criminal Court to what is necessary for the mediation process” and be clear that 
they “cannot endorse peace agreements that provide for amnesties for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights.” (United Nations 2012). However, in some 
cases, ICC member-states and international organizations consisting of member-states actively offer 
mediation to the warring parties. The African Union (AU), for example, has provided mediation in 
situations where the ICC has intervened, including in Libya and Darfur. The AU may be able to achieve 
the trust of indicted parties as a result of its vocal criticism of the ICC's interventions into African 
states, particularly where the ICC seeks indictments for sitting heads of states (Mills 2012, 404-447) as 
well as its support for balancing the prerogatives of justice and peacemaking (see Akande et al 2010). A 
state or organization may also have long-standing relations with the indicted party, engendering its trust 
as a moderator. In short, mediators may decline to offer their services to warring parties as a result of 
an ICC intervention, especially if they will incur political and/or reputational costs for mediating with 
'evil'. But this may not always be the case. The ability of the parties to have confidence in the mediator 
is ultimately of primary importance.  
 Once a mediator has been chosen, they may either address the issue of the ICC arrest warrants 
or strategically neglect it. It is possible that, in attempts to move the parties towards the negotiating 
table, the question of the ICC – and justice and accountability more generally – is rejected or ignored as 
an issue by the mediator. Other issues, especially in high-intensity conflicts, may be more pressing for 
the parties to negotiate or the question of justice may be relegated until other, more 'negotiable' issues 
are resolved. In such cases, we would expect a mediator to show little concern for any arrest warrant or 
ongoing investigation and press on with other issues which the mediator judges to be more likely to 
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move the conflict towards a negotiated settlement.  
 Alternatively, reflecting the central role and fate of the particular individuals indicted by the ICC 
to the peace process, the mediator may view the ICC's indictments as an issue which must be 
confronted head-on for the parties to get to the negotiating table. In such cases, the decision to confront 
indictments directly is likely to be a response to the indicted party's desire to address their sense of 
insecurity, something that, as noted above, arrest warrants may engender. In such cases, there are a 
number of strategies which may be employed.  
 The most likely avenue to evade arrest warrants is through the offer or promise of an amnesty to 
the indicted party. An amnesty's “primary function is to remove the prospect and consequences of 
criminal liability for designated individuals or classes of persons.” (Freeman 2009, 13). Historically, 
amnesties have been granted as a key incentive for parties to negotiate, allowing the parties to escape 
accountability for human rights abuses and crimes committed during the conflict (See Snyder and 
Vinjamuri 2003/04, 5-44; Cobban 2006a; Mallinder 2007, 208-230; Vinjamuri and Boesenecker 2007; 
Freeman 2009). This stems from a logic that parties to a conflict would not enter negotiations if “they 
would find themselves or their close associates facing life imprisonment.” (Scharf 1999, 508). 
Amnesties are seen, in this context, as “necessary evils” or a “least-worst option” (Freeman 2009, 23). 
As Christine Bell (2000, 1-2) writes, “[i]f the choice is between an imperfect peace and a perfect war, 
imperfect peace may be worth a gamble.”  
 The use of amnesties goes to the heart of strategies available in negotiations. Numerous authors 
point to the importance of flexibility as a key quality of mediators (see, e.g. Giessmann and Wils 2011, 
197; Bercovitch 1996, 4). In this context, the ICC, which is antithetical to the use of amnesties for 
“atrocity crimes” (Scheffer 2006), may reduce the flexibility of mediators and thus their ability to offer 
amnesties (or exile) as an incentive for the parties to come to the negotiating table. In short, amnesties 
for crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC may be increasingly removed from the mediator's 
'negotiation toolkit'.  
 Amnesties may also be offered in conjunction with offers of exile which, for all intents and 
purposes, constitute de facto amnesty.21 Exile has often been used as an incentive to remove leaders 
from power. For example, in the wake of defections, mutinies and Tanzania's capture of Kampala in the 
Tanzania-Uganda war, Saudi Arabia offered Ugandan leader Idi Amin exile and paid him a generous 
allowance in exchange for not intervening in Uganda's political landscape. In Libya, offers of exile for 
Muammar Gaddafi were also explored, even after the ICC issued an arrest warrant against the Libyan 
                                                 




 Additionally, mediators may consider the possibility of the United Nations Security Council 
deferring ICC investigations or prosecutions. Under Article 16 of the ICC's Rome Statute, the Security 
Council can defer any investigation or prosecution by the ICC for up to twelve months, renewable 
yearly, if the ICC's intervention is deemed to be a threat to peace and security. The invocation of Article 
16 requires that no permanent member of the Security Council vote against a deferral.  
 These options – amnesty, exile and deferral – can be offered by mediators in an attempt to 
convince the parties that if they attend peace negotiations and come to a peaceful settlement, they will 
not be vulnerable to arrest and surrender to the ICC. Notably, each requires third parties to offer their 
territory for refuge or to respect the passage of any amnesty law. However, whether or not these 
mechanisms can truly convince indicted parties of their safety from arrest and detention is 
questionable. Article 16 deferrals are unstable measures because they are, by definition, temporary. 
They may not be particularly convincing to belligerents indicted by the ICC because little-to-nothing 
can guarantee that Article 16 deferral will be renewed by the Security Council yearly. In terms of 
amnesties and offers of exile, parties may reject an amnesty on the basis that these measures inherently 
confirm that that the party is guilty of wrongdoing. They may also reject offers of exile because they 
have no interest in leaving their positions of influence or home territories, viewing early retirement in a 
foreign state as tantamount to defeat and surrender. Moreover, nothing can guarantee that amnesties 
and offers of exile will not be eventually reneged. The example of former Liberian leader, Charles 
Taylor, is indicative. Taylor, a key figure in the notoriously brutal conflict in Sierra Leone, was indicted 
by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in 2003, during peace negotiations in Ghana to end the 
civil war in Liberia. He consequently agreed to resign his presidency and fled to Nigeria, which granted 
him exile and immunity from prosecution and extradition. However, after two years, repeated requests 
from the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and pressure from the United States, Nigeria 
agreed to send Taylor back to Liberia. He was subsequently flown to The Hague, was tried and, in 
2012, convicted by the SCSL to a fifty-year sentence. In short, while a mediator may have numerous 
avenues for evading matters of justice and accountability, none are full-proof. It is notable that no 
amnesty, offer of exile or Article 16 deferral has ever been successfully used to bring belligerents to the 
negotiating table in a conflict where the ICC has intervened.  
 Lastly, it is worth noting that another important strategy may be affected by the ICC: enticing 
parties with a “power-sharing” agreement. Some authors have argued that such agreements are a 
necessary condition for successful negotiations (see, e.g. Walter 1997, 361). Conflicts that end in 
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negotiated agreements, rather than military victory by one party, tend to include some provisions for 
power-sharing between the conflicting parties (Sisk 2008, 195). Power-sharing agreements, which seek 
to create “social contracts between two or more peoples, or between two or more territorial 
governments,” (O'Leary 2005, xxii) have become an increasingly common tool for negotiators seeking 
to mediate the end of conflict. They act to reassure previously conflicting parties about key issues 
concerning the control of and access to economic resources, political power and security (Vandeginste 
and Sriram 2011, 9). It is argued that power-sharing is particularly necessary where the social fabric of 
a society has especially sharp ethnic, religious, regional, or other, tensions (Ibid., 10).  
 While power-sharing did not play a significant role in Libya or northern Uganda, it is important 
to note that the paradigms of post-conflict power-sharing and accountability may clash (Ibid.). The 
ICC, in this context, may make it more difficult for power-sharing agreements between belligerents to 
emerge. Parties intending to take part in a power-sharing agreement may not trust that they will not 
eventually be detained and surrendered to the ICC. Whether a result of external pressure or not, non-
indicted parties may also feel that power-sharing with an indicted party is too costly and thus may 
undermine their own legitimacy and reputation. As de Waal (2013) observes, a “simplified moral 
positioning can lead western countries to cut themselves out of the picture.” 
 
III.II. At the Table: The Negotiation Phase 
The negotiation phase of a peace process is the stage when the parties are at the negotiating table for 
“face-to-face diplomatic encounters” (Zartman 1989, 238). The Chapter does not delve into 
distinguishing or relating bargaining and facilitation approaches, despite the importance in doing so 
(see Hopmann 2001; Fisher and Keashley 1996). Instead, two issues and dynamics are considered in 





Once a decision to negotiate is made, it is necessary to decide who can and should attend peace talks. 
Despite its obvious importance and the fact that “experience shows how important the selection of 
parties is to success or failure” (Zartman 2013, 128), very little literature exists on the factors which 
affect the composition of delegations at peace negotiations and there is no golden rule or formula to 
                                                 
22
 While delegation composition may be seen as an issue to be considered in the pre-negotiation phase, 
it is treated here within the negotiation phase issue because this chapter is primarily concerned with 
implications of the ICC's effects on delegation composition on the actual negotiations themselves. 
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decide which individuals should be part of a delegation to peace negotiations – and those which should 
not. 
 There is a recognition that “key actors” must be included in the process (Darby and MacGinty 
2000. 7). However, leaders of the belligerent parties are unlikely to be able to attend the entire duration 
of peace talks. Indeed, it would seem unnecessary and possibly even deleterious for leaders of warring 
factions to take part in all stages of the negotiations. Unsurprisingly, then, it is widely accepted that 
intermediaries and representatives of the leadership play a key role in negotiations (Kriegsberg 1992 
82). Representatives will require certain attributes and qualifications to be legitimate and effective. As 
Zartman (2013, 127) writes, these qualities “are clear in the abstract: legitimacy as a recognized 
spokesperson for the identity interests, location in the middle and not just the friendly edge of the 
spectrum, representativeness of a sizeable portion of the opposing group, and deliverability to carry out 
the agreement, among other virtues.” 
 A crucial issue is deciding who speaks for the parties in a peace process and that mutual 
recognition of the legitimacy of spokespersons will be difficult to achieve (Zartman 1995, 10). 
Moreover, as Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks (1996, 34-35) argue, delegates should have an 
ability to represent 
their party's range of feelings, perceptions and aspirations about the issues in conflict, 
as well as being knowledgeable about underlying interests and values, about likely 
reactions to alternative future scenarios and options for solutions, and about significant 
obstacles to achieving any progress towards some acceptable solution. 
 
Despite the utility of employing representatives, however, at some point the leaders of the parties will 
have to become directly involved in the peace process. After all, “peace cannot be reached without their 
agreement” (Hayner 2008, 335). For example, while the negotiations leading up to the Dayton Accords 
were conducted with a wide array of representatives and intermediaries, negotiations at Dayton 
involved the leaders of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia (see Holbrooke 1998). The line at the bottom on the 
last page of a peace agreement will ultimately require their signature. 
 The involvement of the ICC raises two issues: first, whether the ICC prevents indicted 
individuals, and especially indicted leaders, from participating directly in peace talks, necessitating the 
use of intermediaries or proxies; and second, what effects this ultimately has on the negotiations. 
 David Lanz (2011, 175-295) has examined how indictments by international courts may affect 
“who gets a seat at the table” . Lanz argues that two factors determine who is invited to partake in 
negotiations: the utility of inviting particular actors to the table and the normative appropriateness in 
doing so. In situations where an individual is indicted by the ICC, an acute dilemma may arise: 
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international norms pertaining to international criminal justice suggest that indicted actors should be 
excluded but their inclusion in the process is deemed essential to the peace process (Ibid., 287-290). As 
Lanz (Ibid. 289) writes, the creation of the ICC has “made the 'exclude-include' scenario a frequent 
challenge for international peacemakers.”  
 Where their participation is sought, indicted individuals may believe that their direct 
participation in the peace negotiations will lead to their arrest and/or demise. While pre-negotiation 
decisions may be taken to make them feel secure, ultimately indicted individuals may still view their 
direct participation as too risky. This is more likely to be the case with rebels who would have to 'come 
out' in order to attend talks. Indicted government or state military officials are less likely to fear being 
arrested while attending negotiations or where talks occur on their own territory.  
 Another possibility is that indicted individuals do not attend peace negotiations, not because 
they view their presence as endangering their personal safety or security, but because their absence 
from the negotiations is a pre-condition of any talks proceeding. This condition could be set by third-
parties who accept the necessity of negotiations but who do not want to be seen associating themselves 
with ICC-indicted individuals and/or by the other party to the conflict, which may accept negotiations 
in principle but reject any direct role for 'evil' or 'criminal' figures in peace talks. Of course, such an 
attitude on the part of a third party or the other party to the conflict could very well spell disaster for 
potential or actual negotiations.  
 As suggested above, part of the dilemma of who to invite to the negotiating table may be 
resolved by not having the indicted individuals at negotiations but appointing representatives or 
intermediaries in their stead. In theory, this could satisfy the fears of arrest and insecurity on the part of 
indicted individuals as well as the refusal, on the part of non-indicted or third-parties, not to negotiate 
with their ICC-indicted adversaries. However, this may have significant – and potentially deleterious – 
implications on negotiations. Without oversight from leaders, there is a possibility that discipline 
amongst the delegates could suffer. The absence of the leaderships' presence may create opportunities 
for representatives to pursue personal interests rather than the interests of the leaders or the conflict 
party as a whole. Further, an absence of leadership may create space for fringe elements of the parties 
to enter the negotiations. These groups (or individuals) may not have the authority, legitimacy or 
capacity to produce agreements that will be followed by the rest of the group. This is a real danger. As 
Zartman (1995, 22) notes, negotiations can fail “because parties persist in talking to unrepresentative 
counterparts who cannot speak for large groups of followers or carry out an agreement if it were 
reached.” While representatives can play an important role, conflict resolution ultimately requires that 
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the leaders of the parties officially endorse and commit to the peace process and to an agreement. 
However, if the indicted leadership is unable or unwilling to do so, it is difficult to fathom the 
negotiations successfully producing a comprehensive peace agreement between the parties.  
 
(ii) The Agenda 
The agenda of the peace talks sets out the issues to be negotiated (Boelscher 2011, 47). The selection of 
an agenda, as Kriegsberg (1992, 86) notes, is not random: while “[i]t may seem that the conflict itself 
will determine the choice of issues for de-escalation efforts...selecting those [issues] for emphasis in 
de-escalation efforts is a matter of strategy.” There is some debate as to which issues should be 
confronted during peace negotiations and particularly whether or not – and when – the most difficult 
issues should be addressed versus peripheral, but perhaps more amenable, items.  
 With regards to the ICC, the question is whether the existence of an ICC investigation or arrest 
warrants will result in the parties confronting the indictments, or justice and accountability more 
broadly, as an agenda item or not. This will depend on whether the attitudes and incentives of the 
parties towards committing to a peace process were influenced by the ICC's intervention. In other 
words, whether the parties confront justice and accountability will depend on whether their entering 
negotiations was a direct result of the ICC. Where the parties and the mediator agree to do so, we might 
expect to see the issue of accountability on the negotiating table. If an ICC investigation or warrant was 
a major concern of one or both of the parties, it is likely to have a central place in the agenda of 
negotiations. If the warrants are not a major concern for the parties or other issues are deemed more 
crucial to resolve, then we would expect that those other issues will be prioritized in the agenda of the 
talks or the question of justice and accountability will be neglected initially or ignored entirely. 
 If the parties do decide to negotiate questions of accountability, numerous options are available 
including, as stated above, offers of amnesty, exile and deferral. The parties may also seek to negotiate 
alternative measures to satisfy demands for justice by, for example, proposing non-retributive or 
domestic justice mechanisms (see below). 
 
III. III. After the War: Post-Negotiation/Post-Conflict 
A peace process does not end with the signing of a peace agreement, nor is it over with the conclusion 
of hostilities. Even if a negotiated settlement is achieved, “this is only a step, and not the last one, in the 
conflict resolution process.” (Ramsbotham et al 2011, 174; see also Höglund 2008, 17). Not all peace 
processes may get to this point as many wars end “with the extermination, expulsion or capitulation of 
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the losing side.” (Walter 1997, 335). Such cases remain pertinent to the framework offered in this 
chapter. How a conflict ends will have significant bearing on attempts to achieve post-conflict justice 
and accountability.  
 Two key issues are considered in the context of post-negotiation. First, the identification of 
spoilers and the ulterior motives of parties towards negotiating peace and, second, the implementation 
of relevant provisions and decisions pertaining to post-conflict accountability.  
 
(i) Was Peace Possible?  
Darby and MacGinty (2000, 7) argue that amongst the essential criteria for a successful peace process 
is that the protagonists “engage seriously in negotiations, as distinct from approaching them as the 
continuation of war by other means.” This is not always the case. Parties to a mediated negotiation may 
have “devious objectives”, including the use of negotiations as a cover to regroup and reorganize as 
well as legitimize their positions in the conflict (Richmond 1998, 707-722). It may thus be difficult to 
ascertain whether the negotiating parties are committed to a peaceful compromise – even as they 
participate actively in peace talks. The conclusion of negotiations, however, creates an opportunity to 
identify and assess whether negotiations were truly about peace, rather than furthering other, perhaps 
more sinister, interests of the parties.  
 The success of a peace process is likely to be undermined by the presence of spoilers, those 
“leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, 
worldview, and interests and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” (Stedman 1997, 5) 
Spoilers may undermine the peace process from the “inside” while others may do so as “outside” 
spoilers who are excluded from the process (Ibid. 8-9). They have a range of aims in undermining talks 
(Ibid. 11-14; see also Nilsson and Kovacs 2011, 606-626). But spoilers are not always easy to spot and 
may only be identifiable after the peace process has concluded (Zahar 2008, 160). It is for this reason 
that the framework offered here treats the identification of spoilers as a post-negotiation / post-conflict 
issue. 
 A critical question arises from this debate: was the peace process actually about peace? With 
regards to the ICC's purported effects on peace, this is an essential yet overlooked question. If key 
participants in a peace process can be shown to be spoilers, to have negotiated in bad faith or to have 
been disinterested in a mediated solution to the conflict, then the ICC cannot be responsible for a failed 
peace process. However, it is also important to consider whether the ICC provides the means for actors 
to become spoilers, preventing negotiations from succeeding. This may be the case for both indicted 
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and non-indicted parties. Once a negotiation phase has concluded or a war has ended, it is possible to 
decipher whether parties were truly interested in peace, if they instrumentalized ICC arrest warrants 
and if, in doing so, they bolstered or hindered a potential peace process.  
 
(ii) Implementation of Post-Conflict Justice and Accountability  
The implementation of a peace agreement is “one of the most critical and uncertain processes of any 
post-war period.” (Bekoe 2003, 256). Numerous scholars have considered the necessary conditions for 
successful implementation of peace agreements, including the ripeness of the conflict, the regional 
environment, the quality of the agreements, the role of outside actors in supporting and securing the 
peace process, and the presence of external “security guarantees” (see Walter 1997, 345; Crocker et al 
2001; Stedman 2002, 1-20; Duffy 2010). Stedman's theory of peace spoilers also remains a persuasive 
and oft-cited issue in the elaboration of challenges to implementation. To date, perhaps the most 
thorough treatment of the subject remains Stedman et al's Ending Civil Wars – The Implementation of 
Peace Agreements, which covers a diversity of issues that affect implementation, from economic 
priorities (Woodward 2002, 183-214) and the repatriation of refugees (Adelman 2002, 272-302) to the 
challenges of holding elections (Lyons 2002, 215-236) and securing human rights standards (Putman 
2002, 237-272). 
 Unlike the aforementioned authors who see third-party roles as the key variable in determining 
the success or failure of the implementation of peace agreements, Roland Paris's (2004) theory of 
Institutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL) suggests that the formulaic liberal peacebuilding 
blueprints may destabilize or undermine a fragile peace. For Paris, the institutions necessary for 
administering democracy, rule of law, and free-markets must be laid before liberal reforms are hatched 
(Ibid., 188-207). This requires building up state institutions, even if that requires sacrificing liberal 
ideals in the short-run. Amongst these institutions we are likely to see some that deal with issues 
broadly pertaining to human rights and past human rights violations. As Christine Bell (2008, 213) has 
demonstrated, “peace agreements typically include human rights institutions...[with the] aim to ensure 
the protection of rights and prevention of past human rights abuses in the future.”  
 The way a conflict terminates or reignites in the wake of peace negotiations will have a 
significant impact on how justice and accountability is ultimately pursued. The victory of one side over 
another grants the victorious side the ability to impose conditions of 'victor's justice', where only one 
side is held accountable. This was the case, for example, with the international military tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo following WWII. Victor's peace risks translating into victor's justice, at least in 
the short-term. The victorious side may not only seek to hold its defeated adversary accountable but 
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also to protect itself from any accountability by granting itself a blanket amnesty or de facto immunity. 
At the same time, a party may make full amnesty a condition of its full surrender. In contrast, 
negotiated settlements are unlikely to result in such lop-sided approaches to accountability. 
Negotiations promote compromise approaches to post-conflict justice which may include protection 
from prosecution for both parties, alternative approaches to justice or partial accountability.   
 As noted above, it is also not always necessary for peace negotiations to produce a final peace 
agreement in order for some of the items discussed in the negotiations to be implemented. Negotiations 
may produce bits and pieces of an agreement which are followed-through in the post-conflict context 
even when the negotiations do not result in a comprehensive agreement. This has been the case in 
Uganda where the International Crimes Division of Uganda's High Court, an institution born out of the 
Juba negotiations, was created despite the ultimate 'failure' of peace talks between the LRA and the 
Government of Uganda (see Chapter 5). Nor is it necessary that a peace process succeed in achieving 
an accord between the parties at all. While the Arab League blocked any agreement between the 
conflicting parties during US-mediated negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria over the 
use of water in the Jordan River valley, some aspects of the understanding were tacitly implemented 
(Kriegsberg 1992, 87). But how might the ICC affect attempts to deliver post-conflict justice and 
accountability?  
 It should be clear that the ICC is not responsible for a state's approach to post-conflict, 
transitional justice. As Rama Mani (2002, 99) rightly observed, “it is misleading to believe that the ICC 
will solve definitively the many problems and dilemmas besetting the pursuit of justice in the transition 
to peace”. Still, ICC interventions into ongoing conflicts, as well as the conflict narratives that they 
propagate, can shape the decisions made by societies once the war has ended.  
 Broadly, there are three options available to the parties emerging from conflict: fully addressing 
questions of justice and accountability; selectively addressing justice; or ignoring the perpetration of 
crimes and atrocities committed during the conflict altogether. These approaches are likely to take into 
account and/or reflect the attitudes and incentives of the conflict parties towards accountability, but also 
be shaped by the conflict narrative and manner in which the conflict concluded.  
 There are numerous ways in which communities and states may deal with the question of 
addressing post-conflict justice. It cannot be ruled out that one party seeks to support the ICC's efforts 
to detain the suspects, particularly where the party interprets the Court's role as boosting its 
international standing and legitimacy. Moreover, the party may simply want to rid itself of indicted 
figures. This is most likely to be the case where one side has achieved a military victory over the other. 
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A recent example of this is the case of former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo who was sent to face 
trial in The Hague in late 2011 for his role in Ivory Coast's post-election violence in 2010-11. His 
successor and adversary, Alassane Ouattara, did not hesitate to send Gbagbo to the ICC following the 
restoration of order in Ivory Coast (see Human Rights Watch 2013b). At the same time, victorious 
parties may seek to protect themselves from accountability (by providing a self-amnesty) as well as 
bringing additional accountability measures against their former adversaries, such as prosecutions or 
preventing them from holding positions of power via lustration laws.  
 The exact opposite, however, may also occur. A state emerging from a period of violent conflict 
may seek to assert its sovereign prerogatives, restore its international reputation and assert control of 
issues of justice and accountability. Again, this is likely where one side of the war has achieved military 
victory in the conflict. Rather than 'doing away' with an ICC indictee, in this case the state seeks to 
achieve justice through domestic mechanisms. In such a scenario, the state in question may bring a 
complementarity challenge to the Court, whereby the state argues that, because it is now able and 
willing to legitimately and effectively investigate and prosecute crimes, the ICC must cede jurisdiction 
(see case of Libya in Chapter 7).   
 Lastly, if an agreement was reached between parties that included ICC indicted individuals, it is 
possible that the parties would also seek to challenge the admissibility of the ICC's warrants. As in the 
case of the conflict in northern Uganda, they attempt to do so by creating new domestic institutions 
capable of adjudicating international crimes or by claiming that other mechanisms of accountability, 
including traditional justice mechanisms, are both sufficient and more appropriate (see Chapter 5). A 
promised amnesty or offer of exile could also be invoked if it had formed an integral part of moving the 
negotiations towards final agreement. 
 In short, a number of possible avenues exist in addressing the question of ICC, and post-conflict 
justice and accountability more broadly. These decisions will affect the nature of the peace, regardless 




IV. Conclusion: Breaking the 'Peace Versus Justice' Impasse 
To date, the “peace versus justice” the debate has neglected the various phases and dynamics that 
comprise peace processes. The result has been a debate which lacks in nuance.  
 This chapter has built an analytical framework that requires investigation of the possible effects 
of ICC investigations and arrest warrants on the narrative of a conflict, the attitudes and incentives of 
warring parties towards peace negotiations and, subsequently, the three key phases of a peace process 
(pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-negotiation/post-conflict) and as well as on key dynamics and 
issues within these phases. Not all of the issues raised in this chapter will be pertinent across all cases 
and an ICC intervention may not affect the different stages of a peace processes equally or similarly 
across differing contexts. It is also expected that some effects of the ICC will be fixed while others will 
be variable. Where the ICC intervenes, dilemmas about whether or not to invite ICC indictees and 
whether to address issues of justice and accountability during negotiations will be shaped by the ICC, 
regardless of the conflict's context. Other effects are likely to be variable across contexts. For example, 
the effects of the ICC on the location of peace talks, choice of mediators as well as how justice is dealt 
with at negotiations will be context-dependent and likely to vary on the basis of who is targeted by the 
Court.  
 It is clear that the potential to initiate a peace processes and to move it forward are different in 
conflicts where the ICC has intervened than in conflicts where it has not. The framework outlined in 
this chapter is intended to make it possible to interrogate how the ICC affects ongoing conflicts as well 
as the potential for peace processes to progress from one phase to the next and, ultimately, towards 
resolution. It is about asking the right questions when it comes to identifying and assessing the effects 
of the ICC on active conflicts. As such, the framework presented in this chapter is intended to guide 
empirical case-study and cross-case comparative research. Doing so will hopefully allow researchers to 
move beyond the stagnation of the “peace versus justice” debate into a richer and more nuanced 
understanding of how ICC interventions truly affect the prospects for peace. 
 We now turn to the two cases at the heart of the thesis: northern Uganda and Libya. 
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Chapter 4: The ICC and the Road to Juba 
 
It was like strong wind that shook everyone – Martin Mapenduzi (2011), describing 
when the ICC intervened in the crisis in Uganda 
 
The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the 
war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society 
intact. The very word "war," therefore, has become misleading. - Emmanuel Goldstein in 
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four 
 
Introduction   
In the late 2000s, the Government of Uganda (GoU) found itself in a quandary. Through the 1990s, the 
GoU, led by rebel-turned-president Yoweri Museveni was widely seen as a rare African success story, a 
“model for 'new' Africa's goals.” (see Apple 1998). Uganda was a leader in the fight against AIDS and 
an apparent example of a state where neoliberal economic reforms had actually worked. But now the 
country's image was being tested. A long suppressed problem had begun to garner international 
attention: the war in the north. Activists and religious groups were shedding light on a level of suffering 
that could only be embarrassing for a state that was supposed to be that rare example of post-conflict 
development gone right. The mages of vast camps for internally displaced persons and footage of 
young children walking for miles from villages across Acholiland to sleep in the relative safety of 
crammed bus depots in Gulu conflicted sharply with the image the Government had sought to present 
to the world. A forgotten war had suddenly, if belatedly, become a crisis worthy of international 
concern. The GoU had to respond. 
 Of course, the GoU had long been doing something. It had waged a war against rebel groups in 
the north since the mid-1980s when Museveni's National Resistance Army / Movement came to power. 
But the international community, with the exception of some religious groups and NGOs seeking to 
provide relief and actuate a peaceful end to the war, had readily ignored northern Uganda (see, e.g. 
Eichstaedt 2009, 4). Jan Egeland, the former UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief famously exclaimed in 2003 that: “The conflict in northern Uganda is the biggest 
forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today.” (See Agence France-Presse 2003). 
But Uganda's international donors caught on. Pressure mounted for new approaches to the war.  
 It was in this context that the GoU began to explore a self-referral to the ICC. In 2003 they 
referred “the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” to the Court (see ICC 2004). On 8 July 
2005, ICC Judges issued sealed arrest warrants for five senior officials of the LRA: rebel leader Joseph 
Kony, second-in-command Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen and Raska Lukwiya. The 
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warrants became public on 13 October 2005. International human rights organizations hailed the ICC's 
indictments as a historic moment, one which symbolized the end of impunity for violators of the 
gravest crimes. Amnesty International (2005) declared that the indictments sent “a clear message that 
without justice, there can be no prospect of a lasting peace for the region.” Domestically and amongst 
long-time scholars and observers of northern Uganda, the story was quite different. The ICC's 
intervention instigated a fierce and polarizing debate about the appropriateness of pursuing 
international criminal justice and efforts to achieve a much yearned for peace. Like nowhere else, the 
“peace versus justice” debate burst into the public conscience.  
 The case of northern Uganda emerged as a crucible for the “peace versus justice” debate, not 
only because northern Uganda was the ICC's first intervention but because the ICC intervened in the 
midst of an active conflict and ongoing efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the war between the 
GoU and the LRA.  
 Once the ICC opened investigations into alleged LRA crimes in northern Uganda, a polarizing 
debate about the appropriateness and consequences of the ICC's potential intervention erupted.23 The 
debate primarily reflected concerns regarding the alleged effects of retributive justice on efforts to 
resolve the conflict. It was largely hypothetical, concerning itself primarily with what would or might 
happen if the ICC process went forward. But to critics and many key figures on the ground, these 
hypotheticals posed all-too-real dangers. For champions of the ICC, they represented real promises.  
 Proponents of the ICC's intervention maintained that the ICC would marginalize the LRA by 
stripping it of its external support. This isolation would leave the LRA with no option but to enter – and 
commit to – peace negotiations. Moreover, the Court represented a commitment to end impunity in 
northern Uganda putting into practice the rhetoric that there is 'no peace without justice'. Critics, on the 
other hand, argued that the ICC was an unhelpful and belligerent intrusion that risked undermining 
attempts to end the conflict peacefully. The LRA had been in on-again-off-again peace talks and 
renewed its interest in negotiations with the GoU in 2004 (Atkinson 2009, 10). Fears were palpable that 
the ICC would undermine any potential talks by removing incentives for Kony and his high command 
to sign and follow through with any negotiated peace agreement. In explaining how the ICC would 
affect the LRA high command's interest in negotiating peace, Father Carlos Rodriguez noted that 
“nobody can convince a rebel leader to come to the negotiating table and at the same time tell him that 
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when the war ends he will be brought to trial.” (see Lanz 2007, 1). Local religious and civil society 
figures further asserted that criminal prosecutions undermined their efforts to encourage LRA 
combatants to defect and receive amnesty through Uganda's Amnesty Law (2000) and that retributive 
justice was insensitive to 'traditional' and 'local' approaches to achieving justice and reconciliation. If 
prosecution was necessary, they argued, it should be properly sequenced with ongoing efforts to 
achieve a mediated political solution to the war; peace first, justice later (Komakech 2011). Victims and 
survivors of violence in northern Uganda, along with long-time observers of the conflict, also saw the 
Court's focus as inherently biased. It was well documented that the Ugandan People's Defense Forces 
(UPDF) was also responsible for atrocities against civilians (see. e.g. Dolan 2009). But justice appeared 
to be for the LRA only. 
 Amidst these concerns, a curious thing happened. When the Court issued its arrest warrants, 
rather than balking at talks, the LRA openly requested a new round of peace negotiations (BBC 2005). 
Within a year negotiations restarted, and were described as “the best opportunity in twenty years to 
start a meaningful peace process.” (Williams 2006, 69; see also Hayner 2008, 335). But what brought 
the LRA and the GoU to the table? To answer this question, an examination of the conflict narrative 
and the attitudes and incentives of the warring parties is necessary. The following sections examine key 
developments and how they affected – and didn't affect – an official peace process from getting 
underway. First, however, it is necessary to outline a brief background to the conflict and the narratives 
that have been produced and reproduced about the war between the LRA and the GoU.  
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I. 'Good' Versus 'Evil' in Northern Uganda 
That the war in northern Uganda has been the subject of a dominant conflict narrative is not, in itself, a 
novel finding. Indeed, as shown below, it is a common refrain in most comprehensive treatments of the 
war. However, this and the next chapter aspire to take an additional step by bringing together this 
literature as well as primary research conducted in Uganda in order to demonstrate how this shaped the 
attitudes and incentives of the warring parties towards peace negotiations and subsequently influenced 
key dynamics and issues in the lead-up to official peace talks, during the Juba negotiations, and during 
the post-negotiation period.  
 In Chapter 3, it was argued that ICC interventions shape conflict narratives in specific ways. It 
was hypothesized that the Court's interventions in ongoing conflicts would: label indicted individuals 
as criminals and 'evil', thus delegitimizing them as negotiation partners whilst legitimizing those parties 
that are not targeted by the ICC; place particular individuals indicted by the Court and their fate at the 
very core of the conflict narrative; and focus the narrative on the dynamics, rather than the causes of 
the violent political conflict. The ICC's intervention in northern Uganda had all of these effects. It has 
contributed to an obfuscation of the political causes of the war and the political nature of the violence 
waged against northern Ugandans – by both the LRA and the GoU; it has bolstered the narrative of a 
good, just government fighting an 'evil' rebel group; and it has, as a direct consequence of these two 
preceding effects, established a narrative wherein if only Kony was 'eliminated' or 'removed', then the 
crisis facing LRA-affected regions and the civil war between the LRA and the GoU would cease to 
exist. The rest of this section offers an overview of the war and subsequently details all three of these 
aspects of the conflict narrative, focusing on how the ICC's intervention has reified them.   
 There is a danger in offering overly reductionist reasons for the conflict between the Lord's 
Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda (Finnstrom 2008, 8). As Doom and Vlassenroot 
(1999, 20) note in their analysis of the historical and political origins of the rebellion in northern 
Uganda, “it is far from easy to analyse Kony's LRA, or to have a clear understanding of its final goals, 
if they exist as such.” This section does not pretend to offer an exhaustive historical account of northern 
Uganda. Others have done so elsewhere (see, e.g., Doom and Vlassenroot (1999); Allen (2006, 53-71); 
Branch (2007b, 93-221); Sverker Finnstrom (2008); Dolan (2009); Allen and Vlassenroot (2010). Still, 
given the propensity of the conflict to be seen as one driven by Kony and his rebels' terrifying acts of 
violence, it is worth describing how a complex conflict with political causes and dynamics as well 
shared responsibility for atrocities has been neglected in favour of a mainstream narrative that pits an 
'evil', terrorizing and irrational LRA and Kony against a 'good' government. Contrary to Eichstaedt's 
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(2009, 4) observation that “[t]he LRA war in northern Uganda has been going on for so long that most 
have forgotten why,” the causes of the war have been actively distorted. The ICC's intervention has 
contributed to and entrenched this dynamic.  
 According to Van Acker (2004, 338), post-colonial Uganda has been characterized by the use of 
“the army as an instrument of domestic politics” and “ethnic retaliation” as a function of domestic 
politics. These dynamics “solidified violence as a means of interaction in society.” (Ibid.) In this 
context, the inclusion and exclusion of the Acholi people of northern Uganda within the military 
establishments of Uganda's various post-colonial regimes played a critical role in shaping Uganda's 
violent post-colonial history. Amongst the socio-economic and political divisions between north and 
south Uganda, recruitment into the military was the most pronounced (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 
7).24 Even before Uganda's independence, the Acholi “saw the profession of arms as their natural 
vocation”, a development that is owed to “colonial interference.” (Ibid., 8; see also Finnstrom 2008, 
80). Whilst the Acholi made up a significant part of Milton Obote's military forces (1966 – 1971 and 
1985), they were excluded from the regime of Idi Amin (1971 – 1979). Obote's reigns propagated the 
popular, if absurd, notion of the Acholi as inherently warlike. And if Obote elevated the concept of a 
militaristic Acholi ethnicity, this belief was complemented by those who viewed the Acholi as a threat 
and thus sought to persecute them when they were not part of the military and political establishment. 
When Amin took power, he ordered the mass murder of Acholi and Langi troops and was responsible 
for the killing of numerous Acholi intellectuals and political figures (see Okuku 2002, 20-21; 
Finnstrom 2008, 65; Branch 2010b, 29). Most notoriously, in 1972 Amin ordered the purge of Acholi 
troops after ordering them to their barracks.  
 When the National Resistance Army and Movement (NRA/M) of Yoweri Museveni took power 
from the Acholi General Tito Okello Lutwa, who had briefly seized power in 1985, “Uganda's 
succession of rulers from the north came to an end.” (Finnstrom 2008, 68). The Acholi, again, were 
painted as militaristic and as a political threat that required neutralization. Museveni's war propaganda 
made clear that the Acholi were enemies (Finnstrom 2008, 75; Okuku 2002, 22-23) and they were 
widely blamed for some of the worst atrocities committed during the NRA/M rebellion, which had 
begun in 1981 and ended in 1986 when the NRA/M overtook Kampala. In particular, the Acholi were 
blamed for Obote's 1983 Operation Bonanza, “a sustained and murderous military expedition, leading 
to more than 300,000 deaths” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 9) in the Luwero Triangle. Many believed 
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that the seemingly cyclical process of ethnic retaliation was once again aimed at the people of northern 
Uganda. Fleeing Acholi soldiers warned of impending revenge from the NRM (Van Acker 2004, 340). 
 Museveni's ascension to power initiated a new phase of conflict in Uganda, one that would be 
concentrated in the country's peripheries. The Acholi were targeted by the NRA/M who deemed them 
“responsible for Uganda's violent past” (Finnstrom 2008, 75) and their “ethnic enemy” (Branch 2010b, 
31). The result was predictable. The Acholi were excluded from political power whilst the NRM 
launched a violent counter-insurgency into the north (ibid., 31-33). Cattle, a crucial source of wealth in 
the north, were raided by the government-supported and armed Karamojong (Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999, 12), something widely understood as a purposeful attempt to cripple the wealth and sustenance of 
the Acholi people (Finnstrom 2008, 72). Doom and Vlassenroot (1999, 12) speculate that only two 
percent of the original stock of cattle remained by 1997. Morever, the NRA committed numerous 
atrocities, often justified as revenge for the Acholi's alleged actions in Luwero (Otunnu 2002, 13). 
Critically, the NRM's “vicious counter-insurgency in Acholiland” left “the Acholi without effective 
national leadership or representation in the face of extreme state violence.” (Branch 2010b, 26). Many 
were inclined to turn to the various rebel groups in the region.  
 In the mid- to late-1980s, a number of rebel groups sprung up in the north, notably the Uganda 
People's Defence Army (UPDA) and Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). They drew on ex-
soldiers who had not returned to rural life in the North (Finnstrom 2008, 71). Lakwena and the HSM, 
something of a precursor to the LRA, tapped into the spirituality of the Acholi community and thus 
“offered hope for worldly as well as spiritual redemption in a dark hour of despair.” (Doom and 
Vlassenroot 1999, 16).25 But perhaps more than anything, many simply “saw no alternative means of 
survival than to join the insurgency groups in one way or the other” (Finnstrom 2008, 74). The brutal 
response and treatment by the NRA fuelled an existential anxiety amongst the Acholi as human rights 
abuses and looting “became part of their normal conduct”, behaviour which “could only stiffen the 
conviction held by many Acholi that surrender meant death.” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 15). The 
creation of rebellion was thus a response to the marginalization of the people in the north and an 
attempt for the Acholi to find “an outlet for their feelings of humiliation.” (Ibid., 14) 
 Despite some remarkable successes in the battlefield, the HSM was eventually defeated and 
Lawkena fled to exile in Kenya. With the 1988 Pece Peace Agreement, the UPDA and NRM came to a 
negotiated settlement. In this ever-changing and violent landscape, Joseph Kony and the Lord's 
Resistance Army emerged as “the sole viable rebel group in Acholiland” (Branch 2010b, 39). Many 
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disenfranchised Acholi officers joined the LRA; others sought a return to civilian life or joined the 
NRA. As with the HSM, the LRA was led by a leader who presented himself as a “spirit medium” 
(Allen 1991, 372). Kony claimed to be the host of spirits who spoke through him and gave orders for 
the LRA's operations. This has given rise to claims that Kony and Lakwena before him were 'crazy' 
'lunatics'. However, as Dolan explains, Kony was, in fact, unexceptional in this regard (Dolan 2009, 94; 
see also Allen 1991). Moreover, according to Kristof Titeca (2010, 71), the LRA's reliance “on a 
coherent system of beliefs and practices of a spiritual order serves clear strategic and rational 
advantages: it guarantees an internal cohesion of the rebel group through legitimizing the struggle and 
motivating and disciplining its combatants, as well as intimidating the outside world.” It is not, he adds, 
evidence that the LRA is “a chaotic gang of rebels”. Numerous interview respondents, including former 
LRA commanders, continue to believe that Kony is, in fact, a medium for various different spirits. And 
rather than describing the LRA as driven by some irrational, mystical lust for violence, none hesitated 
to describe the LRA as a politically aggrieved entity with political goals. 
 From the outset, the LRA have claimed to have a political agenda, centered around defending 
the Acholi people, toppling Museveni's government and governing Uganda with the Ten 
Commandments. Still, there has been an evident difficulty amongst well-versed scholars of northern 
Uganda to identify the politics of the LRA and the extent to which the LRA is a coherent political 
enterprise with political aims. This is particularly difficult because of the duration of the conflict. It is 
obvious that the rebel group has been far more of a political force than the official narrative suggests. 
Finnstrom's (2008, 99-130) analysis of the rebel group's political manifestos is particularly useful in 
delineating the LRA's politics. Over time, the LRA has spelled out numerous political demands, 
including their desire to see the creation of multiparty politics in Uganda, respect for human rights, a 
division between the military and the judiciary, socioeconomic balance within the country and an end 
to corruption (Ibid., 122). Given the LRA's well-known and undeniably brutal tactics, some of these 
demands are patently absurd. And, importantly, the rebel groups' political claims are no “less 
propagandistic than the official discourse... [but] they are not compatible with the official discourse.” 
(Ibid., 118). The flaw in the dominant narrative regarding the conflict isn't that it focuses on the 
commission of atrocities but rather that it focuses almost exclusively on the LRA's responsibility for 
atrocities and does so at the expense of virtually any political understanding of the conflict. While it 
may not always be evident what the LRA's goals are, “they are political goals” (Vinci 2005, 363; 
emphasis in original). 
 The LRA's emergence as the primary source of rebellion in northern Uganda precipitated a 
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period of heightened levels of violence against civilians. During the 1990s, the LRA diverted its 
attention away from targeting the NRA to targeting the very people they purportedly represented: 
Acholi civilians. As the rebellion progressed and local support for the LRA dwindled, the rebel group 
became increasingly reliant on attacking the people of northern Uganda as a means to ensure the 
“group's material and social survival.” (Branch 2010b, 38). The LRA's violence against the Acholi 
people was also part of an evolving political agenda, namely an attempt to purify and control the 
population, some of which had allied itself with the NRM. Those seen as collaborating with the NRM 
were considered 'impure' Acholi. The creation of a pure and 'New Acholi' became “the centrepiece of 
the LRA's vision” (Dolan 2009, 92). This shift in modus operandi and conceptualization of who was 
Acholi 'enough' “had highly destructive consequences”; the “spiritual discourse of cleansing” those 
who were genuine Acholi and supported the LRA from those who were not and perhaps supported the 
NRM translated into “anti-civilian violence [emerging as] the privileged tool for carrying out this 
political programme.” (Branch 2010b 40). The result was a level of unprecedented violence against the 
civilian population of the north; maiming, abduction, murder and plunder by the LRA against the 
Acholi were commonplace. This campaign of violence further alienated the LRA from the Acholi. As 
Branch (ibid, 42) explains, “[t]he problem was that what perhaps appeared from the LRA's perspective 
to be a reasonable strategy for purifying the Acholi and eradicating the internal enemy looked from the 
Acholi civilians' perspective to be an unpredictable, vicious reign of violence.” (see also Finnstrom 
2008, 90). But what has made the LRA's form of violence particularly egregious and what “makes this 
conflict unusually vicious – even for this troubled region – is that the LRA rebels target young children 
for abduction, virtual enslavement, and even death” (Ehrenreich 1998, 81). In response to this, the 
LRA's crimes became widely documented, inspiring a cottage industry of articles, blogs, documentaries 
and NGOs (see Cavanagh 2012; Finnström 2012). This also helps explain why observers have rejected 
the political nature of the LRA's rebellion and violence. Instead, for many, the LRA was engaged in a 
ruthless and ridiculous campaign of violence for violence's sake. In 2001 the United States State 
Department added the LRA to its list of terrorist organizations and, in 2008, the US government added 
Kony to its Specially Designated Global Terrorist list.  
 The shift in LRA tactics and turn against civilians coincided with the establishment of a 
strategic relationship between the rebels and the Government of Sudan. As Bishop Ochola (2011) 
observes: [t]hat was the time when abductions started... not before 1994. Abductions started very 
seriously, [when the LRA] got their way to Sudan.” The change in the target of the LRA's violence also 
followed in the wake of failed peace negotiations with the Government in 1994. According to one 
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former LRA commander, 28 February, “[t]he day when the L.R.A. came into contact or developed [a] 
good relationship with the Sudanese government is also remembered and celebrated each year.”26  The 
LRA-Khartoum relationship was an open secret but one which the LRA and Khartoum went to great 
lengths to distort. The case of one LRA commander is instructive: he was ordered to take his group of 
rebels to destroy a radio tower and power station on the outskirts of Gulu town, in northern Uganda, 
using newly acquired bombs. His instructions were two-fold: to destroy the tower and station and to 
retrieve all remnants of the bombs. Failing either, the commander was advised not to return. The bombs 
had been provided by Khartoum (Odongo, Sunday and Oling Mussa 2011).  
 The relationship with Khartoum was transformative for the LRA. It instigated a “makeover of 
what had been a motley group of rebels into a coherent, well-supplied military enterprise” whilst “[t]he 
LRA and its use of terror became the ultimate fifth column of the Sudanese army: a clandestine, cost-
effective force used to destabilize the SPLM/A and Uganda.” (Van Acker 2004, 338). As a result, what 
had previously amounted to an intra-state rebellion emerged as part of a regional proxy war with Sudan 
providing support to the LRA and the GoU supporting Khartoum's primary adversary, the Sudan's 
People Liberation Army (SPLA), which was fighting for secession (Finnstrom 2008, 85). In an unusual 
moment of candour, Hassan al-Turabi, a key political and religious figure in Sudan, explained 
Khartoum's support for the LRA: “It's natural. In all wars people do the same. If there's a state of war 
between you and the other side, then you arm the other side's opposition don't you?” (see Blair 2006; 
Eichstaedt 2009, 175). 
 In 1999 a negotiated agreement was reached between the governments of Uganda and Sudan to 
stop supporting each other's adversaries. However, Khartoum continued covert support of the LRA. 
Even with the 2002 launch of Operation Iron First which allowed the UPDF to enter into the territory 
of Sudan, Khartoum managed to appear cooperative (and thus gain approval from the international 
community) whilst simultaneously protecting the LRA. As Rodrgiuez (2009, 41) explains: “The UPDF 
could not go beyond a 'red line' that had been drawn by Khartoum near Juba. Since the UPDF had to 
notify the Sudanese Armed Forces every time it intended to carry out military operations inside 
Sudanese territory, this meant that Kony was always well informed about the movements of the 
Ugandan army and could react accordingly.” Branch (2011, 80, 85) asserts that this also served the 
interests of the US, with the GoU acting as a proxy and conduit to the SPLA, which was fighting 
against Khartoum, a key adversary in the Global War on Terror.  
 A crucial cause for the war was the response and behaviour the NRM/A (later the UPDF) in 
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northern Uganda and, in particular, its direct responsibility for mass human rights violations and its 
unwillingness to provide protection for civilians from LRA violence. Human Rights Watch (2003a; 
2003b, 19-21; 2005) has catalogued cases of torture, murder, rape by government soldiers and even the 
recruitment of child soldiers into government forces – the same egregious allegation levied against the 
LRA. At the same time, the GoU seemed uninterested in defeating the rebels or providing adequate 
protection for civilians. As Branch (2010b, 38) writes, “the NRA has generally abandoned the 
population to rebel violence letting it continue as a kind of collective punishment by proxy”. The result 
was that the people of northern Uganda were trapped as victims of violence perpetrated by the rebels 
and the violence perpetrated by the GoU. They were “caught between the fire and the frying pan: a 
hostile army of occupation and a 'terrorist' rebel group.” (Mwenda 2010, 55). 
 In response to the rebellion, the GoU propagated and imposed a system of structural violence on 
the people of northern Uganda. As violence in northern Uganda spread and intensified in the 1990s, the 
Government began to herd civilians into IDP camps, a process that began in late 1996 (Dolan 2009, 
46). By 2002, 800,000 civilians had been displaced. Some civilians chose to relocate to the camps 
while many others were forced to do so. In 2002, for example, the UPDF ordered all citizens from the 
districts of Kitgum, Pader and Gulu to relocate to the IDP camps. Refusing to do so meant being 
identified as a rebel collaborator (see Rodriguez 2009, 102). Chris Dolan (2009, 1) captures the 
dynamic of northern Ugandan civilians stuck in the cross-fire of the LRA and GoU in his book, Social 
Torture. Dolan persuasively argues that the war is “a form of mass torture, whose principal victims are 
the population within the 'war zone', and whose ultimate function is the subordinate inclusion of the 
population in northern Uganda.” The primary locus of 'social torture' was the IDP camps, named 
“protection villages” by the GoU, although more akin to “concentration camps” according to Rodriguez 
(2009, 104), Branch (2007a, 181) and Mwenda (2010, 55). In these camps, Dolan (2009, 1) finds the 
symptoms and tactics of mass torture: “widespread violation, dread, disorientation, dependency, 
debilitation and humiliation”. Finnstrom (2008, 133) makes a similar argument suggesting that the IDP 
camps constituted a form of structural violence against the people of northern Uganda, wherein 
“cultural and social agency diminish as the logic of domination and violence enter the most private 
spheres of everyday life.” Human rights groups tended to agree. One report, prepared for United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), concluded that “the overall 
picture is one of severe destitution” (Weeks 2002, 5; see also Dolan 2009, 221) and that while direct 
violations of rights were commonplace, the camps' “most damaging achievement of all has been to 
inflict economic and social paralysis on an entire society, which has thereby been reduced to destitution 
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and dependency.” (Weeks 2002, 4). Some suggest that upwards of 1,000 people died per week, not 
from rebel attacks but as a result of the squalid conditions within the camps themselves (Mwenda 2010, 
56; see also The Republic of Uganda Ministry of Health 2005). This represented a death toll that far 
exceeded what the rebels could achieve (Mwenda 2010, 56).  
 GoU violence against civilians was also direct. UPDF soldiers, sometimes disguised as LRA 
commanders, regularly abused civilians. And while some officers were held to account, this typically 
only occurred when cases received attention from notable citizens (Dolan 2009, 147). The camps 
appeared to be a tactical strategy wrapped in a ruse: the 'good' Government as a protector of civilians 
against the 'evil' LRA. “For from the day they were initiated in the name of protecting the civilian 
population, these villages instead became sites of their abuse... In fact, the 'protected villages' violated 
all major categories of rights, and just about all the UN's 'Guiding Principles on International 
Displacement'.” (Ibid. 151).   
 The UPDF forced civilians into the IDP camps not, as the title “protection villages” would 
suggest, for their ultimate benefit, but as part of its broader military strategy. In the midst of ongoing 
suspicion of the Acholi people as rebel sympathizers and collaborators, the use of camps to dominate 
and control northern Ugandans was a useful arrangement for the UPDF (Finnstrom 2008. 141-144). 
Eichstaedt (2009, 260) describes the government's approach as “calculated neglect” which “allowed 
Kony and his rebels to wage a bloody and inhumane war against his own people and then abused these 
same people it claimed to protect.” (see also Branch 2011, 90-118). Finnstrom (2008, 158) adds that 
foreign humanitarian aid agencies have been complicit in this process “as a parallel partner to the 
army”. The forced encampment has since been followed with forced resettlement. The process of 
forced resettlement, however, “has also been enforced domination and an effort to control the 
population”, with the GoU “imposing its rule by regulating everyday life” (Finnstrom 2008, 145).  
 Again, the background of the causes and dynamics of the war, as outlined above, is not 
exhaustive. But it points to certain key realities: that the conflict has, at its core, fundamentally political 
causes and dynamics; that key grievances, captured within and exacerbated by the marginalization of 
the north and a north-south divide, have remained unresolved and generally neglected; and that 
northern Uganda has long been mired in political contestation that privileges militarism and produces 
cyclical violence. Of course, these realities are not separate but mutually enforcing. As Juma Okuku 
(2002, 32-33) writes, the Museveni government's militaristic and confrontational approach to the north 
deepened the north-south divide. This fuels grievances and propels new cycles of atrocity. Yet the 
dominant narrative has generally ignored these realities.  
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 The political causes and dynamics of the war are largely ignored in favour of a narrative that 
views the LRA's actions as being propelled by an irrational need to commit atrocities and as being 
responsible for a humanitarian rather than political crisis.27 The chapter now turns to describing three 
key elements of the mainstream narrative of the conflict, demonstrating that the ICC's intervention and 
decision-making has entrenched each.  
 
(i) Good (the Government) Versus Evil (the LRA) 
In the mainstream narrative of the war, there is no doubt about which party bears responsibility for the 
suffering of the people in northern Uganda. The conflict is seen as a war perpetrated and propagated by 
the LRA against the GoU and against civilians. The dominant discourse of the war paints “the LRA as 
irrational terrorists or greed-driven bandits, and as the problem rather than a problem.” (Dolan 2009, 
256-7). The ICC intervention not only fit neatly into the narrative of the LRA being the only bearers of 
guilt but exacerbated it. The GoU's referral of the LRA situation to the ICC “directed the spotlight at 
the LRA as the cause of all the problems. By accepting the [GoU's] referral with alacrity, the ICC 
played into this – thereby reducing the people's confidence in the ICC as an impartial institution.” 
(Ibid., 100).    
 There is no question that the crimes the LRA have committed fall under the purview of the ICC 
(Allen 2006, 1). The brutal nature of the crimes and their classification as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity is rarely contested. Branch (2004), one of the most vehement critics of this 
mainstream narrative of the conflict is unequivocal: the LRA is guilty of “terrorist subjugation”, is 
“unambiguously evil” and is “synonymous with a reign of terror against children.” However, the 
mainstream narrative which starkly contrasts good and evil, legitimate and illegitimate, criminal and 
innocent, obfuscates key realities of the war's causes and dynamics as well as the intentions of both the 
GoU and the LRA.  
 The common narrative emerging from the conflict has been of an evil, apolitical, terrorist LRA 
waging war against a legitimate, terrorist-fighting GoU struggling to protect the civilians of northern 
Uganda from LRA violence. But in virtually every interview for this thesis and conversation conducted 
with citizens of northern Uganda about the causes of the conflict, the atrocities committed by the 
government were highlighted.  As noted above, evidence has been collected and presented about crimes 
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Finnstrom (2008, 64) also notes: “In the dominant narrative, if the war in the north is commented on 




committed by UPDF troops. The people of northern Uganda have suffered atrocities at the hands of 
both the GoU and the LRA; both are responsible for the plight, suffering and abuse of citizens. 
Everyday existence in IDP camps was to live as a “living shield” between the LRA and the UPDF 
(Finnstrom 2008, 143). Moreover, Okello (2007, 3) argues that “[t]he violations committed in northern 
Uganda are quite clearly attributable to the government of Uganda for failing in its obligation to protect 
its citizens by commission and omission of acts of a serious human rights nature.” (See also Seguya 
2010, 45). This is not how the ICC sees the situation. 
 Key decisions by the ICC engrained the narrative that the war was one-sided. As noted at the 
outset of the chapter, Uganda controversially referred “the situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance 
Army” to the ICC, giving the appearance that the Court's intervention was about targeting the LRA and 
no one else. Moreover, when ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo declared that he was opening an 
official investigation into the situation in northern Uganda, he did so sitting alongside President 
Museveni. Though Moreno-Ocampo insisted that the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) remained 
interested in investigating the UPDF, the decision to appear with Museveni sent a clear signal that the 
ICC had adopted the mainstream narrative: Museveni was partnering with Moreno-Ocampo to 
announce the ICC's investigation because he represented the legitimate (and innocent) party in Uganda. 
After all, it is impossible to imagine the Court's Prosecutor announcing an investigation alongside 
someone he would subsequently indict! It is important to note that many atrocities committed by the 
UPDF occurred prior to 2002 and are thus outside of the Court's temporal jurisdiction and are unlikely 
to ever be adjudicated (See, e.g., Branch 2007a, 186). As argued in the examination of OTP decision-
making on northern Uganda in Chapter 8, there are political justifications for why OTP sought to target 
the LRA and not the GoU. But the perception of the Prosecutor's decision-making was obvious: the 
UPDF would not be targeted by the Court. This regretful incident helped instigate the widely held 
belief that the ICC is working in the interest of the GoU. According to Human Rights Watch (2011b, 
25), “it is not surprising that Uganda’s referral to the ICC of the situation in 2003 struck many as 
nothing more than a ploy to strengthen its hand in a rebellion it had been unable to end over nearly two 
decades.”  
 Assurances of impartiality and protestations against allegations of bias have been insufficient to 
dispel the widespread perception that the Court was biased and intervened in a conflict where there was 
a 'good' and innocent party (the GoU) and an 'evil' and guilty party (the LRA) (Ibid.). They couldn't be 
sufficient. Arguments that the ICC was continuously monitoring and investigating crimes belied the 
fact that that the UPDF's crimes had already been committed and were already catalogued. When the 
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arrest warrants against the LRA's high command were issued, Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch 
described it as “a historic step, but only a first step because the prosecutor has been silent about crimes 
by the Ugandan Army.” (See Simons 2005). However, with massively reduced resources and staff 
dedicated to the situation, it is unlikely that GoU or UPDF officials will be prosecuted by the Court for 
their role in perpetrating atrocities and crimes during the war. ICC assurances have “worn thin.” 
(Human Rights Watch 2011b, 26).  
 
(ii) The Focus on Kony 
As described in Chapter three, the ICC has an 'individualizing' effect on the conflicts in which it 
intervenes. The ICC's focus is on the individual perpetrator and his or her responsibility for atrocities. A 
consequence of this dynamic is that the very nature and understanding of a conflict becomes entangled 
with the actions and fate of the individuals indicted by the Court whilst structural factors are put by the 
wayside. This effect can certainly be seen in the context of northern Uganda.  
 There is little doubt that Kony is a mysterious figure, owing in part to the fact that he has only 
rarely communicated to the outside world. The mainstream narrative paints Kony as an evil lunatic 
waging a senseless and apolitical war (Vinci 2005, 361). But this is not how those who have been close 
to Kony see the rebel leader. A diary entry of a former senior LRA commander is instructive: 
Kony is just a normal human being like any normal human being. He is a medium 
height man, brown in colour and slender. He is not what most people think of him as 
being half way a human and half way a snake or fish. He is a friendly person who likes 
coming and talking freely with his fighters.28 
 
Indeed, “Kony is not a lone freak running wild in northern Uganda.” (Butcher 2008). But the LRA 
leader is not only seen as 'crazy' in the mainstream narrative but as being solely responsible for the war 
and the suffering it has wrought on the people of northern Uganda. As Vinci (2005, 361) notes, 
“[s]ometimes the nature of the Northern Uganda conflict is chalked up to the madness of its leader.” 
 There is no question that Kony is the face of the war. His image has been plastered on the 
placards and t-shirts of NGO campaigns.
29
 Despite the indictment of four other senior commanders of 
the LRA, it is Kony who emerged as a 'poster-child' for international criminal justice, with his face 
even appearing on “Wanted” ads (see Callaway 2012). The groups that have produced these campaigns 
                                                 
28 
Diary of former LRA commander, on file with author.  
29 A quick search on Google images for “Kony t-shirt” reveals hundreds of different t-shirt advertising 
campaigns against the LRA.  
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typically ascribe responsibility for the war to Kony and advocate the view that dealing with him is the 
key – not just a key – to resolving the war. One observer, for example, declares: “We’ve long argued 
that Joseph Kony’s leadership is central to the LRA’s survival, and that a solution to the LRA’s atrocity 
crimes is nearly inconceivable without dealing with him.” (Poffenberger 2013). Most dramatically, this 
was the message behind Invisible Children's Kony2012 video campaign, watched by one hundred 
million viewers and which advocated the elimination of Kony as a solution to the war (see Tiernay 
2013). 
 This obsession with Kony has been criticized by some scholars of the war. Finnstrom (2008, 
112), for example, argues that viewing Kony as the be-all and end-all of the conflict is a reductionist 
conclusion that leads to reductionist prescriptions: “If the alleged lunatic and murderer is removed, as is 
often suggested, the violent conflict will be no more... now the only solution to the war was to have 
Kony 'eliminated.' International peace initiatives have followed the trend of individualizing a very 
complex war.” Crucially, it is difficult to imagine that killing or capturing Kony would be the end of the 
rebel group he has led for over 25 years. Without removing the reasons why rebel groups like the LRA 
have proliferated in Central and East Africa, if Kony were 'eliminated', others could easily step in, 
rebrand the LRA and continue fighting. As Amanda Weisbaum of War Child UK has remarked: “Just 
getting rid of one person does not solve the problem.” (see Mollins 2012). 
 Still, the belief that Kony is individually responsible for the conflict appears to have driven the 
OTP in its decision-making. Upon the announcement that arrest warrants for five LRA commanders 
had been unsealed, Moreno-Ocampo issued a statement which focused primarily on Kony's role and 
responsibility. In it, the Prosecutor declared: 
We have collected evidence showing how he personally manages criminal campaign of 
the LRA. From his bases in the Sudan, Kony directs all LRA operations. Joseph Kony 
is the absolute leader of the LRA and controls life and death within the organization. 
Our investigation has shown that he orders the movements of his forces and dictates the 
types of military and civilian targets of the LRA attacks. (See Statement by Chief 
Prosecutor 2005, 4-5). 
 
The statement included thirty-three lines on Kony. Otti received five, Lukwiya and Ongwen two and 
Odhiambo one. Despite protestations that the Court would investigate both sides impartially, the 
Prosecutor sent the message that it was Kony who bore ultimate responsibility for the war and for the 
suffering of the people or northern Uganda. Notably, Dolan (2009, 100) writes that it was “Museveni's 
decision to refer Kony” (and not northern Uganda or even the LRA) to the ICC, indicating the extent to 
which it appeared, even to those with intimate knowledge of the war, that the ICC was focused on 
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Kony himself. It should thus come as little surprise that Moreno-Ocampo declared that if only Kony 
were arrested, “we will have peace tomorrow.” (see Eichstaedt 2008). The Prosecutor's comments 
reflect not a belief in what justice will be served with Kony's detention but what is necessary for the 
conflict to conclude, thus dissolving the lines between the pursuit of individual accountability and the 
dominant conflict narrative. “[T]he best way to finally stop the conflict after 19 years is to arrest the top 
leaders,” he added (see IRIN 2006).  
 Of course, the focus on Kony isn't only the result of the ICC's indictment. But the ICC helped 
ensure that this would continue to resonate and deepen in the dominant narrative of the war. The 
conflict is about Kony and the violence he perpetrated against innocent civilians. This violence is 
dissociated from its causes and its politics.  
 
(iii) Focus on Humanitarian Dynamics not Political Causes 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that the when the ICC intervenes in ongoing conflicts, its focus is on the 
dynamics of war and, specifically, on the manner that violence is committed (and by whom). 
Complexity is shed as the causes and motivations of violence are neglected. This has certainly been the 
case in northern Uganda where the dominant conflict narrative typifies the war as the consequence the 
moral backwardness of the LRA rather than an extension of political dynamics. The war has been 
predominately interpreted as constituting a humanitarian crisis with humanitarian dynamics rather than 
a political conflict with political causes and dynamics. Kony and the LRA are cast as the source of this 
humanitarian – rather than political – crisis. Crucially, this humanitarian crisis requires a humanitarian 
response and has thus acted as a justification for international intervention (Dolan 2009, 257). In this 
context, “the political issues the rebels have tried to address are left without commentary on the public 
arena” (Finnstrom 2008, 99). The overall neglect of the conflict as a political crisis in favour of the 
dominant discourse which sees it as a humanitarian disaster caused by the LRA has been exacerbated 
by the ICC's intervention.  
 The ICC intervened at a time when the situation in northern Uganda was already seen as a 
humanitarian disaster rather than a political conflict (Finnstrom 2008, 64). The UN consistently 
referred to the situation as a humanitarian issue (see, e.g., Agence France-Presse 2003; UN 2004). Of 
course, it was a humanitarian crisis, but it was also a political conflict and war in which both sides were 
responsible for ongoing violence and the suffering of the civilian population. What mattered, it seemed, 
was that violence occurred and not why it did. 
 The ICC's intervention did not establish that the GoU-LRA war was a humanitarian rather than 
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political crisis, but it entrenched the dominant narrative by ensuring that the causes of the war were left 
outside the scope of its inquiry. The Rome Statute imposes a structural limitation on the temporal 
jurisdiction of the ICC. The Court can only investigate crimes committed after 1 July 2002, the date 
when the Statute came into force. In the context of the conflict in northern Uganda, this limit on the 
temporal jurisdiction of the ICC renders sixteen years of the war out of the Court's scope. 
Consequently, the primary drivers of the LRA rebellion are often left unexplored and under-examined. 
Grievances over the marginalization of the Acholi people and the concomitant abuse of the people of 
northern Uganda by the NRA and, subsequently the UPDF are typically ignored in favour of a conflict 
characterized by the sheer brutality of the LRA and the resulting humanitarian suffering. The political 
roots of the war simply do not fit within the temporal frame of reference available to the ICC to 
investigate and prosecute crimes. For some, given the injustices of the first sixteen years of the war, 
this temporal limitation on the ICC's jurisdiction “makes the court a highly inappropriate vehicle for 
finding justice in response to this legacy of violence, especially since much of the most atrocious 
violence happened before 2002.” (Branch 2007a, 186). 
 Compounding the fact that the causes of the war lie outside the jurisdiction of the ICC, the 
political nature of violence in the north, as brutal and indiscriminate as it may appear, is further ignored 
because of the preference for seeing the war as erratic and irrational. This narrative is propelled by a 
“heart-of-darkness paradigm” (see Finnstrom 2008, 109; Ehrenreich 1998, 83-4; Branch 2011, 81) that 
depicts African states as inevitably and inherently mystical and violent, the locus of endless bloodshed 
and misery and “a place of bizarre and irrational terror” (Allen 1991, 370). Here, references to the 
spiritual nature of the LRA play a critical role and allow the GoU and external actors to claim that the 
LRA is primitive, primordial and beyond the pale of reason: “It is concluded that the LRA, embodied in 
Joseph Kony, is simply insane, the latest manifestation of incomprehensible African violence.” (Branch 
2007a, 182). This framing is a useful tool “in the effort to deny any political dimension to the conflict... 
[making] the wider national, political and socioeconomic dimensions of the war marginal” (Finnstrom 
2008, 114-115). Rodriguez (2009, 21-23) adds: “Even the Ugandan government has been fond of 
presenting the LRA problem as a form of the 'backwardness' they are on a mission to fight against. But 
all that is a part of a history much more complex and difficult to understand.” 
 The dominant conflict narrative has ensured that the political and historical context of the war is 
actively set aside in favour of a focus on the fact that the rebels are perpetrating atrocities and fuelling a 
humanitarian disaster. By focusing on the commission of violence and atrocities by the LRA at the 
expense of the political causes of violence by the LRA and the GoU, the ICC has contributed to an 
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imbalanced and depoliticized narrative of the war. It has fallen into cahoots with the “reductive official 
discourse”. (Branch 2007a, 182). According to Branch (ibid., 191), 
by criminalizing the LRA leadership, the ICC denies the rebels the possibility of 
political relevance or of becoming a political force. Their leaders are to be hunted down 
and captured, and the rest of the LRA is to disintegrate. The ICC dismisses the political 
demands that the LRA leadership has made, some of which have resonance with many 
displaced Acholi: a return to their homes, the end of government violence and 
repressions, the political and economic equalization of north and south, and 
reparations... It denies that the existence of the LRA is a symptom of deeper national 
problems that would require a political solution involving the LRA, the Ugandan 
government, and the various political and social factions among Acholi. 
 
 The mainstream narrative pays little-to-no attention to the political drivers of violence in 
northern Uganda. Instead it suppresses the political causes, grievances and dynamics of the war in 
favour of a moral outlook that unequivocally apportions blame to the LRA and legitimacy to the GoU. 
Again, the ICC is not solely responsible for the establishment of this narrative. But its intervention did 
nothing to challenge it and much to reify it. One might, at this point, assume that this would have 
deleterious effects on getting the LRA and the GoU to the negotiating table. For reasons explained in 
the rest of this chapter, it did not.  
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II. Attitudes and Incentives  
Despite the ICC's arrest warrants, the GoU and the LRA agreed to unprecedented peace talks. But what 
role did the ICC play in shaping their attitudes and incentives towards the peace process? This section 
argues that, in combination with a number of important developments, the ICC's intervention 
contributed to the LRA's decision to commit to engaging in peace talks. However, there is little 
evidence that it directly contributed to the GoU's commitment to do likewise. 
 
(i) Getting the LRA to Juba  
Those scholars and observers who have concluded that the ICC had a positive impact on bringing the 
LRA to the negotiation table rely on accounts of how the Court's intervention affected the relationship 
between the LRA and Khartoum (Akhavan 2009, 625, 642; see also Wegner 2012, 11). There is some 
evidence that the LRA-Sudan relationship changed in the mid-2000s, at the same time as the ICC 
intervened in the conflict. As noted above, during a 2004 military campaign against the LRA, the 
UPDF received the approval of Sudan to operate on its territory. Khartoum even concluded an 
agreement with the OTP in which it agreed to arrest any LRA rebels wanted by the Court who were on 
its territory (Brubacher 2010, 275). The removal of direct support for the LRA has been linked to the 
ICC's investigation of the LRA, the implication being that Sudan did not want to be associated with the 
LRA. This can be seen as an extension of arguments regarding the ICC's marginalization effects which 
suggest that states do not want to be seen to be supporting or cooperating with criminal or criminalized 
parties. This view was described by some interviewees. Justice Alfonse Owiny-Dollo (2011), for 
example, remarked that the ICC “made it difficult for Sudan to identify with [the] LRA.” At the same 
time, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan left little need for 
Khartoum to continue supporting the LRA. This was, according to Otim and Wierda (2008, 22), “the 
most significant factor giving impetus to the [Juba] talks”. Mwenda argues that “the peace agreement 
between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the SPLA has denied the LRA a core military asset 
– a territorial sanctuary.” Sudan would no longer offer training for LRA soldiers, the rebels' supply 
roots would be disrupted, and the LRA would have no place to withdraw from UPDF forces, no place 
to recuperate or regroup and reorganize (Mwenda 2010, 57). As a result, developments in Sudan “left 
the LRA highly vulnerable – militarily and financially.” (Ibid.).  
 The effects of the ICC on Khartoum's support of the LRA and its sincerity in withdrawing 
support for the LRA are difficult to verify. Despite changes in the relationship between the LRA and the 
Government of Sudan, relations between local Sudanese military units and the LRA were maintained 
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(Dolan 2009, 83). Moreover, as noted above, the agreement between the GoU and Khartoum to allow 
the UPDF to track down the LRA in Sudan included a 'red line' beyond which the Ugandan army was 
prohibited from going. At the same time, despite evidence that the LRA continued to seek refuge on 
Sudanese territory, Khartoum has not demonstrated much interest in arresting them. On the contrary, 
the Sudanese Government has been adamant that the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) not expand its mandate to include searching for the LRA, threatening that the entire 
operation would otherwise be abolished (Sudan Tribune 2012). Lastly, there is evidence that the 
relationship was never entirely spoiled and that the Government of Sudan continues to view the LRA as 
a valuable proxy force (see BBC 2012b; Benner 2012; Butagira 2013). Thus changes in Khartoum's 
support for the LRA may have had some effects on the rebels' decision to enter peace negotiations with 
the GoU, but the effects are limited. Sudan's behaviour is not a sufficient reason to explain why the 
LRA committed to the Juba peace talks. 
 There is evidence that Joseph Kony and the senior commanders of the LRA viewed entering 
negotiations as the only way in which they could negotiate the removal of the ICC's arrest warrants. 
This argument is supported by the seriousness with which Kony and senior LRA officials took the issue 
of the warrants. According to Sheikh al Jaji Musa Khalil (2011), a key member of the Acholi Religious 
Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and a member of the delegations that met with Kony, the LRA leader 
“was monitoring and very much suspicious of [his] own security as far as the ICC indictment [was] 
concerned.” The UPDF's spokesperson, Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye (2011) adds that, in response to the 
ICC's arrest warrants, the influential Acholi diaspora, many of whom had long financed and supported 
the LRA, pressured LRA rebels to enter into negotiations with the GoU. The ICC's intervention may 
thus have given the LRA something other than peace to negotiate – the lifting of the arrest warrants. If 
so, the warrants added rather than removed an incentive for the LRA to enter talks with the GoU. The 
belief that this was a feasible outcome was bolstered by government statements to the effect that, as a 
carrot to the LRA for positive engagement in the Juba talks, the warrants could be lifted if negotiations 
succeeded and, more specifically, that the GoU would request the UN Security Council to defer any 
prosecutions of LRA commanders if the rebels signed a final peace agreement (Rugunda 2011). In 
short, Kony and the LRA may have made a decision that Juba represented their best chance at 
removing the ICC warrants (and the labels that came with them). As Mwenda (2010, 56-7) observes, 
“there is strong evidence that the rebels have a stronger interest in peace than the government... With 
international arrest warrants issued for him and his top commanders, Kony's only hope lies in reaching 
an agreement with Museveni”. A legal consultant to the LRA delegation (confidential interview 2011a) 
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similarly adds that the ICC did contribute to getting the LRA to the negotiating table by instilling in 
them an attitude of “let's solve our problem.” But the warrants represented another affirmation of a 
conflict narrative that the LRA sought to challenge. The opportunity to re-negotiate that narrative itself 
was a key incentive for the LRA.   
 Since the earliest peace talks between the LRA and the GoU in 1994, the LRA voiced a desire 
to express its political demands and to communicate its purpose (see O'Kadameri 2002). With a 
dominant narrative skewed in the GoU's favour, the LRA saw the Juba peace talks as an opportunity to 
clear the air, communicate their (political) agenda, and publicly confront the causes of the war. 
Negotiations offered a secular pulpit from which to achieve these aims. Kony clearly paid attention to 
the ICC's involvement in Uganda and maintained that the GoU's referral to the ICC was intended to 
“spoil our name” (see Schomerus 2010, 127). Vincent Otti also felt the ICC had mischaracterized the 
LRA and expressed a desire to set the record straight, stating: the “ICC should quickly come to 
Garamba but without the warrant of arrest. We are ready to host them for three days so they get our side 
of the story... Our side of the story must also be heard.” (see Allio 2006d). 
 The LRA evidently felt that the warrants – and the conflict narrative-affirming labels they came 
with – misrepresented their rebellion. They saw the narrative that depicted them as evil terrorists was 
propaganda. But they were largely powerless to counter that narrative given their seclusion and relative 
inability to communicate with the external world. Kony declared: “(It is) only that I don’t have means 
or I don’t have good communication to the world which can inform the people that these things which 
happened, was not LRA.” (see Green 2006) One way to communicate would be through official and 
international negotiations where the LRA could hope to be treated as an equal partner and have greater 
channels of communication with the outside world. Within months of the arrest warrants being 
unsealed, the LRA entered peace negotiations with the GoU. On the eve of the Juba talks, Kony 
described to Sam Farmar and Mareike Schomerus his views on being indicted and the prospects of the 
talks: 
So with me, I am now here. You have now seen me, I am a human being like you. I 
have eyes, I have brain [...] I wear clothes also...you cannot hear the word from one side 
only. You cannot say that Mr Joseph is guilty without hearing anything from [me]...If 
they want peace to be, they will call all of us together then we talk about it. But [it is 
not enough to say] that I am guilty or I am wanted with the ICC...it is very difficult to 
[go to The Hague]. But when we talk this peace talk, when we talk and everything is 
finished well, we go. We go and talk. We go and judge that case to show that I am not 
found guilty...My message to Museveni is if Museveni can agree to talk with me, it is 
only a very good thing which I know will bring peace to the people of Uganda. (See 




Kony's remarks suggest that the ICC instigated a renewed desire to demonstrate to the world that the 
LRA was not the band of crazed terrorist depicted in the narrative constructed by the GoU and 
propagated by popular conceptions of the war. Kony also seems to have made the judgement that peace 
talks with international attention would provide a platform to achieve this. Unsurprisingly, the LRA 
delegation's first move was to open direct negotiations with a statement which reads like an exasperated 
plea to tell their side of the story:  
Your Excellency, it is not true, as has been suggested, that the LRM/LRA has no 
political agenda. To say so is to underrate the problem at hand and to give the false 
impression that LRM/A has no cause for its armed rebellion. Failure to express its 
Political Agenda loudly in intellection form does not mean the lack of it. Until now, we 
have been speaking through action.We now want to use this forum, space and time to 
express our agenda in words. (See Daily Monitor 2007). 
 
The LRA wanted to challenge the conflict narrative. Juba gave them the opportunity to do so.   
 
(ii) Getting the GoU to Juba  
The actions and statements of the GoU towards negotiating with the LRA might best be described as 
schizophrenic. As noted above, a blanket amnesty was passed and offered to all LRA rebels under the 
Amnesty Act (2000). However, some argue that Museveni was never truly supportive of the Act (Allen 
2006, 37; Finnstrom 2008, 92, 96; Rodriguez 2009, 39). Museveni stated at the time that: “We should 
apply the law of Moses; an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, to bring discipline to society.” (see 
Finnstrom 2008, 92). Statements by the President and others suggested that Kony and those indicted by 
the ICC were ineligible to receive an amnesty. This position was subsequently reversed in favour of 
offering amnesty as an incentive for the LRA to agree to finalized a peace agreement
 
and even promises 
that if Kony “respects the truce, we shall convince the ICC not to arrest him.” (see Ahimbisibwe and 
Jaramogi 2006).
30 
Similarly, government officials first maintained that they would not negotiate if 
Kony, Otti or anyone indicted by the ICC was involved (IWPR 2006), only to reverse course and 
declare that they would only negotiate if the LRA leadership personally led the talks (see Allio 2006f). 
This cohort of contradictory statements suggests that the question of the ICC's indictments tailored how 
the GoU communicated its positions towards negotiating with the LRA. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the GoU's attitudes and incentives towards peace talks were directly affected 
by the ICC or its arrest warrants. 
 The GoU faced immense pressure to resolve its war with the LRA (Otto 2011). As noted at the 
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For an in-depth analysis of the use of amnesties in Uganda, see Mallinder, (2009). 
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outset of this chapter, the GoU's reputation had suffered in the early 2000s as the “forgotten” plight of 
northern Ugandans became the subject of documentaries and NGO attention. Rodriguez (2009, 101) 
writes that “[l]ittle by little Uganda stopped being Africa's success story in international circles and 
became Africa's place of horror, especially for children.” As the International Crisis Group (2006, 11) 
noted, engaging in negotiations gave “Museveni an opportunity to polish an image increasingly 
tarnished by allegations of corruption, electoral malpractice and inability to end the humanitarian crisis 
in the north.” The GoU also felt pressure from South Sudan to play a constructive role in the peace 
negotiations. Following the signing of the CPA between Khartoum and South Sudan, the SPLA sought 
to remove the LRA from its territory. One way to achieve this was by finally settling the war between 
the LRA and the GoU. Museveni was keen to demonstrate support for his long-standing allies in South 
Sudan (Mwenda 2010, 57).  
 As international pressure mounted to resolve the war, so too did pressure from community 
leaders in northern Uganda, particularly from Acholi-region religious leaders. Members of ARLPI went 
to great lengths to persuade the GoU to enter negotiations, acting as unofficial mediators in the lead-up 
to the Juba peace talks. The GoU seems to have calculated that it would be unlikely to have gained 
future political and electoral support in northern Uganda, the most hostile of areas towards the 
Government, had they rejected the efforts of religious leaders. District Chairman of LC.V Martin 
Mapenduzi (2011) suggests that it was the changing political climate in the early 2000s that pressured 
Museveni to take negotiations seriously. An increase in internal opposition to his rule as well as poor 
electoral outcomes led the Ugandan President, in the words of Mapenduzi (ibid.), to say, “'well, maybe 
I need to change and go with [the people of northern Uganda]' who had consistently called for a 
peaceful resolution to the war.” Entering negotiations was thus an attempt by the GoU to rescue its 
image abroad and improve its political standing in the North by appearing to be interested in 
constructively participating in a dialogue over peace in northern Uganda. Critically, however, both 
internal and external pressure preceded the ICC's intervention and the Court's issuance of arrest 
warrants.   
 It is important not to over-state the GoU's interest in negotiations (see Chapter 5). Kulayigye 
(2011) and another senior government official (confidential interview 2011b) involved in the peace 
talks claimed they never thought the peace talks would succeed. The GoU's attitude was that the LRA 
was a “defeated” group to whom they could offer a “soft landing” and offer amnesty as a “gift” 
(Kulayigye 2011) rather that insisting on criminal prosecution of senior rebel commanders, including 
Kony and Otti. This hesitancy should come as little surprise. Insofar as the mainstream narrative, as 
112 
 
crafted and propagated by the GoU, depended on denying the LRA political agency, acknowledging 
them as legitimate partners in negotiations would be counterproductive. But that narrative also required 
the international community's buy-in, literally and figuratively. Entering negotiations should therefore 
be seen as an attempt by the GoU to repair its image abroad by appearing to be interested in 
constructively participating in a dialogue over peace in northern Uganda. As Kulayigye (ibid.) claims, 
it “made no sense to the military to negotiate with [the LRA] but it was done because of political 
expediency and pressure.” Agreeing to negotiate with the LRA may have granted the rebels' a degree of 
political agency, but it also allowed the GoU to remain the benevolent benefactors willing to negotiate 
with the 'bad guys'. 
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III. The Pre-Negotiation Phase 
In order to explore how the parties ended up at Juba and assess the ICC's impact, the following section 
examines three key issues in the pre-negotiation phase: the creation of a 'ripe moment' for negotiations 
between the LRA and the GoU; the decision to choose Juba as a location for peace talks; and the 
mediation strategies to ensure that the LRA would come to the negotiation table.  
 
(i) A Ripe Moment?  
Asked why the LRA was willing to enter direct negotiations with the GoU, LRA second-in-command 
Vincent Otti stated that “[p]eace talks come when the war becomes difficult.” (see Eichstaedt 2009, 
232). So why did the Juba peace talks begin in 2006 and did the ICC have any effect on making the war 
“difficult” for the LRA? 
 Matthew Brubacher, a former analyst and international cooperation adviser to the ICC's 
investigation in northern Uganda, usefully outlines key changes in the LRA during the ICC's 
investigation. Brubacher (2010 272-4) notes that the OTP focused its investigation on crimes occurring 
between July 2002 and July 2004, when the frequency of LRA attacks was at its peak. During this 
period, a combination of military operations and defections from the rebel group severely weakened the 
LRA's capacity to continue fighting against the GoU in northern Uganda and to abduct children to 
replenish its ranks. Estimates of defections – measured by the number of applications to the Amnesty 
Commission for an amnesty certificate – are in the neighbourhood of 20,000 over the period of 2000-
2008 (Okee 2011). For a period in mid-2004, attacks in northern Uganda dropped close to zero. It was 
during this time that the LRA also moved into Southern Sudan and, subsequently, into the eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. Brubacher (2010, 274) argues that 
“[w]ith the constant pressure and the depleting officer corps...[t]he continued existence of the LRA in 
northern Uganda was ending and the LRA knew it.” 
 In addition to the weakened capacity of the LRA prior to the peace talks, it is again necessary to 
consider the changing political dynamics in South Sudan during the period under consideration. The 
signing of the CPA between the SPLA and Khartoum in 2005 ended the decades-long civil war in 
Sudan and guaranteed that the South could hold a referendum to decide whether they would constitute 
a new state.31 However, as Khartoum's proxy force, the LRA posed a significant problem for South 
Sudan. The country had been an active theatre of conflict for the LRA since the mid-1990s and 
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In 2011, the South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in favour of becoming the 54
th
 country on the 
African continent.  
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thousands of civilians had suffered as a result of LRA abductions and attacks. Gerard Prunier (2004, 
359) maintains Sudan and Uganda have long been waging an “undeclared war on their common 
border”. Indeed, it is a fallacy to see the war in Uganda had an intra-state conflict or even a single 
conflict between the LRA and GoU (Seguya 2010, 65). So important was this proxy war that one 
commentator observed: “a purely Ugandan solution, whether by military means or dialogue, cannot 
resolve the LRA issue in Uganda. The solution to [the] LRA war is in Sudan.” (see New Vision 2006a). 
With relative peace between the North and South and with South Sudan on the road to independence, 
Khartoum no longer had as strong a need for the LRA to act as its proxy force and the Government of 
South Sudan made it a priority to rid its territory of the LRA.  
 For many, it was changes in Sudan, not Uganda, that explain why peace talks began. When 
asked why the Juba negotiations started in 2006, Sheikh al Jaji Musa Khali (2011) stressed the shifting 
state of affairs in Sudan:  
I think if you follow the history of the event, there were dimensions if you follow the 
negotiation between Khartoum and the SPLM that successfully made the CPA sign and 
immediately the CPA was signed, was a twist of events. The LRA is an army group, 
they knew their way behind them would be now enemy, in front of them would be an 
enemy. 
 
Of course, it is important not to overstate the role of changes in Khartoum's behaviour. Sudan 
continued to support the LRA. Still, sufficient space was created for talks to begin. The changes in 
Khartoum's relationship with the LRA may have been perceived by the rebels as a sufficiently real 
threat to their continued existence – even if these changes did not mean that Sudan completely 
withdrew its support for the LRA. In others words, the LRA could have seen the negotiations as a 
useful 'time-out' and opportunity to explore what interests could be satisfied through peace talks. 
 As argued above, the ICC warrants were part of the LRA's calculus in committing to peace 
negotiations. Some, like Grace Okeng (2006), argued that “[t]he LRA’s decision to engage in talks now 
is a clear indication of panic and an attempt to avoid the ICC.” Panic or not, the ICC warrants 
contributed to creating a ripe moment for negotiations. Contrary to those who speculated that the LRA 
would fight to the death because of the ICC, the LRA understood the warrants could not simply be 
fought away; they needed (if possible) to be negotiated away. Still, the ICC contributed to the timing of 
the peace talks as only one of a complex set of factors which weakened and threatened the LRA and 





(ii) Picking Juba  
Juba in 2006 could hardly be described as an ideal location for peace negotiations. It had recently been 
a central locus of the war between the GoS and GoSS. Juba was also the soon-to-be capital of South 
Sudan and, as noted above, the LRA had consistently fought against the SPLA and no previous peace 
talks between the LRA and the GoU had taken place in the country. More importantly, having the talks 
in a state with strong ties to one of the warring parties – the GoU – and powerful interests in 
eliminating the LRA from its soil – was unlikely to be an ideal choice. So why was Juba chosen and did 
it have anything to do with the ICC? 
 Holding talks in Uganda was never seriously contemplated. By 2006, the LRA high command 
was outside of the country and the GoU was steadfast against in-country talks. Museveni wanted 
negotiations to take part outside the country whilst the UPDF continued its military campaign in the 
north (Rodriguez 2009, 244). Holding negotiations in Uganda could also have posed a serious dilemma 
for the GoU. It had referred the LRA to the ICC because the LRA senior command was no longer on its 
territory. This allowed the GoU to claim it was “unable” to arrest Kony. Holding the talks in Uganda 
would have required (at least at some point in the process) that members of the LRA's senior command 
return to the country. If they returned, there would be expectations that the GoU would fulfil its 
obligations in arresting LRA commanders and transferring them to The Hague. The commanders might 
also have gained political credence and authority in such a scenario. Thus, if the GoU was intent on 
keeping the LRA outside of northern Uganda, the ICC's intervention helped minimized the chances that 
the talks would be held in the country. But the ICC's intervention also complicated the decision of 
which external location could serve as host for peace talks. 
 When the LRA began exploring the possibility of entering into negotiations with the GoU to 
end the conflict, a number of host locations emerged as possibilities: Italy, because it was where San 
D'Egidio was based, a religious organization active in attempts to resolve the conflict and trusted by the 
LRA; South Africa; and Norway. The first head of the LRA's delegation at Juba, Martin Ojul (2011), 
dismissed discussion on these locations as “just brainstorming” but others maintain that the LRA 
thoroughly explored having negotiations take place outside of the immediate region (Ochola 2011).  
  South Sudan proactively sought to mediate the talks and, as noted above, had keen interests in 
resolving the conflict and pushing the LRA out of the country. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) 
offered Vice President Dr. Riek Machar as chief mediator. Machar travelled to visit Kony and the LRA 
command, giving them US$20,000 as a gesture of good will. While the LRA delegation, frustrated by a 
perceived bias against them in the GoSS, later agitated to change the location of the talks and held side-
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track negotiations in Mombasa, Kenya, Juba remained the location of the official peace negotiations 
throughout the peace talks process.  
 It appears that the ICC, at least in part, shaped the decision-making process and the acceptance 
by the LRA to hold talks in Juba. A key concern was that holding talks in an ICC member-state could 
result in the arrest of the LRA's ICC indictees. It seems unlikely that the LRA could have been 
convinced to hold talks on the territory of a member state whilst the indictments against them 
remained. Rodriguez (2009, 244) captures this worry: “The International Criminal Court's insistence on 
intervening in Northern Uganda was quite an obstacle to negotiations taking place outside Uganda. 
What would happen if a top rebel commander arrived in a country that was a signatory to the Rome 
Statute and was arrested?” Simon Simonse et al (2010, 229) maintain that being a non-member state 
made “Sudan a place where it was safe to talk.” Indeed, Sudan, whose own President, Omar al-Bashir, 
was under investigation by the ICC at the time and whose history with the LRA preceded over a decade 
was unlikely to arrest Kony. Ojul (2011) admits that South Sudan was indeed selected/accepted as a 
location for negotiations as part of the LRA's calculations regarding the ICC arrest warrants.  
 The ICC warrants appear to have precluded holding talks anywhere but in a non-ICC member 
state. Sudan was likely also chosen because it was close to Uganda and to the DRC where Kony was 
stationed. Kony would not have to travel through areas where there was a risk that he would be 
arrested. 
 
(iii) Mediation Strategies to Get the LRA and GoU to the Table 
While Machar eventually emerged as the chief mediator of the Juba peace talks, the LRA did not 
initially intend for this scenario. It was only after failing to contact other possible mediators that the 
GoSS vice president entered the fray. Ojul (2011) maintains that the rebels first wanted the Dutch 
religious organization Pax Christi to mediate talks. The LRA also requested that South Africa play a 
role in mediating the negotiations, with members of the country's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission participating (see Reuters 2006; Uganda Radio Network 2006). All overtures were 
rejected and Machar was left as chief mediator.  
 As suggested above, the civil war between the SPLA and Khartoum was closely interwoven 
with the war between the LRA and the GoU. With the CPA between North and South Sudan, the SPLA 
had finally managed to achieve potential sovereignty. Yet gaining independence also meant 
consolidating order and stability. In the wake of the CPA, removing an enemy rebel army which posed 
a constant threat to civilians and which regularly attacked South Sudanese citizens quickly became a 
117 
 
priority. Salva Kiir, who later became President of South Sudan, argued that South Sudan took the 
decision to host negotiations “because the people who they kill are southern Sudanese, the women they 
rape are southern Sudanese women and girls, and the boys they abduct are southern Sudanese”  (see 
Allio 2006a).  
 Prior to the Juba negotiations, between 4,000 and 5,000 LRA combatants were present on South 
Sudanese soil with twice as many UPDF troops (Atkinson 2009, 10). The LRA's presence in South 
Sudan was, in an odd twist of political fate, linked to Machar's relations with Kony. When asked why 
the LRA would accept Machar as a mediator, many interview subjects responded that there had been a 
long-standing bond between Kony and Machar. In the mid-1990s, Machar's Southern Sudan 
Independence Movement (SSIM), which had broken off from the SPLM-United, became allied with 
the LRA and “facilitated the first LRA-Khartoum contact” (see Schomerus 2007, 18, citing Johnson 
2003). Khartoum, as noted above, subsequently deployed the LRA as a proxy force against the SPLM. 
As Bishop Ochola (2011) explains, “Sudan said this is a great opportunity because Uganda has been 
supporting SPLA against Khartoum government so we are going to support you against Kampala 
government. It was tit-for-tat. So Khartoum started helping the LRA militarily.”  
 Following the signing of the CPA, the LRA's presence created an untenable situation for South 
Sudan and “[h]ence the GoSS interest in trying to resolve the northern Uganda war.” (Atkinson 2009, 
10). For Kiir, co-existing with the LRA was impossible “because it would be like living with a snake in 
the same house.” (See Allio 2006f) Defeating the LRA militarily wasn't an option; after all, neither the 
SPLA nor the GoU had been able (or perhaps willing) to achieve this aim over a period of twenty years, 
despite vastly outnumbering the LRA and wielding superior military hardware. But perhaps South 
Sudan could bring the parties together and make the need for ongoing war between the GoU and the 
LRA obsolete. According to Lyandro Komakech (2011), “to stabilize South Sudan mean to sort out the 
LRA conflict...the priority of peace in northern Uganda was actually an outcome of a discussion of the 
security interests of the Southern Sudan government.” As a result of South Sudan's keen interest in the 
outcome of the war between the LRA and the GoU, the SPLA offered to mediate and host peace 
negotiations. Far from reflecting a neutral, disinterested position South Sudan was directly interested in 
the outcome of the talks.  
 South Sudan managed to get both the GoU and the LRA to agree to negotiations. According to 
Bishop Ochola (2011), Southern Sudan took a proposal for peace talks to Kampala on their own 
initiative: “President Salva Kiir with his vice, Riek Machar, told Museveni: 'look, LRA has been a thorn 
in our foot as much as in yours, why don't you talk to them.' Surprisingly, President agreed.” Jacob 
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Oulanyah (2011), a legal advisor to Machar and an NRM MP for Kony's home constituency, adds that 
when Kiir met with Museveni in 2005 he said: “'We as the Government of South Sudan, we have a 
problem on our hands. We cannot deliver on the CPA for as long as the LRA remains in that territory. If 
you can't do it for anything else, do it for us. We are failing to manage our people's expectations 
because of this LRA there.'” Museveni subsequently agreed to support his long-standing allies in South 
Sudan and a government delegation for Juba was formed. South Sudan's strategies for getting the LRA 
to the table were very different. Here, dealing with the question of the ICC warrants, was crucial.  
 From the number and nature of his statements, it is evident that Machar was compelled to 
address the question of the ICC's arrest warrants as a matter of priority. He subsequently elaborated his 
position on how the ICC had to be sequenced with the goal of negotiating a resolution to the war:  
If the ICC came out to say that they would give the peace process a chance before the 
legal process is done, then we would resolve the conflict in the region...If they did that, 
they would give the peace process a big boost, it would assist the Ugandan government 
to boldly say ‘we are going to negotiate'...The ICC indictments are extremely important 
as part of a process of accountability and ending impunity. But the priority has to be 
getting [Kony] out of the bush...We are a vehicle to mediate a peaceful settlement. With 
a peaceful settlement, the environment would have been set for the ICC to trigger off 
the legal process (see New Vision 2006b). 
 
In the lead-up and during the negotiations, the fate of the top LRA command was an issue of primary 
concern. A key reward for the LRA's participation, the government suggested, would be that Kony and 
his fellow ICC indictees would receive protection from prosecution. On the eve of talks, Museveni 
declared: “We must sit on the table and agree that he comes out of the terrorism. Once [Kony] does 
that, we shall pardon him.” (see Nyanzi 2006). The GoU suggested this was an extension of their 
“kindness” (see New Vision 2006d). Their approach was welcomed by Machar who exclaimed that it 
demonstrated the GoU's political will and “builds their confidence to arrive at a peaceful solution in the 
shortest time possible.” (see Mukasa 2006a). But the issuance of an amnesty was immediately rejected 
by the LRA. Rather than an act of “kindness”, the LRA saw the Government's offer of an amnesty as a 
one-sided request to surrender. Its delegation declared that an amnesty “presupposes surrender” (ibid.) 
and that “[w]hen we go for negotiations, we negotiate as equal persons on the table so it is.” (see BBC 
2006a). Rather than challenging the dominant narrative of the war, the offer of amnesty reified it. In 
offering an amnesty, the Government framed its actions as those of a benevolent and generous actor 
seeking a solution to the conflict, going so far as to pardon the LRA's top command. Moreover, insofar 
as amnesties can be understood as a non-judicial form of accountability (see Villa-Vicencio, 2000; 
Olsen et al 2010, 36), the GoU's unilateral offer of amnesty suggested that the LRA was, again, the sole 
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guilty party in the war. But, as Allen (2006, 80-81) wrote, “there were commanders in the LRA who did 
not want 'forgiveness', which implies an admission of guilt, so much as a negotiated settlement. 
Basically, they wanted to be taken seriously and not dismissed as lunatic or misguided children.” 
Accepting amnesty was untenable to the LRA which, as Finnstrom (2008, 229) writes, “opposed the 
Uganda government's reinforcement of a hierarchical structure in the process of war and peace.” 
 At the same time, Machar understood the desire amongst the LRA to receive political 
recognition and challenge the dominance of the conflict narrative. Machar reassured them that 
engaging in the peace process would not translate into their arrest and surrender to the ICC. He stated: 
“The ICC should differentiate between a political process and a legal process. The main agenda of this 
process is peace.” (see Allio 2006b). Whilst noting that the ICC was “extremely important as part of a 
process of accountability and ending impunity”, Machar reiterated that the ICC had to give peace talks 
a chance: “If the ICC came out to say that they would give the peace process a chance before the legal 
process is done, then we would resolve the conflict in the region.” (see New Vision 2006b). Crucially, 
Machar also demonstrated an understanding of the LRA's desire to confront the mainstream narrative 
that had painted them as an 'evil' rebel group fighting a 'good' government in Kampala. In the lead-up 
to negotiations Machar told the LRA: “We defied the whole world so you could have a chance to come 
and say your viewpoints.” (see Agence France-Presse 2006). He subsequently explained that “[w]e 
thought that the LRA should take this chance and tell the international community their cause. They felt 
insecure.” (see Mukasa 2006b) Committing to Juba gave the LRA the opportunity to use the talks a 
stage to confront what they saw as an uneven and unjust narrative and discourse of the war and, 
ultimately, their responsibility for it.  
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IV. Conclusion: Getting Justice to Juba 
The ICC's intervention did not preclude peace talks from taking place. While the extent to which it 
contributed is debatable, overall the Court appears to have contributed positively. This chapter has 
argued, however, that it did so not for the reasons traditionally provided in analyses of the ICC's 
involvement in northern Uganda, namely that the Court's intervention marginalized the LRA and 
pressured Kony into negotiating. Rather, the LRA saw talks at Juba as an opportunity to confront the 
dominant conflict narrative, accentuated by the ICC's intervention, which had painted the LRA as a 
gang of indiscriminate and criminal terrorists fighting an apolitical war against a legitimate 
government. Without traditional means to communicate their political agenda, the Juba peace talks 
offered the LRA the opportunity to tell 'their side of the story' to the world. The ICC warrants provided 
the impetus for an attempt to renegotiate this narrative. Moreover and relatedly, the LRA seems to have 
calculated that the ICC arrest warrants were something they could negotiate away, a calculation likely 
propelled by statements from the GoU and Machar that justice could be delayed and protection from 
prosecution given to the senior LRA command. This provided Kony with an incentive to commit to at 
least exploring what could be gained through peace talks.  
 Of course, the effects of the ICC should be tempered by context: there are no easy causal 
mechanisms to be drawn. While it has been argued that the ICC had a positive effect on getting the 
LRA to the negotiating table, there is little-to-no evidence that it encouraged the GoU to do so. Instead, 
the GoU's commitment to talks is attributable to its desire to retain good relations with South Sudan 
and its reputation as a benevolent and peace-seeking government. Moreover, while the ICC may have 
contributed to the timing of the Juba talks, it did so only amidst a constellation of other crucial factors, 
especially changes in the conflict between Khartoum and South Sudan. Where the ICC clearly did have 
a significant effect was on selecting Juba, a capital of a state that was under no obligations to arrest ICC 
indictees, as the location for peace talks. Insofar as the warrants represented a reification of the 
dominant narrative that the LRA wanted to challenge, they also affected Machar's strategy of 
presenting the talks as an opportunity for the LRA to tell their story. 
 Still, the commitment on the part of the LRA and GoU to enter peace negotiations should not be 
confused with a commitment to see them through. The intervention by the ICC may have contributed to 
getting the LRA to the negotiating table and to the selection of Juba as a location for peace talks. 
However, this did not mean that the LRA and the GoU would commit to a negotiated settlement. 
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Chapter 5: The ICC, Juba, and the Kwoyelo Trial 
 
The Juba peace talks are the last chance for these terrorists to come out safely from what 
they have been doing so that peace returns and they also stay alive... If the peace talks 
fail, we shall hunt for the rebels and kill them because we were moving on very well with 
the operations before the peace talks. – Yoweri Museveni (see Ocowun and Moro 2006)   
 
Joseph Kony with his other four notorious commanders now will not accept the idea of 
peace negotiations with anybody since they know for sure arrest warrants have been 
issued for them. They will only be buying time with anyone who tries to talk peace with 




Official peace talks between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
commenced in August 2006 in Juba, South Sudan. The negotiations began amidst an atmosphere of 
apparent – if cautious – optimism amongst participants and observers.32 The talks were labelled as the 
“best opportunity” (Williams 2006, 69; New Vision 2006c; Finnstrom 2008, 227) and “most 
promising” (Egeland 2008, 198-199) chance to finally resolve the conflict between the GoU and the 
LRA. This palpably positive view amongst both Ugandan and outside observers was perhaps 
unsurprising. Since the outbreak of the conflict, virtually every approach to ending the war had been 
attempted – and each had failed. Tellingly, a delegate at Juba explained the initial impetus of the 
government's decision to refer Uganda to the ICC as being the result of an attitude that “we have tried 
other stuff.” (Anywar 2011). Massive military operations led by the GoU, and complemented by 
international and regional support, were unable to produce a verdict to the war. While the offer of 
amnesty, in combination with traditional forms of reconciliation, for any rebels who denounced the 
rebellion produced an impressive stream of defectors from the LRA, it did not result in comprehensive 
defections nor the defection of the rebels' senior command (Otim and Wierda 2008, 22). Previous 
rounds of peace negotiations in 1994, 1998 and 2004 floundered, resulting in deepening distrust 
between the warring parties, renewed intensity of violence, and an increased frequency of atrocities 
against civilians. When the ICC intervened, fears that the Court would ruin any chance of getting the 
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LRA and GoU to the negotiating table were palpable (see, e.g. Pelser 2005; Parrot 2006, 15). But those 
fears proved to be overstated; both sides appeared ready to negotiate, even if the ICC question loomed 
large over peace talks. It is in this remarkable context of an exhaustive and exhausting pursuit of 
virtually every approach to conflict resolution that the Juba peace talks began.  
 The Juba peace talks covered five agenda items: a cessation of hostilities; comprehensive 
solutions to the conflict; accountability and reconciliation; a permanent ceasefire agreement; and 
demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration (DDR). The talks broke down on numerous occasions but, 
in the end, all agenda items eventually resulted in agreements between delegates of the GoU and LRA 
delegations. Still, neither Kony nor Museveni signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Despite 
delegates and observers eagerly waiting for the LRA leader to emerge from the bush and endorse the 
agreements reached at Juba, by 2008 the talks had ground to a halt and ultimately failed to produce a 
final, comprehensive resolution to the war. Military operations against the LRA quickly resumed and 
the rebels retaliated with renewed violence (Schomerus and Tumutegyereize 2009).  
 Following the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter seeks to parse out key 
elements in the Juba peace process and its aftermath to suggest how they were affected – and not 
affected – by the ICC's intervention. This analysis makes clear that international criminal justice can 
impact particular phases in a peace process and the ICC may have both positive and negative effects 
within the same context. Specifically, this chapter isolates the Juba negotiations and the post-Juba 
phases in northern Uganda. The chapter begins by considering the effects of the ICC's investigations 
and arrest warrants on the composition of the delegations at Juba and the agenda of the peace talks. The 
second section of the chapter tackles evidence which indicates that the Juba peace talks were never 
really about negotiating peace and that neither party was sufficiently or genuinely interested in a final 
resolution to the conflict. If this is the case, then the ICC can neither have helped nor hindered the 
possibility of a negotiated peace between the LRA and the GoU. In the third section, developments 
since the end of the peace talks are considered, focusing primarily on Uganda's first war crimes trial. 
While concerns that retributive justice would undermine peace in northern Uganda have subsided, the 
conflict narrative of a 'good' GoU fighting an 'evil' band of terrorists has been entrenched post-Juba 
through the selective prosecution of LRA commanders. As this case shows, the effects and implications 
of the ICC on the northern Ugandan peace process are far more complex.  
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I. The ICC at Juba 
This section explores the ICC's effects on two key elements of the Juba negotiations: the composition 
of the delegations and the agenda of the peace talks. The ICC had significant effects on both. 
 
(i) Delegation Composition  
While there is no evidence that the composition of the GoU's delegation was affected by the ICC, it is 
evident that the form and membership of the LRA's delegation was shaped by the ICC indictments. The 
nature of its composition subsequently had significant implications for the Juba talks. Most obviously, 
the absence of the two most senior commanders – and political figures – within the LRA (Kony and 
Otti) has been linked to the ICC's arrest warrant against them. After originally insisting that they could 
not negotiate with 'terrorists' like Kony and stating that “[i]t is absolutely impossible for us to sit and 
talk to people who have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and wanted by 
Interpol for war crimes and crimes against humanity” (Allio 2006a), the GoU quickly changed tack and 
demanded that Kony and Otti lead their delegation since “the Government can only speak to authentic 
and authoritative leadership” (Allio 2006e). The GoU's delegation head and senior Ugandan diplomat, 
Ruhakana Rugunda (2011), now admits that it was not accessing Kony that made earnest negotiations 
difficult. 
 Early in the negotiations it became clear that neither Kony nor Otti would travel to Juba. 
Publicly, both maintained that their fear of being arrested precluded any possibility of them attending 
the peace talks. On the eve of the talks, Machar stated that the LRA “are concerned about this issue [of 
the ICC indictment]; that there is no guarantee that they will not be abducted in Juba.” (See Mukasa 
2006b) Machar was unable to convince either to lead the LRA's delegation. When he asked Otti to 
bolster the delegation by sending at least one ICC-indicted member of the LRA, he was apparently 
told: “It’s easy for you to ask...you’re not indicted.” (see ICG 2006, 15). Complicating matters, LRA 
Brigadier Sam Kolo, who had previously acted as a negotiator for the LRA during 2004 peace talks 
with Betty Bigombe, had defected from the LRA, leaving the rebels without a representative with 
“enough credibility, support from Kony and the capacity to negotiate” on the LRA's behalf (Rodriguez 
2009, 246). In the end, only two rebel field commanders joined the delegation – Colonel Lubwa 
Bwonne and Lieutenant Colonel Santo Alit (Ibid., 256). But Otti was unequivocal about his or Kony's 
participation in the negotiations:  
You are aware that Kony, [and] myself cannot attend the peace talk process although 
they wanted one of the top leader of the LRA to attend in person. We are afraid of the 




[The] ICC is just like a landmine or thorn [ahead] of me which I will not accept to step 
on. I will keep dodging it even if I am being pushed. (See Ocowun 2006). 
  
For Kony, it was not simply a fear of being arrested. There is evidence to suggest that Kony viewed the 
ICC not merely as a threat to his freedom but as a threat to his personal security and, ultimately, his 
survival. McMot Kitara (2011), a former local district chairman in Gulu and a Juba observer, maintains 
that even if he was captured or had surrendered, Kony believed he would never reach the ICC alive. In 
a telephone conversation in which Kony reached out for advice from the respected and experienced 
Kitara, the rebel leader maintained that: 
I will not [go to The Hague] because Museveni has a lot of connections with the British 
and the Americans....I will not accept it. They will hijack me on the way to The Hague 
and kill me.33 
 
George Omono (2011), the former country director for ACORD Uganda, argues that the question of 
Kony's security and safety was never sufficiently addressed during the peace talks: “Kony was mainly 
concerned about his safety, that's all. So, in all this process we never thought carefully about the safety 
of Kony and who would convince him about his safety.” Omono further notes that Kony accepted 
numerous visits by people like Jacob Oulanyah and Justice Owiny Dollo to explain what the ICC meant 
for his fate precisely because he wanted to understand how his own safety was implicated by the 
Court's warrants (ibid.). In the end, Machar – and other parties involved, including the United Nations, 
the European Union and the United States – failed to provide Kony and the senior LRA command with 
sufficient guarantees for their security. What fate awaited Kony if the talks succeeded and he came out 
of the bush, was never clarified. Kony thus calculated that he could not attend the talks – not as a 
matter of his freedom but as a matter of life and death. This, in turn, had significant implications for the 
Juba talks.  
 As a result of his absence from Juba, Kony was unable to control much of the proceedings or to 
keep the delegates who were there to represent him in line. The delegation, which had dozens of 
members and high turnover rates throughout the talks34, consequently suffered from two problems: 
first, the delegation did not reflect or represent the LRA senior command or its positions; second, and 
relatedly, divisions amongst the delegates quickly became apparent and hampered any progress towards 
a final agreement.  
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 George Omono (2011) agrees that it was Kony's personal security that guided his views on the ICC.  
34 
The delegation chief, for example, changed twice.  
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 Delegates and observers on both sides of the conflict agree that there were serious problems 
with the composition of the LRA delegation. Most members were part of the Lord's Resistance 
Movement diaspora and knew little about the actual conditions within the LRA. The International 
Crisis Group (2006, 8) worried that with only two active commanders in the rebels' delegation, the 
delegation could not effectively represent the LRA high command and the talks would “stagnate” 
(ibid., 13). One LRA delegation member, Ayena Crispus Odongo (2011) described his initial concerns 
when he first met a congregation of delegates in Nairobi, prior to the Juba talks:  
When I went to Nairobi I found the kind of people who were actually going from a 
team actually with men of very mean educational background and men who had been in 
the diaspora who did not know anything if at all about what was going on – people who 
did not inspire confidence in the people of northern Uganda in the peace talks. 
 
Michael Otim (2011) argues that while these delegates claimed to represent the senior LRA command, 
“in reality, when you speak to the commanders in the bush what they want is completely different.” 
Similar sentiments have been echoed by observers in detailing what they see as the most significant 
obstacles and challenges facing the peace talks. John Oryema Lacambel (2011), whose popular radio 
show on MEGA FM often aired programs featuring LRA commanders (including Kony and Otti), 
described the challenges of including diaspora members, many of whom had not been in Uganda for 
decades let alone been in the LRA. In a similar vein, Dolan argues that the LRA delegation was not the 
“real thing” while Brubacher maintains that the connection of most delegates to the “real LRA” was 
“intermittent and dubious” (Dolan 2009, 77; see also Brubacher 2010, 276). Jackson (2009, 325) adds 
that “[t]he Acholi in the diaspora appear[ed] to have no idea what Kony seeks from the negotiations 
and there is a real question of legitimacy hanging over this group.” 
 Remarkably, the dissociation between the LRA command and its Juba delegation was evident in 
even the most senior delegation positions. LRA delegation chief Martin Ojul (2011) insists that before 
he was selected to become the initial head of the LRA delegation, “the LRA [didn't] know me.” David 
Matsanga, who replaced Martin Ojul as the head of the LRA delegation in 2008, admitted that he had 
never actually met Kony (Eichstaedt 2009, 275). Most bizarrely, Odongo, who had been a self-
professed supporter of Museveni's National Resistance Movement and who now serves as a Member of 
Parliament in Museveni's Government, was selected to take part. Odongo (2011) maintains that he did 
not seek out any position in the LRA delegation nor did he previously have any relations with the LRA 
senior command. The closest individual to Kony participating in the negotiations directly was Yusup 
Adek, an elderly man from Gulu, who many of those interviewed believed has long been amongst 
Kony's most trusted advisors.  
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 Whatever shuttle-diplomacy was attempted between the LRA delegation and the LRA high 
command, hiding out in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was insufficient 
in producing a final agreement. No top LRA officials attended the negotiations and communication 
between the delegation and the LRA command was poor. While some members of the delegation 
visited Kony in his eastern DRC hideout, as Jane Anywar (2011) explains, key individuals providing 
advice and consulting the LRA delegation did not confer with Kony. This lack of communication 
contributed to Kony's heightened suspicions that delegates were working for the government and 
seeking to undermine – or even kill – him.  
 The lack of effective and direct representation of the LRA leadership, in combination with the 
size of the delegation, created ripe conditions for divisions to emerge within as well as between the 
LRA and the LRA delegation. Consequently, it became easy for delegates to begin pursuing personal 
interests that fell outside of those of the negotiations. These cleavages created major challenges to 
progress in the negotiations and contributed to the ultimate failure to produce a final peace accord.   
 As noted above, delegation members from the LRA diaspora – individuals from northern 
Uganda who had politically and financially supported the LRA from the UK, the US, Canada, Kenya, 
Germany, etc. – had a very minimal understanding of the LRA or its leader, Joseph Kony. Lacking 
knowledge of the shifting dynamics of the conflict, many focused on achieving personal and political 
gains. As Lacambel (2011) explains: 
LRA delegates – people who got in exile, came in and [stood] on behalf of [the] LRA, 
but didn't know the inner heart of Kony. [They] didn't know him at all [but believed 
that] through him they could come to power. 
 
It is not uncommon for two levels of negotiations to occur simultaneously – on the one hand, 
negotiations on the key issues to be included in a final peace agreement and, on the other, a second set 
of negotiations on the provisions to be given to specific individuals. The former is what is visible to 
observers and the media, while the latter often lurks in the shadows of peace talks. Many members of 
the LRA delegation evidently spent a significant amount of time in these shadows trying to get a 'good 
deal' for themselves.  
 Numerous participants and observers in the peace talks note that a significant number of LRA 
delegates sought to prolong the talks in order to benefit financially from the negotiations (see also 
Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize 2012, 6). Delegates were paid a stipend of $300 a day and wanted the 
money to continue flowing into their accounts. As George Omono (2011) puts it: “for some people, it 
was the longer it takes, the more money you make.” Betty Bigombe (2011), a respected mediator in a 
number of negotiations between the government and LRA, maintains that “senior commanders 
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contacted different people to see who gives them more, [undermining] the process very badly...[The] 
LRA ended up with over 200 satellite phones and food was given illegally [to LRA fighters].” Others 
engaged in negotiations with the government sought personal financial gain (sometimes running into 
the thousands of dollars) and positions within the Ugandan government. Rumours persist that the 
LRA's second in command, Vincent Otti, sought a lucrative deal with the GoU in return for his 
defection (see below). Many also suggest that interested individuals contacted the LRA leadership to 
dissuade them from concluding the peace talks and to destabilize negotiations. Lacambel (2011) argues 
that calls were made to Otti to tell him that local leaders who visited him and Kony in the DRC were 
“ICC agents”.35 LRA delegate Ayena Odongo (2011) noted that “one of the biggest challenges again 
was the scramble for power. People came in, new people came in...on the LRA delegation, who had 
their own personal ambitions.” An advisor to the LRA delegation (confidential interview 2011a) agrees, 
arguing that greed within the LRA delegation undermined any possibility of Kony signing the final 
peace agreement: 
Greed in [the] LRA had a very negative impact and caused Kony to break off. They 
were negotiating money from the Government side without telling Kony...[They] get 
money and [Kony] doesn't know about it and doesn't get any.  
 
Not only was this underbelly of the negotiations kept away from public scrutiny but, according to Lino 
Ogora (2011) of the Justice and Reconciliation Project, it was kept away from Kony himself: “all of 
these guys had something they wanted...[and this] contributed to the failure of the talks because Kony 
was never informed what was happening in Juba...those other extra discussions.”  
 Suspicions of divisions within the LRA high command went to the most senior levels. 
According to former senior rebel commanders, Otti had participated in direct talks with Museveni and 
the Government delegation leader, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda without forwarding the details of his 
conversations to Kony (Odongo, Sunday and Oling Mussa 2011).36 Further, Otti was being lured by 
Government officials, including Salim Saleh, Museveni's half-brother, who reportedly offered Otti 12 
billion Ugandan shillings in exchange for his defection. In 2007, Otti's dealings with the GoU, or 
perhaps more accurately, the GoU's dealings with Otti, cost him his life and also resulted in the removal 
of Ojul, who had been close to Otti, as head of the LRA delegation. Many suggest that Otti was a 
crucial force behind the peace talks, the “strong man behind negotiations” (Lacambel 2011), and that 
his assassination signalled the end of any hope for negotiations to succeed: “Everything got ruined the 
                                                 
35 
See also Mukasa and Opolot (2006). 
36
 Father Felix Opio (2011) also argues that Kony began to see Otti as a threat. 
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moment Vincent Otti was killed. From the time Vincent Otti was killed, nothing good came...[Kony] 
just cut off contact until the peace process collapsed.” (Mapenduzi 2011). 
 It is impossible to know whether Kony would have attended the peace talks had the ICC 
warrants not been issued or had they been revoked. Kony had participated in face-to-face meetings with 
Betty Bigombe during the 1994 negotiations but did not participate directly in the 1997 talks and had 
Brigadier Sam Kolo guide negotiations during the 2004 round (Refugee Law Project 2004, 6). In other 
words, Kony had not led delegations in previous rounds of peace talks. By 2006, it was evident that 
part of his recalcitrance stemmed from a fear for his life – and not just his freedom – if he chose to 
participate. However, had he taken part in the Juba talks, it seems unlikely that such cleavages within 
the LRA delegation would have been tolerated. Without Kony or any other senior rebel delegate, the 
LRA delegation's discipline quickly eroded. Tellingly, Anywar (2011) recalls that on the day Kony was 
expected to sign the Juba Comprehensive Peace Agreement, he declared “I'm not part of it. I don't 
know what you are doing.” 
 
(ii) Justice on the Agenda 
Unlike previous attempts at negotiating peace in 1988, 1994 and 1998, the Juba peace talks placed 
justice, accountability and reconciliation at the forefront of negotiations. As Lyandro Komakech (2011), 
a transitional justice scholar from northern Uganda, maintains, it was “the critical stuff” of the talks. 
The ICC warrants were not ignored. As Schomerus (2007, 39) argued: “a comprehensive peace deal 
can only be signed if there is a solution to the problem of the ICC warrants—one that satisfies all 
parties to the peace talks as well as the ICC.” Other agenda items, including demobilization and 
disarmament as well as an agreement on comprehensive solutions to the conflict were quickly 
negotiated to agreement. The question of how to achieve justice, however, seemed far more difficult to 
agree on and dominated the Juba talks. Predictably, the LRA delegation focused its efforts during the 
negotiations on dealing with the arrest warrants. The question of the ICC warrants was framed as the 
issue which, above all, would determine whether the peace negotiations would succeed or fail. 
Oulanyah (2011) claims that the arrest warrants were a “dominant theme” in the negotiations, affecting 
not only questions of justice and accountability, but a diversity of other issues, including trust and 
confidence-building and getting LRA combatants to agreed-upon assembly points in South Sudan. 
 It should be clarified that the negotiations regarding accountability and reconciliation were not 
solely conducted in order to achieve justice, as it were, but to specifically address the ICC's arrest 
warrants. Justice Onega (2011), the head of Uganda's Amnesty Commission, argues that the effect of 
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the ICC at Juba was that “both sides were bent on trying to get an agreement that pleased not just 
themselves but the ICC.” The warrants (and the dominant conflict narrative they represented) shrouded 
the talks. As a result, there was “an early recognition by both sides that the issue of accountability must 
be addressed as a central part of the negotiations.” (Otim and Wierda 2008, 23).  
 Competing demands and views on the appropriate approach to justice were evident at Juba. 
Many argued that local, traditional justice should be prioritized (see Southwick 2005, 113-117; Baines 
2007, 101-103; Allen 2008, 47-54). Others argued that the demands of justice were lop-sided and 
reflected a conflict narrative that painted the LRA as the sole perpetrator of atrocities and human rights 
abuses (see Otim and Wierda 2008, 22; Wegner 2012, 21). As discussed in the previous chapter, only 
the LRA was offered amnesty and was held responsible for crimes committed during the war despite 
the widespread recognition that, in the lifespan of the conflict, both sides had committed atrocities. But 
the ICC also affected the scope of injustices that could be confronted at Juba. 
 Delegates at the peace talks came to the conclusion that traditional justice had to be enacted 
parallel to formal justice rather than replace it (Otim and Wierda 2008, 24). The compromise position 
was to combine a domestic legal institution which could try perpetrators of crimes during the conflict 
with traditional justice mechanisms for less serious crimes. The Annexure to the Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation (2007), agreed to by both delegations in June 2007, stated that 
retributive justice would be achieved via the creation of a special unit of the Ugandan High Court, the 
War Crimes Division mandated to “try individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes 
during the conflict.” The Agreement (2007) stipulated this formal court was to prosecute “individuals 
who are alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes 
amounting to international crimes, during the course of the conflict.” Signifying just how central 
questions of justice and accountability were to any potential success at Juba, one GoU delegate 
exclaimed that the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation was “an indication that soon we 
will be signing the final peace agreement.” (see BBC 2008a). 
 The War Crimes Division was created in order to meet not only demands for formal 
accountability but as a possible challenge to the ICC's jurisdiction (see below). Specifically, the ICD 
was established in order to meet the standards of the ICC's complementarity regime, which dictates that 
the Court cannot open a case unless the state concerned “is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution.” (Rome Statute, Article 17). As LRA delegation head Martin Ojul 
(2011) explains, the War Crimes Division was created to “satisfy [the] ICC.” There was a widespread 
sentiment that it was possible to convince the ICC to return jurisdiction to Uganda. Jane Anywar (2011) 
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believes that: “[ICC Prosecutor Moreno-]Ocampo was ready to give case back to Uganda because he 
was tired, [but only] if there was a system that could try [the LRA] at that standard.” It was hoped that 
Kony would be more amenable to a prosecution in Uganda and would thus be willing to sign the peace 
agreement, which, as noted above was not the case.  
 International observers also viewed the creation of the ICD as having the potential to constitute 
a legitimate alternative to the ICC. Should the government of Uganda demonstrate that it would 
prosecute those indicted, the “ICC could be persuaded to defer to Uganda the prosecution of LRA 
leaders.” (Apuuli 2008, 813). The International Crisis Group (2008, ii) noted that the combination of 
the special division with traditional forms of justice has “some prospect of satisfying...the standards of 
the Rome Statute, so that the ICC case against the LRA leaders can be suspended.” Its advice to Kony 
and the LRA was blunt: “accept that trial by the special division of the High Court is the only 
alternative to ICC prosecution.” (Ibid., iv)  
 The assumption that he could feel more secure in Uganda is curious at best. The agreement to 
create a special division of the High Court appears to have lacked approval from Kony himself. Indeed, 
for many, it is hard to imagine that Kony would accept being brought before any formal, retributive 
accountability mechanism. Ayena Odongo (2011), who was no longer with the LRA delegation when 
the Annexure was signed, concedes that the inclusion of such a special division was a poison pill in the 
agreement: Kony could not possibly accept it. Michael Otim (2011), who met with Kony seven times 
during the Juba peace process, agrees that the special division was a non-starter and contributed to 
spoiling the negotiations: 
national proceedings as a compromise [was] not good enough for the LRA, for whom 
any form of accountability which is punitive or what you call retributive justice was not 
acceptable to them. And so, of course, Kony could not imagine himself, for 
instance...signing a peace deal, coming back to Uganda and ending up in jail. He's a 
guy who fought for half of his life, thinking he was fighting for some power and to be 
humiliated with a trial and imprisonment would be the least thing. So whatever was 
happening now was no longer attractive to him. And so he was better off continuing 
what he was doing. 
 
Moreover, and as explored in greater detail below, despite an agreement that the War Crimes Division 
would be responsible for prosecuting perpetrators of mass atrocities and human rights violations, it 
soon became clear that what that meant was that the division would prosecute LRA perpetrators; UPDF 
perpetrators would be dealt with through other mechanisms, including via Court martial (International 
Crisis Group 2007, 7).  
 The decision to create an accountability mechanism for the LRA but not for the GoU fit 
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perfectly within the dominant conflict narrative. Ultimate, even sole, responsibility for the war and for 
the atrocities it produced lay at the feet of the LRA; it only made sense that the LRA alone would be 
held to account. But an affirmation of the conflict narrative could only hinder the negotiations. 
Anglican Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola II (2011), a respected elder in northern Uganda who was 
heavily involved in the peace process, attributes the breakdown of the talks to the insistence on the 
creation of the special division which would hone in on the LRA but not the Government: 
[The talks failed] because they added that Government of Uganda would create a 
special division of the High Court to deal with the LRA, not the UPDF. But Kony said, 
if he has already agreed to Agenda Item 3 [on Reconciliation and Accountability]...he 
will go through the process of truth-telling...that's why they did not sign it. 
 
 There can be little doubt that the ICC was, in large part, responsible for the focus on justice and 
accountability issues at the Juba talks. It was, in the words of Otim and Wierda (2008, 23), the ICC's 
“main impact (and a positive one)” on the peace process. Issues of accountability had never been so 
thoroughly discussed and negotiated in previous rounds of peace talks. Yet the Juba talks were as much 
about negotiating how to circumvent the ICC as they were about how to achieve justice. The answer to 
how to deal with the ICC was to create an institution that could challenge the Court's jurisdiction. But 
this solution only reified the dominant conflict narrative post-Juba.  
132 
 
II. Was Peace on the Table? 
As discussed in Chapter 3, analyses on the effects of the ICC on peace processes largely assume rather 
than critically examine whether peace is being negotiated at peace talks. But if justice is an obstacle or 
a hindrance to the achievement of a negotiated peace, then peace must be credibly sought during 
negotiations. In other words, justice cannot be a barrier to peace if peace is not the goal of the parties 
during negotiations. At Juba, it is not clear that a credible commitment to peace existed on either side of 
the negotiation table. Invoking a popular line in northern Uganda, Dennis Ojwee (2011) remarked that 
Juba, like previous negotiations between the LRA and the GoU, constituted not “peace talks but peace 
jokes”. 
 As illustrated in Chapter 4, viewing the conflict in northern Uganda myopically as one between 
the GoU and the LRA ignores the regional nature of the war. It is for this reason that a group of leading 
experts on Uganda (Schomerus et al 2011) has exclaimed that “[u]ntil the underlying problem -- the 
region's poor governance -- is adequately dealt with, there will be no sustainable peace.” (Emphasis 
added). The war is an extension of regional dynamics, including the tensions and conflict between 
Uganda and Sudan. As one Acholi elder states:  
The war is not between Kony and the government – it is between the government of 
Sudan and Uganda. The peace talks and conferences will not stop the war unless the 
Sudan and Uganda governments understand each other and Sudan stop support [to the] 
LRA and Uganda stop support [to the] SPLA. (Quoted in Dolan 2009, 47). 
 
The fact that regional players, and particularly the role of Sudan (but also the DRC and CAR), were 
excluded from the negotiations hindered attempts to find a comprehensive solution to the war (Seguya 
2010, 39). As the ICG (2008, i) reported, Machar refused to confront Khartoum's role. Machar had 
been personally responsible for initiating the relationship between the GoS and the LRA in the early 
1990s: “Not least because of this embarrassing history between Kony and Machar, the Juba talks have 
generally treated the LRA as purely a Ugandan phenomenon, with little attention to the changes since 
1994.” (ibid, 13). It is difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate peace without some of the parties to the 
conflict at the negotiating table. It is even harder when the primary parties aren't genuinely interested.  
 
(i) The GoU 
While some believe that Museveni and the GoU took the peace negotiations very seriously (Otim 
2011), it is clear that many senior GoU officials, and even delegates, did not believe that there was any 
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chance of the talks succeeding.37 Numerous peace negotiations had failed and, since at least the mid-
1990s, the Government favoured a military solution to the LRA question, a position that has been in 
tension with northern civil society groups like the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative who have 
consistently urged a negotiated settlement to the conflict (see Dolan 2009, 47-49).  Even the GoU's 
referral of the situation in northern Uganda to the ICC can be understood as an extension of the GoU's 
hopes of finding a military solution. As Bishop Ochola (2011) argues, “Museveni felt at that time that 
his UPDF could not defeat LRA so he went to ICC so that ICC may be with international community 
could find means and ways of defeating LRA. That was the intention.” 
 Previous negotiations between the LRA and the GoU had done little to foster confidence in a 
peaceful solution to the war. The GoU regularly issued rigid timelines and ultimatums, insisting that the 
LRA surrender on the Government's terms. Rhetoric and propaganda invoking the dominant discourse 
of the war wherein the LRA were reduced to a band or crazy terrorists was regularly invoked.38 
According to the ICG (2008, 15), the experience of past negotiations “was one of the strongest 
suggestions that the government may be more comfortable with the continuation of a low intensity 
conflict, which can be used to justify an oversized, non-transparent defence budget, than with a 
negotiated settlement.” Little in the GoU's behaviour changed at Juba.  
 As argued in Chapter 4, the Government accepted negotiations in order to appease international 
and domestic pressure and to salvage an increasingly sullied reputation. Recounting the early days of 
the negotiations, Ayena Odongo recalled that the GoU had no intention of signing an agreement on the 
cessation of hostilities, the first agenda item of the peace talks. Past experiences had inculcated a deep 
mistrust that the LRA would simply use the time to re-arm and re-group. But pressure from the 
international community forced their hand and they agreed in August 2006 to a ceasefire (Ayena 
Odongo 2011). Without scrutiny from domestic civil society groups, their international allies, and the 
international community more generally, the peace talks may have stalled early on. This reality betrays 
the extent to which the GoU itself saw the Juba peace talks as a real opportunity to negotiate a 
settlement to the conflict.  
 In a telling account, Jan Egeland (2008, 211), the former UN Undersecretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief International recalls that, following a 2006 meeting he had 
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the Government knew from the beginning that the peace talks would fail. 
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with Kony and Otti in Garamba, Democratic Republic of Congo, he communicated the importance of 
the peace talks to President Museveni. Museveni responded: “No, those talks were not to our benefit. 
Let me be categorical -- there will only be a military solution to this problem.” According to Kulayigye 
(2011), because of their faith in a military rather than negotiated solution, when negotiations at Juba 
began, Uganda's “military and politicians disagreed but obeyed.” To the military, the LRA were a 
defeated force and it “made no sense to the military to negotiate with them but it was [accepted because 
of] political expediency [and external] pressure.” (Ibid.). Again, negotiations then, were a 'hand-out' or 
'gift' to the LRA, an opportunity for a defeated force to have a “soft-landing” (see, e.g., Mukasa 2006c).  
 At the same time, and as discussed above, the GoU employed divide-and-rule tactics to 
marginalize Kony. They encouraged his fellow commanders to accept lucrative personal settlements 
and defect from the LRA. Atkinson (2009, 12) writes that the GoU “resorted to manipulations, 
including secret cash payments to certain LRA/M members that divided the rebels and undermined the 
peace process.” (See also Seguya 2010, 74). The clearest example of this was with Otti. It appears the 
GoU was attempting to isolate Otti from Kony by offering him a lucrative package in exchange for his 
defection from the LRA. The 2007 side-negotiations in Mombasa were primarily designed by the GoU 
“to broker a deal with Vincent Otti that would create an opportunity to eliminate Kony and divide the 
LRA, after which deserters would receive amnesty and DDR packages, and, it was thought, the LRA 
problem would be solved....Dividing Otti and Kony was key to the government’s strategy and led to the 
former’s assassination.” (International Crisis Group 2008, 15). If the GoU did, in fact, seek to create 
cleavages within the senior ranks of the LRA by offering Otti a defection package, this too should be 
seen as an attempt to undermine the peace talks as it posed a serious threat to Kony and the LRA's post-
negotiation viability – at a time when clarifying their future was of tantamount importance. 
 Preparations by the UPDF to initiate military operations against the LRA continued during the 
peace talks. In August 2006, the UPDF killed Raska Lukwiya, the third-highest ranking LRA 
commander and one of the LRA officials wanted by the ICC, in an attack. As the Juba talks continued, 
the GoU began to prepare for another military engagement, Operation Lighting Thunder which 
commenced in late 2008. The end of peace talks and placing blame for their failure on the LRA was a 
cunning way to justify a return to militarism as the dominant expression of conflict.  
 Ayena Odongo believes that the “[g]overnment wanted to get as much from [the negotiations] 
as could justify the [military] action it was taking against the LRA, as much from it as would now 
justify the involvement of the international community to descend on the LRA.” The government 
enjoyed a degree of legitimacy as America's partner in the war on terror (Mwenda 2010, 49) before, 
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during and after the Juba peace talks and the US maintained support for the GoU's military approach to 
the conflict, both politically and directly in the form of 'non-lethal military aid' and selling of arms to 
the UPDF. Komakech (2011) thus argues that the Government never sought a successful conclusion to 
the peace talks and that the GoU was duplicitous in ascribing the negotiations' ultimate failure to 
Kony's decision not to sign the final peace agreement:  
the government kept maintaining propaganda, you know, that he refused to sign...So, 
they wanted to justify that Kony should not sign it so that they can move on him 
militarily. If you remember that explains the [Operation] Lightning Thunder. 
 
While many point to Kony's failure to sign the final peace agreement as the ultimate failure of the 
negotiations, it is often overlooked that Museveni too refused to put pen to paper. 
 The GoU's preference for a military approach to the war, however, should not be conflated with 
a genuine interest to resolve the war – militarily or by other means. Serious questions remain about 
whether the GoU is genuinely interested in defeating the LRA. Some believe the propensity to continue 
the seemingly unending barrage of military operations serves the interests of some government officials 
(see Otunnu 2006). Komakech (2011) describes the existence of “conflict entrepreneurs” who benefited 
from the ongoing war: “We had individuals within the national army whose interest was business and 
therefore to sort out Joseph Kony would also mean the end of business.” The use of 'ghost soldiers' – 
names of officers who had been killed in action on payrolls – was a common tactic by the UPDF 
officials throughout the war. The conflict, according to Finnstrom (2008, 169; 177), was “good 
business for high-ranking army officers...the involvement of the president's closest military and 
political associates, even his half-brother [Salim Saleh], in the shadow economy of war in northern 
Uganda and beyond should not be dismissed out of hand.” One of the senior UPDF officers regularly 
used as an example of war entrepreneurs is Gulu-based Brigadier Charles Awany Otema who in 2003 
was found responsible for the extra-judicial killing of a prisoner in Gulu Central Prison (see The 
Guardian 2010). Not only has he continued to enjoy impunity, Otema's personal prestige and wealth 
flourished during the war. He is the owner of the Acholi Inn, the most expensive hotel in Gulu and was 
promoted to the position of commander of the Fourth Division of the UPDF.  
 The GoU has benefitted from an ongoing conflict with the LRA, especially one that has been 
exported beyond its borders, allowing the UPDF to make periodic – and potentially profitable – 
excursions into neighbouring states. According to Dolan (2009, 96-97), the LRA's core of fighters is 
small and, in comparison to the strength of the UPDF, the GoU should have long been able to defeat the 
LRA. Yet, despite regional assistance and military support from the United States, the UPDF has been 
unable to turn its rhetoric of the LRA being a “defeated force” into reality. Dolan (ibid., 102) explains 
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that “for the GoU winning seemed to lie in keeping the opponent alive for as long as possible, in 
particular by using humiliation tactics to provoke him into reacting whenever the situation became 
calm for too long.” Eichstaedt (2009, 137-138) similarly observed: “It was a cat playing with a mouse, 
swatting it, batting it, biting it on occasion, but never killing it...The continued existence of the LRA 
was a useful evil.” (see also Mwenda 2010, 57). When the talks failed, the GoU could blame the LRA 
for not signing – a convenient way of leaving its own responsibility and lack of genuine commitment to 
the peace talks unexamined whilst acting as a cogent justification for renewed military operations.  
 
(ii) The LRA 
Questions abound as to whether the LRA was committed to the negotiations. While the government 
continued military operations, the LRA also committed atrocities and to abducted civilians during the 
negotiations. Further, as noted above, Kony ordered the execution of Otti, who many felt was the most 
serious about negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Ogora (2011) argues that the LRA “was 
never interested in a peaceful settlement and that is why he had to execute his Deputy, Vincent Otti.” 
Whatever Kony's rationale, killing Otti had a chilling effect on the negotiations and undermined the 
prospect of success.  
 Some former rebel commanders and observers believe that Kony was ready to “walk out of the 
bush” and sign a final peace agreement if only the ICC had revoked its indictment against him 
(Odongo, Sunday and Oling Mussa 2011). Additionally, they argue that had the ICC dropped its 
warrants and Kony decided not to come out of the bush to sign the Juba peace agreement, his 
commanders would have deserted him (Ibid.; Onega 2011). Others disagree. Lacambel (2011), for 
example, maintains that Kony would never had come out regardless of the ICC warrants because he 
fears and mistrusts the northern Ugandan community. Michael Otim (2011), who met Kony seven 
times, also doubts whether Kony would have signed the peace agreement and returned to Uganda, even 
if the warrant against him was lifted: 
I highly doubt Kony would come back because, one, he is aware of the atrocities he has 
committed in Uganda. He even has a sense he cannot be forgiven. Actually, he thinks 
all this talk of forgiveness is not genuine. He fully understands that...To even imagine 
himself submitted to someone else's jurisdictional control is just unthinkable. It's as 
good as he's walking naked. That's how this guy feels...he has the power because he has 
the gun. And to imagine himself coming back, with hands folded, no arms, no 
bodyguards – it's just unthinkable to this guy. 
 
Omono (2011) also believes that Kony would not have come to the peace talks or signed the final 
agreement because, again, Kony's personal security was not guaranteed. Schomerus (2010) has 
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similarly suggested that there was too much uncertainty facing Kony's fate for him to sign the peace 
agreement. Notably, no interview subject was able to coherently articulate what would happen to Kony 
after he had come out of the bush and signed the peace agreement.  
 It has often been suggested that the rebels, weakened by military strikes and defections, sought 
the space a cease-fire afforded them in order to regroup and re-arm. Under the cover of the Juba talks 
which guaranteed the rebels' security, the LRA had the opportunity to re-arm and re-stock. Some 
dispute this (see, e.g., Atkinson 2009, 16). For others, this was the obvious goal of the LRA's 
engagement with the talks themselves. The District Chairman of LC.V, Martin Mapenduzi (2011), for 
example, believes that, in the context of neither side being fully committed to the Juba negotiations, 
Kony used the opportunity to re-arm and re-mobilize in lock-step with the UPDF's military 
preparations: 
In [2006, Museveni] did not want to show total willingness to the process and every 
time he would say...that “this is a soft landing ground”. And so, such a message is not 
good for a kind of confidence building and negotiation...And so [the LRA] thought 
maybe they were being under-estimated and at the time, Museveni was saying “in case 
we fail with this, we will have Plan B [military solution]” and when they started talking 
about Plan B, Joseph Kony said he has already Plan C. Now, so Museveni was 
developing a plan B, Joseph Kony was already in the plan C stage. They were 
pretending to be talking in Juba, he had this men in Congo, but some were already in 
Central African Republic doing abduction and training. So he knew, after failing from 
here there would an attack in Congo, and he had already sent his wife and children in 
CAR. We were wasting time. He had already succeeded in doing his Plan C, Museveni 
was still doing Plan B – planning war – but Kony was already building another base.   
 
If the LRA was not genuinely interested in a peaceful solution to the war, then it is easy to see how the 
tension between achieving a final peace agreement and pursuing criminal accountability was 
instrumentalized by the LRA delegation in order to prolong the cover of negotiations. As suggested 
above, the ICC's intervention and the “peace versus justice” formed the backdrop of the peace talks 
themselves. It was the impetus and framework in which argumentation and negotiation took place, the 
language with which much of the talks were described. This discursive framing of the negotiations 
provided fertile ground for manipulation of the “peace versus justice” vocabulary not only to evade 
justice but to prolong peace talks. 
 As early as 2005, HRW (2005, 59) predicted that the ICC would be blamed for spoiling peace 
negotiations that were not, in fact, about peace: “It may be that the issuance of arrest warrants results in 
the LRA cutting off peace negotiations, but this may be only a pretext for a foreordained result. The 
ICC may be criticized unfairly”. If they were not interested in peace but wanted to stretch out talks, the 
“peace versus justice” rhetoric proved a useful tool. The LRA, according to Eichstaedt (2009, 273), 
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was adept at framing the war within the discourse of “peace versus justice”. An LRA combatant also 
suggests that the ICC gave the LRA an excuse with which to drag talks on:  
My fear is I.C.C. has jeopardised the process of peace talks because these guys will 
never accept it anymore. If they try to accept, it will be only to buy time and nothing 
more. They will be play 'GWENO-ONIN'. 'GWENO-ONIN' means someone is just 
deceiving you and not telling you the truth or fact and wants time to go so that he 
achieves what he/she is planning to.39  
  
An LRA delegation advisor  (confidential interview 2011a) argues that the LRA kept using the ICC “as 
their trump card” to continue to avoid signing the agreement.40 The issue of the warrants and efforts to 
negotiate a way forward that balanced all of the demands for justice and accountability necessitated 
continuing negotiations. And so long as the ICC issue remained unresolved, the LRA could use it to 
prolong negotiations. Dennis Ojwee (2011), a journalist who covered the talks, goes so far as to argue 
that had the arrest warrants been successfully removed, the peace talks would have collapsed: “the 
indictments were the biggest hook that kept Kony on his toes and made him think that if he did not 
send delegates to the talks, they would get him.” But if Kony had an interest in drawing-out the 
negotiations, he wasn't alone. The “peace versus justice” language was also instrumentalized by the 
LRA delegation. And the longer talks persisted, the more money they would receive. The ICC was the 
perfect “scapegoat”41 to prolong the negotiations and thus the time and space for the rebels to regroup 
and rearm as well as to fill the coffers of individual members of the LRA delegation. Importantly, the 
necessary language pitting justice against peace was readily available. Not only could the Court be 
blamed for prolonging the conflict but the “peace versus justice” debate presented a well-versed 
explanation of how and why it did so.  
 When the ICC became involved in the situation in northern Uganda, the polarizing “peace 
versus justice” rhetoric flourished – both within northern Uganda but also amongst external observers 
and scholars. However, in 2011, when fieldwork for this thesis was conducted the “peace versus 
justice” discourse had dissipated markedly. During the interviews, subjects were asked to describe the 
key challenges and obstacles at Juba. Later in the interview, they were asked to describe what effects 
the ICC's intervention had on the Juba talks. This sequence of questions was chosen in order to see 
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Ugandan Minister Steven Kagoda (2011) concurs. See also Eichstaedt (2009, 253). 




whether subjects immediately associated “obstacle” and “challenge” with the Court without first being 
prompted into a discussion about the ICC's intervention. Interestingly and importantly, most 
respondents did not initially reference the Court as a key obstacle and challenge, often only suggesting 
that it was a stumbling block when asked about the specific impact of the ICC on the peace process. 
This is particularly remarkable given that the interviewees were made aware of the subject matter of the 
thesis prior to the interviews. In line with the empirical analysis offered above and in Chapter 4, this 
would seem to suggest that unless directly framed within the “peace versus justice” discourse, even 
those most closely associated with the peace talks view the ICC's arrest warrants as just one of the key 
challenges and issues at Juba. The lack of trust, the unrepresentative nature of the LRA delegation, and 
the lack of a credible commitment of either parties to a negotiated settlement all contributed to the 
ultimate failure of having a final peace agreement signed. The fact that respondents typically no longer 
suggest that the ICC was the biggest challenge but rather one of many, suggests that there is a gulf 
between the “peace versus justice” language and the actual effects of the ICC on peace and conflict 
processes in northern Uganda. This supports a key claim in the thesis, namely that key arguments 
posited within the “peace versus justice” rarely reflect reality.   
 There is ample evidence to suggest that the ICC and the Juba negotiations were 
instrumentalized by the LRA and the GoU for their own political aims. The attitudes and incentives that 
led the GoU and LRA to commit to coming to the negotiation table did not translate into a genuine 
interest in finding a final, negotiated resolution to the conflict. The GoU's global standing clearly 
benefited by siding with international justice. At Juba it could re-entrench a narrative that showed it as 
a peaceful government giving peace talks a chance whilst simultaneously preparing to continue the war. 
The LRA may have benefited from using the ICC to prolong negotiations and thus increase the space 
and time to re-arm and re-mobilize. If this holds true and neither the GoU nor the LRA were genuinely 
committed to a negotiated peace, then both parties can be (and indeed have been) considered to “fall 
into the category of insider spoilers” (Seguya 2010, 71). Moreover, the talks may have been destined to 
be, in the words of Justice Owiny Dollo (2011), a “still birth” and the “peace versus justice” dilemma 
in northern Uganda truly represents a false debate. If peace isn't on the table, justice can't be said to 
help or hinder it.   
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III. Justice After Juba 
It has been five years since the Juba peace negotiations fell apart. Yet, while the Juba talks may not 
have been about establishing peace, to a remarkable extent, order and stability has been achieved in 
northern Uganda. Virtually every interview respondent claimed that there was peace in the country. The 
few that did not, cited the academic distinction between negative and positive peace, acknowledging 
that northern Uganda enjoyed the former but still not yet the latter.42 Nevertheless, as a process where 
the ultimate goal was a final, comprehensive peace agreement, the Juba peace negotiations failed. A 
diverse host of reasons have been given to explain why the Juba talks collapsed. Prominent amongst 
them is the view that that the ICC warrants posed an insurmountable obstacle; the LRA simply would 
not sign without the warrants being removed.  
 A decade after the ICC became involved in the conflict in northern Uganda, there remains 
significant division in opinion over the effects of the ICC on the talks. The preponderant view remains 
that the ICC helped get the LRA to the negotiation table but was too much of a stumbling block to 
overcome, leading the negotiations to fail (see Wegner 2012). This view becomes problematic when put 
under scrutiny and when the assumption that the talks were, in fact, about achieving peace is tested. 
Overall, it is impossible to make the causal claim that the failure to arrive at an agreement was the 
result of the ICC. Importantly, this is reflected in the views of individuals involved in the peace 
process. Fears that the ICC threatened to derail any possibility of peace were not commonly expressed 
in interviews. At the same time, the concern that the ICC would derail peace talks or squander a fragile 
peace in northern Uganda have dissipated with time. This was evident in interviews with actors 
involved in the Juba peace process as well as in the lack of fear that Uganda's first war crimes trial 
would derail peace. This may be the result of a process of social learning: the doomsday predictions 
regarding the ICC's role in northern Uganda simply did not come to fruition and northern Uganda is 
currently enjoying its lengthiest relief from large-scale violence in decades.  
 It would be tempting to suggest, at this point, that the ICC's intervention into northern Uganda 
was a success. But the LRA crisis remains unresolved. Whilst northern Uganda is stable, the LRA 
remain active in neighbouring regions. The GoU regularly conducts military operations into 
neighbouring states in order to 'hunt Kony' (see, e.g. Araali and Talemwa 2013; Candia 2013). At the 
same time, the dominant narrative that needed to be challenged and undermined if peace talks were to 
succeed was reaffirmed at Juba – and in its wake.  
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 Despite the ultimate failure to get a comprehensive peace agreement signed by all parties, many 
of those involved directly and indirectly in the Juba peace negotiations insist that the talks were a 
success. Part of the “success” of the Juba talks was an agreement, outlined in the annexure to the 
agreement on accountability and reconciliation, was the creation of a War Crimes Division which could 
prosecute international crimes in Uganda. In the summer of 2011, Uganda began its first ever war 
crimes trial. Treatment and reactions to the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo in Uganda or, better, the lack 
thereof indicates a population that no longer fears that retributive justice will undermine peace. This 
may reflect a level of comfort amongst Ugandans with criminal justice or at least a dissipated fear that 
it would destabilize the north's fragile peace. But it has done nothing to challenge the conflict narrative.  
 As noted above, a key breakthrough in the negotiations occurred in June 2007 when the 
delegations agreed that a domestic approach to accountability and reconciliation should be pursued. In 
the agreement, both sides maintained that national jurisdiction over LRA crimes could be achieved by 
creating a special unit of the Ugandan High Court “to try individuals who are alleged to have 
committed serious crimes during the conflict.” Importantly, the creation of the special division did not 
require a signature or ratification of the final peace agreement, allowing the government to move ahead 
to establish the division irrespective of the Juba talks' demise. Originally titled the War Crimes Division 
of the Ugandan High Court, it was subsequently re-branded as the International Crimes Division (ICD). 
 The GoU sought to demonstrate its commitment to retributive accountability. As Minister 
Ruhakana Rugunda (2011), the former head of the GoU delegation at Juba, explains:   
You know, many who came were given amnesty, were given amnesty because there was 
an amnesty law operating at that time. So people like [Brigadier Kenneth] Banya and 
others...they gave themselves up. Some of them were caught, they were all forgiven. 
But now the situation has changed. The standards of accountability have become 
sharper both in Uganda and international community. 
 
But the GoU also knew that retribution was for the LRA only.  
 In July 2011, the ICD began its first case, the prosecution of former senior LRA commander, 
Thomas Kwoyelo in Gulu, northern Uganda.43 Following his capture in 2009, Kwoyelo was charged 
with 12 counts and 53 charges under Uganda's Geneva Conventions Act (1964). His trial began in July 
2011, amidst much pomp and circumstance. A marching band played on the grounds of the courthouse 
in Gulu before Kwoyelo was delivered, shackled and dazed, to the High Court. Journalists gathered to 
take snapshots of the diminutive rebel who held the distinction of the first-ever LRA commander to be 
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prosecuted. Human rights workers and advisers gathered to watch, some of whom were actively 
advising Government prosecutors. A number of Kwoyelo's family members looked on. Once 
proceedings were under way, the courtroom was overflowing. One could easily imagine that this was a 
momentous day in Ugandan history for post-conflict justice, and that the whole country would be 
watching keenly. It wasn't; they weren't. 
 The Kwoyelo trial was not particularly big news in Uganda. In comparison to the ICC 
investigations and arrest warrants, it did not feature prominently in the media nor in public 
discourses.44 On the contrary, there appeared to be widespread apathy towards the trial. This is all the 
more remarkable given that the trial was replete with controversies – many of which mirrored the 
controversies, expressed just a few years earlier, of the ICC's involvement in the war. Most notably, the 
prosecution of Kwoyelo flew in the face of the 2000 Amnesty Law which stated that any rebel who 
denounced the rebellion could apply and receive an amnesty from the government. Indeed, this 
contradiction constituted the basis of Kwoyelo's defense, who argued that because other commanders 
of similar seniority, most notably Brigadiers Sam Kolo and Kenneth Banya, had received amnesties, 
the ICD violated Kwoyelo's constitutional right to equal treatment before the law. Kwoyelo's defense 
was successful in getting judges to agree to refer the “amnesty question” to Uganda's Constitutional 
Court (Aber and Akena 2011) which, in September 2011, ruled that trying Kwoyelo did, in fact, violate 
his right to an amnesty (see BBC 2011h; Human Rights Watch 2012a). Despite rulings that Kwoyelo 
should be released from prison and granted amnesty, as of writing, he remains in prison.45   
 The uproar, couched in the harsh and dichotomous language of the “peace versus justice” 
debate in the wake of the ICC's investigations and arrest warrants was reduced to a whimper in the 
Kwoyelo case. This is not to say that the trial was completely ignored. Local and international human 
rights organizations watched the proceedings keenly. But public discourse was more interested in the 
extent to which Kwoyelo was a scapegoat. Ogora (2011), for example, commented that:  
I practically still believe [Kwoyelo] is a scapegoat of the ICD because several senior 
commanders have not been prosecuted [but] he has been prosecuted. I think he has been 
just unlucky because he came in at the wrong time, at the time when [Operation] 
Lightning Thunder was on and there was a stalemate and the peace talks cannot take 
place. So he was a senior figure captured and they just had to make an example [of] 
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Relative to coverage of the ICC there were relatively few analyses of the Kwoyelo trial in 
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 Despite multiple rulings ordering Kwoyelo to be issued an amnesty certificate and to be released, he 
remains imprisoned in Luzira prison. See Anyoll (2012); Kisige 2012). 
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something...he was [a] scapegoat, he [was] unlucky, he was a sacrificial lamb, describe 
it the way you want but I think Kwoyelo is just unlucky. He came in at the wrong time. 
  
At the same time, there were some who feared the implications of prosecuting Kwoyelo. Former rebel 
commanders of similar rank worried about what Kwoyelo's prosecution could mean for their own 
amnesties. Three former senior LRA fighters expressed such fears in interviews, noting that they saw 
the ICD “as more or less the same as [the] ICC.” (Odongo, Sunday and Oling Mussa 2011). Similarly 
to when the ICC became involved in this crisis, the rebels and some observers also suggested that the 
ICD would negatively affect the rate of defections amongst LRA rebels still in the bush (Ibid.; IRIN 
2011). If commanders like Kywoyelo could be tried, despite the Amnesty Law's existence, or if the 
amnesty was done away with altogether, there would be no incentive to stop fighting and return to 
northern Uganda. These concerns echoed previous debates about the effects of the ICC. Yet their 
minimal expression and their relative lack of urgency is noteworthy. It is powerful evidence that the 
fear that retributive justice would destabilize northern Uganda has withered.  
 There may be a number of reasons for the level of popular disengagement in the Kwoyelo trial. 
In the wake of the return of thousands of formerly displaced northern Ugandans, the most pressing 
issue in recent years has become land ownership. At the same time, the pursuit of selective justice 
against former LRA combatants is nothing new to the people of northern Uganda; however, this time 
there are few tangible implications for the region's population. While concerns that LRA fighters will 
not return because of challenges to the amnesty remain, it is important to note that the number of 
defectors has been reduced to a trickle in recent years (Okee 2011). Rather than being a result of the 
Kwoyelo trial, the decrease in returnees is more likely a result of the majority of the LRA no longer 
being based in close proximity to northern Uganda. The negative peace that the country enjoys has not 
been sacrificed on the altar of justice. The result, it seems, is that northern Ugandans no longer fear the 
effects of retributive international justice as they once had. There are more important and pressing 
issues on their agenda.  
 Still, it remains unclear whether the ICD can be considered a positive development. Indeed, it 
may make a peaceful solution to the war less likely rather than more. As an institution prosecuting war 
crimes, it is structurally biased against the LRA and thus represents the failure of the Juba talks to 
challenge the dominant narrative of the conflict. The ICD, as noted above, has been consecrated as a 
legal institution to prosecute anyone the GoU sees fit – and not any “individuals who are alleged to 
have committed serious crimes during the conflict.” LRA rebels can be prosecuted by the ICD for their 
“international crimes” but offenders within the Government and UPDF will be admonished with 
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internally through the use of non-transparent court martial proceedings – if at all. Despite providing 
material support (in the form of evidence previously gathered) as well as sharing “lessons learned and 
best practices, including in relation to witness protection and support and evidence handling” (see 
Report of Court 2011, 8), the OTP has not pushed nor mentioned accountability measures for GoU 
officials or UPDF soldiers (Rodman 2014, 18).  
 But the ICD is not only a Court for the LRA. After all, most LRA commanders, even senior 
ones, are not prosecuted by the Division. The ICD is for those LRA commanders who the GoU wants 
to see prosecuted. Others, especially those of use to the UPDF, are left outside the realm of 
accountability. This became particularly evident in the case of Caesar Achellam who, like Kwoyelo, 
was a senior rebel commander. In May 2012, the UPDF claimed to have captured Achellam in the 
Central African Republic. Achellam was then flown to a base in South Sudan where, dressed in military 
fatigues, he smiled for cameras and spoke calmly to gathered reporters whilst sitting amongst contented 
UPDF officers. Surely, if Kwoyelo was to be brought to the ICD, Achellam would too. After all, he did 
not surrender according to the UPDF, but was captured (The Independent 2012). Yet no action has been 
taken to initiate a prosecution of Achellam. Instead, he lives in UPDF barracks with his family in Gulu 
(see Ross 2013). Some have suggested that he is “an intelligence goldmine” for the army (Webb 2012) 
while Kwoyelo “is considered of little use by the ruling party.” (Nouwen 2013, 221). 
 The ICD seems to be only for those LRA commanders than the GoU believes can and should be 
prosecuted. This asymmetric understanding of responsibility and accountability for mass atrocities and 
human rights abuses lies at the very core of the conflict narrative and has been transplanted onto the 
post-conflict narrative. The ICD was a direct response to the ICC's intervention but, as a solution to 
promoting justice and accountability, the ICD did nothing to deal with the mainstream narrative and 
everything to entrench it. The “peace versus justice” debate may have dissipated and the people of 
northern Uganda are enjoying the current period of calm. But accountability for atrocities remains 




IV. Conclusion: The ICC, Juba and Beyond 
The conclusions that can be drawn at this stage regarding the effects of the ICC on the stages of the 
peace process are modest but nonetheless important. First, the ICC did not prevent negotiations 
between the LRA and the GoU from taking place. The ICC was not an obstacle to moving from the pre-
negotiation phase to the negotiation phase of the peace process.  
 Second, during the negotiation phase, the ICC warrants affected the composition of the LRA 
delegation by creating an obstacle for the indicted senior command's direct participation in the talks 
themselves. The Court also shaped the agenda of the Juba peace talks by putting questions of justice 
and accountability front and center. However, the ICC warrants have been identified by those involved 
in the peace process as only one of many issues which prevented Kony from signing a final peace 
agreement. Many of the individuals interviewed who were involved in the peace process neglected to 
bring up the ICC as a primary stumbling block when considering the main challenges at Juba. A lack of 
trust, a disconnect between the LRA delegation and the senior LRA command, and the lack of 
commitment from both the LRA and the GoU to a negotiated settlement deeply impinged on the peace 
talks. Importantly, there is strong evidence that the peace negotiations at Juba were never really about 
peace. Rather, they represented an opportunity for both the GoU and the LRA to pursue their own 
political and economic interests.  
 Post-Juba, the ICC has had no negative effects on the level of stability and security in northern 
Uganda. While the language of “peace versus justice” remains prevalent in discussions about the Court 
international criminal justice does not loom large in public discourses. In comparison to the ICC's 
intervention, the trial of Kwoyelo has barely registered within the “peace versus justice” discourse. But 
as a direct response to the ICC's intervention, the ICD may make a return to negotiations more difficult 
because it has reaffirmed the asymmetrical conflict narrative which lies at the core of the conflict 
between the GoU and the LRA and which has fuelled the war's intractability.  
The mainstream understanding of the effects of the ICC suggests that the Court contributed to 
getting the LRA to the negotiating table at Juba but subsequently became an obstacle in getting Kony to 
sign a final, comprehensive peace agreement (see Wegner 2012, 11). This chapter and the preceding 
one has sought to complicate this neat picture of the ICC's intervention. Together, these conclusions 
suggest that reaching an overall verdict for the ICC in northern Uganda remains difficult. The jury, as it 
were, is still out. The ICC's investigations and arrest warrants affected every stage and element of the 
peace process in northern Uganda. But the Court's effects have been mixed, denying the possibility of 
coming to any sweeping conclusions about its role in establishing peace. Indeed, asking whether the 
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ICC helped or hindered peace is, quite simply, the wrong question. This, of course, points to the futility 
of the “peace versus justice” debate which tends to assume that a conclusive answer to whether justice 
aids or abets conflict resolution can be found. The analysis above suggests that, instead of attempting to 
come to a final conclusion about the ICC's effects on peace, researchers should focus more on the 




Chapter 6: Peace, Justice and the ICC's Intervention in Libya 
 
One Libyan-American said he and his friends, hiding in Tripoli at the time, felt they 
were watching a climatic image from Lord of the Rings, as the forces of evil amassed to 
destroy the forces of good. (Chorin 2012, 208) 
 
The ICC warrant arrest did not force the conflict to be prolonged. It did not force 
Gaddafi to remain put inside Libya. If he wanted to stop the bloodshed, he could have 
left. He had many options where he would not be arrested by the ICC and yet bring the 
conflict to an end. – Senior NTC official (confidential interview 2014) 
 
Introduction 
In late February 2011, the UN Security Council requested that the ICC intervene in the ongoing conflict 
in Libya. A host of rebel militias and their political wing, the National Transitional Council (NTC), had 
risen against the rule of Muammar Gaddafi. What began as a series of protests quickly escalated into 
civil war. The regime faced an aggressive opposition bolstered by a UN-sanctioned NATO-led military 
intervention. In this volatile context, the feasibility of resolving the Libyan civil war through diplomatic 
means was perhaps always unlikely. Indeed, on first glance, it would appear as though Libya had little 
in terms of a peace process as no official negotiations between the sides ever took place. Yet a closer 
reading of the conflict reveals a number of attempts to initiate mediated negotiations. Drawing on the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter is concerned with how the ICC affected – 
and didn't affect – those attempts. 
 The ICC intervention, at the behest of the Security Council, instigated a debate centered around 
whether the Court's intervention would help or hinder peace. The debate did not reflect realities on the 
ground, which were complex and nuanced. The chapter begins by setting the scene of the ICC's 
intervention into the war in Libya. The chapter then examines the empirical effects of the ICC on both 
the conflict and attempts to initiate a peace process. The first and second sections examine the effects 
of the Court's intervention on the dominant narrative and understanding of the Libyan conflict and the 
attitudes and incentives of the warring parties towards committing to an official peace process. The 
next section explores the effects of the ICC on the strategies employed to get the rebels and the Gaddafi 
regime to the negotiating table and the potential emergence of a ripe moment for peace negotiations. 
By examining the attitudes, behaviour and positions of key actors (the Libyan opposition, Gaddafi, Saif 
al-Islam Gaddafi
46
, the African Union, and the intervening forces), the fifth section of the chapter 
interrogates whether a negotiated settlement could have been achieved, irrespective of the ICC's 
                                                 






I. The ICC Enters the Arab Spring 
Libya's uprising was remarkable for both how quickly it descended into civil war as well as how 
rapidly the international community responded. The Gaddafi regime had enjoyed an international 
renaissance in the preceding decade. Just months prior to the uprising, the former pariah could be seen 
sharing the stage with international leaders, shaking the hands of foreign dignitaries and pitching his 
Bedouin tent in European capitals. The international community had its share of political squabbles 
with the erratic Colonel, but “the regime looked as invincible and unassailable as it had ever been.” 
(Vandewalle 2012, 203). No crisis or conflict monitoring group suggested that Libya was at risk of state 
collapse or a descent into civil war (Bellamy 2011, 4) and Foreign Policy's 2010 Failed States Index 
ranked Libya 111
th
 in the world, ahead of states such as India, Turkey, Russia and Mexico (Foreign 
Policy 2011). Just months prior to the onset of Libya's revolution, a significant number of states had 
praised Libya's human rights record at the country's Universal Periodic Review (see OHCHR 2010). 
But within a few short weeks in early 2011, Gaddafi's seemingly airtight grip on the state began to 
loosen.  
 In February 2011, protesters emboldened by events in neighbouring 'Arab Spring' states and 
agitated by long-held socio-economic and political grievances staged largely peaceful demonstrations. 
In the eastern capital of Benghazi, protests escalated on 17 February, named the Day of Rage, with 
demonstrators calling for political reforms. The largest demonstrations against the regime in decades 
quickly turned bloody as Libyan security forces opened fire on protesters who in turn resorted to 
violent measures. Despite attempts to contain the proliferation of protests and the fomenting unrest in 
Libya, images of bloodshed spread rapidly, instigating greater – and much less peaceful – agitation 
against the regime.  
 What began as large-scale demonstrations voicing grievances and demanding political reforms 
quickly transformed into a full-scale rebellion with the aim of overthrowing the Gaddafi government. 
Increasingly fervent, armed, and organized groups clashed with the regime's feared security forces. The 
NTC was also set up to manage the opposition's political objectives. With violence escalating, a 
consensus emerged that without a concerted international intervention, Gaddafi was prepared to 
indiscriminately slaughter any challengers to his regime (see Chesterman 2011, 4). The Security 
Council was faced with unprecedented regional and state support for coercive measures to end the 
violence in Libya. The Organizations of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the African 
Union lined up to call on the international community to intervene. If detractors of international 
intervention had reservations, an impassioned plea by Libya's deputy permanent representative to the 
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UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, appeared to tip the balance. On 21 February 2011 he declared:  
Gaddafi’s regime has already started the genocide against the Libyan people since 
January 15. His soldiers and the mercenaries being flown into the country were ordered 
to shoot to kill...We call on the UN Security Council to use the principle of the right to 
protect to take the necessary action to protect the Libyan people against the 
genocide...We also call on the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to start 
immediately investigating the crimes committed by Gaddafi (see du Plessis and Louw 
2011, 1-2). 
 
According to Hugh Roberts (2011), “[i]t was Dabbashi more than anyone else who, having primed his 
audience in this way, launched the idea that the UN should impose a no-fly zone and the ICC should 
investigate Gaddafi’s ‘crimes against humanity and crimes of war’”.   
 Amidst widespread support for intervention in Libya, the Security Council passed Resolution 
1970 (26 February 2011) and Resolution 1973 (on 17 March 2011). Resolution 1970 (2011) was passed 
unanimously and consisted of a package of sanctions aimed at pressuring the Gaddafi regime to cease 
its violent crackdown on civilians. Amongst its measures was the Security Council's second-ever 
referral of a situation to the ICC. Resolution 1973 (2011), notable for the fact that it marked the first 
time the Security Council authorized military intervention to protect civilians against the wishes of the 
target state, authorized a no-fly zone over Libya (Bellamy and Williams 2011, 825),
 
precipitating a 
military engagement which was subsequently spearheaded by a NATO-led coalition of forces.47 It was 
a remarkable moment which came on the back of a widespread sense that “the assertive liberal 
intervention heyday of the 1990s [was] ancient history.” (Weiss 2013, 215-216; see also Keating 2013, 
200).  
 Just two weeks after Resolution 1970 was passed, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
opened an investigation into alleged crimes committed in Libya. On 16 May 2011 he requested that the 
Court issue three arrest warrants – for leader Muammar Gaddafi, Abdullah al-Senussi, Gaddafi's head 
of internal and external intelligence, and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the Libyan leader and one-time 
heir apparent. On 27 June, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants for all three. This represented a 
remarkable turnaround time from referral to the issuance of warrants. In Darfur, the only other case of a 
UN Security Council referral to the ICC, the Court took two years to move from accepting the referral 
to issuing arrest warrants.  
 In the wake of the ICC's intervention and its subsequent indictments, a chorus of observers 
                                                 
47
 In addition to NATO states, Jordan, Qatar, Sweden and the United Arab Emirates participated in the 
military intervention in Libya. 
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tapped into the “peace versus justice” debate in their assessments of the Court's alleged impact on the 
Libyan civil war. Max Boot (2011) exclaimed that the ICC's intervention gave Gaddafi the incentive to 
“fight to the death and take a lot of people down with him.” Doug Saunders (2011) similarly suggested 
that the ICC's intervention “created a dilemma that has become tragically familiar in recent years: By 
applying the pressure of justice to a savage leader, the ICC may have perpetuated, rather than ended, 
his crimes.” Phillippe Sands (2011a), who would subsequently represent the Libyan government in its 
admissibility hearings at the ICC, declared that the ICC “made Gaddafi's orderly, early departure from 
Libya less likely. Once he was subject to arrest warrants, he was bound to dig in his heels.” Leslie 
Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder (2011) opined that the ICC's decision to issue arrest warrants against 
Gaddafi and his inner circle would severely complicate efforts to bring the conflict to an end: “Qaddafi 
or his core supporters will be unlikely to abdicate power without guarantees against prosecution. The 
international coalition that backed UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 may have boxed 
itself into a corner.” 
 As the conflict progressed, Jackson Diehl (2011) argued that the ICC itself was to blame for the 
protracted violence in Libya, stating that the country was “in a civil war in large part because of 
Gaddafi’s international prosecution.” Bâli and Rana (2012, 339) add that the indictments closed the 
space for a negotiated solution: “by threatening the regime with criminal indictment, this first concrete 
action seemed likelier to foreclose than encourage a negotiated solution to the crisis.” Similarly, the 
International Crisis Group (2011, ii) insisted that the ICC warrant was potentially counter-productive to 
a negotiated settlement: “To insist that [Gaddafi] both leave the country and face trial in the 
International Criminal Court is virtually to ensure that he will stay in Libya to the bitter end and go 
down fighting.”  
 All of these accounts suggested that the ICC had clear, significant and deleterious effects for 
any potential negotiated resolution to the conflict. They tapped into the common premise that 
intervention by the ICC would necessarily complicate the fate and possible future political role of its 
targets, leaving them with no incentive to negotiate and every incentive to continue fighting. In sharp 
contrast to the aforementioned arguments, there has been a distinct lack of attention paid to the Court's 
role in Libya in full-length monographs on the revolution and civil war (See St John 2011; Chorin 
2012; Hilsum 2012b; Pargeter 2012; Vandewalle 2012). The role of the ICC simply does appear to 
figure as a key factor in the lifespan of the conflict.  
 The ICC's actual impact, lies somewhere in between these two poles: while the ICC had some 
important effects on the conflict and attempts to initiate peace negotiations, they were complex and 
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interwoven with other key developments and dynamics in the war.  
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II. Libya – A War of 'Good' versus 'Evil'? 
In Chapter 3, it was suggested that ICC interventions shape conflict narratives in three ways: by 
labelling indicted individuals as 'evil' and thus delegitimizing them as negotiation partners; by making 
the conflict narrative about particular individuals, namely those indicted by the Court; and by focusing 
on the dynamics, rather than the causes of the conflict itself. The ICC's intervention into Libya had all 
of these effects.  
 The causes of the Libyan uprising should be understood primarily as the result of long-standing 
socio-economic, political and regional grievances. Gaddafi's forty-two year reign had been plagued by 
unfulfilled promises of political and socio-economic reforms (see Wright 2010, 210-222; St John 2011, 
262-270; Vandewalle 2012, 137-209). The depth of these grievances cannot be understated. By the turn 
of the century, Libyans “lived under persistent and insidious economic and social pressure more typical 
of conditions during a total war.” (Wright 2010, 218). 
 The Libyan uprising was not spontaneous. Rather, in the words of Hassan al-Amin (2013), a 
human rights advocate and former member of the post-Gaddafi General National Congress, “it was a 
cumulative kind of thing.” Dirk Vandewalle (2013), a historian of modern Libya, suggests that the “real 
starting point [of the Revolution] was 2003 “when the Gaddafi regime was rehabilitated by the 
international community and there was an apparent “economic and political opening led by Saif”. Such 
an opening was, according to Vandewalle (2013), impossible due to the regime's patronage system: 
“Expectations were raised but then nothing really happened to the average Libyan” and it was “very 
clear that it was the Gaddafi family that was manipulating the system.” Despite periodic declarations 
and guarantees by the regime that real reform was forthcoming, these were consistently hampered and 
limited by conservative-minded regime officials. The result was that “the quality of life of the Libyan 
people failed to improve, with widespread corruption, high unemployment, and limited housing 
compounding the negative political and human rights aspects of an authoritarian regime.” (St John 
2011, 262-263) 
 Political freedoms were virtually non-existent. Freedom of expression and speech was severely 
limited and the effective political expression of grievances was constrained by the regime's systematic 
suppression of civil society. Gaddafi's four-decade rule “seemed determined to destroy whatever 
institutions could create any sense of political community.” (Vandewalle 2012, 211; see also St John 
2011, 279). As a result, there were few places to express resentment or communicate grievances other 
than in the streets and in the relative safety of numbers. As a consequence of the limited efforts to 
reform and increase freedoms (many instigated by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) in the years leading up to the 
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revolution, it had become increasingly common to organize local demonstrations to protest the regime 
and demand reforms (Pargeter 2012, 216). According to Alison Pargeter (Ibid.), these protests “were 
symptomatic of the burning anger and seething resentment that had been building in the country for 
decades, but that had worsened in recent years.” This was particularly true in eastern Libya which had 
long experienced a sense of regional disenfranchisement and “relative political deprivation.” (Wright 
2010, 218). As former Canadian Ambassador to Libya, David Viveash (2013) notes, “it was not 
surprising that people from the east started the uprising.” The region “was on a knife-edge, ready to 
explode.” (Pargeter 2012, 216).  
 The memory of one particular tragedy played a crucial role in fomenting dissent. A lack of 
accountability and a consistently frustrated yearning to know the truth about the 1996 Abu Salim 
Massacre, where some 1,200 prisoners were murdered, acted as a lightning rod around which concerted 
political action could take place. The importance of the memory of Abu Salim should not be 
underestimated. It was an enduring historical grievance and “a running sore” for the regime, a constant 
point of agitation (Hilsum 2012b, 5). In this context, the observation of Neil Kritz (1997, 127) seems 
particularly astute: without a sense of justice and accountability, “the past will haunt and infect the 
present and future in unpredictable ways.”  
 It was the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a lawyer who represented the families of Abu Salim victims, 
that more than anything else galvanized an escalation of protests in Benghazi. With his arrest, Hilsum 
(2012b, 7) writes, “the accumulation of grievances had toppled over, like a huge pile of documents. 
Fathi Terbil's arrest was the last file thrown on top, causing the whole lot to collapse.” As Terbil 
explained, for the families of Abu Salim victims, “calling for the release of people, including me, who 
had been arrested became the justification for their protest.” (Quoted in Hilsum 2012b, 7). 
 While some believe that any uprising necessarily required the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime 
(see, e.g. confidential interview 2014d; Tarhuni 2013), it is important to note that the uprising was not 
initially about regime change (see Pargeter 2012, 215). As al-Amin (2013) explains, “no one was 
talking about regime change at the beginning (though some were thinking about it).” Indeed, prior to 
NATO's intervention in support of the Libyan opposition, it is difficult to imagine how a fully-fledged 
campaign of regime change would have been feasible.48 However, “with momentum people started 
saying Gaddafi must go.” (al-Amin 2013). In reaction to the Gaddafi regime's violent response to 
demonstrations, which included the killing of scores of demonstrators on the planned 'Day of Rage' as 
                                                 
48 According to Hana El Gallal (2014), who helped set up the NTC, “if there was no help from the 
outside we would not have been here talking today.”  
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well as opening fire on mourners grieving for killed protesters, the demands of Libyan protestors turned 
sharply away from voicing grievances towards demanding Gaddafi's ouster. As St John (2011, 283) 
notes, “the thrust of the protests shifted from complaints about a lack of housing, social services, and 
jobs to a call for regime change.” 
 It was during this shift towards demanding the overthrow of the regime that the UN Security 
Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC. In moving expeditiously to target Gaddafi and his 
regime, the solution to the war crystalized: getting rid of Gaddafi. As al-Amin (2013) suggests, the 
ICC's intervention bolstered efforts to bring an end to the regime: 
I think the ICC decision to put Gaddafi on the list along with the others, that really 
helped a great deal. In terms of the morale of the people it was amazing - the effect that 
decision had on people. Second, it was ending the legitimacy of Gaddafi if ever he had 
any. He's now wanted. And for that to come from the international community is 
something. Now we are dealing with a guy who is criminal, who is wanted. It made it 
very clear we are going all the way to make sure he is out and he is finished. 
 
The ICC also helped to broaden the consensus regarding regime change for the international 
community which, in turn, legitimated the aims of the opposition on the ground. According to HRW's 
Fred Abrahams (2013), “[t]he ICC gave a boost to the opposition fighters – justice is on our side, the 
world is on our side, political backing to their cause. I can accept that it gave moral support to the 
opposition – they welcomed it.” Elham Saudi (2013), Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya called 
the ICC's intervention a “vote of confidence for the revolution”. Libya's Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi was unequivocal about the ICC's impact on reinforcing the Libyan 
opposition and its goals: “it gave them an indication that the international community is with them and 
they can continue their struggle into the fall of the regime.” The ICC's involvement publicized the 
revolution and paved the way for NATO intervention – and its justification. As one Libyan activist 
claims, “It helped us a lot to turn the attention of the world, not only leaders of the world, journalists, 
normal people all to stand on one side to say Gaddafi must stop, NATO must intervene to protect 
civilians.” (Badi 2013). A senior Western diplomat in Libya (confidential interview 2013g) concurs, 
arguing that the ICC was “seen as a necessary element to the combined efforts of those opposed to 
Gaddafi and those assisting.” In short, the Court lent the Libyan opposition and their international 
backers support in their ultimate aim of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime.    
 In crystallizing and propelling the goal of regime change, the original grievances of the conflict 
were made largely irrelevant. Or, perhaps more accurately, addressing grievances and regime change 
became synonymous. What mattered, above all, was that Gaddafi was an 'evil' that had to be expunged.  
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 At the same time, the ICC helped shape a narrative that ignored the previous political support of 
Gaddafi by Western states. The focus was on Gaddafi and his regime which, as suggested above, made 
it easier for NATO to justify its military intervention on humanitarian and 'justice' grounds. The very 
same states that had rehabilitated Gaddafi and his regime in the years leading up to the civil war were 
also the states responsible for the demise of the 'Brother Leader'.  
 The referral of Libya to the ICC under Resolution 1970 placed a strict limit on the temporal 
jurisdiction of the ICC. While Article 11 of the Rome Statute (1998) provides the ICC with jurisdiction 
for crimes perpetrated after 1 July 2002, the resolution curtailed the ICC's jurisdiction to 15 February 
2011 (UNSC Resolution 1970). To date, there has been no official explanation as to why the ICC's 
jurisdiction was restricted to events post-15 February 2011, nor has the Court commented on the 
subject. This may reflect a general acceptance that the temporal restriction is not necessarily 
problematic under international criminal law. However, given its explicit inclusion in the Security 
Council's referral, it is clear that the inclusion of this temporal limitation was pre-meditated and 
negotiated by the Council's members. It is noteworthy that Resolution 1593 (2005), which referred 
Darfur to the ICC, did not limit the Court's temporal jurisdiction. It would thus appear that the 
restriction to events after 15 February 2011 was included in order to shield key Western states from 
having their affairs and relations with Libya exposed or perhaps even investigated.  
 The period between the ICC’s establishment and the Libya referral is almost exactly the same 
period when relations between Libya and the West were restored. Libya had previously been a pariah 
state, especially in the West, for the better part of two decades. But during its period of rehabilitation, 
numerous Western states saw Libya as a key ally in the global war on terror and a lucrative source of 
oil (see Vandewalle 2011; Vandewalle 2012, 173-194). Many of the same Western states that ultimately 
intervened in Libya in 2011 developed close economic, political and intelligence relations with the 
Gaddafi regime during this period. This inevitably helped to legitimize and sustain the Libyan leader's 
oppressive government (see Wright 2010, 221-229; St John 2011, 225-278).  
 Western states, according to former Canadian Ambassador to Libya, David Viveash (2013), 
were “anxious to convince [themselves] that the leopard had changed its spots”. Gaddafi's 
rehabilitation and the development of closer relations, it was argued, had been both necessary and 
pragmatic in that it achieved a worthy outcome: Gaddafi's abandonment of a nascent nuclear 
programme as well as the development of weapons of mass destruction. In the hopes that he could be a 
liberal heir-apparent, Western diplomats and senior political officials maintained close relations with 
Colonel Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam, who was widely seen as a reform-minded potential successor to 
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his father and who successfully spearheaded efforts to de-radicalize members of the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG) (Hilsum 2012b, 179-182).  
 But the rehabilitation of Gaddafi and his regime was not tied to significant or actualized 
democratic reforms or improvements in political or human rights standards. While there were, in the 
words of former UK ambassador to Libya Oliver Miles “signs of relaxation” in the years before the 
uprising, promises of reform were consistently broken and the regime appeared to feel minimal 
pressure to address long-standing grievances. As Ethan Chorin (2012, 143, 145), a US diplomat in 
Tripoli between 2004-2008, notes, increased coordination and cooperation between Western states and 
the Gaddafi regime undermined Western attempts to push for human rights reform and “[a]ll Gaddafi 
(or his advisers) had to do – and perhaps did do – when asked to moderate his behaviour on any 
number of outstanding issues, was remind his handlers that he was doing some of their dirty work... 
[C]ooperation effectively turned the US and Western intelligence agencies into collaborators with 
Gaddafi in the repression of his own people.” 
 What dirty work? In the years preceding the Revolution, a close intelligence relationship 
between the US, the UK and Libya developed. This burgeoning cooperation on intelligence was no 
secret, even if its darker practices were denied or hidden from the public eye. On his infamous visit to 
see Colonel Gaddafi in March 2004, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair proudly praised Gaddafi's joint 
commitment to the 'global war on terror', claiming that “the world is changing and we have got to do 
everything we possibly can to tackle the security threat that faces us,” and requesting Libya to make 
“common cause with us against al-Qaeda, extremists and terrorism” (see BBC 2004). The extent of this 
joint commitment and its seedy underbelly of human rights violations was exposed, in dramatic 
fashion, during the Libyan conflict.  
 In the chaos of war in Libya and in the absence of any foreign troops able to secure sensitive 
sites of interest, political offices replete with confidential government files were left abandoned. In 
September 2011, documents were found by officials from Human Rights Watch (HRW) in the office of 
Gaddafi's defected foreign minister, Moussa Koussa. They detailed American and UK engagement with 
Libyan intelligence and anti-terrorism practices, including the extraordinary rendition of individuals to 
be interrogated and tortured in Libya (see BBC 2011a). HRW (2012f) subsequently issued a report 
outlining the participation of the US, in particular, in the systematic use of torture, including 
waterboarding, and extraordinary rendition.  
 In the midst of the NATO intervention, the West's indulgence of intelligence ties with Gaddafi 
created a particularly awkward development when the chief rebel commander in Tripoli and a former 
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leader of the LIFG, Abdel Hakim Belhadj, declared that he was suing the British and American 
governments for their complicity in his extraordinary rendition and torture (see Reprieve 2014). The 
documents retrieved by HRW appear to confirm Belhadj's charges against MI6. Additionally, in a 
damning letter, Mark Allen, the former chief of counter-terrorism at MI6, wrote to Koussa that the 
rendition of Belhadj to Libya “was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the 
remarkable relationship we have built over recent years.” (see Spencer 2011c). 
 None of the above is to argue that engaging Gaddafi was unwise, even if it does expose the 
limits of so-called political pragmatism when dealing with autocratic leaders. Gaddafi's abandonment 
of his nuclear programme and weapons of mass destruction were valuable concessions. However, a 
threshold was exceeded in relations between Western states and Gaddafi whilst little, if anything, in 
terms of human rights improvements was achieved with Gaddafi's reintroduction into the mainstream 
of international relations. As al-Amin (2013) explains: “although we acknowledged that the West had 
their interests, they should not go as far as celebrating the rehabilitation and treating Gaddafi as a 
Messiah and someone who is completely transformed. I think they went over the top.” (See also Glover 
2011). 
 The effect of curtailing the ICC's temporal jurisdiction was to prevent investigators from 
exposing the unsavoury, possibly illegal, and undoubtedly embarrassing relations and partnerships 
between the Gaddafi regime and some of the very states that ultimately guaranteed its demise. 
Moreover, these relations fed into Gaddafi's confidence that Western support would allow him to 
sustain his grip on power. This, in turn, contributed to the continued frustration of grievances held by 
Libyans. As Romesh Ratnesar (2011) observed: “Far from initiating domestic reforms or improving 
human rights, the Libyan leader used the legitimacy conferred on him by the West as cover to crush 
dissent and steal more of his country's wealth.” The ICC's restricted jurisdiction, however, framed the 
conflict as one which began in February 2011 and not one whose roots reached much deeper into 
Libya's political history. Key elements in the wider understanding of the causes of the conflict remained 
largely outside of the scope of the narrative of the war.  
 In the wake of the unanimous UN Security Council vote to refer the situation in Libya to the 
ICC, Western states, in particular, voiced their support for the Court and its role in the Libyan crisis. In 
a joint letter titled Libya's Pathway to Peace, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy and US President Barack Obama (2011) declared that the Court “is rightly 
investigating the crimes committed against civilians and the grievous violations of international law.” 
In early May 2011, American Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice reaffirmed support for the ICC, 
159 
 
stating that the US administration 
welcomes the swift and thorough work the Prosecutor has done... The specter of ICC 
prosecution is serious and imminent and should again warn those around Qadhafi about 
the perils of continuing to tie their fate to his. (Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, 
2011). 
 
As the organization leading the military intervention, NATO similarly supported the work of the ICC 
(see Press Briefing on Libya). These statements also made clear that the ICC's intervention was, in the 
eyes of intervening powers, singularly about targeting Gaddafi and his regime.  
 The demonization of Gaddafi had a legitimating effect on intervention and regime change as the 
solution in Libya. The 'good' versus 'evil' narrative was established by Western governments and taken 
up by the media-justified intervention (Roberts 2011; see also Curtis 2012). As a result of this 
demonization, some argued that the possibility of a negotiated settlement evaporated. Roberts (2011), 
for example, writes that any negotiations between the NATO-supported rebels and the Gaddafi regime 
“would have called the demonisation of Gaddafi into question...And that would have ruled out violent – 
revolutionary? – regime change and so denied the Western powers their chance of a major intervention 
in North Africa's spring.” He adds that the ICC “crowned” this process of demonization. In a similar 
vein, Alan J. Kuperman (2013) has argued that this narrative justified not only intervention as the best 
solution to the Libya crisis but regime change as its only logical conclusion. Despite having a mandate 
to protect Libyan civilians, the removal of Gaddafi emerged as NATO's ultimate goal, closed off 
opportunities to seek a negotiated settlement, and fuelled the conflict until Gaddafi's demise was finally 
achieved: 
...intervening states, to justify their use of force to domestic and international 
audiences, tend to demonize the regime that they are targeting. Unfortunately, such 
demonization later inhibits the intervening states from considering a negotiated 
settlement that would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some power, which often 
would be the quickest way to end violence and protect civilians... NATO’s intervention, 
launched explicitly on humanitarian grounds, evolved within two weeks to the goal of 
regime change, thereby inhibiting even the exploration of a negotiated settlement that 
could have saved thousands of lives (Kuperman 2013, 214-215). 
  
 The ICC's intervention obfuscated grievance-based accounts of the Libyan uprising, bolstered 
widespread perceptions of the conflict as a one-sided revolution between 'good' opposition forces and 
an 'evil' regime that needed to be removed by force, and left the preceding decade of Western 
rapprochement with Gaddafi outside of the narrative of the conflict. Of course, the establishment of a 
'good versus evil' narrative, as argued in Chapter 3, is likely to resonate through, and impact, other 
aspects of a peace process. But while the ICC may have affected the possibility of successful 
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III. Attitudes and Incentives of Towards Negotiating Peace 
No direct negotiations took place between the NTC and the Gaddafi regime (Gebreel 2013). However, 
numerous overtures aimed at bringing the Gaddafi regime and the opposition to the negotiating table 
were made. What role and impact did the ICC have?  
 In February 2011, at the outset of the civil war, Muammar Gaddafi declared: “I am not going to 
leave this land. I will die as a martyr at the end. I shall remain, defiant.” (see St John 2011, 262). 
Nothing suggests that his resolve to remain in Libya changed at any point. For their part, once Libya 
descended into civil war, opposition forces, bolstered by the NATO-led military engagement, remained 
steadfast in their conviction that regime change was a precondition to any negotiations. An analysis of 
the numerous attempts to initiate peace talks demonstrates that there is little-to-no evidence that the 
ICC had any effect on Gaddafi’s attitude or incentives towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict. 
However, the intervention by the ICC boosted the Libyan opposition’s position that negotiations with a 
'criminal' like Gaddafi were a non-starter. The morality tale of a 'good' opposition opposed to an 'evil' 
regime was crucial for the Libyan opposition. As one individual who helped set up the NTC argues “the 
most important thing to win the battle with this prize is to have the morality around the people”. (El 
Gallal 2014). The ICC helped them do just that. As Ayat Mneina (2013) maintains, “as soon as the ICC 
decision had passed (pretty early on), I think it just gave Libyans or those fighting during the revolution 
a real sense of credibility – what they were doing was being recognized by the world and the world 
even recognize that such-and-such should to tried at the ICC... They are so evil, everyone recognizes it, 
not just us.” This sense of credibility, according to one senior Western diplomat (confidential interview 
2013h), was “very valuable for the NTC”. It fell on the back of an intervention which “criminalized the 
regime” (Gheblawi 2013). But could it have made a negotiated solution to the conflict more difficult to 
achieve? 
 In early March 2011, even before the military intervention by NATO, the Libyan opposition 
rejected offers to hold negotiations with Gaddafi. Echoing earlier statements by Libya's ambassador to 
the UN that Gaddafi was waging a genocide against Libyan civilians, an NTC spokesperson, Mustafa 
Gheriani, declared that the rebels' “position is [that] there will be no negotiation with this man. He has 
committed genocide with aeroplanes and tanks...We will never compromise...We would like him to 
leave the country to stop the bloodshed. But even if he leaves we will go after him and bring him to 
justice.” (see Spencer 2011a). A spokesperson for NTC Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil added that “[i]f 
there is any negotiation it will be on one single thing – how Gaddafi is going to leave the country or 
step down so we can save lives. There is nothing else to negotiate.” (see BBC 2011g). Still, this did not 
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preclude some actors from attempting to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table. 
 In April 2011, a high-profile, five-member African Union High-Level Panel, that included 
South African President Jacob Zuma, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Malian 
President Amadou Toumani Toure, Democratic Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou Nguessou 
and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, travelled to Libya in an attempt to broker an end to 
hostilities. In addition to a cessation of hostilities – including NATO airstrikes – the AU's peace plan 
included provisions for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid, the protection of foreign nationals, 
and official peace talks between rebels and the Gaddafi regime aimed at finding a political solution to 
the crisis. On 11 April, it was announced that Gaddafi had accepted the AU roadmap (Al Jazeera 
2011b). The AU's plan was immediately rejected by the rebels. When the AU delegation reached rebel-
held Benghazi, they were greeted with slogans that declared “African Union take Gaddafi with you”. A 
rebel spokesman was clear, declaring that “[t]here is no other solution than the military solution, 
because this dictator's language is annihilation, and people who speak this language only understand 
this language.” (see Golovina 2011). Jalil explained why the rebels had rejected the plan: “The African 
Union initiative does not include the departure of Gaddafi and his sons from the Libyan political scene, 
therefore it is outdated.” (See The Independent 2011). In words that echoed statements by Gaddafi 
himself, Jalil added: “We will not negotiate with the blood of our martyrs... We will die with them or be 
victorious.” (see Fahim, 2011b). 
 At the same time, Gaddafi made overtures to initiate negotiations with the primary participants 
in the NATO-led military intervention in Libya (France, the UK and the US), an offer quickly rejected 
on the basis that Gaddafi failed to cease attacks on civilians. However, while Gaddafi declared “Let us 
negotiate with you, the countries that attack us” (see Reuters 2011a), he simultaneously maintained that 
he was not the official leader and would not yield: “I have no official functions to give up – I will not 
leave my country and will fight to the death” (see BBC 2011g). This contradictory perspective was 
captured in further comments in which the Libyan leader recalled his previous ability to negotiate with 
Western states: 
We are ready to talk with France and the United States, but with no preconditions. We 
will not surrender, but I call on you to negotiate. If you want petrol, we will sign 
contracts with your companies—it is not worth going to war over. Between Libyans, 
we can solve our problems without being attacked, so pull back your fleets and your 
planes. (Ajbaili and Ghasemilee 2011).  
 
With NATO's intervention propping up the rebels' military gains, the NTC's vice chairman, Abdul Hafiz 
Ghoga, responded to potential talks by declaring that “[t]he time for compromise has passed. The 
163 
 
people of Libya cannot possibly envisage or accept a future Libya in which Gaddafi's regime plays any 
role.” (see BBC 2011g). NTC foreign minister, Ali Al Issawi, was unequivocal: “[Gaddaf] has to 
choose between three options; he can either join [Slobodan] Milosevic at the ICC, or his friend 
[President Hugo] Chavez [in Venezuela], or have the same fate as Hitler... His only option to avoid 
death is to go to a country that has not signed the ICC Agreement [the Rome Statute], the African 
option [of exile] remains in place, and we are not against this.” (see Asharq Al-Awsat 2011b). A senior 
NTC official agrees (confidential interview 2014d), stating that the NTC “even said that there are 
countries that are not signatories to the Rome agreement of the ICC that Gaddafi and his sons can go 
to.” However, he added that the NTC was not directly negotiating Gaddafi's exile:  
We did not actively encourage Gaddafi to go to a country that is not a signatory to the 
Rome agreement. But we said that Gaddafi knows very well that that option is open to 
him. Especially that he is well-connected with the majority of African countries, for 
example. He is very well connected with Venezuela, with Nicaragua, with Zimbabwe... 
So he had that option.  
  
 During the first weeks of NATO's intervention, Gaddafi did not show any flexibility with 
regards to stepping down as a precondition to talks and, at the end of May 2011, Zuma conceded that 
Gaddafi would not yield (BBC 2011e). Zuma explained that Gaddafi had “called for an end to the 
bombings to enable a Libyan dialogue [but h]e emphasized that he was not prepared to leave his 
country, despite the difficulties.” (see Bearak 2011). Throughout meetings aimed at bringing the 
conflict to a negotiated end, Zuma refused to discuss exile with Gaddafi which he saw as a non-starter 
with the Libyan leader (BBC 2011d). In June, Gaddafi again reiterated that he would not leave despite 
the military campaign led by NATO against his regime: “We have only one choice, we will stay in our 
land dead or alive. We will not kneel. We will not surrender. We are stronger than your missiles, 
stronger than your planes, and the voice of the Libyan people is louder than explosions.” (see St John 
2011, 262).  
 In June, the AU High Level Panel stated that Gaddafi had agreed to remain outside of any 
negotiation process (Al Jazeera 2011c). Still, the rebels showed no interest in negotiating. Remarks by 
NTC Foreign Minister Fathi Baja at the end of May reflected this position and the skepticism that any 
overture by Gaddafi could be trusted: “We refuse completely. We don't consider it a political initiative, 
it is only some stuff that Gaddafi wants to announce to stay in power.” (see BBC 2011e). 
 As the conflict progressed, Gaddafi appeared increasingly interested in potential negotiations. 
At this juncture, the international community and the intervening powers also indicated a degree of 
interest in peace talks. With the backdrop of a military stalemate and fears amongst Western powers of 
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becoming mired in another dragged-out military engagement, NATO member states were reportedly 
“anxious that the military campaign has not yet succeeded and are keen to explore a political solution.” 
(Black 2011a). In July, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon maintained that negotiations continued: 
“[w]e are far from reaching an agreement to reach an end to the conflict but the negotiating process is 
ongoing.” (see Chikhi 2011). Back-channel negotiations were also taking place. In mid-July, France 
admitted that indirect talks were ongoing with the Gaddafi regime. French defence minister Gérard 
Longuet even suggested that a practical solution for Gaddafi's involvement in talks had been identified: 
“He will be in another room in his palace with another title.” (see Al Jazeera 2011d). However, Longuet 
also continued to affirm the precondition that the Libyan leader be removed from power. He insisted 
that “[t]he question is not whether he leaves power but how and when.” (See Lichfield 2011).  
 While hosting July meetings on a 'Libya Summit', Turkey proposed a new, two-stage “roadmap” 
to bring the crisis to a negotiated end involving an immediate ceasefire, UN monitoring, the withdrawal 
of forces loyal to Gaddafi from besieged areas and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid (Black 
2011a). Turkey's proposal was, in the words of Ibrahim Kalin (2011), an advisor to the Turkish Prime 
Minister, an attempt to “prevent two potential disasters: a protracted civil war in Libya, or partition.” 
Kalin (Ibid.) explained that the creation of “a new political order...means Gaddafi leaving office”. 
However, while Turkey's proposal followed the prescription that Gaddafi leave power, it did not “spell 
out how that should happen or whether he would have to be accompanied by his sons.” (Black 2011a). 
At the same time, Jalil seemed to suggest that the NTC had softened its position on Gaddafi by 
declaring that he could remain in the country in a location determined by the NTC and “under 
international supervision.” (See Norton-Taylor and Stephen 2011). Some observers have suggested 
such a plan was “never really an option” (Stephen 2013). However, attempts to find a solution to the 
question of Gaddafi's fate were complemented by a softening on the part of William Hague who 
claimed that “[w]hat happens to Qaddafi is ultimately a question for the Libyans”, as well as French 
Foreign Minister Alain Juppé who suggested that a possible solution was that Gaddafi “stays in Libya 
on one condition, which I repeat: that he very clearly steps aside from Libyan political life.” (See 
Cowell 2011). These developments were met by sharp criticism from human rights groups. HRW's 
Richard Dicker (2011), for example, decried any potential “get-out-jail-free card” for Gaddafi and 
warned that not only did it risk undermining the pursuit of justice, but that any “plan that gives Qaddafi 
a comfortable retirement (inside or outside of Libya) is short-sighted. Qaddafi... would remain a 
destabilizing figure.” The ICC also weighed in, insisting that Gaddafi had to be arrested (see Norton-
Taylor and Stephen 2011). Notably, Saif emerged at this time to discuss the conflict and the ICC's 
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warrant against him and his father, suggesting that some offer had been made which could have by-
passed the ICC's arrest warrants: 
It’s a fake court. Under the table they are trying to negotiate with us a deal. They say if 
you accept this deal, we will take care of the court. What does that mean? It means this 
court is controlled by those countries which are attacking us every day! It is just to put 
psychological and political pressure on us. That’s it. Of course, it won’t work. The court 
is a joke here in Libya. (See RT 2011). 
 
Whatever deal was offered (indeed, if any deal was offered), ultimately failed to come to fruition.  
 As Tripoli came under sustained attack from rebel fighters in August 2011, Gaddafi's 
spokesperson declared that the Libyan leader was offering to negotiate a transfer of power (Al Jazeera 
2011f). But the prospects of opening negotiations in the midst of the regime's imminent collapse were 
immediately shot down by the NTC. As Vandewalle notes, “[t]he diplomatic process became overrun 
by events on the ground – the fall of Tripoli. The whole diplomatic climate changed. Even the South 
Africans realized their original suggestion was unrealistic. By default the rebels/NTC and Gaddafi 
[were] committed to [a] military solution. I talked to NTC leaders. It was very clear that most, if not 
everyone, sensed victory in the air. In Tripoli, they really wanted to see military victory.” (Vandewalle 
2013).  
 Having made significant in-roads in the conflict only to turn to negotiations was not in the 
Libyan opposition's interest. And Gaddafi's last offers appeared to be an act of desperation. As the 
NTC's Ali Tarhouni declared, “No negotiation is taking place with Gaddafi... If he wants to surrender, 
then we will negotiate and we will capture him.” (See Smith 2011c). NTC information minister 
Mahmoud Shammam exclaimed: “We are looking at them as criminals. We are going to arrest them 
very soon.” (See Shelton 2011). Another NTC official, Guma el-Gamaty stated that the opposition was 
“absolutely 100% not” prepared negotiate with Gaddafi: 
[t]he only negotiation is how to apprehend him, [for him] to tell us where he is and what 
conditions he wants for his apprehension: whether he wants to be kept in a single cell or 
shared cell or whether he wants to have his own shower or not, you know. These are the 
kind of negotiations we are willing to talk about. (See Smith 2011c). 
 
All parties, including Gaddafi, had come to realize that Libya's transition was irreversible. It was not a 
conducive context for negotiations. William Hague described any offer from Gaddafi to hold talks as 
“delusional”, stating that “[a] transition of power is already taking place. The NTC ministers are in 
Tripoli and in increasing control of the situation.” (Ibid.). 
 One development which may have contributed to the regime's apparent willingness to negotiate 
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as the conflict persisted was that, throughout the civil war, the leader appeared increasingly isolated and 
marginalized as a result of a stream of defections. Beginning just days after the conflict erupted in 
February 2011, scores of high-profile diplomats, loyalists and generals defected from the regime 
(Spencer 2011b), including General Abdelfatah Younis and controversial Foreign Minister Musa 
Koussa, who arrived in the UK from Tunisia, reportedly on a British military aircraft (BBC 2011b). 
Abdul Jalil and Mahmoud Jibril also defected, becoming senior political figures in the NTC. Interior 
minister Abdel-Fatah Younes al-Obeidi and oil minister Shurki Ghanem both abandoned Gaddafi and, 
in May 2011, five generals, two colonels and a major defected to Italy. But did the ICC instigate these 
defections? 
 As noted in Chapter 2, proponents of international criminal justice often suggest that the ICC 
has a potential marginalization effect. The spate of defections in the wake of the international 
community's engagement in the crisis in Libya would seem to be at least cursory evidence that the 
Court contributed to the isolation of Gaddafi. Juan Cole (2011) speculated as much, arguing that the 
ICC indictment of Gaddafi “is likely to hasten the end of the regime by signalling to the Tripoli elite 
that they are increasingly likely to face prosecution and sanctions, encouraging them to throw the 
Qaddafis under the bus.” Similarly, some in the NTC believe the ICC may have instigated defections. 
El Gallal (2014), for example, maintains that the ICC primarily impacted “on the morality of Gaddafi 
and his regime and more people defected after that because they didn't want to have their names 
coming in.” 
 But there is no evidence that the defections of senior officials are directly attributable to any 
single aspect of the conflict, including the ICC's intervention. A fear of being killed by siding with 
Gaddafi is just as likely to have played a role in the decision-making of former Gaddafi loyalists to 
'abandon ship', as it were. Moreover, it should be noted that the majority of Gaddafi's closest allies 
remained loyal throughout the conflict, many remaining with him until his death (Pargeter 2012, 225). 
More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that defections affected Gaddafi's attitude towards 
committing to a peace process. 
 On 21 August 2011, Tripoli finally fell to the rebels. While he had fled the capital, true to his 
word, Gaddafi refused to leave Libya and instead sought refuge in his birthplace of Sirte. There is no 
evidence that the ICC's intervention had any effect on Gaddafi or his regime's attitude towards 
negotiations with the rebels. Continuing to fight may have been the regime's best and, for Gaddafi the 
only, option – but not because of the ICC but rather because, for the Libyan leader, the war was always 
'all or nothing'. As Daniel Serwer (2011) argued in April 2011: “we can be certain that Muammar 
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regards the issue as one of life or death and will therefore fight on until he finds a way out that enables 
him and his family to survive.” On 20 October, Gaddafi was captured alive and subsequently killed by 
rebel forces. 
 Importantly, there is no evidence that the Libyan leader sought, at any point, to address the 
ICC's intervention as a pre-condition to coming to the negotiating table. Thus it cannot be concluded 
that the Court gave Gaddafi an incentive or disincentive to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. However, this analysis also suggests that the ICC's intervention affected the attitudes and 
incentives of the rebels and NTC towards negotiations by bolstering their refusal to negotiate with 
Gaddafi. This is evidenced by their consistent rejection of negotiations with the Gaddafi regime as well 
their insistence that Gaddafi be permanently removed from power and brought to 'justice'. The rebels 
and the NTC drew on the narrative that demonized and delegitimized Gaddafi as a negotiating partner, 
portrayed him as a 'criminal', and re-inforced their goal of a military victory over the regime. It is 
hardly surprising that the opposition's insistence to overthrow the regime militarily entrenched the 
regime's own resolve to continue fighting. And in this context there was little room for talk of a 
political solution. As Mohamed Eljarh (2013c) explains, with the Court's intervention, the opposition 
had the feeling that the battle had been won and it was just a matter of time. The idea 
changed – these are now criminals on the run, what we're doing is trying to catch them 
and it's just a matter of time before we do. So it had an effect on opposition forces. It 
reinforced the opposition. The intervention made sure that one side had to win over the 
other. It ended any prospects of coming back together, trying to find a solution. It made 
sure both sides had to fight to the end. 
 
In short, the judicial intervention of the ICC and military intervention of NATO made the rebels' 
demand for regime change more feasible and defensible, allowing the NTC to hold steadfast to 
Gaddafi's removal as a precondition to any negotiated solution. The Security Council's decisions – both 
to refer Libya to the ICC and to authorize military intervention – galvanized the opposition. According 
to one scholar, “the resolutions may have actually facilitated an increase in violence by opposition 
forces, as the rebels would have likely interpreted the recognition by the Security Council as validation 
of their cause from the international community.” (Amditis 2012, 16). In contrast to the arguments 
made by observers outlined at the outset of the chapter, it wasn't Gaddafi who was emboldened by the 
ICC to continue fighting, but rather the Libyan opposition.  
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IV. From Civil War to a Peace Process? 
While an official peace process was never initiated in Libya, it remains worthwhile analyzing the ICC's 
effects on a number of dynamics that could have contributed to the conflict entering a negotiation 
phase. As per the analytical framework, three key issues and decisions can be affected prior to the onset 
of negotiations: where to hold peace negotiations; the timing of peace talks; and the mediation 
strategies employed to get the parties to the negotiation table. There is no evidence that any thought 
was given about where to hold official peace talks. However, the creation of a ripe moment as well as 
the mediation strategies to get the regime and the opposition to negotiate peace are relevant to this 
analysis. 
 
(i) Mediation Strategies and Gaddafi's Fate 
From the outset, efforts to establish negotiations were hampered by the international community's 
response to the unrest in Libya. Rather than seeking to instigate mediated negotiations, the international 
community reacted to the uprising by turning almost immediately towards coercive measures: 
economic sanctions, a referral to the ICC and military intervention. This may be explained by the speed 
of events and the broad consensus that coercive action against Gaddafi was justified. Some, however, 
believe that the turn to aggressive policies was an extension of the West's ultimate aim of regime 
change, leaving the AU’s subsequent mediation attempts – which followed rather than preceded the 
Security Council's approval of coercive measures – hopeless (Roberts 2011; de Waal 2013c; see also 
discussion below). Despite this, various efforts to mediate between the rebels and Gaddafi were made. 
The most crucial barrier faced by potential mediators was finding an agreement on Gaddafi’s role and 
fate. This section explores the attempts by potential mediators and key actors to deal with this dilemma 
and how the ICC may have affected two possible outcomes in particular: exile for Gaddafi and a 
Security Council deferral of the ICC's investigation.  
  Reflecting the importance of Gaddafi's personal fate to resolving the war, the possibility of him 
going into exile was a key topic of contention. As noted above, the AU took a leading mediation role. 
In doing so,  explored options for both internal and external exile (de Waal 2013b). So too did the 
intervening states. In the midst of a conference on the future of Libya in March 2011 Paul Koring 
(2011) observed that “[t]he tough talk of relentless pressure aimed to oust the unpredictable and brutal 
despot who has ruled Libya for 41 years didn't entirely drown out hints of possible exile and the 
possibility of avoiding a war crimes trial.” States were divided over whether to offer Gaddafi a way out 
and to guarantee him immunity from potential prosecution at the ICC (Wintour 2011). It was reported 
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that both the US and the AU were quietly identifying states willing to provide Gaddafi with safe haven 
(see de Waal 2013b; Sanger and Schmitt 2011). Until at least July 2011, states were torn between 
efforts to convince Gaddafi to move into exile and a deal that would allow him to relinquish power but 
remain in the country.  
 Throughout the conflict, it was reported that numerous governments had offered Gaddafi exile, 
including Uganda, Chad, Malawi, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (see Barry 2011; 
Biryabarema 2011; Sanger and Schmitt 2011; Smith 2011a). Because some of these states were 
members of the Court49, de Waal (2013b, 71) argues that issuing arrest warrants against Gaddafi, Saif 
and Senussi “threatened to close the door on any solution that involved Gaddafi going quietly into 
exile.” Perhaps as a consequence, during later stages of the war, Western states were focused on non-
ICC member-states as possible exit targets for Gaddafi. Amidst Turkish attempts to ignite peace talks 
between the rebels and the Gaddafi regime in July 2011, it was reported that NATO had privately 
acknowledged that they would approve of Gaddafi's exile to a non-ICC-member state such as Belarus 
or Zimbabwe (Black 2011a).  
 Gaddafi himself refused to accept any deal that included his departure from the country, despite 
apparent pleas from his closest advisors that he consider exile (see, e.g. Fahim 2011a). Until his death, 
Gaddafi never appeared to seriously consider leaving Libya. His last will was telling in this regard: 
Let the free people of the world know that we could have bargained over and sold out 
our cause in return for a personal secure and stable life. We received many offers to this 
effect but we chose to be at the vanguard of the confrontation as a badge of duty and 
honour. (see BBC 2011j). 
 
 A second option available to mediators and intervening powers was to guarantee that Gaddafi 
would not be prosecuted at the ICC. Resolution 1970 explicitly included a preambular reference to 
Article 16, explaining that it could be invoked by the Security Council in order to suspend an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution by the ICC for up to 12 months (renewable yearly) if the investigation or 
prosecution constituted a threat to international peace and security. Notably, the reference to Article 16 
in Resolution 1970 was included in order to assuage the concerns of states that the ICC could 
complicate attempts to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict (see Sudan Tribune 2011; du 
Plessis and Louw 2012). In this context, the prospect of an Article 16 deferral of an investigation or 
prosecution could be seen as a potential 'carrot' in efforts to negotiate peace.  
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 In July 2011, the African Union (2011) officially requested the “Security Council to activate the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute with a view to deferring the ICC process on Libya, in the 
interest of Justice as well as peace in the country”. By that point, however, the AU had little leverage as 
a mediator. Moreover, in response to the potential invocation of a deferral, concerns were voiced 
among human rights groups. For example, Dicker (2011) argued that “diplomats may be thinking of 
using a possible escape hatch contained in the I.C.C.’s treaty....This truly unfortunate provision 
authorizes political interference in a judicial proceeding, and it should be used only in exceptional 
circumstances.” 
 There is no evidence that the Security Council contemplated invoking Article 16. Even if the 
Security Council had offered a deferral, it seems unlikely that it would have affected Gaddafi's 
willingness to enter negotiations. It would not have resolved questions over his fate and whether he 
would receive internal or external exile. Again, an Article 16 guarantee requires that the Security 
Council renew its pledge to defer investigation or prosecution every twelve months. With no guarantee 
of renewal, deferrals are thus a temporary and unstable incentive. Indeed, previous practice seems to 
suggest that guarantees against prosecution are often revoked in time.50 It should also be noted that the 
temporary nature of an Article 16 deferral presents leaders such as Gaddafi with perverse incentives. In 
order to guarantee that a deferral is consistently renewed rather than allowed to expire, it is in the 
interest of leaders to retain sufficient capacity for violence in order to leverage it for prolonged 
impunity. This is worth noting as it suggests that bypassing an ICC investigation or prosecution via an 
Article 16 deferral could threaten to prolong violence.  
 In the end, neither offers of exile nor a UN Security Council deferral under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute were able to address the role and fate of Gaddafi in a negotiated settlement. Importantly, 
while the intervening powers and the opposition may have considered circumventing the ICC's 
mandate in Libya, there is no evidence that the ICC affected Gaddafi's decision-making in rejecting any 
offer of exile or protection from prosecution. Indeed, the first speculation from within the regime that 
Gaddafi had recognized any effect of the ICC on his situation only came after the war. In a description 
of his last days, Mansour Dhao, Gaddafi's chief of security said the Libyan leader 
paced up and down in a small room, writing in a notebook. We knew it was over. 
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Gaddafi said, 'I am wanted by the International Criminal Court. No country will accept 
me. I prefer to die by Libyan hands'. (see Adler 2011). 
 
Whether or not Dhao's account is accurate, by this point Gaddafi had rejected exile. And in the end, he 
kept his word and died in Libya, at the hands of its citizens.  
 
(ii) A Ripe Moment and Mutually Hurting Stalemate?   
In the summer of 2011 it could have been argued that that a “ripe moment” for negotiation had 
crystallized. The conflict between Gaddafi loyalists and the rebels had reached an impasse. It appeared 
that neither side would emerge victorious. As Vandewalle (2012, 206-7) describes: “it had become clear 
that a military victory for the rebels would perhaps prove elusive and, simultaneously, that the loyalists' 
options were being increasingly degraded.” The east of the country was largely in the hands of the 
rebels while Gaddafi loyalists held much of the West and, crucially, the capital, Tripoli. It was during 
this period of time that the intervening powers, seeking options that would avoid a long drawn-out 
conflict, appeared most keen to support negotiations. Additionally, as de Waal (2013b, 71) notes, the 
AU identified the apparent military stalemate as an opportunity to “make both sides accept the need for 
a negotiated solution.” However, any stalemate that emerged was certainly not one that was mutually 
hurting – or hurting enough – to produce or sustain the conditions necessary for a successful political 
settlement.  
 The belligerents' insistence that they would continue fighting, in spite of periodic suggestions 
that they were prepared to negotiate, as well as their unwavering insistence regarding Gaddafi’s fate, 
belied the fact that both sides believed they could be victorious. In other words, the condition wherein 
both sides mutually could not have imagined ultimate victory was never met. Moreover, the NATO 
intervention had a significant impact on any potential stalemate to emerging. But, as Ayat Mneina 
(2013) observers, “since the UNSC granted the no-fly zone and NATO went in, there was no discussion 
– they were going to overthrow the regime... Had they attempted negotiations a lot earlier on [from 
military intervention] then maybe the regime stood a chance but since we as Libyans saw France, UK 
and the US jump at the opportunity to do this, why would you negotiate?” 
 Gaddafi's eventual overtures to negotiate indicate that he viewed negotiations as a potential 
alternative to his demise. But by the time serious offers were made, the end of his regime was a matter 
of when, not if. Additionally, as noted above, the military stalemate that characterized much of the 
conflict was eventually broken by rebels' capture of Tripoli. With it the chances of a negotiated peace 
process evaporated. In the context of a unilaterally hurting stalemate, no “ripe moment” for 
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negotiations could have emerged. As Greig and Diehl (2012, 109) write: “A one-sided hurting 
stalemate would leave a situation in which the unconstrained side may continue fighting and reject any 
settlement attempts.” And so the Libyan opposition did.  
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V. Negotiation Impossible  
Throughout a period of “strange envoys and failed mediations” (Chorin 2012, 239), very little traction 
for a peace process was achieved and whatever momentum was gained was quickly squandered. It has 
been argued that the ICC bolstered the resolve of the Libyan opposition to refuse negotiations with the 
Gaddafi regime and thus committed them to regime change via military means. It might therefore be 
tempting to conclude that the ICC ruined the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Libya and that 
critics in the “peace versus justice” debate who argue that the ICC is deleterious to peace have been 
vindicated. However, in order to claim that it was the ICC that ruined the prospects of a negotiated 
peace in Libya, it must be shown that the Libyan civil war could feasibly have been settled through 
peace negotiations. An examination of the attitudes, behaviours and positions of five key actors which 
could have led to a negotiated peace – (i) the Libyan opposition, (ii) Gaddafi, (iii) Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi, (iv) the African Union, and (v) the intervening NATO forces – demonstrates that factors other 
than the ICC spoiled any potential peace talks between the Libyan regime and opposition. Attempts to 
initiate peace negotiations would fail – irrespective of the ICC's intervention.  
 
(i) The Opposition 
When asked whether it would have been possible to reach a negotiated, political solution to the crisis in 
Libya, El Gallal (2014), was unequivocal: “no way.” The NTC consistently reiterated their precondition 
that Gaddafi be permanently excluded from power. For another member of the NTC (confidential 
interview 2014d), “it wasn't so much a political negotiation. It was a political resolution and a way out 
for Gaddafi.”. An oft-repeated refrain was that “any political initiative that does not condition the 
departure of Gaddafi and his children is, for the people of Libya, completely rejected... if the political 
initiative does not include this issue, then it is not even worth looking at!” (see Asharq Al-Awsat 
2011b). This demand that Gaddafi leave immediately condemned any prospect of getting an official 
peace process underway (International Crisis Group 2011a, ii).
 
So was the NTC ever interested in a 
peaceful solution to the conflict?  
 Let us assume that the NTC was amenable to a political solution that compromised on the issue 
of Gaddafi's role and fate. In this instance, they would have to 'sell' a potential deal to opposition 
fighters and to the Libyan public. The suggestion that the NTC had full authority in determining the 
outcome or terms of a negotiated settlement would be easy – but wrong. Rather, as has become even 
more clear since the conclusion of the war, Libya's rebel militias have had a “stranglehold” on the 
country since the civil war erupted (Amnesty International 2012a ). By some accounts, some 125,000 
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Libyans fought against the regime, many comprising “groups [that] do not see themselves as serving a 
central authority.” (International Crisis Group 2011b, i). Once the revolution had begun and the calls 
for regime change amongst anti-Gaddafi factions had consolidated, that Libyan militias and their 
supporters would never have supported any deal that saw Gaddafi remain in power. As the NTC's 
Foreign Minister al Issawi proclaimed, “we will not look at or respond to any political initiative that 
does not include the departure of Gaddafi and his children.” (see Asharq Al-Awsat 2011b). The NTC 
felt “intense pressure from Libyans in rebel-controlled territory to reject any deal that does not include 
Qaddafi’s departure.” (Barfi 2011). Even those instances when the NTC suggested it might be inclined 
to negotiate with the regime may have actually been attempts by the opposition to further the goal of 
removing Gaddafi rather than negotiating a settlement with him (Eljarh 2013c). Complicating matters 
further was the lack of unified positions within the NTC itself. As Tarhuni (2013) argues, the NTC 
“couldn't agree with negotiations themselves. It was hard enough for them to consider it themselves. It 
would have been extremely difficult” for the NTC to convince rebel factions that a negotiated 
settlement was in their interests. 
 In response to a question about whether negotiations could have occurred between the 
opposition and Gaddafi, one senior NTC official (confidential interview 2014d) states: 
Definitely not if what you mean is negotiating with the regime that somehow Gaddafi 
and his family can stay and share power. That was never, ever put on the table of the 
agenda. The NTC was willing to negotiate a safe passage for Gaddafi and his family to 
leave the country... That's it. No offer of power-sharing whatsoever. 
 
When we learned that South African President Zuma was visiting Gaddafi, we hoped 
that the only message Zuma was bringing to Gaddafi is: “it's time for your to leave.” But 
obviously that did not happen, the Libyan people had to do it the hard way.  
 
El Gallal (2014) insists that some within the NTC were interested in negotiating with the regime – but 
not out of a commitment to peace but because the regime had “all the documents to humiliate them... 
They had interests [and] wanted to negotiate to protect them and the information about them.” Others 
never wavered: “Those who were committed 100% were not interested – because we know Gaddafi. 
Either we win or we will die.” (Ibid.) 
 The NTC's and NATO's endorsement of regime change certainly complicated any potential 
peace process, especially one that would have included any form of transitional power-sharing 
arrangement. But the popular demand for regime change was not imposed on Libyans by the 
international community or the NTC itself. Once Libyans made regime change a primary political 
objective, they never yielded. The ICG (2011a, ii) accepted this reality, stating that the view that 
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Gaddafi “can have no role in the post-Jamahiriya political order is one thing, and almost certainly 
reflects the opinion of a majority of Libyans as well as of the outside world.” 
 In the hypothetical instance where a negotiated settlement was accepted by the NTC and the 
Gaddafi regime, it is all too easy to imagine that they would have been seen as conspirators who had 
never been truly loyal to the Revolution. For such charges one could easily pay with their life.51 Even 
if Gaddafi had been willing to negotiate a political settlement, the opposition was unable and unwilling 
to do so. And the ICC may have played a minimal role. Fred Abrahams (2013) has concluded likewise: 
Even if Gaddafi had wanted to negotiate or was open to it, the other side wasn't - both 
the Libyan opposition and the international community - because a decision was made, 
by the US and France and more broadly, that Gaddafi had to go. I would find it very 
hard to imagine that the anti-Gaddafi coalition locally and internationally would have 
accepted or would have been open to a political conversation In that sense, you could 
argue that the [ICC] indictment didn't matter because the political and military decision 
had been made and they were streaming ahead. 
 
(ii) The Colonel  
As argued above, Gaddafi showed virtually no inclination to surrender, but could he have been 
convinced of the utility of a negotiated settlement and could he have been genuinely interested in its 
terms which, as noted above, had to include his stepping aside? 
 Ambassador Miles (2013) argues that it depends on how one judges Gaddafi's personality. The 
Libyan leader's four-decade long rule had time and again demonstrated the regime's “absolute 
commitment to its own survival.” (Wright 2010, 220). Pargeter (2012, 235) adds that “anyone who 
believed that the threat of international action would force Qaddafi to back down clearly did not know 
him.” She argues that his position may have been pathological: 
With his unstinting Bedouin pride and uncompromising self-belief, there was no way 
the Colonel was going to step aside and walk away from power gracefully – let alone 
flee the country. He was not simply a head of state – he was the very embodiment of the 
Jamahiriyah. He was Libya. (Ibid. 226). 
 
Miles (2013) adds that Gaddafi “simply dominated everyone around him – a trait that must have had an 
effect on him. He thought he could win and he believed it.” It is reasonable to assume that Gaddafi 
believed it was within his power to hold out and survive. His previous rehabilitation conferred the 
message that the Colonel was never beyond the pale and his treatment of Libyan citizens had little-to-
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nothing to do with the how the international community would deal with him.  
 That Gaddafi refused to leave Libya despite numerous offers of exile and that the opposition 
did not trust that he would ever relinquish power should come as no surprise. Given what is known 
about Gaddafi's psychology and his conflation between his own survival and the Libyan state, it seems 
he would never have ceded the type of influence necessary for a negotiated settlement to succeed – 
regardless of whether the ICC indicted him or not. 
 
(iii) Saif al-Islam Gaddafi   
Prior to the civil war, it was widely believed that Saif was eager to transform Libya from a pariah state 
and integrate the country into the international community. Gaddafi's son “held out the possibility, in 
the minds of some, that Libya might one day chart a happier course.” (Sands 2011b). He had been 
instrumental in Libya's rapprochement with the West and, as Hilsum (2012b, 156) writes, in the 2000s, 
“it became clear that he was his father's heir apparent, and anyone who wanted to do business in Libya 
had to do business with him.”  
 In the years preceding the Libyan uprising, Saif had attracted a wealth of liberal, democratic 
and reform-minded Libyans to work with the regime and led efforts to open up the country. His efforts, 
somewhat ironically, contributed to the onset of the uprising (Pargeter 2012, 229). As Miles (2013) 
asserts, revolutions like that in Libya, “happen not when the screw is tightened but when it's loosened.” 
Saif's reforms had the consequence of making protests and rallies to express grievances increasingly 
common. Pargeter (2012, 229) even argues that Saif was blamed by his family for causing the uprising. 
 When the Libyan revolution broke out, hope remained that Saif might side with the protestors 
who were agitating for many of the reforms he had promised. There was some belief that he could 
moderate the regime's response, perhaps even play the role of a transitional leader. As the so-called 
Arab Spring rattled Tunisia and Egypt, Saif, who was in London at the time, was reportedly supportive 
of the protesters (Sands 2011b). There were reports that Gaddafi's son was prepared to give a speech 
that would have apologized for the regime's crackdown in Benghazi, promised a new constitution and 
would have lent support to real reform and a transition towards constitutional democracy. Some 
believed that “this was Saif Al-Islam's moment and his chance to turn his well-worn promises into 
reality,” (Pargeter 2012, 227) and emerge as “the peacemaker” (Verini 2011). 
 Many were consequently dismayed when Saif fervently sided with his father in his defiant 
speech televised on 21 February 2011. Saif chose “to ride the black horse over the white horse.” (Miles 
2013). Evoking his father's unyielding rhetoric, Saif defiantly declared: “We will fight to the last 
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minute, until the last bullet.” (see Al Jazeera 2011a). With time, Saif appeared to become only more 
fanatical in his support of the regime. As James Verini (2011) observed, Saif had “become the new 
spokesman for a congenital strain of Qaddafian dementia.” Video footage showed him inciting a crowd 
loyal to the regime to attack the country's growing opposition, whom he called “bums, brats and 
druggies”. (See CBS 2011). Recordings also emerged which seemed to indicate that Saif had given 
direct orders to kill (McElroy 2012).  
 The argument that Saif was interested in brokering a political settlement between the regime 
and the NTC assumes that Saif's decision to side with his father was tactical, giving him leverage from 
within the regime to push for peace. Virtually every 'liberal'-leaning figure from the Gaddafi regime, 
many of whom had worked with Saif previously, defected to the rebel side (Gallal 2014). Saif 
apparently sought to mediate between them and his father and was disappointed that reformers “turned 
on him” (Verini 2011). This raises two questions: was Saif serious about negotiating peace and would 
he have been accepted as a negotiation partner?  
 In early April it was reported that Saif had reached out, via intermediaries and confidantes, to 
the international community, offering a peace settlement which would result in Gaddafi stepping down 
and his taking power (see Haynes et al 2011; Karon 2011; McElroy 2011; Chorin 2012, 241). Saif also 
apparently contacted the NTC and stressed his previous role in endorsing and pushing for democratic 
reform: “People close to Seif [sic] are doing their best to ingratiate him with the rebels and Western 
powers by telling reporters that he’s been trying to achieve the same goals as the rebellion from within 
the regime but has been frustrated.” (see Karon 2011). According to one report, Saif's proposal included 
holding elections (in which he would run for President) and “a 'reconciliation process' put in place in an 
attempt to heal the bitter wounds between the regime and its opponents.” (Sengupta 2011).  
 The notion that Saif would be a negotiating partner was not entirely baseless. Some states 
allegedly “had at one stage envisaged a transition to representative government in Libya with Saif in 
charge” (ibid.) and, as Julian Borger (2011) reported, numerous Western states had “hoped the London 
School of Economics-educated Gaddafi son's contacts to London could be a conduit for talks.” As a 
result, ICC staff (confidential interview 2013c) have suggested that some intervening states were 
“disappointed” that the Court indicted Saif. Still, reading this fact as being evidence of a willingness on 
the part of intervening states to negotiate a peace settlement with Saif is misleading. There is no 
evidence of genuine negotiations between Saif and NATO states. It is more likely that their 
disappointment stemmed from an interest in preserving the possibility of negotiations insofar as doing 
so was useful to avoiding becoming mired in a military stalemate. 
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 It is also unclear whether Saif would have been accepted by the Libyan opposition as a 
negotiation partner. Views on the matter are mixed. Many of those interviewed believe that Saif could 
have presented himself as a genuine negotiator but that, in the words of one senior diplomat 
(confidential interview 2013h), “what clinched it was his ridiculous speech”. With his speech, Saif “lost 
all credibility. People put him in the same category as his father” (Gheblawi 2013). According to 
Hassan al-Amin (2013), while Saif could have been a “viable” negotiator, he “[l]ost any chance for 
[the] West to have him in a solution.” Comments by Libyan Ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi 
(2013) further demonstrates the mixed, perhaps contradictory, sentiments regarding Saif's potential 
role: 
No one within the regime can negotiate. Everyone is afraid of Gaddafi. No one can 
represent Gaddafi. Saif could want to play a role. It was the first day. When he spoke on 
February 20. He should say something completely different if he wants to play a role. 
Unfortunately he said exactly what his father wants him to say. [It was] really a crazy 
man making a statement on the TV and it was completely against all the factors on the 
ground.  
 
 If it could be established that Saif was genuinely able and interested in brokering peace between 
the rebels and his father's regime, then there is an argument that his indictment by the ICC complicated 
the potential to establish peace by delegitimizing perhaps the only individual who could legitimately 
partake in a power-sharing agreement with the NTC. But the argument that Saif was truly committed to 
a peace process is dubious. Even after his initial speech, Saif made no public efforts to appear moderate 
or present himself as a potential player in a peace process. And, for one simple reason, it was not the 
ICC that drove Saif to lash out and side so vehemently with his father's regime: Saif's speech was made 
almost a week before the Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC. 
 As compelling as it is to think Saif was truly interested in a negotiated settlement, there is 
evidence that his commitment to the regime was solidified by a feeling of betrayal by Western forces. 
Indeed, Saif apparently told his friends: “We gave up our nukes and they screwed us.” (See Hastings 
2011). It was telling when Saif responded to the ICC's warrants against him by describing the 
institution as “a Mickey Mouse court” and, echoing his father, once again committed himself to a 
military victory and remaining in Libya:  
We live here, we die here, so we are very patient. We may win tomorrow, in one week 
or in one year, but one day we'll win. One day the French will go back to Corsica in 
France, the Italians will go back to Sicily in Italy, the Danish will go back to Denmark, 





The ICC's indictment had little effect on keeping Saif out of any potential negotiated transition. Rather, 
it was Saif's decision-making, his belligerent support for his father and his threats to Libyans which 
condemned his role in any potential peace process.  
 
(iv) The African Union  
The African Union was an obvious choice as a third-party mediator. While three member-states 
(Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which 
authorized NATO's intervention, the AU was not a member of the alliance of intervening states – even 
if some AU member states played active roles in the conflict (see de Waal 2013a, 365-379). A degree of 
trust between Gaddafi and some AU member-states could have been expected on the basis of Gaddafi's 
purchase of political support throughout the continent (see Vandewalle 2012, 194-198). Gaddafi 
counted Nelson Mandela amongst his close friends (see BBC 1999), and there existed a relationship 
with some African leaders to whom Gaddafi might listen (Roberts 2011).
  
As de Waal (2013b, 69) 
notes, “only African leaders could make the case to Gaddafi that he should both stop his assault on 
civilian populations and step down, with any credibility.” 
 The AU's greatest advantage, however, was also its gravest weakness. The close relationship of 
some of its member states and leaders to Libya meant that the African Union High-Level Panel also 
gave the widespread appearance of being a cynical move by governments indebted to Gaddafi: 
“Africa’s reluctant and qualified support for foreign intervention in Libya was explained as misguided 
historical loyalty at best, and hypocritical at worst” (Alberts 2011; see also Al Jazeera 2011e). 
Unsurprisingly, the rebels and the NTC never viewed the AU delegation as an impartial and trustworthy 
mediator. El Gallal insists that South Africa was a poor choice to mediate any negotiated settlement 
“because they were not neutral. They were with Gaddafi – they couldn't see the whole picture, so they 
couldn't do it.” (Gallal 2014). The selection of states to negotiate on behalf of the AU was also 
misguided, insofar as it was left to a select group of states, “many of which had, or appeared to have, 
specific political interests in the outcome.” (de Waal 2013b, 77). It thus made “sense [that] the dictator 
was eager to meet the AU leaders, while the [NTC] was cool toward the initiative.” (Barfi 2011). 
 The AU delegation was also hobbled by their lack of a clear and consistent position on the fate 
of Gaddafi. Its member-states were sharply divided and some of its members actively detested Gaddafi. 
The Libyan leader “had become at best out of step, and at worst loathed, by other African leaders. He 
was neither respected nor trusted, but barely tolerated.” (de Waal 2013b, 64). Some condemned the 
regime. Rwandan President Paul Kagame (2011), for example, drew a direct parallel between Gaddafi's 
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actions and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The lack of unity within the AU reached an apex when, in 
June 2011, some members of the AU mediation team gave up hope of getting an agreement that 
included a role for Gaddafi. Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz declared that 
“[w]hatever happens, there will be a negotiated solution, even later. In any case, [Gaddafi] can no 
longer lead Libya. His departure has become necessary... [Gaddafi] must be made to leave without 
causing more damage.” (See AFP 2011). Even though the AU insisted that it had convinced Gaddafi to 
step down from power, it was never able to fully clarify how this would happen and where Gaddafi 
would end up. 
 While the view that the AU offered to mediate a political settlement out of a sense of blind 
loyalty is simplistic and pejorative, it is also true that its mediation efforts were suspect from the outset. 
In its lack of unity and coherency regarding the fate of Gaddafi, the AU could not have successfully 
brought both parties to the negotiation table, let alone brokered a peaceful resolution to the conflict. At 
the same time, prospects for a settlement mediated by AU member-states certainly weren't helped by 
the lack of interest on the part of intervening NATO forces in the Union's mediation efforts.  
 
(v) The Intervening Forces 
Chorin (2013) maintains that the stalemate in the conflict produced a brief period when Western 
powers, especially the US, considered the possibility of a negotiated settlement: the “US was getting 
antsy just before Tripoli fell and was seriously contemplating [negotiated] solutions to the war... It 
seems like there was a period from June – early August where US was willing to consider some kind of 
negotiated solution or compromise. Things weren't going anywhere but worse.” But was NATO willing 
and able to negotiate a settlement? 
 The inclination of NATO member states to avoid becoming engulfed in a military stalemate was 
clear and there is no evidence to suggest that it was disingenuous. From the outset, key member-states 
– particularly the US – had expressed hesitation towards participating in 'another Middle East war', 
especially one that might result in putting troops 'on the ground' (Hastings 2011; see also Chesterman 
2011). There is also little reason to doubt that, amongst at least some NATO states, there was an interest 
in keeping the potential of a negotiated settlement between the NTC and the Gaddafi regime alive. 
Still, this interest did not amount to any concerted or consistent effort to find a negotiated solution. 
Indeed, with the exception of Turkey's attempts to broker negotiations with its two-stage “roadmap”, 
there is no evidence that NATO member states achieved anything more than preliminary talks about 
talks. Moreover, no NATO state retracted or softened the pre-condition that the Gaddafis be completely 
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removed from power, hindering potential negotiations.  
 There is little-to-no evidence that the states that eventually intervened in Libya took a 
negotiated settlement seriously prior to authorizing military intervention. Ahmed Gebreel (2013), who 
worked with the NTC during the revolution, maintains that an opportunity to resolve the war through 
peaceful means was lost:  
I think it was a window of opportunity during the conflict, especially in the first few 
months to end the conflict and reach a peaceful solution that serves the whole country. 
But some countries, especially the European countries – France and the United 
Kingdom and the United States – were not willing to support any peace process and 
they were determined to overthrow Gaddafi's regime by force. 
 
At the same time, intervening states showed no interest in working with, or lending support to, the AU 
initiatives. In fact, NATO states undermined the AU's initiatives by leaving the AU out of the Libya 
Contact Group (de Waal 2013b, 68). As de Waal (ibid., 67) writes, “the U.S., France and Britain were 
following a different track, and driving UN policy... Sarkozy [for example] had no patience for the AU 
and its diplomatic approach.” (See also Roberts 2011). This is also borne out in comments from 
Gebreel (2013), who observed that:  
When [the] African Union visited and tried to negotiate a peaceful solution to broker a 
peaceful solution with the two parties, some countries that had participated in air strikes 
didn't just not support [the AU initiative] but threatened, behind [closed] doors to 
withdraw their support to the opposition if they accepted intervention by the African 
Union. They were not willing at all to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict.”  
 
Having refused to take AU's efforts seriously, it is difficult to argue that there was any interest amongst 
NATO states for a political solution. 
 The intervening states' intimated interest in a potential peaceful resolution to the war did not 
have the effect of igniting peace talks. But it did send a clear signal to the Libyan opposition and their 
military backers in Qatar and elsewhere that NATO support was limited and that it was a matter of 
urgency that the military stalemate be broken. The rebels heeded that warning. Just weeks after the 
suggestion that Gaddafi might be negotiated with, Tripoli fell. Within four months, Gaddafi was killed 




This chapter examined the effects of the ICC on four key dynamics which affected the potential to 
resolve the Libyan civil war through peace negotiations: the narratives and understandings of the 
conflict itself; the attitudes and incentives of the rebels, the NTC and Gaddafi towards peace 
negotiations; mediation strategies and the role and fate of Gaddafi in a post-conflict settlement; and the 
potential of a ripe moment for peace talks.  
 The most evident effect of the ICC was its impact on shaping the narratives and understandings 
of the Libyan war. The Court's intervention contributed to an understanding of the conflict as a war of 
'good' rebels versus a 'evil' and 'criminal' Gaddafi regime; it helped to justify the goal of regime change; 
and it obfuscated both the causes of the conflict as well as the West's political rehabilitation of the 
Gaddafi regime in the years preceding the war. These effects on the conflict's narrative, in turn, had 
implications on other dynamics, notably on reinforcing the opposition’s claim that Gaddafi's departure 
from power was a necessary precondition to any negotiated settlement and encouraging their insistence 
to secure a military victory. As a result, it may have contributed to preventing the emergence of a 
mutually hurting stalemate and ripe moment for peace talks, adding fuel to the regime’s insistence to 
continue fighting.  
 But the effects of the ICC on the conflict should not be overstated. The dynamics of conflict 
were also deeply influenced by the military intervention by NATO. Moreover, there is little evidence 
that the ICC's intervention affected Gaddafi's attitude towards entering peace negotiations, the 
defection of key regime officials, or the possible mediation strategies aimed at resolving Gaddafi's fate. 
 While the ICC may have “raised the barriers” (Martin 2013) to a negotiated solution by 
bolstering the resolve of the rebels, the above analysis of the internal positions, attitudes and behaviour 
of key actors makes clear that a peace settlement was never a feasible option to ending the civil war in 
Libya – for reasons other than the ICC's intervention. If attempts to achieve a peaceful solution were 
either fundamentally flawed or disingenuous, then the ICC can't be said to be responsible for a failed 
political settlement to the war.
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Chapter 7 - Justice after the Revolution: The ICC and Post-Gaddafi Libya 
 
Libyans will likely find that winning the war was the easy part. It is not the war but the 




The second research question of this thesis asks what the effects of ICC interventions are on peace, 
conflict and justice processes. In the case of Libya, there have been various post-conflict justice 
processes on which the ICC could potentially have had an effect – directly and via its contribution to 
the conflict narrative. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the conflict narrative and the manner in which a 
conflict ended would both shape the decision-making of states regarding post-conflict justice and 
accountability. This is certainly true of post-Gaddafi Libya, where the limits of the ICC's ability to 
positively influence post-conflict accountability have been on display.  
 Vandewalle (2012, 207) observed that a negotiated settlement to the Libyan civil war 
“represented perhaps the most promising path for the future of the country, and certainly would 
minimize – but not eliminate – the dislocations and potential infighting some of the other scenarios 
entailed.” However, such a settlement was not to be. Instead, with the backing of NATO, the Libyan 
opposition achieved an outright military victory. Consequently, there were no negotiated post-conflict 
justice mechanisms to implement. The country's approach to justice can be described as one-sided, 
selective, victor's justice and an extension of how the conflict ended. As Ian Martin (2013) the former 
head of the UN Mission to Libya argues, victor's justice is the almost inevitable product of any conflict 
that concludes with regime change.  
 The ICC's effects and impact on post-conflict Libya have primarily been the result of what it 
has not done rather than what it has: not prosecuting alleged crimes committed by Libyan rebels during 
the civil war and, consequently, not challenging the dominant post-conflict narrative of one-sided 
justice. The Court's inability to hold accountable those it indicted or affect the achievement of justice 
for other international crimes committed in Libya has been compounded by the prominence of the 
Libya's conflict narrative, the rebels' one-sided military victory and the continued dominance of rebel 
militias, or 'thuwar', intent on punishing and, in some cases, purging figures associated with the 
Gaddafi regime. Post-conflict Libya has consequently been characterized by furious and, at times, 
violent demands for revenge against Gaddafi supporters in combination with a belief that those who 
had participated in the regime's demise should be protected from accountability for crimes committed 
during the conflict. The conflict narrative, bolstered by NATO’s military intervention and the ICC’s 
judicial intervention, was about purging Gaddafi and his supporters. So too has been the narrative of 
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post-conflict Libya. The ongoing violence in Libya, the lack of justice for international crimes and the 
judicial mechanisms introduced since the end of the civil war expose the limitations of the ICC to 
produce positive effects on impartial justice and peace.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section examines the debate of who should try the 
two surviving ICC indictees – Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi. It delves into the debate 
about where they should be tried, focusing on the Office of the Prosecutor's position supporting 
Tripoli's intentions to prosecute Saif and Senussi in Libya by Libyans and the failure of the Prosecutor 
to explore options other than a trial by the ICC in The Hague or a trial by Libyans in Tripoli. This is 
where the ICC should have the most direct effect. However, the ICC has been unable to ensure that Saif 
or Senussi are brought to justice – in Libya or The Hague. Section two examines non-investigated 
international crimes committed by Libya's opposition forces, focusing on the cleansing of Tawergha 
and the killing of Gaddafi. The analysis makes it clear that the ICC has been unable to positively affect 
the pursuit of justice in Libya or the maintenance of peace. The final section examines two 'transitional 
justice' mechanisms implemented by Libya: a blanket amnesty for revolutionaries and the Political 
Isolation Law. This section demonstrates that the post-conflict narrative, bolstered by the ICC's 




I. Trying Saif and Senussi - In Libya or The Hague?  
The most direct impact of the ICC on debates about justice in post-Gaddafi Libya has been on the fight 
over the fate of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, who the Court viewed as Libya's “de facto prime minister”, and 
Abdullah al-Senussi (see The Prosecutor v Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi 2011). Libya 
has not ignored the question of accountability. Rather, it has engaged with the ICC since the end of the 
war with the intention of having the Court endorse its aim of prosecuting Saif and Senussi in Libya, by 
Libyans. This section examines the role and impact of the ICC on the debate over where Libya's two 
remaining ICC indictees should be tried.  
 During the concluding phases of the war, Saif attempt to flee Libya. In October, Moreno-
Ocampo suggested that Saif had contacted the Court, via intermediaries, to discuss his potential 
surrender (Chulov and Smith 2011). It was also reported that mercenaries were seeking to move Saif to 
a non-ICC state (ibid.; see also Moreno-Ocampo 2011, 3). Saif, however, later claimed that Moreno-
Ocampo's statement was “all lies” and that he'd “never been in touch with them.” (see Gumuchian 
2011). It remains unclear whether these calls were actually made or not or by whom. Regardless, on the 
night of 19 November 2011, a small convoy carrying Saif was stopped by a group of rebels from Zintan 
near Obari (ibid.). The rebels arrested Saif and, on 20 November 2011, Saif and his captors landed in 
Zintan where they were met by impassioned crowds. Saif was taken to an unknown location in the city. 
An NTC spokesperson greeted Saif’s capture by declaring that it marked the “final act of the Libyan 
drama.” (See Gumuchian 2011). In many respects, however, the drama was just beginning.  
 While Saif has been held by the Zintani militia that captured him ever since, his uncle and 
fellow ICC indictee, Abdullah al-Senussi, was eventually captured and surrendered to Libyan 
authorities in September 2012. Little is known about Senussi other than the outline of a shadowy career 
owed to his personal proximity to Gaddafi. Senussi was a key member of Gaddafi's most trusted circle 
of advisors, serving as both Libya's external and internal intelligence chief. As one observer suggests, 
“Senussi's association with the worst excesses of the Libyan regime stretch back to the early days of 
Col. Gaddafi's dictatorial rule.” (See Sherlock 2011). Senussi is widely believed to bear responsibility 
for the infamous 1996 Abu Salim Massacre an the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. Due to his intimate 
knowledge of the internal machinations of Gaddafi's rule, Senussi has been described as the regime's 
“black box” (Hilsum 2012a). Because of his position as the gate-keeper of the regime's secrets, 
Geoffrey Robertson (2011a) called Senussi the “crown jewel” of justice in Libya. The ICC issued an 
arrest warrant against Senussi as an “indirect perpetrator” of two counts of crimes against humanity – 
murder and persecution – pertaining to his role in crushing the Libyan uprising.  
186 
 
 In March 2012 it was confirmed that Senussi had been arrested in a joint operation between 
French and Mauritanian officials in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Senussi was subsequently held in a luxury 
villa, treatment which, according to an official, indicated that “Senussi has protectors in high places” in 
Mauritania (Mark 2012). It was reported that intelligence officials from numerous states, primarily 
from the West, interrogated Senussi while in detention (See Hilsum 2012a; Prieur 2012; RNW 2012b). 
Senussi's arrest triggered a “three-way custody battle” (Mark 2012) and “extradition race” (Hirsch 
2012) between Libya, France and the ICC. France had long sought custody of Senussi for his role in the 
1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772 in which 170 passengers, including 54 French citizens, perished. It 
maintained that its role in capturing Senussi gave it a privileged position in requesting that Senussi be 
surrendered to France (Prieur and al Shachi 2012). 
 In the wake of Senussi’s arrest, Libya sent a delegation, headed by then Deputy Prime Minister 
Mustafa Abu Shagour, to persuade Mauritania to extradite Senussi (RNW 2012a).
 
Despite periodic 
statements by Libyan authorities that Senussi would be extradited to Libya (Al Arabiya 2012), it was 
only in early September 2012 that Senussi was extradited to Libya “on the basis of guarantees given by 
the Libyan authorities”. (See Harding and Black 2012). Senussi's transfer reportedly cost Libya $200 
million (see Sydow 2012). 
 It was always unlikely that the ICC would gain custody over Senussi. David Bosco (2012) 
argued that “[p]acking their prize catch off to the Hague [sic] will earn the country a slap on the back 
from Human Rights Watch, but probably little else.” Notably, Mauritania is not a member-state of the 
ICC and, while UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011) “urged” the international community to cooperate with 
the Court, Mauritania had no clear legal obligation to surrender Senussi to the ICC. Whether or not 
such an obligation existed, however, is irrelevant given that the OTP showed no interest in obtaining 
custody of Senussi. The OTP was lackadaisical. On a visit to Libya, Moreno-Ocampo made it clear that 
his office had made no contact with Mauritanian authorities to request Senussi's surrender and declared 
that the NTC was entitled to request Senussi's extradition to Libya (see Libya Herald 2012). Libya, it 
seemed, would be allowed to proceed with Senussi and Saif as they wished. Moreno-Ocampo would 
not demand that they be transferred to the ICC. 
 The debate on where to try Saif and Senussi began as early as August 2011, when the collapse 
of the regime was inevitable and the prospect of prosecuting senior Libyan officials became a real 
possibility (see, e.g., Bosco 2011; Jillions 2011).
 
The debate has been characterized by a polarizing 
battle between proponents of trying Saif and Senussi in Libya on the one hand, and those who believe 
that only the ICC can do so impartially and legitimately, on the other. Within these camps, however, is a 
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rather curious constellation of actors. Predictably, Libyan authorities have made clear their intentions to 
try Saif on Libyan soil with Libyan judges while international human rights NGOs have generally 
insisted that Gaddafi's son be tried in The Hague (see, e.g, Amnesty International 2011b; 
Parliamentarians for Global Action 201). However, the OTP acquiesced to Libya's claims to try Saif 
and Senussi, while others, including the ICC's Office of Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) has 
vociferously worked to demonstrate that a fair trial in Libya is all but impossible.   
 From the outset, the NTC maintained that Saif and Senussi would be tried in Libya. Doing so, 
they argued, was essential to re-establishing the country as a sovereign member of the international 
community. In October 2011, a month prior to the arrest of Saif, Colonel Ahmed Bani, the military 
spokesman for Libya's interim rulers stated: 
We will not accept that our sovereignty be violated like that... We will prove to the 
world that we are a civilised people with a fair justice system. Libya has its rights and 
its sovereignty and we will exercise them. (See Chulov 2011). 
 
This position was reiterated by other Libyan officials. In April 2012, the government again declared 
that trying Saif (and Senussi) was “a matter of the highest national importance, not only in bringing 
justice for the Libyan people but also in demonstrating that the new Libyan justice system is capable of 
conducting fair trials (that meet all applicable international standards) in complex cases.” (See CNN 
2012).  
 At the same time, a trial of Saif and Senussi has been perceived in Libya as a crowning moment 
for the Revolution: “The Libyan government has adopted the same defiant stance, vowing to try the 
men on Libyan soil as testament to the country’s successful transition from dictatorship to democracy.” 
(see Hauslohner 2013). There is also a concern that Saif could be found innocent or even released after 
serving a short sentence if tried at the ICC, the result of a combination of the relatively minor charges 
against him at the ICC, his young age (42 years-old as of writing) and the possibility of a relatively 
lenient sentence. Robertson (2011b) has argued that if tried at the ICC, “Saif has the makings of an 
arguable defense... [H]is conviction on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt would by no means 
be a foregone conclusion.” 
 Libya may need to convict and punish Saif and Senussi as a means to see the conflict – and its 
narrative – through. According to the Libya Working Group, an assembly of experts on Libya, it would 
be politically impossible for the Libyan government to allow Saif to receive an innocent verdict 
because it would be seen to “betray the revolution” (see Chatham House 2012a, 3). And the revolution 
and the conflict narrative was, above all, about ridding Libya of the Gaddafi regime and family. Libya's 
insistence on trying Saif and Senussi should thus be understood within the context of prevalent fears 
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that surrendering Saif or Senussi to the ICC could undermine the revolution and potentially destabilize 
the country by incensing the country's militias.  
 This has not prevented concerns regarding the impartiality of Libya's justice system from being 
raised. But despite these, the OTP has generally sided with Libya's insistence to try Saif and Senussi 
itself, a leniency that is unprecedented. During his November 2011 visit to Tripoli, Moreno-Ocampo 
capitulated to the inevitability of the NTC's demands to try Saif: 
The standard of the ICC is that it has to be a judicial process that is not organised to 
shield the suspect… and I respect that it’s important for the cases to be tried in Libya… 
and I am not competing for the case. (See BBC 2012a). 
 
Rather than holding up the orthodox standard of complementarity, whereby a state has to convince ICC 
judges that it is actively able and willing to prosecute the same individuals for the same crimes, the 
Prosecutor's office seems to have calculated that it is best positioned to argue that it contributed 
positively to Libya's pursuit of accountability.
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 There are a number of plausible reasons for this 
leniency. 
 First, the OTP's position can be seen as means of paying respect to the obvious interest and 
willingness of Libyans – not just the government – to mete out justice themselves. As some members 
of the OTP (e.g. confidential interview 2013f) have pointed out, there is a strong sense of “national 
pride” regarding the trials. In this context, denying that Libya has any right to investigate or prosecute 
Saif or Senussi outright may be tantamount to declaring that Libya's interest and efforts are irrelevant. 
It could also mean losing any hope of contributing to or positively influencing potential proceedings. 
In other words, siding against Libya would reaffirm the view that no state which emerges from decades 
of autocratic rule, where an independent judiciary is non-existent, can be judged able and willing to 
prosecute key figures itself. In such contexts, the state will be expected to simply 'flip' individuals 
indicted by the ICC over to The Hague at the earliest possible opportunity. If the state refuses, the 
country risks being judged in contravention of its obligations under international law and castigated by 
the international human rights community. There is a risk of conflating the previous, autocratic regime 
with the new transitional one. But as one observer commented, “Libya continues in this appeal process 
to prove that it wants to be part of the international community. The old Libya would not have 
bothered.” (See Al Shalchi 2013).  
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It should be noted that, in response to Libya's admissibility challenge, the OTP has expressed concern 




 Fred Abrahams (2013) of Human Rights Watch suggests that the ICC's stance is “coming from 
a few things: a legitimate, genuine and helpful view towards complementarity (let's give the Libyans a 
chance to do it); the other is more problematic – whether they fear that they don't have the case, that 
they don't have the goods.” As suggested above, it is not a given that the OTP would be able to 
successfully convict Saif. The Libya Working Group noted in February 2012 that “[t]here is 
speculation that the ICC does not want Saif to be put on trial in The Hague as they do not have a strong 
case against him.” (See Chatham House 2012b, 6). Others suggest that the ICC's performance may 
undermine the perception that it would be an effective tool for bringing Libyan perpetrators to justice. 
Ghazi Geblawi (2013) argues that “people know [the] ICC doesn't have a strong record. They fear that 
they will get away with it but people are not ambiguous – they have a verdict in their mind that they 
are guilty.” 
 Timothy William Waters (2011) has argued, alternatively and persuasively, that Moreno-
Ocampo's acquiescence was a pragmatic response aimed at ensuring the cooperation of Libyan 
authorities so as “to have any hope of influencing the process.” In this context, it is important to note 
that the ICC has received scant support from the UN Security Council which set the ICC's intervention 
in Libya in motion (see Arbour 2014; Kersten 2014c). The Council has appeared largely uninterested in 
the pursuit of post-Gaddafi accountability, periodically reaffirming that the ICC and Libya should 
cooperate but that it is ultimately up to Libya to decide the fate of Saif and Senussi. Some have even 
suggested that the OTP has faced diplomatic pressure to not alienate Libya by pushing for the two ICC 
indictees to be surrendered (see Bosco 2014, 170). The ultimate effect of the international community's 
lack of interest in having Gaddafi's son and former spy chief surrendered to the ICC has been the 
endorsement of Libya's intent to prosecute them (see Lynch 2011; McGreal 2012). Without political 
will from powerful states, demands by the OTP to have Saif or Senussi surrendered would be futile. 
This lack of political support serves to limit the capacity of the ICC to affect post-conflict justice in 
Libya and has shaped the OTP's position towards accountability in Libya.  
 Not long after the civil war concluded, the OTP shifted its focus away from seeking custody of 
Saif or Senussi towards framing the Court's role in Libya as contributing to “positive complementarity” 
(confidential interview 2013f; see also Stahn 2011). In this context, Moreno-Ocampo argued that “the 
ICC is still providing an important service, because we will ensure justice in Libya, whoever will do 
it.” (See Papenfuss 2012). Moreno-Ocampo, moreover, appeared on numerous occasions with NTC 
leaders, reaffirming the perception that his role is to provide support, rather than compete with, Libya. 
More recently, current Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda declared that trying Saif and Senussi in Libya 
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could represent the country's “Nuremberg moment”, implying that Libya should conduct the trials in 
Libya and reap its benefits – “seal the primacy of the rule of law, due process and human rights for 
future generations” (see UN News Centre 2014). She has also declared that the Court would continue 
to “work with the Government in trying to address as many cases as possible” and that “Libya through 
its active involvement in related proceedings before the Court is setting an example of how States can 
invoke complementarity to protect their sovereign right to investigate and prosecute their nationals.” 
(see Seventh Report of the Prosecutor 2014; Statement of the Prosecutor 2014b). Emphasizing the 
Court's role in positively influencing domestic trials may, as Waters suggests, reflect a pragmatic 
decision on the part of the OTP. Claiming some responsibility for bringing both Saif and Senussi to 
justice in Libya by couching arguments in the rhetoric of positive complementarity may soften the 
blow – and deflect criticism – of the ICC appearing impotent in contributing to accountability in Libya. 
Indeed, it seems self-evident that the Court would be criticized and blamed if the OTP consistently 
demanded that Saif and Senussi be surrendered to The Hague, only to be actively ignored by Libya.  
 The attitude of the OTP has not been shared by all organs of the Court. The Office of Public 
Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) has sought to ensure that Saif and Senussi be tried in The Hague. In 
doing so, the OPCD has questioned the Prosecution's acquiescence to Libya's demands to prosecute 
Saif and Senussi on a number of occasions. Just days after Saif's arrest, on 28 November 2011, the 
OPCD asserted that the OTP was employing double-standards with regards to its conception of 
complementarity and was “applying a more relaxed standard in the present case due to the apparent 
coalescence of Prosecution and State interests.” (See OPCD Request 2011, 5). The OPCD also took 
issue with Moreno-Ocampo's public comments and appearances with members of the NTC which, as 
noted above, gave the impression that the Court had sided with Libya and wasn't interested in 
prosecuting rebel crimes. In May 2012, the OPCD filed a motion with the ICC's Appeals Chamber to 
disqualify Moreno-Ocampo from the Libyan case due to “an objective appearance that the Prosecutor is 
affiliated with both the political cause and legal positions of the NTC government.” (See Request to 
Disqualify 2012, 4)
.
 While the motion was ultimately unsuccessful, just four days before the end of 
Moreno-Ocampo's tenure at the Court, the Appeals Chamber (2012, 17) issued a scathing ruling which 
claimed that the Prosecutor's 
behaviour was clearly inappropriate in light of the presumption of innocence. Such 
behaviour not only reflects poorly on the Prosecutor but also, given that the Prosecutor 
is an elected official of the Court and that his statements are often imputed to the Court 
as whole, may lead observers to question the integrity of the Court as a whole. 
 
 On 1 May 2012, Libya filed an admissibility challenge with the ICC regarding the case of Saif 
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and, on 2 April 2013, Libya filed a similar admissibility challenge regarding Senussi. Their application 
affirmed that the Libyan government had an interest in having the ICC and the international community 
endorse Libya's efforts at achieving retributive justice. The Libyan government argued that it was 
actively investigating and willing to prosecute Saif and Senussi and that, under the principle of 
complementarity underpinning the Court, the ICC had an obligation to rule in favour of Libya's 
admissibility challenge. Specifically, Libya argued that (See Application on Behalf of the Government 
of Libya 2012, 3). The fact that, while an admissibility challenge was ongoing, Libya had a legal 
obligation to surrender Saif and Senussi to the ICC was largely neglected.  
 At the same time, Libya sought to publicly demonstrate its preparations to try Saif. It unveiled a 
refurbished courtroom in Tripoli (Al Shalchi 2012) and a prison for Saif, described as having 
“luxurious conditions, [and] which will include a private mosque, personal chef, 24-hour medical cover 
and satellite television.” (Stephen 2012b). Still, despite numerous pronouncements suggesting that Saif 
would be transferred from Zintan to his personal prison in Tripoli, the Libyan government has been 
unable to attain custody of Gaddafi's son, significantly complicating its ability to claim that it is 
“actively” investigating and able to prosecute Saif. The OPCD (Public Redacted Version of the 
Corrigendum 2012, 80-82)
 
and legal scholars (Heller 2012) have put this argument forward in claiming 
that Libya's admissibility challenge had to be rejected. 
 It became clear that the key to the admissibility challenges was not the quality or nature of 
justice that Saif or Senussi would face but whether Libya could demonstrate that it had custody of the 
accused. As Alex Whiting, a former prosecutor at the OTP, insisted: “The big issue is that [Saif is] not 
under the control of the government. That's the thing that's so odd about the Saif case. If that could be 
solved, it would be a big win-win for everybody -- the Libyan government, Libyan people, the ICC, 
international community, and the international criminal justice project. If the government gets its hands 
on the guy and does a reasonably fair trial of him, that would be an incredible victory. Nobody loses.” 
(See Caryl 2013).  
 With Senussi in the detention of the Libyan government and Tripoli having begun proceedings 
against the former intelligence chief, the judges in Pre-Trial Chamber 1 ruled that the case against al-
Senussi was inadmissible before the ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision 2013a). The Chamber found 
that “the same case against Mr Al-Senussi that is before the Court is currently subject to domestic 
proceedings being conducted by the competent authorities of Libya - which has jurisdiction over the 
case - and that Libya is not unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out its proceedings in relation to the 
case” (ibid., p 151). In response, one of Libya's legal representatives declared that the ruling 
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“vindicates the efforts it [the Libyan government] has made to give effect to the principle of 
complementarity, which allows Libya to conduct the trial of Mr Senussi if it satisfies the court, as it has 
done, that it can conduct a fair trial.” (see BBC 2013). 
 Libya was unable to replicate their success with the admissibility challenge in Saif's case. 
Tripoli's failure to gain custody of Saif ensured that the admissibility challenge failed. On 31 May 
2013, ICC judges ruled that Saif's case was admissible before the Court since Libya was unable to 
prosecute Saif so long as he remained outside the custody of Libyan authorities: 
the Chamber is of the view that its national system cannot yet be applied in full in areas 
or aspects relevant to the case, being thus “unavailable” within the terms of article 
17(3) of the Statute. As a consequence, Libya is “unable to obtain the accused” and the 
necessary testimony and is also “otherwise unable to carry out [the] proceedings” in the 
case against Mr Gaddafi in compliance with its national laws, in accordance with the 
same provision. (Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision 2013b, 84-85). 
 
In response, Libya's Justice Minister declared “[w]e will give what is needed to convince the ICC that 
Libya is capable of conducting a fair trial in accordance with international standards.” (see Gumuchian 
and Shennib 2013). 
 Libyan authorities were given a 'long leash' to demonstrate that they could, in fact, bring Saif 
into custody. Saif was eventually put before judges in Tripoli – along with a dozen other senior figures, 
including Senussi – but via videolink (Stephen 2014). After almost a year of deliberation by the ICC's 
Appeals Chamber, Libya's appeal of the admissibility challenge was rejected (see The Appeals 
Chamber Judgement 2014). Saif remains in Zintan. And the Zintani brigade has benefitted from 
leveraging its custody of their prized prisoner. Indeed, Zintani Defense Minister, Osama al-Juwali's 
surprise appointment to his post was linked to the political leveraging of Zintan's custody of Saif 
(Stephen and Harding 2011). 
 The polarizing battle between proponents of a trial in Libya versus those advocating a trial in 
The Hague obfuscated legal and political options where the interests of both the ICC and the Libyan 
government could have been met. Two distinct options existed which could have satisfied the interests 
of both the ICC and Libya: an in situ trial and a sequencing of trials. Neither were sufficiently explored, 
helping to reaffirm the dichotomous debate over where the trial should be held. More importantly, it 
has had the effect of leaving the pursuit and narrative of post-conflict justice in Libya outside of the 
realm of compromise and the ICC unable to positively influence the prosecutions of Saif and Senussi.  
 Under Article 3(3), the Rome Statute envisages the possibility of the Court holding an in situ 
trial, to international standards, outside of The Hague “whenever [the Court] considers it desirable”. 
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The potential of holding trials away from The Hague has been explored by the ICC in both the DRC 
and Kenya. Such trials have numerous advantages: being in close proximity to the victims, witnesses 
and evidence; greater facility in demonstrating that justice was achieved; contributing to the building of 
the rule of law in Libya by training Libyan lawyers and providing a material legacy; and maintaining 
international criminal justice, due process and human rights standards (see Kaye 2011; Kersten 
2011a).
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 The latter point was particularly salient amidst growing concerns that Libyan authorities 
would invoke the death penalty against regime officials (see Reuters 2011b).  
 The OTP initially saw the option of an in situ trial favourably and presented it to the NTC 
during a visit in November 2011 to discuss the fate of Saif. ICC spokesperson, Fadi El Abdallah, 
suggested that a trial by ICC judges in Libya was indeed a viable option (see Murphy 2011) and the 
OTP subsequently reported that it had offered such an option to the NTC (see Office of the Prosecutor 
2011). Holding an in situ trial in Tripoli (or perhaps even Zintan) could have satisfied the need for 
Libya and Libyans to retain their sovereignty, demonstrate a commitment to international law and to 
fair trials standards, and achieve retribution against Saif and Senussi. The ICC would have been able to 
avoid being left 'empty-handed' and demonstrate that it was willing and able to be politically sensitive 
and bolster the intentions of Libya to see justice served where the crimes occurred. Nevertheless, the 
NTC rejected the possibility of an in situ trial and stated that it would only accept a trial in Libya, by 
Libyan judges (see Stephen 2012a). Rather than defending the option of an in situ trial, endorsing 
compromise over competition and presenting its benefits to the Libyan public, the possibility of an ICC 
trial in Libya appears to have been subsequently ignored by the OTP. 
 During their November meeting, the Prosecutor also suggested that the ICC and the NTC could 
sequence prosecutions. Sequencing, envisioned under Article 94 of the Rome Statute, would have 
entailed Libya trying Saif and Senussi and subsequently transferring them to the ICC to be tried over 
the alleged crimes outlined in their indictment (or vice versa) (see Stahn 2012, 325-349). The 
sequencing of trials could have been “settled on a negotiated basis, i.e. through consultation and 
agreement” (ibid., 340). Importantly, the trial at the ICC would have given time for Libya to stabilize 
the country and build an independent judiciary capable of subsequently trying Saif and Senussi 
domestically for crimes beyond the ICC's warrant against them (Robertson 2011b). Moreover, 
sequencing could have ensured that alleged crimes committed before and after 15 February 2011 were 
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investigated and prosecuted. Again, however, sequencing was ignored after the NTC rejected it as a 
feasible compromise. 
 Of course, neither an in situ trial nor a sequencing of trials are risk-free options. There would be 
obvious concerns regarding the security of judges, staff and witnesses. In order to effectively sequence 
the trials, Libya's use of the death penalty would have had to be addressed. Otherwise, in the words of 
former Ambassador Miles (2013), the country “might have to send the head and the body separately.” 
Nevertheless, sequencing and holding an 'in situ' trial were real options which could foreseeably have 
avoided the current animosity between parties over the fate of Saif and Senussi by potentially satisfying 
the interests of all actors involved – not to mention the interests of justice.  
 While Libya may not have ever looked upon any option other than a local trial favourably, the 
ICC itself had very little leverage to push Libyan authorities towards compromise. During the conflict, 
the Court did very little to communicate or demonstrate its work locally or to establish any kind of 
local presence (see Chatham House 2011, 10). Without having done any on-the-ground investigations 
during the uprising or civil war, the ICC appeared alien: “People... did not understand why, for 
example, the BBC was in Libya but the ICC was not.” (See remarks by Elham Saudi, ibid.).  
 It was thus inevitable that Libyans would be hesitant to surrender their prized prisoners to a 
Court that had a minimal presence during their struggle against Gaddafi. But there should be no 
confusion: the polarizing nature of the debate regarding where to try Saif and Senussi was not 
inevitable. It was an extension of the OTP, international human rights groups and the international 
community not effectively communicating the existence of other options. As Elham Saudi, Director of 
Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), added:  
It is not an either or of having a trial in The Hague or a trial in Libya. There's a 
multitude of options in between as well and that's where the education is lacking and  
the ICC is failing because they have an active responsibility and a positive duty to 
inform Libyans of all their options and to assist them in achieving those options. (See 
BBC 4 2012). 
 
These alternative options were not sufficiently explored. While the Libyan government has sought the 
ICC's approval to prosecute Saif and Senussi, the lack of interest in compromise solutions has allowed 
the post-conflict narrative of purging and punishing anyone associated with the Gaddafi regime to 
consolidate – and flourish. And the Court has been left unable to positively influence bringing Saif or 
Senussi to justice. 
  
A minimal expectation of the Court should be that it seeks to prosecute those it indicts or that, when it 
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does not, the situation state does so itself. This expectation has not been met and the Court has not been 
able to positively influence Libya's ability to prosecute Saif or Senussi. In other words, the OTP's 
pursuit of “positive complementarity” in Libya has failed. Libya has experienced a return to a state of 
political violence so severe that, in July and August 2014, the UN, along with numerous embassies and 
aid groups pulled their staff out of the country (see IRIN 2014). In a statement to the UN Security 
Council in July 2014, Libya's Foreign Minister, Mohamed Abdelaziz declared that the country suffers 
ongoing instability, the absence of a functioning judiciary and that “you cannot talk about democratic 
institutions and democratic transformation in the absence of a humane, effective and strong criminal 
justice system” (see Mohamed Abdelaziz 2014). In this context, it is difficult to see how the ICC has or 





II. The Limits of Justice: Impunity for Opposition Crimes 
The ICC has had no discernible effect on accountability for crimes committed by Libyan opposition 
forces during the civil war. On the contrary, clear cases where investigation and prosecution is 
warranted have been generally ignored by the Court and the Libyan government. In December 2011, 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya concluded that “war crimes and crimes against 
humanity were committed by rebels, or thuwar, and that breaches of international human rights law 
continue to occur in a climate of impunity.” (see Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya 2012, 197).  
 The clearest case for an ICC investigation is the forced expulsion of Tawergha by the Misratan 
rebels in retaliation for the Tawerghan's allegiance to Gaddafi. Kevin Jon Heller (forthcoming) has 
suggested that “[i]t is at least arguable that the Misratan thuwar committed genocide against the 
Tawerghans.” Heller's view is supported by assertions, cited in the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya, that the Misratan rebels openly declared that Tawergha deserved “to be wiped off the face of 
the planet.” (See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya 2012, 130). With regards 
to the expulsion of Tawerghans, they added that “[t]he Misrata thuwar have killed, arbitrarily arrested 
and tortured Tawerghans across Libya. The destruction of Tawergha has been done to render it 
uninhabitable.” (See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya 2012, 13; see also 
Kafala 2011). Despite assertions that it may still investigate events in of Tawergha, no official 
investigation has taken place (see, e.g., The Office of the Prosecutor 2014, 5). On the contrary, the 
Misratan militia received praise from then Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo during a visit to a 
museum commemorating the revolution: 
I am honored to visit this museum. It is showing the courage and determination of 
Misrata people. They freed the city, the country and are an example for the world. The 
office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court will present a case exposing 
the responsibility of those who ordered all these crimes. [Signed -] The Prosecutor with 
great admiration for Misrata.54 
  
 The killing of Muammar Gaddafi also warranted investigation and prosecution as a potential 
war crime. However, to date no one has been held responsible for the Colonel's death. Libya's interim 
Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril was quick to declare that Gaddafi had been killed in cross-fire between 
regime loyalists and rebel fighters. Most, including members of Libya's NTC, however, asserted that he 
was killed by the rebels as an act of vengeance (Gaynor and Zargoun 2011) and Libya's chief 
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pathologist reported that the cause of death had been a bullet to the head.  
 Gaddafi's death marked the end of the civil war. Informed of Gaddafi's demise, US Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton joked: “we came, we saw, he died.” (See Corbett 2011). But, in calling for an 
investigation into the circumstances leading to Gaddafi's death, Christof Heyns, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions declared that “[t]he Geneva conventions 
are very clear that when prisoners are taken they may not be executed wilfully and if that was the case 
[with Gaddafi] then we are dealing with a war crime.” (see Al Jazeera 2011g). Navi Pillay, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights also called for an investigation (see Cumming-Bruce 2011). On 
the ground, the attitudes could not have been more divergent. Many Libyans articulated a sense of 
relief that Gaddafi was dead and appeared baffled by the subsequent debate and international concern. 
One Libyan remarked: “I don't care, so long as he's dead.” (Walt 2011; see also Black 2011b). Some, 
however, expressed regret was that Gaddafi had not been put on trial. As one Libyan lawyer declared: 
“I was sorry that his life ended so easily. He should have been brought to justice and faced the families 
who suffered.” (see Black 2011b). Jibril similarly stated that “I wish [Col Gaddafi] was alive. I want to 
know why he did this to the Libyan people. I wish I were his prosecutor in his trial.” (see BBC 2011i). 
NTC leader Mustafa Abdel-Jalil was more stern, declaring that “[t]hose who have an interest in killing 
him before prosecuting him are those who had an active role with him.” (See Gamal 2011). 
 Bowing to international pressure, the NTC set up a committee to investigate Gaddafi's death. To 
date, however, nothing has come of the commission's investigation and the UN Commission of Inquiry 
on Libya was barred by authorities from properly investigating the Colonel's death. Moreover, the 
blanket amnesty issued by the NTC for any acts committed in the name of Libya's revolution is likely 
to preclude any effective investigation of Gaddafi's death (see below). Despite former ICC Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo's statement that Gaddafi's death “creates suspicions” that a war crime had been 
committed, the Court has also been uninterested in investigating the Libyan leader's death (see Reuters 
2011c).  
 Since the end of the conflict, dozens of former Gaddafi regime officials have been assassinated 
by the thuwar. These acts have set the tone for post-conflict justice based on selective vengeance. To 
date, neither the ICC nor the Libyan state has been able (or perhaps willing) to prosecute these crimes. 
In July 2014, as fighting between rival militia groups in the capital of Tripoli escalated, Libya's Justice 
Minister visited the OTP to explore the possibility of the ICC prosecuting the thuwar (Moutaz 2014). It 
is likely that the decision by Libyan authorities to contact the ICC with regards to militia violence 
demonstrates their interest in utilizing a potential investigation as a threat rather than reflecting a 
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genuine intention to have the Court prosecute rebel crimes. Moreover, Libya's complaint regards 
current violence and the destruction of civilian infrastructure rather than alleged crimes pertaining to 
the civil war (Statement of the Prosecutor 2014a).  
 Lending further credence to the fact that militia crimes are unlikely to be investigated is Libya's 
2013 Transitional Justice Law which considers transitional justice to mean addressing “severe and 
systemic violations of the basic rights and liberties to which the Libyans were subjected by state 
affiliated apparatus under the former regime.” (see Law No.29 of 2013 on Transitional Justice 2013). 
While the law does stipulate that a truth commission would be set up to investigate “human rights 
violations after the fall of the Qadhafi regime” and “accompanying the 17 February Revolution”, there 
is no mention of militia or opposition crimes or human rights abuses (ibid.).  
 Despite Libya's unwillingness or inability to prosecute rebel crimes from either the conflict or 
post-conflict period, there is no indication that the ICC itself will do so. On the contrary, the Court 
appears interested in pursuing enemies of the Libyan state who currently reside outside of the country 
(See Statement of the Prosecutor 2013). The Court thus remains interested in potentially prosecuting 
additional individuals responsible for committing atrocities in Libya. Indeed, subsequent statements by 
the Prosecutor requesting states to provide telephone intercepts and information regarding the transfer 
of funds “to establish the whereabouts and movements of persons under investigation” suggest that the 
Court's investigations are advanced (See Statement of the Prosecutor 2013). However, there is no 
indication that the targets of such investigation or prosecution will be former rebel or current militia 
groups.  
 The slate of unprosecuted crimes as well as ongoing violence illustrates the severe limitations of 
the ICC to produce positive effects on post-conflict justice and peace in Libya. This has had the effect 
of entrenching the conflict narrative in Libya's post-conflict context. Perhaps this was no accident. 
Some believe the ICC and Libyan government's selective approach to justice in Libya is a reflection of 
the wider political context. To hold rebel perpetrators to account would have undermined the conflict 
narrative which insisted that the regime be toppled and requires that those associated with the previous 
regime be eliminated. As Mohamed Eljarh (2013c) notes: “going after people now would assume that 





III. 'Justice' Through Amnesty and Isolation 
Following the end of the Libyan civil war, the NTC passed a blanket amnesty (Law 38) while the 
General National Congress (GNC), elected in July 2012, passed the Political Isolation Law. These 
policies emerged from a context in which the former Libyan opposition forces ensured through 
coercion not only that they would escape investigation or prosecution but would be protected from 
prosecution. Both fit within the post-conflict narrative, accented by ICC inaction to investigate or 
prosecute rebel crimes, that Libya must marginalize, isolate, punish and purge individuals associated 
with the Gaddafi regime whilst shielding militias from accountability. They also expose, once again, 
the limitations of the ICC in positively affecting post-conflict peace and justice in Libya.  
 
(i) Law 38: A Blanket Amnesty 
Passed in May 2012, Law 38 On Some Procedures for the Transitional Period granted a blanket 
amnesty for any “military, security or civil actions dictated by the February 17 Revolution that were 
performed by revolutionaries with the goal of promoting or protecting the revolution.” (see Human 
Rights Watch 2012b). Crimes such as torture and rape are excluded but other crimes, including murder 
and forced displacement, are not explicitly omitted from the amnesty law (Human Rights Watch 
2012c). Moreover, in practice, all rebel crimes have been de facto amnestied. The implication and 
reasoning behind Law 38 was clear to the Libya Working Group, which argued that the NTC's laws 
“were not just in the public interest but rather served the interests of other groups (such as protecting 
members of the NTC from future prosecution and appeasing militia groups)” (Chatham House 2012a, 
11). In other words, the amnesty would protect those militia groups that retain the ability to threaten 
peace in Libya. 
 The implications of Libya's blanket amnesty have been to entrench selective justice and 
impunity on the part of the country's emboldened thuwar. As the International Crisis Group (2013, 28-
29) noted in a report on Libya's judiciary: 
The NTC in effect gave legal sanction to impunity in May 2012 when it amnestied 
those who had committed crimes – including murder and forced displacement – during 
the uprising. The broader impression that action taken in defence of the new order is de 
facto legitimate has emboldened armed groups, many of whom justify ongoing illegal 
activity as necessary to safeguard the '17 February revolution'. 
 
It is difficult to imagine how the killing of Gaddafi could be prosecuted by Libya given the existence of 
Law 38, especially insofar as the civil war and its legitimating conflict narrative were based on 
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expunging the Gaddafi regime. Moreover, the forced expulsion of the entire population of Tawergha by 
Misrata rebels in August 2011 appears unlikely to be investigated or prosecuted by Libya even though, 
as noted above, it may amount to ethnic cleansing and arguably even genocide.  
 The amnesty is a formal demonstration that Libya is unwilling to prosecute pro-revolution 
militias who may have committed serious crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya has detailed alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the 
thuwar and observed that “breaches of international human rights law continue to occur in a climate of 
impunity” and that it is “deeply concerned that no independent investigations or prosecutions appear to 
have been instigated into killings committed by thuwar.” (see Report of the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Libya 2012, 21; 10). Some groups have increased their calls on the OTP to investigate 
and potentially prosecute Libyan militia leaders. In the wake of Law 38’s passage, Richard Dicker of 
HRW (2012c), for example, argued that “[w]ith the NTC now openly trying to shield militia leaders 
from justice, it falls to the ICC prosecutor to vigorously examine these crimes.” However, despite 
periodic suggestions that the OTP may open an investigation into the events in Tawergha (see UN 
News Centre 2012) and a declaration by Moreno-Ocampo that Law 38 was not binding on the Court 
and could not prevent an investigation or prosecution by the ICC, there is no evidence that such a 
prosecution is forthcoming (See Press Conference by Prosecutor 2012). On the contrary, whilst 
Moreno-Ocampo stated that “my office takes note of Law 38” he was broadly supportive of Libyan 
efforts at achieving post-conflict justice, maintaining that “My Office understands that the Government 
of Libya has committed to a comprehensive strategy to address all crimes and end impunity in Libya.” 
(see ICC Prosecutor Statement 2012). The result of Law 38 remains the entrenchment of one-sided 
justice, impunity and the authority of militias. The ICC has been powerless to challenge it and has 
decided not to attempt to take accountability for militia crimes upon itself.  
 
(ii) Lustration in Libya: The Political Isolation Law 
 
In May 2013, Libya's GNC overwhelmingly passed the Political Isolation Law (PIL). The PIL's passing 
represented a far-reaching attempt to prevent members of the Gaddafi regime from holding public 
office during the country's transition. But, like the amnesty law, the decision also appeared to fit a 
precarious pattern of post-conflict vengeance and one-sided justice aimed at those associated with the 
defeated regime.  
 Libya's PIL is a lustration law – a form of vetting citizens to discern whether or not they can or 
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cannot – hold public office on the basis of their relationship with a prior, delegitimized and defeated 
regime (See Ellis 1996; David 2003; Horne and Levi 2003; Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007; David 
2011). The passage of official and legally sanctioned lustration laws as a mechanism of transitional 
justice is typically attributed to the experience of post-communist states in Eastern Europe where states 
such as Poland and Czechoslovakia instituted lustration policies to prevent former communists from 
holding political office (see Michnik and Havel 1993; David 2011). The impetus behind these laws 
goes directly to the struggle characteristic of societies confronting and grappling with a recent past 
characterized by human rights violations. 
 In principle, the PIL is generally popular with Libyans, although they would prefer a more 
restrictive mandate than it was given (National Democratic Institute 2013, 25). It is also notable that 
international and local human rights groups did not necessarily view the PIL as being, in and of itself, 
illegitimate. Rights groups argued instead that it should not be vague or violate human rights (See 
Human Rights Watch 2013a; Human Rights Watch 2013c; Lawyers for Justice in Libya 2013). The 
Libyan government did not – or perhaps could not – heed their calls.  
 The passage of the law reflected political and violent pressure applied by the country's powerful 
militias as well as groups that had been so marginalized under Gaddafi that lustration could not affect 
them (Amirah-Fernández 2013). Since the end of the Revolution, Libya has struggled mightily to reign 
in various regional militias, many of which have acted as a law unto themselves, challenging and 
undermining the Libyan government's capacity to exert central authority over key cities and regions 
(see Amnesty International 2012a; Amnesty International 2012b; Pack and Barfi 2012). Following the 
conflict, “militias that had taken up arms against the former regime.... held on to them to fill the 
security vacuum after it collapsed accumulated weapons and consolidated control over entire 
neighbourhoods and areas.” (International Crisis Group 2013, 21). Pro-PIL groups maintained that the 
government had to be purged of virtually anyone and everyone who had ties to the previous regime. As 
the GNC was debating the merits and specifics of the PIL, the militias stormed and took over the 
Foreign and Justice ministries in Tripoli, demanding that the bill be passed (Jawad 2013).  
 Despite former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan's proclamation that “we will not surrender to anyone 
or bend to anyone and no-one can twist our arm” (see Jawad 2013), the militias successfully ensured 
the law was passed on 5 May 2013. In its rushed and final form, the law is broad and unspecific, 
seemingly aimed at anyone associated with the Gaddafi regime and not simply those who were 
complicit with, or responsible for, Gaddafi-era corruption and crimes (see Libya Herald 2013). 





Since the conclusion of the Libyan Revolution and civil war, Libya has been characterized by selective 
impunity. Libya's PIL and the blanket amnesty are symptomatic of Libya's post-conflict narrative of 
ridding the state of anyone associated with Gadadfi – even those who were instrumental in 
guaranteeing the rebels' and NTC's victory in the civil war. Both are the result of the ongoing ability of 
militias to affect Libyan policy-making through violence and threatening the country's fragile peace. 
Both are also stark reminders of the limitations of the ICC in affecting a post-conflict context in which 
impunity is ended and peace and security are restored.
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III. Conclusion: The ICC and Post-Gaddafi Libya 
The Libyan civil war was about the 'good' rebels and NTC deposing the 'evil' Gaddafi regime. Post-
civil war Libya has seen the extension of this narrative into the realm of post-conflict justice, embodied 
by the passage of both Libya's blanket amnesty and the Political Isolation Law. Reflecting the influence 
of the thuwar and their violent demands that Libya be purged of those associated with the former 
regime while militia crimes be amnestied or ignored, accountability has been conflated with selective 
retribution and punishment of those associated with Gaddafi – even those who had worked to topple the 
regime. Post-Gaddafi Libya has been “characterized by a revenge-seeking mindset instead of a 
disciplined and legal transition.” (Nesira 2013). Justice in Libya is victor's justice.  
 Ultimately, the ICC's effects on post-Gaddafi Libya and post-conflict justice have been 
primarily a result of what the Court and, in particular, what the OTP did not do rather than what it has 
done. In deciding not to prosecute alleged militia atrocities during the civil war or since its conclusion, 
the Court has confirmed Libya's conflict narrative. Ongoing violence and crimes also demonstrate the 
limitations of the ICC to produce positive effects on post-conflict justice, accountability and peace. It 
has not been able to positively influence the prosecutions of those it indicted. The Court has largely 
confirmed that the Libyan government was able and willing to genuinely investigate and prosecute Saif 
and Senussi. Even in the case of the admissibility challenge regarding Saif, the Court's most significant 
point of contention was the Libyan government's ability to retain custody of Saif – and not its genuine 
ability or willingness to prosecute him. Middle ground options have been neglected and it remains 
unclear what – if any – positive impact the ICC can or will have on any prosecution of Saif or Senussi.  
 While it is important to recall Rama Mani's (2002, 99) observation that the ICC isn't a panacea 
for post-conflict transitions and that the mere fact that the Court has intervened does not mean that the 
implementation of post-conflict justice will go smoothly, the case of Libya clearly demonstrates that 
the capacity of the ICC to produce positive effects on post-conflict peace and justice is limited. 
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Chapter 8: The ICC as an Actor – Negotiating Interests, Selecting Targets, and Affecting 
Peace 
 
Whether states or the UN security council choose to confer jurisdiction on the ICC is a 
decision that is wholly independent of the court. Once made, however, the legal rules 
that apply are clear and decidedly not political under any circumstances. In both 
practice and words, I have made it clear in no uncertain terms that the office of the 
prosecutor will execute its mandate, without fear or favour, where jurisdiction is 
established and will vigorously pursue those – irrespective of status or affiliation – who 
commit mass crimes that shock the conscience of humanity. – ICC Chief Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda (2014) 
 
Now you and I are part of the same tribe, the ICC tribe.  – Former ICC Chief 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni55  
 
Introduction 
The thesis began by arguing that the claims currently made about the effects of the ICC on 'peace' are 
empirically and theoretically problematic and provide no clear resolution of the “peace versus justice” 
debate. Drawing on insights from literature on conflict resolution and negotiation theory, the analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 3 provided the grounds for a more nuanced understanding of the 
empirical effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict processes. Using this framework as a guide, 
the preceding four chapters examined and assessed the effects of the ICC in northern Uganda and 
Libya. This analysis, however, begs the question: why does the ICC have the effects that it does? In 
order to answer this question, the Court needs to be analysed as an actor in its own right. After all, the 
Court is a complex international legal institution and not simply a robotic indictment-issuing machine. 
This chapter therefore analyses the institutional interests, political forces and key contextual features of 
each situation that shaped the Court's decision-making and determined the effects it had on peace, 
justice and conflict processes in Libya and northern Uganda.  
 A key weakness in the “peace versus justice” debate is that it typically assumes similar 
behaviour irrespective of context and of key factors including: how the ICC intervenes; who the ICC 
targets and who it does not; and who the Court's work in specific contexts benefits and legitimates. This 
chapter seeks to address these issues, arguing that they shape how the ICC affects peace. Specifically, 
the chapter delineates the relationship between the ways in which the ICC is requested to intervene in 
ongoing conflicts, the decision-making of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in determining which 
parties to prosecute, and the effects of the ICC on peace, conflict and justice processes. It is argued that 
the ICC is guided by a negotiation between its own institutional interests and the interests of the 
                                                 
55
According to a confidential interview with a former ICC staff member (2014c).  
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political actors upon which the Court depends. This negotiation of interests has resulted in a proclivity 
within the OTP to selectively investigate and prosecute parties to a conflict. Ultimately, the selective 
prosecution of non-state actors (i.e. rebels) or state actors (i.e. government officials) is a key 
determinant of the Court's effects on peace processes in Libya, northern Uganda and beyond.  
 The chapter proceeds in three sections. In section one, the ICC's referral mechanisms are put 
into political context. It is argued that self-referrals lead the Court to prosecute non-state actors whilst 
Security Council referrals have a tendency to primarily lead the OTP to seek the prosecution of 
government officials. However, it is insufficient to conclude that the ICC works at the behest of  
political actors that refer situations to it. Rather, as demonstrated in the second section, the ICC's 
decision-making, especially as it pertains to selecting cases, is an extension of a negotiation between 
the Court's institutional interests and the interests of the political actors upon which its effectiveness 
and continued existence depend. Three institutional interests are outlined: the ability to collect evidence 
on the ground or from actors able to provide it; cooperation leading to the enforcement of arrest 
warrants and the surrender of suspects to the Court; and recognition of the ICC as a relevant and 
effective institution in international politics. In section three, the chapter revisits the two cases at the 
heart of this thesis, northern Uganda and Libya, and shows that the processes of decision-making, 
negotiation of interests and selectivity were instrumental in determining the ICC's effects on peace, 
justice and conflict processes in both cases.  
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I. Directing Justice: From Political Referrals to Prosecutorial Targets 
 
As the Court's caseload has increased and the number of investigations the OTP conducts has grown, 
scholarship on the ICC has begun to scrutinize the politics of referral types (see, e.g., Tiemessen 2014). 
To date such analyses have focused primarily on how different referral types politicize the ICC and 
affect the independence and legitimacy of the Court. The core contention of this chapter is that the way 
in which a situation is referred has implications on how the ICC affects conflict and peace processes. It 
does so by narrowing the range of actors that are targeted by the Court for prosecution as well as the 
actors that are legitimized by its intervention. This, in turn, shapes conflict, peace and justice processes 
in the given conflict situation. This is evident in both ICC interventions that the thesis has examined. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis described the Court's trigger mechanisms and noted that states have 
relied on self-referrals and UN Security Council referrals to initiate ICC interventions into ongoing 
conflicts. During its first years, the ICC had to find ways in which to promote its work by presenting 
itself as a viable institution that was deferential to the interests of those political actors which could 
potentially threaten its existence. As a result, the Court selected those cases that would produce a record 
conducive to better relations with major powers and the UN Security Council, while avoiding 
interventions into situations where it could potentially shed light on alleged crimes committed by major 
powers or on its allies (see Bosco 2014). But the nature of the negotiation between the Court's interests 
and the interests of political actors has not only determined the situations that were selected for 
negotiation but the specific individuals that were targeted for prosecution. 
 Within the “peace versus justice” debate, it is deemed largely irrelevant who is targeted by the 
ICC. This may come as a surprise given the centrality of particular individuals to conflict narratives 
(re)produced by ICC interventions. However, analyses of the Court's effects on peace processes 
generally neglect what type of actor is targeted by the Court. This is likely the result of the recycled 
claims characteristic of the discourse that strip the ICC's decision-making and specific conflict 
situations of context and replace them with the dichotomous proposition that the ICC can ultimately 
only help or hinder peace. Within the debate, the theorized incentives and disincentives produced by 
ICC interventions are seen as applying equally to government figures as well as rebels; they are taken 
to be equals who will have the same motivations and behaviours. It is thus possible to see the argument, 
as previous chapters have detailed, that ICC interventions will force both Kony and Gaddafi to fight to 
the death, to refuse to negotiate peace or, alternatively, marginalize and deter both from committing 




 At the same time, engagements with the “peace versus justice” debate have focused primarily 
on those parties who are ultimately targeted by the ICC, neglecting how interventions by the Court 
affect those who are not. This is not to say that non-targeted parties are entirely ignored in scholarship 
on the effects of ICC interventions. As suggested in the preceding chapters on Libya and especially 
northern Uganda, there is some recognition that the political legitimacy of warring parties is bolstered 
if they avoid being targeted by the Court but their adversaries are indicted. Still, non-targeted parties 
are primarily considered in critiques of the selective or biased nature of the Court's interventions – in 
others words, within arguments that non-targeted parties should be targeted. What is needed is better 
analyses of how the behaviour of non-targeted parties changes with ICC interventions or how such 
interventions promote their interests vis-a-vis peace, conflict and justice processes. 
 The previous chapters considered the effects of the ICC on non-targeted parties, suggesting that 
the Court not only bolstered their sense of legitimacy but affected their attitudes and incentives 
towards, and decision-making within, peace processes (see also below). But this raises the question: 
how does the ICC decide who to investigate and prosecute? The argument that follows suggests that 
who is targeted and who is not targeted for ICC prosecution is ultimately determined not only by their 
alleged responsibility for crimes but by the way in which a conflict is referred to the ICC and the 
consequent, and not simply subsequent, political decision-making within the OTP.  
 
Table 8.1: Mapping ICC Referral Type and Targeted / Non-Targeted Parties at Time of Arrest Warrant 
State  Referral Type Government (or 
Government Affiliated) 
Actors Indicted  
Non-Government / Rebel 
Actors Indicted 
Uganda (2003) Self-Referral 0 5 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2004) 
Self-Referral 0 5 
Central African 
Republic (2004) 
Self-Referral 0 1 
Darfur / Sudan (2005)  UNSC Referral  4 2 
Kenya (2010) Proprio Motu 3 3 
Ivory Coast (2011) Proprio Motu 3 0 
Libya (2011) UNSC Referral  3 0 
Mali (2012) Self-Referral ---  --- 
 
To date, in every case of a self-referral by an ICC member-state in which arrest warrants have been 
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issued, the OTP has exclusively targeted non-state actors. None have resulted in arrest warrants for 
officials from the referring government (see Table 8.1). As early as 2006, Antonio Cassese (2006, 436) 
worried about this apparent link between self-referrals and myopically targeting rebels:  
The striking feature in all three self-referrals lies in the fact that in each case the 
referring state asked the Prosecutor to investigate crimes allegedly committed by rebels 
fighting against the central authorities... [T]he practice of self-referrals by states beset 
with civil war is of concern. It might lead to states using the Court. (Emphasis in 
original; see also Heller 2008, 675). 
 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the OTP has decided not to request arrest warrants 
for any government official closely allied to President Joseph Kabila, focusing instead on rebels such 
Thomas Lubanga as well as former political figures who have fallen out of favour with the President, 
such as Jean-Pierre Bemba (notably for his role in alleged atrocities in the Central African Republic and 
not the DRC). To a certain degree, this is to be expected. After all, it is unlikely that a state would refer 
itself or a situation on its territory to the ICC if it believed its officials would be prosecuted by the 
Court. As one OTP staff member (confidential interview 2013b) notes: “states aren't stupid, so if states 
refer, they think there is no reason why they should be brought to account or that they can avoid it.” 
But in many (if not most) cases, responsibility for political violence does not lie starkly on one side of a 
conflict and not the other. And there is a difference between a state being confident that it will not be 
investigated or prosecuted because its officials are innocent, and a government knowing that it is not in 
the Court’s interests to pursue prosecutions for state-perpetrated atrocities. But states will not only want 
to avoid coming under the ICC's gaze but may also judge the Court's work to be politically useful in 
attributing responsibility and guilt to their adversaries. As Schabas (2007, 145) notes in his analysis of 
self-referrals, “in reality the States concerned did not intend that prosecution be directed against 
themselves... [but rather] sought to induce the Court to prosecute rebel groups operating within their 
own borders.” In some instances, such as in the case of the GoU's referral of the LRA to the ICC, this 
also pertained to rebels operating outside of the states' borders, in neighbouring countries.  
 In contrast to self-referrals, UN Security Council referrals have tended to result in the OTP 
focusing on the alleged perpetration of crimes by government actors (see Table 8.1). Following UN 
Security Council Resolution 1593, the primary focus of the OTP has been on the complicity of the 
Sudanese government and, in particular, of President Omar al-Bashir for his alleged role in the 
commission of atrocities in Darfur. While non-state actors involved in the war in Darfur have also been 
targeted, it is notable that only Bashir has been indicted for genocide, the so-called “crime of all 
crimes” (see, e.g. Schabas 2009), and no other individual involved in the conflict has received nearly as 
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much attention from the international community or civil society groups (See Mills 2012). In Libya, as 
discussed at greater length below, the focus of OTP investigations has been exclusively on the Gaddafi 
regime.  
 In short, despite the small sample size, a pattern between referral types and the selection of 
targets by the OTP emerges: the actor that refers a situation to the ICC does so in order to have the 
Court target its adversaries and/or those who are no longer in political favour. There is a clear 
correlation between referral type and the type of actor that is likely to be pursued for prosecution by the 
OTP: Security Council referrals lead the Prosecutor to target state and government officials; self-
referrals lead the Prosecutor to target non-state actors and rebels. This is in line Alana Tiemessen's 
(2014, 450) research which suggests that “[o]nce a situation is referred, the UNSC, and especially 
States Parties, have generally directed the Court’s attention to crimes committed by only one side of the 
conflict. In so doing, they have ensured impunity for themselves or their allies.”  
 As suggested in the above quote by Cassese, it is important to note that different referral types 
can lead to different types of political instrumentalization of the Court. As noted in Chapter 1, it is often 
noted that the biggest threat to the ICC is politicization. The fear of politicization manifests itself 
primarily through the discourse on the Court's independence. Since the Rome Statute negotiations, 
supporters have sought to ensure that the Court be created – and remain – an institution independent of 
the political interests of states. In other words, for the Court to survive, it must keep its distance from 
overt political machinations and avoid being instrumentalized or manipulated by state actors. Despite 
this anxiety about being instrumentalized and losing its independence, when the Court intervenes 
selectively into ongoing conflicts, it opens itself to manipulation by warring actors and, more 
specifically, by the non-targeted parties to a conflict. As Branch (2011, 186) writes:  
The ICC's need to accommodate itself to political power leads to a number of 
detrimental consequences for peace by setting the stage for the Court's 
instrumentalization. It can be instrumentalized by Western states, African states, or even 
non-state political forces such as rebel groups or local elites who seek to appropriate for 
themselves the mantle of savior so as to legitimate their violence. 
 
Citing the examples of Uganda, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Phil Clark (2011) adds that “[s]ome African governments have been all too willing to assist the ICC in 
exchange for insulating their officials from prosecution.” It is difficult not to be left with the impression 
that the ICC does the bidding of at least some states. But the ICC may view being used by states as 
beneficial to its mandate and of service to its own interests. What is less clear is why the ICC is 
selective and what factors determine its selectivity.  
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II. ICC Decision-Making and Institutional Interests 
It can seem as though the ICC's work is beholden to political interests: where the interests of states 
point towards cooperation and engagement with the ICC, the Court's work will be supported; where 
state interests are in conflict with the Court, the ICC's mandate will be undercut. This is a particularly 
realist argument, dependent as it is on state preferences determining the functioning of international 
institutions and it is, at times, characteristic of international relations scholarship which, as Michael 
Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004, 23) observe, has not given sufficient attention to how 
international organizations “actually behave” and has stripped international institutions of their 
influence (see also Bosco 2014, 17). International institutions have institutional interests which shape 
their actions and behaviour and which are aimed at their legitimation and preservation. This was argued 
by Barnett (2003) in his seminal work on the United Nations' (lack of) response to the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide. Barnett showed how staff treated the UN as a “church” and viewed themselves as the 
institution's guardians and protectors. As a consequence, officials were reluctant to have the UN 
intervene in situations which were unlikely to further the UN's desired perception as a guardian of 
international peace and security:  
Roughly translated, the UN was interested in picking 'winners,' those places that had 
stability on the ground, and avoiding 'losers,' those places where stability was absent 
and humanitarian nightmares were present. This development not only was a pragmatic 
recognition of the possible but also was justified by a principled defence of the UN... 
Helping those who could not help themselves could suffocate the organization... The 
desire by the UN decision makers in New York to pick winners and to avoid failures 
meant that the UN was as interested in its own security as it was in human security. 
This represented an important shift in the discourse of peacekeeping, as officials in and 
around the UN took greater care to protect the organization's interests, reputation, and 
future. These rules represented an epoxy that bound together the desire to help with the 
desire to defend the organization and its ideals. Rwanda was born in these uncertain 
circumstances (Barnett 2003, 47-8). 
 
It is therefore insufficient to claim that the UN responds or doesn't respond to a particular crisis simply 
as an extension of the preferences or interests of its member-states – or as a result of the extent of 
humanitarian suffering. Contrary to claims that the UN had lost legitimacy for its lack of response to 
the genocide in Rwanda, UN officials saw their recalcitrance as a means to protect the UN's legitimacy. 
Any understanding of the decision-making within the UN must take into consideration a negotiation 
between the expectation that the UN respond to emerging crises (e.g. the genocide in Rwanda) and the 
institution's interests (preservation by not becoming embroiled in Rwanda and legitimation by avoiding 
“losers”). It should be expected that international institutions such as the UN or the ICC will not take 
actions which threaten their ability to function effectively and / or their long-term viability. 
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 Scholarship on international criminal law and justice has generally neglected any systematic 
analysis of the ICC's interests or how these interests are acted upon and interact with the interests of 
states and other international organizations. The argument that follows is simple: the ICC's decision-
making reflects a negotiation of the Court's own interests with the interests of those political actors it 
depends upon. The Court may be used and instrumentalized by states and organizations such as the 
Security Council. But an analysis of OTP decision-making must take into account the fact that the 
Court has an interest in being instrumentalized by states and by the Security Council, insofar as it 
believes that where the interests of such political actors overlap with the interests of the Court, its 
legitimacy and standing in international politics will be promoted and strengthened – and its mandate 
may be successfully implemented. Despite functioning as a judicial body, the Court is itself a political 
institution with its own set of political interests which influence its decision-making. This negotiation 
of interests is most pronounced in the selection of prosecutorial targets. 
 
Defining ICC Institutional Interests 
In 2008, Phil Clark briefly analyzed the OTP's record in selecting certain cases, highlighting that it was 
not only external political forces determining the Prosecutor's course of action but internal interests: 
the ICC has been fundamentally motivated by self-interested pragmatic concerns, 
avoiding the fraught task of investigating and prosecuting sitting members of 
government who are responsible for grave crimes, while also overlooking the capacity 
of domestic jurisdictions to address the atrocities concerned. Such pragmatism reflects a 
new global institution that needs to get legal runs on the board in order to build support 
among its states parties and to be perceived as an established global actor in the fight 
against impunity (Clark 2008, 44). 
 
Clark's analysis points to an inherent tension within the OTP between “idealism” and “reality”, a 
tension it manages and negotiates via “self-interested” “pragmatism”. This pragmatism emerges in the 
OTP's decision-making with regards to specific selectivity – who to target for prosecution. This is 
reflected in the response of the current ICC Deputy Prosecutor, James Stewart, to allegations that the 
OTP has tended to focus on only one side of a conflict: 
The Prosecutor, for example in the case of Cote D’Ivoire, has always made it clear that 
she intends to look at all sides of the conflict. Sometimes you just can’t do everything at 
once. You have to make a choice between action and paralysis and between pragmatism 
and ideals. And I think if you choose pragmatic action, you really shouldn’t be 
criticized. But in the end, I suppose history will tell us whether or not the OTP has 
acted appropriately. (See Kersten 2013). 
 
Serge Brammertz, the current Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ICC's former Deputy Prosecutor maintains that this approach is indeed 
appropriate, stating that there is a need for the OTP to sequence cases and start with one side before 
targeting the other.56 This amounts to an admission of selectivity as an institutional strategy within the 
OTP. But at the heart of their comments is an attempt to explain how the ICC can and should conduct 
investigations and prosecutions in the context of highly politicized situations and in such a way that 
preserves the interests of the Court. However, their comments do not tell us what specific factors 
determine and shape the ICC's institutional interests. 
 Three key issues can be ascertained about the core of the Court's interests from the above 
comments. First, as Stewart argues, the ICC's Prosecutor wants to examine the culpability of all sides 
of a conflict. Assuming that there are very few violent political conflicts in which only one side bears 
responsibility for atrocities, it follows that, ideally, the Prosecutor would target all parties to a conflict. 
Second, the OTP is unable to target all sides at the same time. In Stewart's words, “you just can't do 
everything at once.” In other words, the OTP has calculated that targeting both sides simultaneously is 
unwise and would have a negative impact on the Court. In other words, targeting everyone at once risks 
paralysis – no one being prosecuted, no one being surrendered to The Hague and no justice being 
served. And third, when the OTP faces the dilemma of targeting only one side of a conflict, it views 
selectivity as a pragmatic position which is likely to translate into a temporally staggered approach –  
prosecute one side first, the other side (maybe) later; governments first rebels later – or vice versa 
depending, as per the analysis above, on the source of a referral. Together, this is strong evidence that 
the OTP's political calculus in deciding who to target for prosecution takes into account what is good 
for the Court – i.e. the ICC's institutional interests.  
 But what specific elements of the Court's institutional interests determine how the OTP charts a 
“pragmatic” course, negotiates selectivity and decides who to target? The research carried out for this 
thesis suggests that there are three particularly important institutional interests. 
 The first two institutional interests pertain to cooperation between political actors and the ICC 
to gather evidence and to enforce arrest warrants. Cooperation will depend, in part, on the manner in 
which the ICC intervenes. Kenneth Rodman (2014 6-19) describes the challenges of the ICC in 
attaining cooperation in what he terms “adversarial” and “cooperative” relationships. The former 
relates to investigations where the ICC is investigating crimes by official actors (i.e. government 
officials) and is typically the product of Security Council referrals. Because the ICC is intervening 
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against an entrenched political entity, in such cases, prosecutors will likely require cooperation from 
external sources. Cooperative relationships, on the other hand, result primarily from self-referrals, 
where the targets of ICC investigation are non-state actors. In line with the analysis above on self-
referrals, Rodman (ibid., 7) maintains that, while cooperation here is likely to be higher than in 
adversarial relationships, cooperative relationships pose an ever-present risk that the state in question 
will instrumentalize the Court's intervention in order to delegitimize and marginalize their adversaries – 
without improving their own human rights record. 
 Because the ICC's resources in terms of budget and staff are limited, the OTP needs states (as 
well as non-state actors) to bolster investigations by allowing investigations to take place on their 
territory or by volunteering evidence for specific cases. Evidence must be strong enough to convince 
judges to issue arrest warrants for prosecutorial targets. Prosecutors must subsequently seek sufficient 
evidence for a conviction. The process of evidence-gathering from states is not politically neutral. 
States are able to choose which evidence they provide and which they retain in an attempt to shape the 
OTP's investigations. At the same time, in order for the OTP to investigate allegations where the crimes 
occurred, they need to not only have the acquiescence of the state on whose territory the crimes 
allegedly took place, but also the protection of state security, police or military forces. Where this isn't 
possible, as in the case of Darfur and Libya, investigators are forced to rely on evidence and testimony 
from third-party sources (including states and NGOs) or witnesses outside the affected situation. The 
OTP, then, has an interest in assuring that it receives cooperation from those states within which it is 
carrying out investigations or, when this is not possible, from those states which may hold evidence 
gathered on the ground.
 
We should expect that the OTP will pursue strategies that enhance rather than 
undermine case-building cooperation with relevant states.  
 A second form of cooperation pertains to enforcing arrest warrants. Once arrest warrants have 
been issued, prosecutors have a vested interest in suspects being surrendered to the Court. In order to 
function effectively and to be perceived as a viable institution, the Court needs the cooperation of states 
to put suspects in its dock. After all, the ICC does not have a police force of its own and therefore is 
unable to enforce any warrants of arrest it may issue (see Moreno-Ocampo 2005; Grono 2008). If 
suspects do not surrender themselves voluntarily, then the ICC requires state cooperation in order to 
detain and surrender indictees to The Hague.
57
 The prospects of arrest are key for the Court because, in 
                                                 
57 Even in instances where suspects surrender themselves, the ICC still may require state cooperation. 
This was the case with the surrender of Bosco Ntaganda, who turned himself in to the US embassy 
in Kigali, Rwanda and requested to be transferred to the ICC. Two non-member states, the US and 
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the words of one OTP official (confidential interview 2013a), “suspects at large damage the credibility 
of the Court.” A Court with an empty dock is a Court empty of legitimacy and purpose. In its first 
years, the OTP was under pressure from within to present cases it would be able to prosecute. In a 
curious decision, ICC judges were elected before the Prosecutor, meaning that they had little to do until 
the OTP was set up and requested the issuance of arrest warrants. According to OTP staff (confidential 
interview 2013a), Judges put pressure on Moreno-Ocampo to produce a case as soon as possible. One 
told him: “just give us a Tadic!” – a reference to the first case at the ICTY. In short, it should be 
expected that the OTP is guided by an institutional interest to receive cooperation from states and will 
avoid making decisions that preclude cooperation – contemporaneously or in the future. As Bosco 
(2014, 19) writes, “[p]ursuing an ideal apolitical form of justice by ignoring the need for state support 
would only sap the institution's credibility.” 
 While the two institutional interests outlined above can be placed under the umbrella of 
'cooperation', they should not be conflated. Cooperation to achieve evidence and investigate in-country 
requires different political relations with potentially different actors than cooperation to achieve the 
enforcement of arrest warrants which relies, above all, on coercive power. 
 In addition to the ICC's institutional interests to receive cooperation from political actors, there 
is an 'impact factor' which weighs heavily on the Court. This third, reputational, interest is at least 
partly related to the fact that the Court is still establishing itself within the international system. It bears 
repeating – although not as an excuse – that the ICC is a relatively young institution and much of what 
the Court does is 'invented' for the first time when it does it. As such, the ICC clearly has an interest in 
its own viability as well as the perception that it is viable. This reputational interest also relates to the 
consistently reiterated, if poorly defined, notion that it is insufficient to 'do justice' and that justice must 
be “seen to be done” (see Kerr 2004 92-114), as well as the heightened expectations that the Court will 
act swiftly and have a positive impact on the establishment of a sustainable peace (see Whiting 2009). 
Just as the ICC has an interest in its justice being “seen to be done”, the Court also has an interest in 
giving the appearance of having a positive impact on the conflicts in which it intervenes (see, e.g. 
Bensouda 2013a). Here, we return to the claims discussed in Chapter 2. Amongst the ICC's potential 
impact factors will be its ability to argue a deterrence factor, a positive influence on 'peace', and that it 
marginalizes those actors it targets.   
 The ICC has an interest in capturing global public attention and recognition. The reputation of 
the ICC suffers when there are demands for international justice that are unmet – as in the case of Syria 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Rwanda, played critical roles in having Ntaganda transferred to The Hague.  
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– yielding an expectations gap. This interest in capturing attention and fulfilling expectations 
predisposes the ICC to intervening while conflicts are ongoing. If an ICC intervention is delayed or 
neglected for conflicts, like Syria, where there is a clear case for judicial intervention, the reputation of 
the Court may suffer. Consequently, when the Court gets an opportunity to deliver on its promise, it can 
be expected that it will embrace the opportunity – even if it comes at some cost to its political 
independence.  
 Together, these issues of cooperation and reputation constitute the core elements of the ICC's 
institutional interests. The OTP wants to present compelling cases to judges – requests for warrants 
built on strong evidence as well as cases that can be won. They also want to ensure that those they 
target stand a good chance of being surrendered to the ICC. At the same time, it is important for the 
Court to appear to be an active and effective institution with high-profile cases. It should be expected 
that the OTP will seek to make decisions that can further these interests whilst avoiding those that will 
undermine them. It is important to note here that the decision of whether an investigation of a particular 
situation or a case should proceed ultimately rests with the Prosecutor and his or her interpretation of 
the Court's institutional interests (see Schabas 2010, 541). The prosecutor may use nebulous concepts 
such as “gravity” and the “interests of justice” to determine whether or not a case should proceed. 
Because they are poorly defined, both of these concepts help to justify political decisions vis-a-vis 
selectivity via legal language. In the case of gravity, for example, Schabas writes (2012, 89) that “[t]he 
gravity language strikes the observer as little more than obfuscation, a laboured attempt to make the 
determinations look more judicial than they really are...  to take a political decision while making it 
look judicial.” This, as Alana Tiemessen (2013) argues, is deeply problematic as it leads to selective 
prosecutions of only one side of a conflict and risks perpetuating rather than filling “impunity gaps”. 
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III. ICC Institutional Interests in Northern Uganda and Libya  
In the eight situations in which the ICC has intervened, the sources of referral, especially in the case of 
the Security Council and self-referrals by member-states, have directed the ICC with regards to which 
parties to target for prosecution. Security Council referrals tend to lead to the Office of the Prosecutor 
to focus on government officials and adversaries of Council member-states. Self-referrals lead the OTP 
to target rebel groups and officials out of favour with the referring government. This is not an accident. 
Deciding which parties to a conflict to prosecute is the result of a negotiation between the political 
interests of referring powers and the institutional interests of the ICC. 
 




 The decision-making that flows from this negotiation of interests determines the effects the 
Court has on conflict, peace and justice processes (see Chart 8.1). This can be seen in both cases at the 
core of this thesis: northern Uganda and Libya. Both have followed the trajectory of decision-making, 
negotiation of interests and selectivity elaborated above. Predictably, this has had a significant impact 
on peace, conflict and justice processes in both and provides an additional and important layer to our 
understanding of how and why conflict, peace and justice processes unfolded the way they did in both 
cases.  
  
(i) The ICC Intervention in Northern Uganda  
According to staff within the OTP (confidential interview 2013a), during the first years of the Court's 
existence, Moreno-Ocampo was facing significant pressure from external actors, including human 
rights NGOs and judges within the Court, to open a first case. Moreno-Ocampo's inclination was to 
open an investigation into alleged crimes committed in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo because the crimes were grave, recent, the DRC was a State party, and the prosecutor was 
advised specifically to do so by different actors (ibid.). He eventually did so in 2004, following a self-
referral from the country's President Joseph Kabila for the whole of the DRC. However, he was also 
advised that the conflict in the eastern DRC was too complex and complicated for a young, 
inexperienced institution to delve into for its first case (ibid.). The field conditions were extremely 
difficult and dangerous for ICC staff and witnesses. A running joke within the Court was that Moreno-
Ocampo would “end up like Che Guevara, another Argentinian stuck in the Congo.” (ibid.).58 
 The DRC posed logistical challenges as well. To appropriate Barnett's phrasing, it did not 
represent an obvious “winner” for the ICC. Other situations were more appealing. Whilst struggling to 
come to a decision on whether or not to proceed with an intervention into the DRC, Moreno-Ocampo 
was approached by Payam Akhavan who was representing Uganda on a case in front of the 
International Court of Justice. Akhavan asked whether Moreno-Ocampo would be interested in a self-
referral from Uganda (see also Akhavan 2005, 403). According to OTP staff (confidential interview 
2013a), in response Moreno-Ocampo:  
got overly excited with that prospect because it was the ticket out of the Congo. 
Furthermore, LRA crimes were extremely grave and cruel, Kony and his commanders 
were notorious perpetrators about whom it should not be too difficult to prove a case, 
the LRA was considered a terrorist group by the USA (which would help managing the 
                                                 
58 The joke refers to fellow Argentine, Che Guevara’s failed attempt at initiating revolution in the 
Congo in the 1960s. 
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USA at a point when they were hostile towards the Court), and the Ugandan 
government was expected to give full cooperation for the investigation. The Court 
needed a first successful case on a notorious situation, sooner rather than later, and 
Northern Uganda appeared to be the better candidate for that purpose. 
 
Rodriguez (2009, 219) adds that, in comparison to the DRC, “investigating the perpetrators of the 
conflict of Northern Uganda seemed less complicated to the ICC...Besides, Uganda, unlike Congo, had 
more functioning infrastructures.” The OTP did not need to create a popular narrative of an evil LRA. 
It already existed. “Because the situation could be described with simplicity, it seemed clear that the 
LRA was the villain, and that the government of Uganda had tried their best to protect the population 
and fight the LRA.” (Ibid.). In other words, not only did the ICC embolden and entrench the narrative 
of a good GoU against an evil LRA which, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, had important implications 
on the peace process in northern Uganda, but its decision-making was itself shaped by this pre-existing 
conflict narrative. The dominant 'good' versus 'evil' discourse justified the ICC's intervention and also 
served the Court's interests. In turn, the ICC's intervention reaffirmed that narrative and served the 
interests of those who benefitted from the narrative remaining unchallenged – the GoU.  
  In line with the analysis offered above, the ICC's decision-making in Uganda “can be explained 
by considering its institutional interests at the time of the referral.” (Nouwen and Werner 2010, 953). 
For the ICC and for Moreno-Ocampo, Uganda was seen as an important opportunity to demonstrate the 
vitality of the Court. The ICC needed to prove its mettle. It wanted to be noticed and it needed to 
demonstrate that it was more than the paper tiger its critics claimed it was. The situation in Uganda was 
seen as an ideal case. Akhavan (2005 404) writes: “For the ICC, the voluntary referral of a compelling 
case by a state party represented both an early expression of confidence in the nascent institution’s 
mandate and a welcome opportunity to demonstrate its viability.” (see also Lanz 2007, 7). According to 
Branch (2011, 187), Uganda's self-referral met two requirements for the Court: it was a voluntary 
referral from the GoU and thus “feasible on the local level” and it did not conflict with the interests of 
any major powers. 
 
The ICC and its supporters thus welcomed the referral. Senior Canadian politician 
and diplomat, Lloyd Axworthy and Uganda expert Erin Baines (2005) wrote that “[i]f it works, it will 
install a very potent instrument of justice.” Others saw Uganda it as a “litmus test” (Akhavan 2005, 
404; Apuuli 2008, 804) for the Court.  
 As Nouwen and Werner (2010, 949) point out, the GoU did not refer itself to the ICC “out of a 
conviction about law and justice” but rather “as part of a military strategy and international reputation 
campaign.” Museveni made the referral not because Uganda was unable or unwilling to prosecute 
senior LRA commanders but because the Ugandan military, Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF), 
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had been unable to arrest them (Apuuli 2008, 805).
59
 As noted in Chapter 5 and recalled by Ugandan 
Judge Alfonse Owiny Dollo (2011), the Government consciously attempted to first refer the “LRA 
situation” to the Court but the ICC refused in order not to give the appearance of partisanship. The 
Court cannot accept referrals of specific perpetrators or groups but only “situations”. 
 Moreno-Ocampo did attempt to give the appearance that his office was, in fact, impartial and 
would investigate all sides. The Prosecutor (successfully) requested that the referral be interpreted as a 
referral of “the situation in northern Uganda” rather than “the situation concerning the Lord's 
Resistance Army” (see Decision Assigning the Situation in Uganda 2004). Moreover, observers and 
ICC staff argue that the Prosecutor was deferential to efforts to establish an official peace process (see 
AMICC 2006). Matthew Brubacher (2010, 274), a former OTP staff member, maintains that the OTP 
carefully and politically calculated the timing of its request for arrest warrants, with Moreno-Ocampo 
waiting to make his application when “the LRA capacity to inflict violence was low relative to the 
ability of the Ugandan government to provide security.” Additionally, Sarah Nouwen (2013, 213-214) 
observes that the OTP was clear that, with the exception of those LRA leaders it had indicted, it had no 
intention of undermining the provision of amnesties in northern Uganda. From the outset, however, the 
Prosecutor gave the impression that his office was allied with the Government of Yoweri Museveni 
(Nouwen 2013, 230). Clark (2011) has found that the Prosecutor's office had been engaged in 
negotiations with GoU as well as DRC government officials for at least one year before either referral 
was made. He adds that “Only when the Ugandan and Congolese governments were certain that an ICC 
intervention would serve their interests did they request the Court’s involvement. The suspicion among 
many Ugandan and Congolese actors is that deals were struck and promises made to convince their 
governments to cooperate with international justice.” (Ibid.). The perception of bias was most 
dramatically evidenced when Museveni and Moreno-Ocampo appeared, side-by-side, in a London 
hotel room at a press conference announcing that Uganda had referred itself to the Court. It is very 
unlikely that this was simply an oversight or blunder that could be attributed to a young Court going 
through growing pains. Given that negotiations had been going on for over a year, it is far more likely 
that Moreno-Ocampo had been advised not to appear with Museveni and told that it would give the 
OTP the impression of being biased. 
 
That the Prosecutor targeted only the LRA can be explained by the fact that the OTP needed the 
cooperation of the GoU in order to conduct any investigations. As one former senior ICC member 
                                                 
59 This point was also reiterated by numerous interview respondents including Justice Alfonse Owiny 
Dollo and Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye. 
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(confidential interview 2014b) recalls: 
At this moment, [the Prosecutor] is trapped. Yes it is a referral of a situation but if he 
wants the support of the country, information, documentation, [then] he needs to 
operate in the country. If you say: “we are going to look at UPDF, allegations against 
UPDF”, what kind of document do you have to have? That's the issue. How are you 
going to be able to make your case against the country, against the power, against the 
head of state who actually is able to block all the documents [so] that you can't have 
any information about these cases. One of the main things for international criminal 
justice is to have support of the states. If Moreno-Ocampo said I will investigate not 
only LRA but UPDF, he will not have support from Uganda. All of what you need to 
investigate, you will not get.
.  
 
The result of this 'trap' was a decision to target only the LRA, leaving GoU and UPDF crimes outside 
the remit of international criminal justice.  
 The ICC intervention delivered benefits to the GoU. Museveni rightly calculated that requesting 
the intervention of the ICC would add to the ongoing marginalization of the LRA and legitimation of 
its war against the rebels. According to Branch (2007a, 183), it was an “excellent strategy” in 
criminalizing and further delegitimizing the LRA. As Werner and Nouwen (2010, 950) add: “While 
branding the LRA as humanity’s enemy, the referral portrayed the Ugandan government as a defender 
and friend of mankind.” Similarly, as Olara A. Otunnu (2006) writes, “[t]o keep the eyes of the world 
averted, the government has carefully scripted a narrative in which the catastrophe in northern Uganda 
begins with the LRA and will only end with its demise.” The ICC's intervention legitimated the GOU, 
further castigated the LRA and likely bolstered the GoU's commitment to military solutions to the war.  
The OTP attempted to dispel criticism that it was biased by arguing that the UPDF's crimes 
have been investigated but did not meet the Court's gravity threshold (See Statement by the Chief 
Prosecutor 2005; Moreno-Ocampo 2007b). In a statement in the wake of the unsealing of the five arrest 
warrants, Moreno-Ocampo stated: “Crimes committed by the LRA were much more numerous and of 
much higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. We therefore started with an 
investigation of the LRA.” (See Statement by the Chief Prosecutor 2005, 2-3) This conception of 
gravity has apparently precluded the OTP from requesting arrest warrants for any GoU or UPDF 
officials. But it was poorly received by a population that had suffered from crimes perpetrated by both 
sides and, according to Branch (2011, 188), reflected “the Prosecutor's public acceptance of the official 
discourse on the conflict” which “assumes the absolute malevolence of the LRA and, by implication, 
the benevolence of the Ugandan government”. Gravity seemed an odd reason to neglect the crimes and 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the UPDF and, as Finnström (2008, 227) writes, gave “the court 
procedures a high degree of arbitrariness when imposed upon Ugandan realities... [T]he Court's 
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mandate and principle of gravity makes little sense to my Ugandan friends.” In the case of Uganda, the 
political decision was to take sides: to indict LRA commanders and leave the UPDF and GoU free to 
proclaim their innocence.  
The effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict processes in northern Uganda were, in 
large part, a result of the ICC's selective prosecution of the LRA. As explored in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
arrest warrants for the senior LRA officials propelled a narrative of a tyrannical LRA fighting a 
benevolent GoU. While the LRA sought to challenge this asymmetrical narrative at the Juba peace 
talks, negotiations were hindered because Kony and Otti would not lead the LRA's delegation and 
because both sides – the LRA and the GoU – never appeared to genuinely commit to peace 
negotiations. The dominant conflict narrative has been left largely unchallenged and permeates post-
conflict justice in northern Uganda.  
 The political interests of the GoU and the institutional interests of the ICC converged in 2003. 
As a result, the Court intervened but did so selectively, pursuing only the LRA while neglecting UPDF 
crimes. But this convergence of interests did not last forever. Divisions emerged during the Juba talks 
when the GoU publicly toyed with the idea of negotiating away the arrests warrants for the LRA senior 
command. Moreover, President Museveni has recently been amongst the most vociferous of the ICC's 
critics, exclaiming that it is a neo-colonialist institution bent on unfairly targeting African states. This 
has left many in the OTP “furious, not only because they risk seeing their historic first case reduced too 
far, but because they launched the inquiry at the request of the Ugandan government, which is now 
accusing the ICC of neo-colonialism.” (see McGreal 2007; Bosco 2014, 126).   
 
Given the OTP's decision-making, it seems impossible that the ICC would target the GoU now 
for crimes committed during the war in northern Uganda. Doing so would give the Court the 
appearance of having purposefully not targeted the UPDF – and investigators would receive no 
cooperation from a belligerently anti-ICC Museveni. 
 
(ii) The ICC Intervention in Libya  
Few could have foreseen that Libya would emerge as a target for an ICC intervention or that, within 
just three months of being asked to investigate alleged atrocities in the country, the Court would issue 
arrest warrants against its head of state, Muammar Gaddafi, his son and heir apparent Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi and the country's head of intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi. In fact, the ICC itself was 
unprepared with poor Arabic language outreach and a shortage of Arabic-speaking lawyers (See ICC 
Launches Campaign 2011). The Court's lack of preparedness was hardly without reason. The idea of an 
222 
 
Arab or Middle Eastern state becoming a situation under the ICC's jurisdiction did not seem feasible 
prior to the Arab Spring of 2011. Since the Court's creation, the relationship between the Arab world 
and the ICC had been one of the more neglected subjects in the study of international criminal justice.
60
 
This changed with surprising speed. 
 The ICC was eager to accept the Security Council's referral of the situation in Libya, an act 
which was seen as an opportunity to capture international attention and to have an impact on an 
ongoing conflict. According to one senior official (confidential interview 2013f), the OTP “focused on 
what we saw as an incredible step of a unanimous referral... [it] felt like a legitimizing step.” As noted 
in Chapter 6, UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, 
was passed with the backdrop of unprecedented regional and state support for action against the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya.  The referral was seen as a legitimizing act for the ICC and was roundly 
praised by proponents of the Court. Observers highlighted, in particular, that it had been passed with 
unprecedented efficiency and was authorized unanimously by all members of the Security Council (see, 
e.g., Amnesty International 2011a; Coalition for the International Criminal Court 2011; Human Rights 
Watch 2011a; RNW International Justice 2011). Amnesty International (2011a), for example, 
exclaimed that the unanimous “referral of Libya to the International Criminal Court marks a historic 
moment in accountability for crimes under international law,” while Geoffrey Robertson called it a 
“great milestone in international criminal justice.” (See Chatham House 2011, 3). For advocates and 
champions of the Court, Resolution 1970 no doubt contained many important advances for the ICC. A 
number of key powers who were not ICC member-states, including China, Russia, the United States 
and India, voted in favour of the Resolution. The United States not only voted in favour of referring 
Libya to the ICC but co-sponsored the Resolution.  
 Still, Resolution 1970 had deeply political contours. As detailed in Chapter 4, the referral 
included provisions barring the Court from investigating citizens of non-ICC member-states, a 
reference to the Security Council's ability to intervene and stop any ICC investigation or prosecution 
via Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and restricted the Court from investigating any alleged atrocities 
prior to 15 February 2011. Moreover, the referral saddled the ICC with any and all costs incurred by its 
investigations in Libya. But these issues were not a source of apprehension for the OTP. Christian 
Wenaweser, the former President of the Assembly of States Parties, stated that there was “pretty much 
everything wrong” with the language in Resolution 197061 while his predecessor, Bruno Stagno Ugarte 
                                                 
60 For a notable exception, see Roach 2006, 137-158. 
61 Comments by Christian Wenawaser at conference, Through the Lens of Nuremberg – The 
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(2012) wrote that language in both Resolutions 1593 and 1970 was “inimical to the integrity of the 
Rome Statute.” However, as one OTP source (2013f) explains: there were “few concerns” within the 
office over the terms of Resolution 1970. The OTP was not blind to the conditions imposed in 
Resolution 1970, but to complain would be “like getting great gift on birthday and then complaining 
about the wrapping paper.” (ibid.). Others felt that to complain would be tantamount to political 
advocacy. As one OTP staff member (confidential interview 2013c) explains, 
If we advocate politically for a broader referral from the Council, in terms of territorial 
jurisdiction (more than Darfur) or temporal jurisdiction (earlier than 15 February 2011, 
as with Libya) or personal jurisdiction (not excluding any nationals of non-States 
Parties, for example), where do we draw the line in our advocacy? We have to be very 
careful about what we advocate for, lest we be accused of playing a political role. 
 
In accepting the referral and opening an investigation, the Prosecutor could also “demonstrate unity 
with the international community.” (ibid.). One former OTP staff member (confidential interview 
2014c) recalls that the office was “abuzz” about the opportunity of playing an active role in ongoing 
events in Libya.  
 If the ICC was going to have any impact on the situation in Libya and thus prove its utility to 
the international community, it had to proceed expeditiously. The Court had to capitalize on the 
Council's referral – and the nominal unity behind its purpose. As a matter of prosecutorial strategy, the 
OTP deliberately chose to proceed rapidly. According to a staff member (confidential interview 2013f), 
the Prosecutor  “thought that he had to [move quickly] because the international community came to us 
first... [I]f we sit on it, then it's pointless. The signal was to do something... [and] the Prosecutor felt we 
could marginalize the main perpetrators.” At the same time, the Prosecutor understood that 
international support for the Court was unlikely to be permanent or steadfast. Any benefits to the Court 
had to be captured within a narrow window of opportunity. The “idea was, if we act quickly, that we 
would have an effect and support in international community was fragile and fleeting.” (ibid.).  
 From the moment that it accepted the UN Security Council referral, the OTP moved with 
unprecedented speed to open a formal investigation and to request that the Court's Pre-Trial Chamber 
issue arrest warrants. On 3 March 2011, just fifteen days after receiving the referral from the Security 
Council, ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo declared that crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court had 
been perpetrated in Libya. Two months later, Moreno-Ocampo declared that “[c]rimes against 
humanity have been and continue to be committed in Libya, attacking unarmed civilians including 
                                                                                                                                                                       
International Court at its Tenth Anniversary, Nuremberg, Germany, (October 5, 2012) 
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killings and persecutions in many cities across Libya” (ICC 2011). Just days after, Moreno-Ocampo 
requested that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issue arrest warrants for Gaddafi, Saif and Senussi, and on 
27 June, less than four months after the OTP opened its formal investigation, the Court had issued 
arrest warrants for all three. 
 While the speed with which the Prosecutor proceeded surprised some human rights advocates 
(Abrahams 2013), the decision to proceed so expeditiously reflected the desire of the OTP to have an 
impact on a fast-developing conflict. But to have the desired effect, the Prosecutor also judged that he 
would have to target NATO's adversaries in Libya – i.e. key figures of the Gaddafi regime. Moreno-
Ocampo was very quick to name his targets. During a press conference announcing the opening of an 
official investigation, the Prosecutor exclaimed: 
We identify some individuals with de facto or formal authority who have authority, 
authority on the security forces who allegedly committed the crimes. They are 
Muammar al-Gaddafi, his inner circle including some of his sons who had de facto 
authority. (See Libya Situation 2011). 
 
This early invocation of the responsibility of Gaddafi, his sons and key officials was legally 
questionable (Knoops 2012) and was subsequently raised by defence counsel at the ICC (See Keïta 
(2011). Moreover, according to Fred Abrahams (2013), Moreno-Ocampo's public focus and “proclivity 
for media dramatics, in my view, undermined his credibility as a Prosecutor.” Abrahams (2013) further 
criticizes the timing of the warrants, suggesting that the haste with which they were issued left the 
Court vulnerable to criticisms that the ICC was being manipulated by the intervening forces in Libya: 
The timing of the indictment was problematic and Ocampo's dramatics were 
problematic. Because it happened so fast, it opened the Court and more broadly, 
international justice mechanisms, up to criticisms of politicization because the speed 
with which it happened and the quick indictments against a targeted enemy of major 
western powers had that impact... [It is] a tricky [situation] because if they've got the 
goods, they should do it – they shouldn't pull punches. But in this case, one has to 
recognize that it is one of the side effects that the ICC could more easily be criticized 
for serving a political interest. 
 
Moving so expeditiously also appears to have locked the OTP into targeting Gaddafi officials. As an 
OTP member of staff (confidential interview 2013f) states, the Prosecutor was interested in “charging 
someone where the narrative makes sense” and it did with the “long history of Gaddafi's criminal 
conduct.” Again, the conception of the Gaddafi regime as being 'evil' preceded the ICC's intervention. 
And while it should be conceded that Moreno-Ocampo (see Libya Situation 2011) also declared that “if 
opposition groups commit crimes, their leaders will also be investigated,” his statements ultimately 
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contributed to the framing of the conflict as one in which the key perpetrators were to be found within 
the Gaddafi regime.  
 The Prosecutor's selectivity fits within the above analysis regarding the ICC's institutional 
interests and, more specifically, the desire to be seen as effective and to be legitimized by the Security 
Council. As one former senior ICC official argues, targeting individuals or groups supported by the 
Security Council and NATO – i.e. the rebels or the National Transitional Council – could have 
undermined the Court's interests. The Prosecutor's selectivity in Libya “has to do with the desire to 
illustrate to the Security Council that this can be a good thing .... [I]f you start to indict those that 
permanent members say are wonderful and are the future of the country, then perhaps you won't 
demonstrate how good of a court you are.” (Confidential interview 2013e). In response to a question 
regarding the case selection, another ICC staff member (confidential interview 2013f) explained: “in all 
these decisions, you need to think about building our legitimacy.”  
 The ICC's selectivity in only targeting the Gaddafi regime had important effects on the conflict 
narrative and the attitudes and incentives of the warring parties towards peace. The regime was 
delegitimized, Gaddafi once again considered 'evil' and beyond the pale of redemption – or negotiation. 
The legitimacy of rebels and their political wing, the National Transitional Council, was bolstered and 
they were also able to tap into the rhetoric provided to them by an internationally ostracized regime in 
their refusal to hold peace talks with Gaddafi. They could not negotiate with the regime because, after 
all, it was now led by a tyrannical international criminal. This further legitimized calls – by NATO 
states as well as the Libyan opposition –  for regime change and military solutions to defeat the Gaddafi 
regime (see Kersten 2014a). This 'good' versus 'evil' narrative has continued into the post-conflict 
period in Libya where individuals affiliated with the regime are the targets of assassinations and laws 
such as the Political Isolation Law. Crimes committed by opposition forces, however, have not only 
been largely ignored; the rebels and militia have been absolved from responsibility via a blanket 
amnesty covering acts committed in the name of the Revolution.  
 As for the OTP, it was soon left in a very difficult position. As noted in Chapter 6, it is not clear 
how strong the Court's cases against Saif or Senussi were. Abrahams (2013) observes that the 
“difficulty of conducting investigations in Libya makes it possible that their dossier is thin.” Evidence 
could have been provided by the third-party states which were intervening in Libya. However, it 
quickly became clear that powerful actors would not lend it support if it pursued the surrender of Saif 
or Senussi. At almost the same time as the warrants were issued, NATO states had made it known that 
justice was up to Libyans to achieve (see Kersten 2014a and 2014c). The farthest these states went in 
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supporting the Court's mandate was to claim that they “encourage Libya to continue cooperating with” 
the ICC (Kersten 2014c). As one former ICC staff member notes (confidential interview 2013e), 
impressing the Security Council didn't work in Libya. In the end, “[i]t didn't work at all. The Council 
stopped being interested in [the ICC].” In response, and as noted in Chapter 7, instead of pushing for 
the cases, the OTP was remarkably lenient, generally siding with Libya that it should prosecute Saif 
and Senussi. The OTP has sought to frame its work in Libya in the context of positive complementarity, 
whereby it sees its role as contributing to rather than competing with Libya's pursuit of accountability. 
Positive complementarity provides the means with which to save face – as well as to support the 
Libyan people's desire to have perpetrators prosecuted in Libya, by Libyans. These developments fit 
well within Sarah Nouwen's (2013, 13-14) analysis of when the OTP will encourage domestic 
proceedings and when it will push for trials in The Hague: 
In accordance with what it perceives to serve its institutional interests (legitimacy and, 
what it prioritises even more, effectiveness), [the OTP] has encouraged domestic 
proceedings in those situations and cases in which cooperation is unlikely to be 
forthcoming, in which intervention would upset an international great power and in 
which it has not yet invested many resources. But it has discouraged domestic 
proceedings in situations and cases where it could count on essential cooperation, 
which have obtained the blessing – or at least a no objection certificate – from the 
world's great powers and in which it has invested its resources. 
 
At the same time and as noted in Chapter 7, the OTP has moved on from the Libya situation and 
avoided opening any new cases in Libya. Despite some statements suggesting the ICC may still 
investigate alleged crimes committed by Libyan militias (see, e.g., Statement of the Prosecutor 2013), 
there is no sign that those investigations will result in the opening of an official investigation, let alone 
arrest warrants. 
 The referral of Libya signalled an unprecedented, albeit temporary, convergence of interests 
between the Security Council (and especially the NATO states that intervened) and the ICC. When the 
ICC received the Council's referral, Moreno-Ocampo calculated that the Court had to seize the 
moment. Whether it was an extension of his discretion or external political expectations (and most 
likely some combination of both), the Prosecutor did precisely what the UN Security Council and 
Libyan rebels would have wanted: he moved quickly to target and criminalize their opponents – the 
Gaddafi regime. What followed were failed attempts to get the parties to the negotiating table, a loss of 
interest in the ICC's mandate to prosecute Saif and Senussi in The Hague, and, after the UNSC loss of 




IV. Conclusion: Behind the Veneer 
How the ICC affects peace, justice and conflict processes is determined by who the Court targeted for 
prosecution and who it didn't. Which side of a conflict is targeted for investigation and prosecution by 
the ICC is a determining factor in the effects of the Court's interventions on ongoing and active 
conflicts. In northern Uganda, only non-state actors (the LRA) were targeted, despite widespread 
acknowledgement that the Government and the Ugandan military were also responsible for atrocities. 
In doing so, it propelled an asymmetric conflict narrative, galvanized the LRA's interest in peace talks, 
impacted the LRA's delegation at Juba, and affected the choice of Juba for peace negotiations. In 
Libya, only Gaddafi regime figures were pursued by the ICC, while the alleged crimes committed by 
rebels have been left uninvestigated. This too (re)produced an asymmetric conflict narrative, one which 
legitimated a military solution to the conflict, the opposition's rejection of negotiations with the regime 
and the ultimate aim of regime change. The ICC would not have had these effects on peace, justice and 
conflict if both sides of the conflicts in Libya and northern Uganda had been targeted.  
 More broadly, the specific selectivity that flows from self-referrals and Security Council 
referrals risks creating particular types of asymmetry in how a conflict is understood and, in turn, 
affects how peace processes can (or can't) move forward (see Chart 8.1 above). This chapter has sought 
to explain from where this selectivity derives, arguing that the selection of prosecutorial targets is 
linked to how situations are referred to the ICC and the consequent negotiation between the interests of 
referring parties to have their adversaries targeted by the Court and ICC's own institutional interests: 
cooperation for case-building; cooperation for the enforcement of arrest warrants; and the desire to be 
perceived as an effective institution. 
 This chapter should not be read as a criticism of the ICC. Acknowledging the politics of the 
Court or that the OTP considers the Court's institutional interests in deciding who to prosecute is not an 
indictment of its decision-making but an attempt to understand it. Without considering how its 
decision-making would affirm its legitimacy and standing in international politics, the Court would not 
survive for very long.  
 The purpose of the above analysis was to answer the question: why does the ICC have the 
effects that it does on the conflicts in which it intervenes? What followed was a critical examination of 
the Court in an attempt to understand and explain the reasons for its decision-making, what factors 
determine the OTP's selection of targets, and how this decision-making determines its effects on peace, 
justice and conflict processes. The ICC's effects stem from decisions made within the Court on how to 
intervene in ongoing and active conflicts and, specifically, who to target. This is an important finding as 
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it points to the fact that different decisions within the Court can have different impacts on peace, justice 







Chapter 9 – Conclusion  
If you have a system of international justice you've got to follow through on it. If in some 
cases that's going to make peace negotiations difficult that may be the price that has to 
be paid. The international community must keep a firm line and say are we going to have 
a better world because of the international court or not. – Richard Goldstone (quoted in 
McGreal 2007) 
 
The ICC indisputably forms part of a broader, global diplomatic network of international 
politics – Antonio Cassese (2006, 8)  
 
Introduction 
While there is no doubt that the ICC has complicated efforts to peacefully resolve active and ongoing 
conflicts, it remains unclear whether the ICC is ultimately a help or hindrance to peace processes. Still, 
it is possible to offer some concluding reflections about the ICC's impact.  
 This thesis has sought to answer three questions:  
 
(i)  How should we study the effects of the ICC on the conflicts in which it intervenes? 
(ii) What are the effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict processes in northern Uganda and 
Libya?  
(iii)Why does the ICC have these effects on peace, justice and conflict processes? 
 
This concluding chapter revisits how the thesis answered these research questions. In the first and 
second sections, the key empirical findings of the thesis are outlined. The primary effects of the ICC's 
interventions in Libya and northern Uganda are summarized in this section as well as in Charts 9.1 and 
9.2 respectively. These sections also briefly consider the current state of affairs in Libya and northern 
Uganda as well as prospects for further ICC involvement. In lieu of a traditional comparative analysis, 
the third section of the chapter draws on insights from both the Libyan and northern Ugandan cases to 
reflect on each aspect of the thesis' analytical framework, highlighting where future research should be 
focused as well as offering some practice-oriented conclusions.  
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I. The ICC in northern Uganda  
The ICC's intervention into northern Uganda has had mixed effects on peace, justice and conflict 
processes (see Chart 9.1). The Court's intervention, insofar as it targeted only the LRA and not the 
GoU, entrenched an already potent narrative that the conflict was caused by the LRA and that Joseph 
Kony was personally liable for the crimes and atrocities committed during the war. The political causes 
and dynamics were obfuscated in favour of a view of the conflict as humanitarian crisis for which the 
LRA was solely responsible. This benefitted the GoU and delegitimized the LRA. 
 
Chart 9.1: The Effects of the ICC's Intervention in northern Uganda 
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 Unlike the prediction of critics that the ICC dissolves the incentives to negotiate peace, the LRA 
high command responded to the ICC's intervention by exploring negotiations and saw peace talks as an 
opportunity to challenge the dominant conflict narrative. There is also evidence that they also saw the 
relative calm of peace talks as a opportunity to regroup and rearm. The GoU, on the other hand, was 
compelled to demonstrate a commitment to the Juba negotiations for reasons other than the ICC. In 
particular, the GoU needed to rescue its image which had been stained by its inability to resolve the war 
with the LRA as well as images of large-scale suffering in the north.  
 How to achieve justice and accountability received privileged attention in the Juba talks' 
agenda. This was particularly noteworthy as it had not formed part of previous rounds of negotiations 
between the LRA and the GoU. Both delegations agreed to the creation of a division of Uganda's High 
Court which could investigate and prosecute international crimes relating to the conflict. As noted in 
Chapter 6, this was done, at least in part, as a potential means to confront the ICC warrants via a 
complementarity challenge. But there is no evidence that either Kony or the LRA high command 
accepted the creation of the War Crimes Division and there is every indication that it was set up to 
prosecute only the LRA – and not UPDF perpetrators. This division in what the LRA delegation 
negotiated and what the LRA high command approved is symptomatic of the divide between the two. 
From the outset of the Juba talks, the representativeness of the LRA delegation was in question. Citing 
their fears over being arrested and sent to the ICC, both Kony and LRA second-in-command Vincent 
Otti refused to participate directly at Juba. During the talks, many delegates sought to pursue their own 
interests and delegation discipline suffered. The talks received a severe blow when Otti was killed on 
suspicion that he was privately negotiating with the GoU. While the negotiations produced several 
agreements between the delegations, neither Kony nor President Museveni ultimately decided to sign 
the comprehensive peace agreement. Questions remain as to whether they ever intended to do so – 
irrespective of the ICC warrants. 
 There is strong evidence that the GoU was never fully or genuinely committed to negotiating a 
comprehensive peace with the LRA. Figures within the Government and the UPDF benefitted 
significantly from their continued conflict against the LRA – both monetarily and in terms of the 
legitimacy bestowed upon them for fighting 'evil' terrorists. Engaging in negotiations painted the GoU 
as a willing partner in peace and may have helped restore its reputation. But it is clear that its primary 
intentions were to resolve the war through military means, an approach it quickly returned to upon the 
termination of peace talks (see Atkinson 2009). The Government's ability to legitimize such action was 
only abetted by its ability to blame the LRA for the failure of the peace talks.  
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 There is also evidence that the LRA may likewise have been uninterested in negotiating a 
settlement. The LRA 'bought time' under the veneer and relative security of peace negotiations. 
Moreover, the killing of Otti – who many believe was genuinely interested in finding a lasting peace – 
signalled a death knell for the talks. Even if the ICC warrants were lifted, many insist Kony would not 
have 'come out of the bush'. Crucially, what his fate would be post-Juba was never clarified. In 
explaining why they could not continue to negotiate or sign a comprehensive peace agreement with the 
GoU, the rhetoric of “peace versus justice” was particularly useful for the LRA. Because neither the 
GoU nor the LRA were genuinely committed to a conclusive peace to their war, it cannot be concluded 
that the ICC undermined the potential for peace at Juba. A comprehensive peace was simply not on the 
table.  
 The conflict has not been resolved. Instead, it has been exported to Uganda's neighbours, where 
the LRA remains active. But despite the failure to achieve a final peace agreement, northern Uganda is 
enjoying an unprecedented period of stability. There have been no reported LRA attacks on northern 
Ugandan soil since the conclusion of the Juba negotiations. Thus, the ICC's intervention did not prevent 
peace in northern Uganda, at least insofar as peace can be understood in its negative variant – the 
absence of large-scale physical violence (Galtung 1969). This period of peace may also explain the lack 
of fear that Uganda's first-ever war crimes trial, of former LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo at the 
International Crimes Division (ICD), would undermine stability in the north. However, Kwoyelo's trial 
is also indicative of northern Uganda's asymmetrical conflict narrative being extended into the post-
Juba context. As made clear in Chapter 5, in practice, the ICD will only prosecute the LRA.  
 Today, local interest in the ICC's role in northern Uganda has withered. Other issues, including 
land appropriations (see Mabikke 2011; IRIN 2012), education and development are much higher on 
the political agenda than international justice. According to Atkinson and Titeca (2014), the LRA is 
present in small groups in the CAR, DRC and South Sudan and, since 2010, has “splintered into ever 
smaller, increasingly uncoordinated bands totaling probably less than 200 fighters.” 2010 also marks 
the date of the rebels' last large-scale attack (Ibid; HRW 2010).  
 The relationship between the GoU and the ICC has soured. Museveni is now amongst the most 
virulent critics of the Court (Mao 2013; Mutaizibwa 2013). This is perhaps not surprising. The 
Ugandan President has always had a schizophrenic approach to international justice (see Kersten 
2013a). With the Court's 2010 intervention into Uganda's regional ally and economic power Kenya and 
its targeting of current President Uhuru Kenyatta, Museveni has identified an opportunity to curry 
favour with Nairobi by opposing the ICC. Most ironically given his direct role in negotiating the 
233 
 
Court's intervention into northern Uganda, he has insisted that “[t]he ICC in a shallow, biased way has 
continued to mishandle complex African issues. This is not acceptable.” (See Mugisa 2013).  
 The prospects for a return to peace negotiations are unclear. As Finnstrom (2008, 85) observed: 
“The rhythm of the war in northern Uganda has always been an uneven one.” There is a lull now but 
without a comprehensive peace, there is no promise that the current stability and order will last forever, 
especially if underlying factors are left unresolved and unchallenged. In contrast to Atkinson and 
Titeca, the ICG has warned that the LRA may only be sleeping (see Lesueur).  
 To date, efforts to resolve the war through dialogue have been propelled by a particularly statist 
view of the conflict where the ultimate aim is to get a comprehensive agreement between the LRA and 
the Government of Uganda. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis reiterated the importance of regional actors, 
especially Sudan and South Sudan, but also the DRC and CAR in achieving a lasting peace. A broader 
approach to building peace, one which captures the diversity of actors responsible for both the 
continued crisis and any potential peace, is required. Some of the structural issues in the region – 
especially related to “poor governance” – need to be resolved (Schomerus et al 2011). Moreover, the 
apparent incentives on the part of the GoU to continue its military conflict with the LRA, as discussed 
in Chapter 6, need to be acknowledged – and challenged. As Doom and Vlassenroot (1999, 31) rightly 
noted, “it may be wondered whether a kind of no-peace/no-war situation is not in their favour.” While 
it is common to hear or read about the fact that the conflict between the LRA and the GoU has lasted a 
quarter of a century, perhaps the more telling point is that it has been ongoing almost exactly since 
Museveni came to power. The GoU continues to benefit from this war, in the form of international 
attention and, more recently, a 100-troop force of US soldiers which provide the UPDF with non-lethal 
military aid for the 'hunt for Kony' (Fisher 2011; Keating 2011). To date, these efforts have been futile 
(see Economist 2014b) and, despite rumours that Kony is prepared to surrender, there is no compelling 
evidence that he is planning to do so (see Ronan 2013). Indeed, there is no strong evidence that he 
remains alive. 
 Ultimately, if a lasting peace is to succeed, the conflict narrative in northern Uganda must be 
challenged. It does not appear that this will occur any time soon. Indicative of the staying power of the 
conflict narrative, two of the most respected northern Uganda observers describe the current 'hunt for 
Kony' as the product of “framing the LRA issue as a personal and technical military problem, rather 
than a political one” and one with “a single goal... to catch Kony.” (Titeca and Atkinson 2014). The 
response to Invisible Children's Kony 2012 is also indicative of how stubborn this narrative is (see 
Finnström 2012). Unfortunately, the conflict retains the same narrative – and the same narrators.  
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II. The ICC in Libya 
Few could have foreseen an ICC intervention in Libya in 2011. The regime of Muammar Gaddafi had 
previously been ostracized but, since the early 2000s, had undergone a remarkable political 
rehabilitation. Gaddafi had emerged as an economic ally and partner in the global war on terror. In 
February 2011, however, his forty-year reign began to crumble and civil war erupted. 
 
Chart 9.2: The Effects of the ICC's Intervention in Libya 
235 
 
 The ICC's intervention in Libya had a diversity of effects on the uprising, civil war and post-
conflict / post-Gaddafi period (See Chart 9.2). As noted in Chapter 8, it was made clear, from the outset 
of its intervention, that the OTP would focus on Gaddafi and his senior officials. In doing so, the 
former Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, contributed to framing the conflict as one between 'good' 
(the Libyan opposition and NATO forces) and 'evil' (the Gaddafi regime). As such, it justified both the 
recalcitrance of the Libyan opposition in refusing to negotiate with Gaddafi as well their insistence that 
the regime had to be defeated militarily. It also justified NATO's intervention. This came at some cost. 
The responsibility for rehabilitating Gaddafi and the nefarious political relations of major Western 
states (including the UK and the US) with him have been neglected. The initial cause of the conflict – 
socio-economic and political grievances – were ignored in favour of a view that perceived Gaddafi and 
his regime as the root of all evils in Libya which needed to be excised. The current volatile and violent 
situation in Libya would suggest that the problems within Libya run much deeper than the regime itself 
(see Kirkpatrick 2014).  
 While no official negotiations between the Libyan opposition and the regime took place, a 
number of overtures were made by an array of actors – including the African Union and Turkey – to 
kick-start peaceful dialogue between the warring parties. However, Gaddafi at no point indicated any 
significant interest in negotiating peace and consistently reiterated that he would fight until the death. 
There is no evidence that his attitude towards peace talks was affected by the ICC's intervention. 
Rather, Gaddafi likely viewed the conflict as an existential threat to Libya and himself – which he 
viewed as one and the same. In other words, the direct threat to him was a threat to Libya. The threat 
from the ICC ranked low on his list of concerns in relation to NATO's intervention and his forces losing 
ground to the opposition. The NTC, on the other hand, was able to consistently reject negotiating with 
the 'criminal' Gaddafi. The ICC's intervention appears to have helped them justify their position. In 
rejecting negotiations, the Libyan opposition forces – backed up by NATO – were able to achieve an 
outright military victory over the regime.  
 As argued in Chapter 7, it is unlikely that mediated negotiations could have taken place. The 
interests and behaviour of key actors – the African Union, the Libyan opposition, the intervening 
forces, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Colonel Gaddafi – in committing to a negotiated peace process were 
insufficient and / or never coalesced. Their preconditions and strategies towards the conflict and 
potential peace talks spoiled any potential peace process. As with northern Uganda, then, it cannot be 




 The war in Libya ended in the one-sided military victory of the Libyan opposition. The conflict 
narrative that backlit their victory, and to which the ICC's intervention contributed significantly, has 
been extended into post-conflict / post-Gaddafi Libya. The limitations of the ICC to positively affect 
post-conflict peace or justice have been revealed. Libya is currently mired in a renewed round of 
violence between rival militias. No opposition groups have been held liable, despite evidence of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Moreover, two transitional justice mechanisms passed since the 
end of the civil war illustrate Libya's severely asymmetrical approach to post-conflict accountability: 
the provision of a blanket amnesty to rebel groups and militias for any acts deemed necessary in 
furthering the Libyan revolution and a lustration law – the Political Isolation Law (PIL) – to rid the 
country of any and all public figures associated with the Gaddafi regime. 
 As with northern Uganda, it appears likely that the ICC will be left empty-handed following its 
Libya intervention. Middle-ground options such as an in situ trial by the ICC in Tripoli or a sequencing 
of prosecutions were neglected. Ultimately, judges granted Libya's request to prosecute Abdullah al-
Senussi and, while they ruled that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's case was admissible at the Court and that the 
accused should be surrendered to The Hague, Saif remains in the custody of a Zintani militia which has 
showed no inclination to hand him over – to Tripoli or the ICC. That is not likely to change. As one 
senior diplomat based in Libya (confidential interview 2013g) insists: “I can't see them giving up their 
big card unless it is a big, big reward or they are pummelled into giving him up, but I don't see that 
happening.”  
 This is not to suggest that there are no positive signs or that there are no officials committed to 
ensuring more even-handed justice, respecting human rights and challenging the thuwar. For example, 
when the NTC passed Law 37 in May 2012, which criminalized the “praising or glorifying Muammar 
Gaddafi, his regime, his ideas or his sons” (see ABC 2012), it was challenged by human rights lawyers 
and repealed by the country's Supreme Court for being unconstitutional. More recently, the country's 
Justice Minister, Salah Bashir Margani, was remarkably forthright and honest in his response to a very 
critical assessment of the country's human rights situation by HRW, stating that “the new Libya has so 
far failed expectations of the Libyan people who revolted against the tyranny of the Gaddafi regime in 
the hope that the new Libya would never allow human rights abuses unchecked.” (See Statement by 
Justice Minister of Libya, 2013). Still, positive developments are few and increasingly rare. Original 
grievances continue to be ignored. Three years after the Arab Spring, “the upheavals have so far failed 
to address the demands of millions of ordinary citizens who had clamored for change — for jobs, food, 




 Today, Libya is likely more unstable than any time during the Gaddafi regime prior to 2011. A 
return to civil war is a distinct possibility (Kirkpatrick 2014; Economist 2014a).The promise of a 
revolution leading to the ouster of Gaddafi in combination with a lasting peace has not come to 
fruition: “Libya should have once again achieved peace and stability. Instead, the country, of more than 
six million people, seems to have been fatally destabilized by the war to remove its dictator, and it is 
increasingly out of control.” (see Andersen 2013). And the former regime isn't entirely to blame. While 
“[t]here is no doubt that Qaddafi’s legacy is largely responsible for the post-Qaddafi authorities lacking 
the institutional capacity, leadership style, or collective will to face down their opponents”, “the Libyan 
government’s appeasement of its many adversaries is the root cause of most of Libya’s security, 
economic, and political problems.” (Pack et al 2014, 1, 6). 
 Today, it is common to hear Libya described as “lawless” (see, e.g. Chothia 2014). In reference 
to Chinua Achebe's 1958 classic, a recent report on Libya by the Economist (2014c) was entitled 
“Things Fall Apart”. In addition to former regime officials, human rights advocates have been 
assassinated (Hilsum 2014). Torture and arbitrary detention by various militias is common-place and, 
according to the ICG, Libya's “trial by error” approach to post-conflict justice has triggered “more 
grievances, further undermining confidence in the state.” (ICG 2013). As noted in Chapter 6, during its 
forty years in power, the Gaddafi regime had systematically eroded the roots of state institutions. When 
the regime collapsed, those institutions had to be rebuilt. Doing so has proven remarkably difficult and 
has been undermined by the continued political prominence of militias and criminal networks (Shaw 
and Mangan 2014). As Hisham Matar (2013) argues, “Libyans used to be afraid of a brutal state; now 
they are afraid of the absence of the state.” 
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III. The Effects of the ICC on Peace, Conflict and Justice Processes 
In identifying and analyzing the effects of the ICC's interventions on peace, conflict and justice 
processes, it becomes clear that certain aspects are made more relevant than they otherwise would be 
and that, in many cases, the key issues which scholars focus on are not as positively or negatively 
affected by the Court as typically portrayed. The ICC can have a multiplier effect, heightening the 
importance and bringing hitherto relatively minor or less considered issues to the fore. Not all of the 
ICC's effects are direct. Some of the Court's impacts, such as its effects on post-conflict narratives in 
Libya and northern Uganda and on delegation discipline in the case of the LRA may be indirect. At the 
same time, it is critical not to over-read or over-state the effects of the Court. There is an ongoing risk 
of inappropriately isolating ICC decisions and ascribing causal effects to them. The thesis has sought to 
take into account not only instances where the ICC may have minimal or no impact (such as how it 
affected Gaddafi's strategic thinking and potential commitment to peace negotiations), but also where 
the ICC's effects need to be considered alongside other developments (such as the Court's effects on 
bringing the LRA to the negotiating table in the wake of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between 
South Sudan and Sudan).  
 In addition to amplifying the relevance of certain dynamics and issues, it is also evident that the 
ICC's effects on peace, justice in conflict processes are shaped, even determined, by who is targeted for 
prosecution – and who isn't. There is very little understanding of why the ICC has the effects that it 
does and what drives its decision-making. Chapter 8 sought to outline the institutional self-interests of 
the ICC in order to explain the Court's tendency to intervene against one side of an ongoing conflict. 
But there is a continued need to go behind the veneer to ascertain why the OTP, in particular, does what 
it does – namely, why it selects specific situations to investigate (and not others) and why it selects 
specific individuals or parties to prosecute (and not others). Doing so can help elucidate the relationship 
between decision-making within the OTP and the effects the Court ultimately has on peace, justice and 
conflict processes. More research, especially research done through embedded participant observation, 
is needed to fully understand the practices within the Court and how the OTP's decision-making, in 
particular, shapes the effects the Court has on the conflict situations it investigates. Prosecutorial 
decision-making is constrained and negotiated within the context of international politics. It seeks to 
reaffirm the Court as a legitimate and effective institution and to improve its chances of successfully 
investigating crimes and having arrest warrants enforced. How this plays out shapes how the Court 
affects the peace, conflict and justice processes of the states and situations in which it intervenes. 
Future research on the Court should focus not only on what effects the ICC has but why and how it has 
239 
 
these effects.  
 This rest of this section offers concluding reflections on the ICC's effects on each of the issues 
and dynamics that constituted the thesis' analytical framework. It identifies where further research is 
needed and, where appropriate, offers some practice-oriented suggestions for moving forward. 
 
Conflict Narratives  
The preeminent effect of ICC interventions on ongoing and active conflicts is on conflict narratives – 
the dominant understanding of the causes and drivers of violence, who is responsible for the conflict 
and how the conflict should be resolved. State actors and international organizations are interested in 
utilizing the ICC to frame their conflicts. For the GoU, the ICC's involvement and its targeting of the 
LRA has legitimated it and boosted its reputation. In Libya, it legitimized the opposition and NATO's 
military intervention. In both cases, non-targeted parties (the GoU; Libya and NATO) were able to use 
the ICC to legitimate their military aims against their targeted enemies (the LRA; the Gaddafi regime). 
In other words, there is a correlation between targets of judicial intervention and targets of military 
operations. There is a risk that the ICC not only acts to attribute responsibility and achieve 
accountability but provides support for military targeting decisions.  
 That ICC interventions shape conflict narratives may be inevitable. However, the specific way 
in which it contributes to the framing of conflicts is not. As noted above, it depends, in particular, on 
who the Prosecutor decides to target for investigation and prosecution. The cases that this thesis has 
focused on – Libya and northern Uganda – are instances where only one side of a conflict is targeted by 
the ICC, creating a fundamentally asymmetrical understanding of violence and responsibility in each. 
In both cases, observers suggested that the targeted parties would fight to the bitter end, thus 
prolonging violence. However, in both Libya (the opposition) and northern Uganda (the GoU), the 
resolve of the non-targeted parties to seek a military solution to the war was bolstered by the ICC's 
intervention. This is an important finding insofar as it suggests that military solutions to conflicts may 
be less likely in situations where both sides are targeted by the Court.  
 It is important to note that the ICC did not create a 'good vs evil' narrative in either Libya or 
northern Uganda. Such a narrative preceded ICC intervention in both situations. This raises another 
pressing question: can the ICC intervene in a conflict where there is no dominant narrative elevating 
one side as 'good' and another as 'evil'? How the ICC impacts or entrenches dominant conflict 
narratives and how this, in turn, affects peace, justice and conflict processes requires further and 
continuous analysis. This is particularly the case if the ultimate aim of peace processes is conflict 
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transformation and thus to transform the relationships and discourses between warring parties (see 
Miall 2004, 4). 
 
Attitudes and Incentives of Warring Parties 
Will parties to a conflict be able to challenge a narrative they view as unfair or biased? Will they be 
able to redefine their relationship? Can they transform their conflict into one which is expressed 
through peaceful dialogue and contestation rather than violence? The potential for warring parties to 
commit to a peace process (even if they do not do so fully or genuinely) is dependent on the nature of 
the conflict narrative and how warring parties relate and respond to it. This does not mean that a 
conflict narrative that is heavily biased against one party will necessarily result in their precluding a 
commitment to peace talks. In the case of northern Uganda, it was shown that the conflict narrative 
heavily favours and legitimates the GoU, ascribing responsibility for atrocities and the conflict itself to 
the 'evil' LRA. However, this did not preclude the LRA from entering negotiations. Rather, as outlined 
in Chapter 4, the LRA explored and at least nominally committed itself to the Juba peace process as a 
means to challenge the dominant discourse regarding responsibility for violence and atrocity during its 
war with the GoU. In contrast, the conflict narrative in Libya bolstered the ability of the Libyan 
opposition to reject any commitment to peace negotiations with the 'criminal' Gaddafi regime.  
 Scholars and analysts should not assume that the attitudes and incentives of warring parties are 
the same across cases. It is insufficient to suggest that targeted parties will “fight to their death” 
irrespective of whether they are non-state actors or state actors and whether they are senior actors or 
mid-level officials. We may not know what incentivises specific leaders of rebel groups or 
governments, but the assumption that they follow the same logics needs to be scrutinized. Joseph Kony 
is not Muammar Gaddafi and it should not be assumed that, just because of the ICC issues arrest 
warrants against them, their attitudes and incentives towards negotiating peace will be the same.  
 It is also clear from this thesis' analysis of the ICC's effects that the role of contextual factors, 
especially the interests and involvement of third parties, are too often neglected. It should be expected 
that the ICC not only affects the active participants in a conflict but also third parties with vested 
interests in the conflict – including sponsors (such as South Sudan and Sudan in northern Uganda) and 
intervening actors (such as NATO in Libya). More research is needed to understand how interventions 
by the ICC affect these actors, justify their positions vis-à-vis the conflict in question, influence their 




Timing of Negotiations  
With regards to Mutually Hurting Stalemates, the question that arises is whether ICC interventions 
induce or undermine such stalemates from emerging. The ICC's effects on timing are heightened by the 
fact that the Court has, as demonstrated in Chapter 8, generally only targeted one side of a conflict. 
This proclivity need not necessarily undermine the Court's contribution to the emergence of a Mutually 
Hurting Stalemate. However, evidence from the cases of Libya and Uganda suggests that the Court 
tends to intervene in a way that supports and legitimates the stronger (or strengthening) belligerent over 
the weaker (or weakening) side. In Libya, the opposition, which was backed by a NATO-led mission, 
benefitted from the ICC targeting the Gaddafi regime. In northern Uganda, the ICC targeted the LRA 
which is, militarily, no match for the GoU and UPDF. How the ICC relates to the power dynamics 
between belligerents is an issue that this thesis has, for reasons of time and space, not covered 
explicitly. But it is crucial to determining whether and how the ICC can ever induce the creation of ripe 
moments where parties mutually recognize and are attracted to the potential of a negotiated peace. 
 
Location of Negotiations  
The decision of where to hold peace negotiations is undoubtedly important to their outcome. Not every 
location is best suited for peace talks. In situations where the ICC intervenes, the importance of 
deciding where to hold talks is amplified. Targeted parties will find it difficult to negotiate on the 
territory of an ICC member-state, particularly if the targeted party is a non-state actor. 
 If a goal of international conflict resolution is that key parties to a conflict participate in 
negotiations, then finding the right spaces to do so is crucial. Ironically, these spaces may need to be 
protected from ICC jurisdiction or interference by the very international community that supposedly 
supports the Court. To a certain extent, this has already occurred. Doha, Qatar has played host to peace 
negotiations regarding the war in Darfur as well as negotiations between the US and the Taliban (Sudan 
Tribune 2013; Graham-Harrison 2013). In a world where proscription (in the case of the Taliban) and 
potential prosecution (in the case of the Khartoum leadership) are increasingly common-place, 
mediators may seek to shift their focus away from Western sites of negotiations like Geneva towards 
other locales where the ICC is less likely to have an influence. As a non-member of the ICC, states like 
Qatar may be able to offer indicted parties security in the knowledge that the country has no legal 
obligations to surrender suspects to The Hague. However, more research is needed on whether Qatar 
(or other states like it) can actually provide adequate and impartial spaces for negotiation and whether 
there are any contexts in which indictees should be directly negotiated with – irrespective of where 
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negotiations are held.  
 
Mediation Strategies to get Parties to the Negotiation Table 
More clarity is needed on what mediation strategies are conducive to getting warring parties to the 
negotiation table in cases where the ICC has intervened. As a first step, a more consistent and 
comprehensive dialogue between mediators and practitioners of international criminal justice needs to 
take place. International criminal justice has often been presented as a fait accompli to negotiators. In a 
2009 interview, for example, former Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo spoke of how Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir could not be negotiated with and that mediators have to 'deal with it': “Mr. 
Bashir could not be an option for [negotiations on] Darfur. I believe negotiators have to learn how to 
adjust to the reality. The court is a reality.” (See Allen 2009). This establishes neither respect nor 
respectful dialogue between those engaged in the project of international conflict resolution and those 
committed to the project of international criminal justice. 
 Compounding matters, international mediators and negotiators do not have adequate rules to 
guide their engagement with ICC indictees (see Kersten 2013b; Lynch 2013). The UN Guidelines 
briefly discussed in Chapter 3 remain insufficient and convoluted. Without greater clarity (as a product 
of an honest and fair debate between mediators and jurists), engaging in negotiations with individuals 
who may be indicted by the ICC or other tribunals will continue to be haphazard and piecemeal – 
satisfying no one. Again, in order to achieve clarity on guidelines for negotiating with alleged 
perpetrators, there is a need to get those with experience – in international criminal justice and conflict 
resolution – into the same room. Additionally, scholars of conflict and peace studies need to better 
integrate questions of justice and accountability into their research agendas. As shown in Chapter 3, 
while this process has begun, more can – and needs – to be done. Lastly, it would be a welcome 
development if the ICC increased its capacity to analyze the conflicts in which it previously intervened. 
To date, it has not conducted stock-taking on the impact of interventions on ongoing and active 
conflicts. As a result, the Court's ability to learn from previous experiences is limited.  
 
Delegation Composition 
The process of inclusion and exclusion is an important element in peace negotiations. In conflicts 
where the ICC has intervened, deciding who gets a seat at the negotiating table is an issue whose 
importance is heightened. Should indicted actors take an active role in negotiations? If not, who should 
take their place and is it possible to ensure that they truly represent their leaders? 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, proponents of international criminal justice maintain not only that 
wanted criminals should not participate in peace talks, but that international criminal law helps to 
ensure that they do not. However, in some cases, it may simply be unfeasible to proceed with 
negotiations if indicted individuals are unable to participate. The ICC issues arrest warrants only for 
those “most responsible” for international crimes. As a result, it is bound to target senior state and non-
state actors, precisely the types of individuals who need to endorse and, at least at some point, 
participate in the process. If it is simply unacceptable that such actors participate in negotiations, then 
mediators need to develop novel strategies to deal with this. One such strategy may be to build trust 
and provide training for mid-level combatants prior to peace negotiations so that they can emerge as 
feasible and capable representatives. Where responsibility over peace talks is delegated to 
representatives of ICC indictees, as it was in the LRA delegation during the Juba peace negotiations, it 
is crucial that third parties monitor the delegation's behaviour and capacity to genuinely represent the 
positions and interests of their leadership. The discipline of delegations is critical to ensuring that the 
process retains the trust of the most senior actors. Its erosion is a significant danger to peace talks.  
 
The Agenda of Peace Talks 
It is unclear in which cases justice might be placed on the agenda of peace negotiations, why it might 
be done, and whether the ICC will have a direct impact on its inclusion. In some cases, like the Juba 
peace talks, it is clear that the parties – especially the targeted parties – will want to deal with justice. 
However, including justice and accountability on the agenda of negotiations does not tell us whether 
the intention is to negotiate ICC arrest warrants 'away', whether its presence is a result of external 
pressure (by mediators or other third parties), or whether there is a genuine interest in achieving post-
conflict accountability. More research needs to be done on what determines the presence of justice as 
an agenda item in peace talks.  
 It also remains unclear when matters of justice and accountability should be addressed. Should 
they be dealt with during talks or should they be dealt with afterwards? Should they be addressed first 
or should other issues which could potentially build trust between the parties and confidence in the 
process be agreed to first? Here it is important to remember that, unless their target dies or they are 
tried and acquitted, arrest warrants are permanent and cannot be revoked once they are issued. This 
creates a certain structural inflexibility if parties seek to deal with warrants during negotiations. In 
northern Uganda, for example, despite assurances from the GoU that the warrants for senior members 
of the LRA could be withdrawn, they were not. Other belligerents in similar situations may 'learn' from 
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this experience and be more skeptical of attempting to enter negotiations in order to have warrants 
dropped or prosecutions deferred.  
 
Were Peace Talks about Peace? 
As noted in Chapter 3, violent political conflicts increasingly lead to negotiations rather than conclude 
in a one-sided military victory. It should thus be expected that negotiations affect the rationale and 
strategic positions of warring parties. It may be that, in many cases, entering peace negotiations 
represents a strategic decision to continue conflict rather than a concerted commitment to end or 
transform the war in question. This certainly appears to have been the case for the LRA and the GoU 
where, as argued in Chapter 5, neither party appeared fully and genuinely committed to a 
comprehensive peace agreement.  
 Asking whether peace talks were actually about peace is crucial – and not just for those seeking 
to absolve the ICC of responsibility for the failure of peace negotiations. Querying the intentions and 
behaviours of warring parties forces researchers to consider the array of factors which may affect the 
potential of negotiations to succeed or fail – irrespective of ICC interventions. As suggested at the 
outset of this section, there is an ever-present danger in 'not seeing the forest for the trees' and over-
stating the role, importance and impact of the ICC. It would be useful for future research to examine 
non-cases of ICC interventions – situations which clearly warrant an ICC intervention but where the 
Court cannot intervene, such as Syria. These cases should be critically analyzed to assess what effects 
the ICC might have and whether many of the predicted outcomes of ICC interventions, as represented 
by the tropes of the peace-justice debate (deterrence, failed negotiations, prolonged violence, etc.), 
persist without ICC intervention.  
 
Implementation of Post-Conflict Accountability Mechanisms  
Both the Libyan and northern Ugandan cases confirm that how a conflict concludes will have a 
significant impact on the accountability mechanisms and approaches to justice that are subsequently 
implemented and pursued. But in neither case was the dominant conflict narrative, which the ICC's 
interventions helped to propagate, redrawn. Instead, post-conflict mechanisms and approaches to 
justice tended to affirm the dominant narratives of responsibility for violence. In the case of Libya, 
where the opposition and rebel forces achieved an outright military victory, this is unsurprising. The 
decision to amnesty militias, pass the PIL and the inability or unwillingness to prosecute opposition 
crimes, has entrenched the dichotomous narrative which justifies the prosecution and political 
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elimination of figures associated with the Gaddafi regime. In northern Uganda, the creation of the ICD 
was negotiated by the LRA and GoU delegations at Juba. But as it was set up, the Division will only 
prosecute LRA commanders (i.e. Kwoyelo) – and only those who are of no political use to the GoU 
(i.e. not Achellam). As such, it has acted to further entrench rather than transcend the dominant 
narrative of the war in northern Uganda which sees the LRA as the root of all violence and as 
ultimately responsible for the war and its excesses. Any accountability for Government or military 
perpetrators will be achieved through other means – if at all. 
 In Chapter 3, it was suggested that one possibility for states emerging from war was to ignore 
the question of the ICC altogether. This was certainly not the case in either Libya or northern Uganda. 
Both post-conflict Libya and Uganda have engaged directly with the Court. In northern Uganda, the 
ICC's intervention galvanized a number of justice-related processes (Nouwen 2013, 234). This was 
most evident in the creation of an ICD, established to prosecute international crimes domestically in 
Uganda rather than in The Hague. In Libya, legal representatives of the state have now worked for over 
three years on admissibility challenges at the ICC. This is strong evidence that post-conflict states in 
which the ICC has intervened will engage with the Court and that they feel some degree of pressure to 
achieve justice domestically – and to have their efforts endorsed by the ICC itself. There are, of course, 
limits to how positive a development this is. Again, in northern Uganda, the ICD has only affirmed the 
asymmetrical narrative of the war while a fair trial for either Saif or Senussi in Libya appears to be a 
distant prospect.  
 One over-arching question should be asked of post-conflict justice mechanisms: do they act to 
further the dominant conflict narrative or are they contributions to the transformation of relationships 
between former belligerents? There is an ongoing danger, as both the Libya and northern Uganda cases 
demonstrate, that approaches to post-conflict accountability entrench rather than alleviate asymmetrical 
conflict narratives therefore feeding rather than dispelling the seeds of conflict.  
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IV. Conclusion: The ICC, Peace, Conflict and Justice 
There is unlikely to ever be a consensus regarding the effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict 
processes. The “peace versus justice” debate is a – if not the – dominant framework within which the 
appropriateness of ICC interventions is contested. While there is a desire amongst many to move 
beyond the “peace versus justice” debate, doing so may be impossible. As debates over a possible ICC 
investigation in Syria (see, e.g., Cronin-Furman 2014; Vinjamuri 2014) suggest, potential interventions 
by the ICC into an ongoing and active conflict will be debated using the language of the “peace versus 
justice” debate. But while debating whether ICC interventions are 'good' or 'bad' for peace is a 
permanent feature of international relations, the arguments within the peace-justice debate need not 
remain stagnant. Fortunately, as the field of international criminal justice matures, the arguments within 
the peace-justice debate have become increasingly refined and nuanced. Still, more nuance and in-
depth knowledge of the ICC's effects is needed, particularly in regards to case studies of specific ICC 
interventions which could feed empirical findings back to analytical models.   
 This thesis has sought to achieve three things: create an analytical framework based on insights 
from conflict resolution and negotiation theory which could be used as a novel tool to study and assess 
the effects of the ICC on peace, justice and conflict processes; provide new insights and an original 
account of the empirical effects of the Court's interventions in northern Uganda and Libya; and analyze 
why the ICC has the effects it does on peace processes by examining the Court's decision-making and 
selectivity. The ultimate success of this thesis will be if the analytical framework that was presented as 
the basis of how to study the ICC is developed, adapted and refined in response to new developments 
in Libya and northern Uganda as well as other relevant contexts. How does the framework apply to the 
ICC intervention in Kenya, where the OTP opened an investigation using propio motu powers and 
targeted both sides responsible for the 2007/08 post-election violence? How does it apply to the non-
case of Syria where there is no consensus conflict narrative regarding responsibility for the conflict and 
atrocities and therefore no 'good' side to legitimate or 'evil' side to castigate?  
 The ICC is now a permanent actor in the realm conflict resolution. The ICC will continue to 
intervene in, and have effects on, ongoing conflicts. But greater clarity is needed on what those effects 
are and whether they are helpful to peace or not. This thesis has demonstrated that interventions by the 
Court have a diversity of effects which may be both a help and hindrance to peace processes. This 
makes continued and in-depth empirical research into specific cases all the more important. Using this 
thesis' analytical framework as a 'roadmap' to conduct empirical research into these cases – as well as 
cases which may be more similar to Libya and northern Uganda (such as Darfur and the DRC) – has 
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the potential to enrich our understanding of the ICC's interventions and non-interventions and, perhaps, 
move beyond the dichotomous framing of ICC interventions where the Court must either be a help or 
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